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Abstract 
This research is a study of power in contemporary American society which 
calls into question the assumptions of openness and permeability so 
cherished by the pluralists. Within a power framework, we explore the 
functional realities of government that i l luminate why some powerful 
interests manage to prevail with some consistency, while the broad public is 
assigned to a lesser task. The context for the study is the U. S .  Army's $ 1 1  
billion dollar Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP) . The Army's 
decision to use on-site incineration for the destruction of the stockpile ignited 
a social movement in opposition. Employing participant observation and in­
depth interviews, we analyze the citizen-led opposition movement that 
began at the Lexingtron-Bluegrass Army Depot (LBAD) in Kentucky, and the 
ambiguous role of the NEPA (National Environmental Policy Act ) regulatory 
process. Using the 'three dimensions of power' framework formulated by 
Steven Lukes ( 1974) and extended by Gaventa (1980), and Bachrach and Baratz 
( 1974), we uncovered patterns of power (i .e., "hidden faces of power") that 
a llowed the Army to exploit some issues and suppress others while all the 
time urging that citizens abide by " the process." This was accomplished 
chiefly through the 'mobilization of bias ' ,  and propped up by a heavily­
financed public relations campaign which emanates from the Pentagon. We 
conclude with some recommendations for what can be done to revitalize our 
moribund democracy. 
Vl 
Preface 
In the 'SO's, Dwight Eisenhower warned us of the growing power of the 
military-industrial complex. His words are now almost a cliche. However, 
never has it been more imperative that we understand the degree to which 
the military in conjunction with industry and governmental agencies, have 
taken control over the realm of what used to be public discourse. In seeking 
to clarify the nature of the military-industrial complex, Pilisuk and Hayden 
( 1965) extend the concept. They state that the United States does not contain a 
military industrial complex, but instead argue that  the United States "is a 
military industrial complex" {p. 68) . They write, "We are d escribing the 
current system as one of overall  'minimal accountability' and 'minimal 
consent' .  We mean that the role of democratic review, based on popular 
consent, is made marginal and reactive. Eli te groups a re minimal ly 
accountable to publics  and have a substantial, though my no mea ns, 
maximum, freedom to shape popular attitudes" {Pilisuk and Hayden 1 965, p. 
68). It  is important to emphasize at the outset that the furor surrounding the 
Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program is not a technical controversy, nor is it 
just another local "siting problem," but a profoundly disturbing illustration of 
deep-seated structural change, a move away from 'government by the 
people.' 
The story that fol lows is  several things: (1) I t  i s  a story of 
empowerment, of citizens' attempts to take control of decisions that affect 
their l ives and that of their children; {2) it is the story of power holders and 
their attempts to thwart citizens' efforts; and {3) it is, in the final analysis, a 
Vll 
demonstration of a profoundly disturbing trend in the United States, away 
from classical notions of 'democracy' toward a form hollowed out of any real 
meaning involving "government of the people, by the people, and for the 
people," to a democracy that is just a shell for the operation of unbridled state 
power aided by the very laws that were designed to protect both the citizens 
and the environment. This then, is a study of power, the power of the 
modern state to insure its prerogatives through organized institutional 
arrangements and propaganda. 
My viewpoint, in telling the story of the Chemical Stockpile Disposal 
Program is different from the account as told by the Army in which the 
destruction of the stockpile is presented as an issue of "national interest" in 
terms of our treaty obligations and the Congressional mandate. Howard 
Zinn (1980) reminds us that "nations are not communities and never have 
been." He writes, "The history of any country, presented as the history of a 
family, conceals fierce conflicts of interest (sometimes exploding, most often 
repressed) between conquerors and conquered, masters and s laves, capitalists 
and workers, dominators and dominated in race and sex" (Zinn 1980, p. 9). 
Therefore, I prefer to tell the story of the Chemical Stockp ile Disposal 
Program (CSDP) from the point of view of the citizens who are being asked to 
shoulder the consequences of the current destruction plan or, as Parent (1970) 
has suggested, "from the bottom up." 
Finally, this is a story about dissent and the context for d issent in 
contemporary American society. There are some who argue that dissent is no 
longer necessary or "proper" given the plethora of avenues open to citizens 
for redress of their grievances. They will find this case study most disquieting. 
Vlll 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
"We submit to the peaceful production of the means of destruction, to the 
perfection of waste, to being educated for a defense which deforms the 
defenders and that which they defend." 
Herbert Marcuse 1968, One Dimensional Man : Studies in the 
Ideology of Advanced Capitalist Society 
1 . 1  The Problem: Are We a Hobbesian or a Lockean Society? 
This research examines the issues of p olitics and p ower i n  
contemporary American society. It contributes to our understanding of how 
state policy-makers, private p lanners and the military use public institutions 
and environmental l aws to serve their own special interests. To explore 
these issues, the study focuses on the controversy surrounding the 
destruction of the United States' arsenal of lethal unitary 1 chemical weapons 
(CW) by high-temperature incineration. 
The Army's  decision to build eight nerve-gas incinerators to carry out 
the destruction of the weapons "on site" will be examined as well as the 
regulatory climate and the citizen opposition that has arisen in response. We 
can see in the unfolding of the drama to be presented here, not just another 
"siting" controversy, or " locational conflict," but a political and social 
conundrum that challenges our fundamental assumptions about the way our 
democracy functions. Although policy issues will be discussed, the central 
interest is not an analysis of U.S.  chemical weapons (CW) policy per se. 
1 Unitary weapons are those in which a live agent is loaded into the weapon at 
the time of manufacture. 
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Rather, the focal point is the political climate surrounding the plan to destroy 
the weapons known as the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP). 
The following are an example of some of the fundamental research 
questions that have guided this research: (1) What is the nature of power in 
the modern state as seen through the lens of the Chemical Stockpile Disposal 
Program? (2) How does the state maintain its prerogatives in the face of 
organized opposition? (3) What legitimations are used to support the status 
quo and in what manner are they promultaged? (4) What part does the 
regulatory process play in defining the paramaters for citizen input? (5) What 
factors gave rise to the early emergence of organized opposition at the 
Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot (LBAD) in Kentucky (with only 1% of the 
stockpile) as opposed to the seven other sites with appreciably more lethal 
chemical weapons stored? 
This work challenges a general assumption held by many political 
scientists, i.e., that siting controversies are debates about competing interests 
with equal power in a relatively open system (Corry 1979). We maintain that, 
although conflicts over siting are involved, this is not just another "siting" 
controversy. Nor is it a purely technical controversy, notwithstanding the 
debates about incineration. What it is a story about power and about the 
distribution and operation of power in what is believed to be the exemplar of 
Western democracies, the United States. What Michael Crenson (1971) said 
in The Unpolitics of Air Pollution, is also true of this research: "What is at 
stake in this investigation is the allegation of openness of the American 
political system" (Crenson 1971, p.  5). In addition, there is the further 
question of whether we have a democracy at all, or whether we have evolved 
some hybrid that only looks like democracy. 
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Parenti ( 1980) suggests that one might better think of ours as a dual 
( italics mine) political system: a symbolic system centered around electoral 
politics and voting behavior, etc, and a substan t ive (italics m ine) system 
involving multibillion dollar contracts, tax write-offs, give aways and serving 
major producer interests. "The symbolic system," he argues, "is highly 
visible, taught in the schools, dissected by academicians, gossiped about by 
newsmen. The substantive system is seldom heard of or accounted for" 
(Parenti 1980, p. 304). We are concerned here with the substan tive system: 
the world of a nonymous Pentagon p lanners, hi gh-tech multinational  
corporations, secret negotiations, and a ponderous and bureaucratic 
regulatory system which all but insures the fact that the status quo will be 
maintai ned against the incursion of outside claims, in this case, that is 
citizens' demands for change. In short, we are concerned with analyzing 
exactly how the state maintains the status quo and yet gives the appearance of 
openness so touted in Army news briefs about the Chemical  Stockpile 
Disposal Program (CSDP). Nevertheless, despite the fact that we mention 
"secret negotiations" (and indeed there were such), we are not championing a 
"conspiracy" theory involving evil  individuals consciously conspiring to 
elude the laws and cause d amage to the environment and the general 
population. In fact, there are many decent, well-intentioned people involved 
in this project, that really believe in what they are doing (however, this does 
not render them harmless) . The focus of our argument is rather on the 
structural aspects of the operation of power. As Michael Albert ( 1992) wrote, 
"What we have to understand is the script behind the actors, and that script 
flows from the interstices of institutiona l  power, not from the will of some 
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malevolent conspirators operating outside the bounds of the system or even 
against it" (Albert 1992) . .  
Finally, w e  will present here, what Parenti (1970) referred to a s  "a view 
from the bottom." This is a view of power as seen from below, from the 
position of those involved in the struggle for inclusion and empowerment. 
We are looking at the emergence of rebellion as a way to analyze the way in 
which power relationships are altered to meet the challengers. In doing so, 
we hope to reveal the underlying structures of power that remain hidden 
from view. 
I shall suggest that to understand the state's use of power in the context 
of the present study, it is necessary to present a dialectical analysis. The 
exercise of power is dialectical in the sense that the relationship between the 
Army and the citizen activists is always changing, evolving, never static; it is 
dialectical in the sense that the maintenance of the status quo depends to a 
large extent on the dynamic interaction between what the state proposes and 
how the challengers respond . Indeed, power holders must always be alert to 
innovations on the part of challengers that call for novel responses and the 
erection of either new barriers or the reinforcement of old ones. 
In positing a d ialectical relationship, we intend it in the sense described 
by Cardechi (1987) who wrote, "A dialectical relation is not a relation between 
dependent and independent variables: all variables are dependent upon each 
other . . .  Mechanical causation is alien to dialectical causation {determination)" 
(Cardechi 1987, p. 100). Additionally, a dialectical analysis involves attention 
to the Marxian distinction between 'appearance' and 'essence'. For Marx, the 
distinction between the two in no sense implies that appearance is any less 
"real" than essence. The distinction between appearance and essence refers to 
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different levels of determination rather than different levels of reality. And 
finally, as Mandel (1977) cautioned, "The main danger for any scientist 
involved in the study of social phenomena is that of taking anything for 
granted, of 'problem blindness'. The distinction between appearance and 
essence, which Marx inherited from Hegel and which is part and parcel of the 
dialectical method of investigation, is nothing but a constant attempt to pierce 
farther and farther through successive layers of phenomenon ... " (Mandel 
1977, p. 19). We will return again to this central theme in the course of this 
analysis. 
The English philosopher, John Locke (1689) argued in his Second 
Treatise of Civil Government that the state should rest upon consent, and 
that the governing authorities should never have absolute or monistic power 
(Locke 1689). Tyranny was understood as arbitrary interference by 
government with individuals' natural rights (their person and property) 
without the backing of law made by representatives. Locke's main target in 
the Treatise was John Hobbes for whom the subject of state power was 
pivotaL According to Hobbes, "the Sovereign { i.e., the State} is Judge of what 
is necessary for the Peace and Defense of his subjects, and Judge of what 
doctrines are fit to be taught them" (Dolan, 1991, p. 6). Hobbes' argument is 
taken up in contemporary society by those who champion the idea that 
complex technical questions are best handled by "experts." This position is 
articulated by Allen Mazur (1981) in The Dynamics of Technical Controversy. 
Mazur observes that "We never make a point of bringing housewives and 
blue collar laborers into formal decisions about the prime interest rate or 
whether or not to attack Iran, so why do it when evaluating nuclear power 
plants and recombinant DNA laboratories?" (Mazur, 1981, p. 125-126). With 
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respect to the Chemical Weapons Destruction Program, the Army unilaterally 
, i .e . ,  without consulting citizens in the p otentially-affected comunities, 
decided to use incineration as the baseline technology. This falls directly in 
line with the Hobbesian argument that the State has the right to decide what 
is best for its citizens. 
The Army's rhetoric of inclusion, by which they c laimed to have 
incorporated all relevant citizen concerns into their decis ion-making matrix, 
belies the fact that many of the important decisions relating to the disposal of 
the weapons were made behind c losed d oors in the board rooms o f  
multinational corporations and b y  high-ranking mil itary and  civilian 
officials at the Pentagon. In fact Dolan (1991) argues that many people view 
the post-modern political condition as demanding private Hobbesian action 
coupled with public Lockean rhetoric (Dolan 1991) . It seems that whatever 
value we place on democracy as an abstract political philosophy, it has no 
p lace in the world of 'rea lpol itik' where power holders can, through the 
operation of the system itself, subvert the real meaning of the concept. I shall 
a rgue that a lthough we are said to be a Lockean society devoted to 
maximizing individual freedom, we are, in fact, as Dolan (1991) suggests, a 
Hobbesian society couched in Lockean rhetoric. 
In a democracy, control is intended to be exercised by the people and 
their elected representatives. As Lukes ( 1 974, p. 29) reminds us, "Under 
conditions of representative government the people are supposed to rule 
those who govern them." We argue that to a very considerable degree, the 
American people are not now exercising effective control over the Armed 
Forces; nor indeed is the Congress, despite its primary constitutional 
responsibility in this field and despite its requirement for annual progress 
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reports from the Army. As a prominent lawyer from a well-respected 
Lexington, KY. law firm quipped, "Separation of powers is bogus. The Army 
is an extension of Congress. It is in Congress's own interest {to support the 
Army} ."  So we are left with a problem. How can one argue that democratic 
principles are being violated when power holders are able to control 
outcomes to their advantage by working through the system and not having 
to revert to "extra-legal" measures? The answer is to shift the study away 
from a focus on "process" as an end in itself  and toward some empirical 
consideration of substantial effects, e. g., who gets what. (Parenti, 1980). 
1 .2 Description: Background of the Problem 
Aldous Huxley once observed that, "Technological progress has merely 
provided us with more efficient means for going backwards "  (Larson and 
Cyrus-Michells 1987) . His words may be applied to the Army's p lan to destroy 
the United States' stockpi le of lethal unitary chemical weapons (CW), also 
known as the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP). For we have not 
only created weapons whose potential devastation is wholly unimaginable, 
we have been stockpiling them for decades. The ultimate irony is that we 
have built weapons that are actually easier to build than to destroy. In fact, a 
wel l known scientist involved with the creation of the U.S.  chemical 
weapons program, admitted that very little thought was given to disposing of 
the weapons when they were first created, as it was assumed they would be 
used (CBS, "60 Minutes ," January 5, 1992) .  
Between 1 943 and 1969, when the United States declared an 18 year 
moratorium on unitary weapons production, the U.S. military had amassed 
an arsenal of chemical weapons that is estimated to be in the range of 27, 000 
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tons. (Rogers, et al. 1990) .  (The exact amount of the stockpile is classified for 
"national security" reasons). The "retaliatory stockpile," as it is referred to by 
the Army, includes both nerve agents and "vesicant" (i .e, b lister agents), 
commonly known as mustard gas. The explosively-configured agents and 
munitions are stored in earth-bermed bunkers termed "igloos." The only 
munitions stored in the open are ton containers of mustard agent . The 
weapons are maintained at Army depots around the country and on Johnston 
Atol l, a small island in the South Pacific 800 miles southwest of Hawaii. The 
Tooele Army Depot (Tooele, Utah) alone, with 42% of the stockp ile, has 
enough nerve agent to kill every creature on earth many times over. The 
weapons are stored in a variety of configurations such as rockets, spray tanks, 
projectiles, and bulk containers. Each has been especially formulated to cause 
major injury or death to enemy forces in time of war (Department of the 
Army, U.S. FPEIS 1988). 
The Army offers several arguments for the need to destroy the 
weapons. They argue, for example, that : (1) the weapons are deteriorating 
posing dangers from leaking or explosion; (2) international treaty obligations 
require that both the U.S. and the former Soviet Union destroy their 
respective arsenals of chemical weapons (CW) within ten years, or by the year 
2004; (3) Congress has mandated the destruction of the weapons. Each of 
these assertions will be examined in detail later in the analysis. However, 
making chemical weapons has proven to be a lot easier than "unmaking" 
them. In fact, the proposed plan to build eight specially-designed high­
temperature incinerators at Army depots around the country has proven to 
be a boondoggle for the Army. It faces escalating costs --- the current life-cycle 
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cost is approaching $9 billion dollars --- and a militant citizen opposition 
movement gaining momentum daily. 
No one disputes the fact that the world would be better without these 
weapons of mass destruction, however, there is tremendous controversy over 
(1) how to destroy the weapons safe ly; (2) where to destroy them (either on­
site or transported to a regional or national site };  (3) whether continued 
storage is still a viab le option---and for how long; and (4) whether some 
alternative technology other than incineration should be tried .  However, 
the "technical" questions pale before the social, economic and political  
considerations. No federal program in recent history has involved so vast an 
array of federa l, state and local governments and involved compliance with 
so many federal laws, i .e . ,  the National Environmental Protection Act of 1969 
(NEPA), the Recourse Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 ( RCRA), the 
Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 (TSCA), and the Clean Air Act of 1970 (as 
amended) .  Added to this are the many federal agencies involved in the 
project, e.g,  the Environmental Protection Agency ( EPA), the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Department of Health and 
Human Services (DH HS), the Department of Defense (DOD), and, of course 
the Department of the Army (DA). Additional players are the Pentagon, 
Congress and several national laboratories. 
1 .3 Gas and Fire: Chemical Weapons in Historical Context 
The idea of chemical weapons is not new. There is evidence that some 
form of chemical weapons were used in wars dating as far back as four or 
even five hundred years before the birth of Christ. Thuckydides reports that 
the Spartans, in the battles of Plataeae and Belium, during the Peloponesian 
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War, 431-404 B.C., used smoke containing arsenic for attack. Plutarch reports 
in the vita of Quintus Sertorius that he used an ash-like sand in the war 
against the Charakitanes in Spain, which was driven by the wind, thus 
causing coughing and blindness. In 187 B.C. according to Polybius, 22nd Book, 
1 1 th Chapter, the people of Ambrajia, besieged by the Romans, produced 
smoke from a barrel, filled with fine feathers and glowing coals to drive out 
the Romans from the mines (Wachtel 1941 ). 
Fire has always been one of the main weapons m war throughout 
history. The effects of fire and smoke were frequently combined in old-time 
weapons ( Wachtel 1941) .  Such was the case with the famous Greek fire. 
"When Acron was besieged in 1289, three hundred catapults threw Greek fire 
into the town, until it  was entirely burned down. Many inhabitants were 
asphyxiated by the smoke formed" (Lewin, 1920, p .678). Other variations of a 
more modern character were made by Leonardo da Vinci, Leibnitz and 
Johann Rudolf Glauber ( 1604-1668) .  According to reports, Glauber used a 
preparation made from turpentine and nitric acid to make incendiary bombs 
and smoke shells (Wachtel 1941) .  
Modern chemical warfare began with the German gas attack against the 
French at Ypres on April 22nd, 1915, when 5,700 cylinders, filled with chlorine 
gas were used. With this attack, the Germans achieved complete strategic and 
tactical surprise. The Allied troops were wholly unprepared. The enemy had 
developed a weapon for which there seemed to be no defense. This segment 
from Major. S.J .M. Auld's  diary describes the horrors of that day: 
Ypres, April 22, 1915 :  Try to imagine the feelings 
and the condition of the {French} colonial troops as 
they saw the vast cloud of greenish-yellow gas 
spring out of the ground and slowly move down 
wind toward them, the vapour clinging to the 
1 0 
earth, seeking out every hole and hollow and 
fil ling the trenches and shell holes as it came. First 
wonder, then fear; then as the first fringes of the 
cloud enveloped them and left them choking and 
agonized in the fight for breath---panic. Those who 
could move broke and ran, trying, generally in 
vain, to outstrip the cloud which followed 
inexorably after them (Auld, 1918, pp. 11-12). 
Auld ( 1918) reports that the casualties of this attack were the first of 
approximately one million gas casualties of World War L 
According to Brown ( 1968), the German decision to initiate gas warfare 
enabled Germany to make maximum use of one of her most significant 
advantages over the Allied powers---a highly developed chemical industry. 
(The chlorine gas used at Ypres was the product of a civilian laboratory.) As a 
result of the attack at Ypres, the Allies began issuing gas masks to all troops, 
believing, of course, that if the troops were masked, they were protected.  
"Crude gauze bandages were immediately dispatched to the front and a crash 
program was instituted to develop a protective mask" ( Brown 1968, p. 11) . 
However, on July 12, 1917, the Germans achieved their second major 
technological breakthrough with the discovery of mustard gas---a persistent 
agent that could disable by coming in contact with the skin. Under favorable 
conditions, mustard can retain its disabling properties for weeks. The 
discovery of mustard introduced yet another dimension to the waging of 
chemical war. Now, masks were not enough to protect troops since mustard 
could inflict its damage by coming in contact with skin. Brown (1968) reports 
that "by mid-1918, gas was competing with air power and the tank as the most 
rapidly-expanding weapon of land warfare." "All belligerents," he observes, 
"were employing chemical agents to the limit of their production capability" 
(Brown 1968, p. 12). 
1 1 
After WWI, the Germans were bound by the Treaty of Versailles which 
all but brought chemical weapons research to a halt in Germany. Funding 
dried up and research had to be done in strictest secrecy. When research 
resumed, Hitler feared that they were twenty years behind the A llies in 
developing offensive chemical weapons. But despite the restricted research 
program, the Germans made the only significant toxic agent breakthrough of 
the war when they d iscovered nerve gas. Brown ( 1968) writes that 
" fortuna tely for the Allies, the Germans assumed that  a comparable 
development had been made elsewhere" (Brown, 1968 , p. 234).  In  addition 
to fearing massive retaliation from the Allies, the Germans also feared the 
Russians who were presumed to possess a very formidable a rsenal of 
chemical weapons. Brown ( 1968) observes that "Hitler feared poison gas for 
the same reason that he feared the employment of strategic air power. Each 
was a weapon that could exploit Germany's vulnerab ility as an interior 
continental power" (Brown, 1968, p. 236) .  Hitler also had a personal aversion 
to chemical warfare, stemming, no doubt, from his own experience of being 
temporarily b linded in a British gas attack near Ypres in 19 18. But as  the 
nature of the war became increasingly bitter, Hitler's former aversion was 
turned completely around and in 1942, he authorized unrestricted terror 
attacks against England (Shiver 1960); however Brown (1968, p. 237) reports 
that "saner minds prevented implementation of Hitler's intent." 
In reality, a l l  the major powers had serious problems with the 
"delivery" of chemical agents; and this, coupled with public aversion to the 
use of chemical weapons which was shared in large part by both political and 
military leaders, leads us to speculate whether restraint was due less to fear of 
retaliation than to lack of readiness to initiate (Brown 1 968) .  Nevertheless, it 
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is ironic that toxic agents, considered sufficiently humane to be used in the 
execution of convicted prisoners, were not employed in a war which saw the 
extensive use of another weapon with enormous destructive power---the 
atomic bomb. 
1.4 U.S. Chemical Warfare Policy 
The fundamental tenet of U.S. chemical weapons policy has long been 
one of "no first use." In 1943, President Roosevelt stated categorical ly that 
"we shall under no circumstances resort to use of such weapons unless they 
are first used by our enemies" (Brown 1968, p. 264). Brown (1968) argues that 
the primary sources of this policy were external to the United States. He 
writes, " the pattern of abstention had been formed by al lied and enemy 
powers alike, and the United States had neither the military capability nor the 
will to contest this decision until late in the war" (p. 263). 
This "no first use" policy was later reaffirmed by Eisenhower in 1960 
and again in November 1969 (Stringer 1986) .  Brown (1968) forcefully argues 
that United States policy during the Vietnam War calls into question the U.S. 
resolve not to use chemical weapons as a first strike weapon. During the war, 
U.S. troops in Vietnam used tear gas to separate Viet Cong from civilians and 
sprayed thousands of acres of forest and cropland with an herbicidal defoliant 
("Agent Orange") to deny food and cover to communist forces. De facto U.S. 
policy was seen by some to have become transformed gradually from no-first­
use to "deterrence by offensive capacity" (McCarthy 1969) . 
Official American chemical warfare policy has traditionally centered on 
two concepts: disarmament and deterrence. According to the U. S. Arms 
Control Agency' s  Public Relations Office, the United States has sought to 
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l imit the p rol i feration of chemical weapons through international 
negotiations and agreements. Of particular concern has been limiting the 
spread of chemical weapons to the Third World .  United States efforts toward 
chemical disarmament include the 1984 submittal, at the Geneva Conference 
on Disarmament, of a draft chemical weapons convention, which would 
have imposed a global ban on the use, possession and development of 
chemical weapons (Apt 1988) . More recently, a multi lateral treaty, the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), was concluded on September 3, 1992, 
and signed by more than 100 signatories. 
While disarmament is one tenet of U.S. policy on chemical warfare, 
de t erre n c e  represents the other. In fact, deterrence through threat of 
retaliation has been one of the p illars of U.S. chemical warfare policy (Apt 
1988). Historically, the doctrine of deterrence can be traced as far back as the 
Roman Empire . Gibbon writes, "The terror of the Roman arms added weight 
and dignity to the moderation of the emperors. They preserved peace by a 
constant preparation for war. . .  " (1963 {1788}, p.33). However, the doctrine of 
deterrence as practiced in the context of contemporary society has very 
different consequences than "deterrence" as  practiced by the Romans 
preoccupied with keeping the warring barbarians at bay, for they were not 
stockpiling weapons of mass destruction. And, for all the reputed might and 
power of the Praetorian Guards, and the rapaciousness and rapine of many of 
her emperors, the weapons arsenals of the Romans did not possess the 
demonic killing power of modern-day weapons systems. Technology and the 
structure of the economy have changed the game dramatically, calling into 
question the wisdom of trying to keep one step ahead of some imagined 
enemy by building bigger and more deadly arsenals that are stored in our own 
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backyards. As Walt Kelly's "Pogo" once put it, "We has met the enemy; and 
it is us." 
The argument for deterrence was bolstered by the belief that the Soviet 
Union possessed a greater arsenal of chemical weapons than did NATO (Apt 
1988) .  Reports of Soviet chemica l /biologica l weapons (CBW) were 
exa ggerated, and the dangers to American populations w ere made 
frighteningly clear. Some even estimated the Soviet CBW capability to be ten 
times greater than the U.S. stockpile (Lewis 1989) . Estimates vary, but most 
sources believe the former Soviet Union has about 50,000 tons of (CW) as 
opposed to the U.S. 27,000 tons. 
The policy of deterrence maintains that a strong chemical weapons 
(CW) capability is essential to deter possible use by an aggressor. A necessary 
adjunct to this stated policy is the maintenance of a credible retaliatory 
capability. Military strategists argued that the United States must have the 
ability to respond i n  k ind  to a chemical  weapons attack, otherwise an 
aggressor would possess a tactical advantage (Apt 1988). They further argued 
that our arsenal must contain not only defensive, but an offensive weapons 
capability as well; hence, the stockpiling of many different types of agents in 
varying weapons configurations. The U.S. Army's breezy acceptance of this 
policy was summed up very succinctly by an "Information Officer" at the 
Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot (LBAD) a few years ago. In response to 
questions posed by newsmen who had been invited to tour the depot's 
stockpile of munitions, containing agent GB, which were scheduled for 
disposal, Col. Mellon, said, "We'd be living in a cocoon if we thought that 
other nations didn't have the same thing", and later, he explained, "It's like 
the big bully on the block. If he carries a big stick, you'd  better carry one too. 
1 5 
You may never use it---and you hope you don't  have to---but you carry it just 
the same" (Lexington Herald Leader, August 5, 1970) .  
More recently, U.S .  policymakers have shifted their attention away 
from deterrence and instead, are looking for ways to implement the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC) concluded in Geneva in September 3, 1 992 and 
signed in Paris on January 1 3, 1 993. Representatives from more than 1 30 
countries (including the United States and Russia) were present for the 
signing (U.S .  Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1 993) .  Unlike the 
Geneva Protocol of 1 925 (not ratified by the United States until 1 975), which 
called for a ban only on the use  of chemical weapons (CW), the CWC 
p rohib its the use,  p rod uct ion, and stockpi l ing  ( re tention)  o f  
chemical/biological weapons, calls for a timetable for destruction o f  existing 
stockpiles, and bans the sale of precursor chemicals. The treaty also provides 
for challenge inspections. Signatories of the treaty are now preoccupied about 
possible use of chemical weapons by Third World countries . Chemical 
weapons are often referred to as "the poor man's atomic bomb," because of 
how cheaply and easily a chemical weapons arsenal can be acquired. One 
need only recall the recent incident in Tokyo in which twelve people were 
killed and 5,500 others sickened by the nerve gas sarin on March 20, 1 995 
(Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, May 6, 1 995, p .  A-4) .  
1 .5 International Chemical Weapons (CW) Treaties 
Scott ( 19 1 5) reports that efforts to outlaw or control the use or 
possession of chemical weapons have gone on in one form or another since 
the Hague Peace Conference of 1 899 in which the signatories agreed "to 
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abstain from the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of 
asphyxiating or deleterious gases" (Scott 1915, pp.225-226). 
In 1925, of course, carne The Geneva Protocol, the first agreement to 
include specific mention of bacteriological as well as chemical weapons. At 
the time, 29 nations signed the treaty. Although the United States did not 
ratify the treaty until 1975 it did adhere to its terms---at least for lethal 
chemical weapons (Seigel, Draft 1990). The Geneva Protocol of 1925 was 
brought up for consideration at a General Assembly of the United Nations 
held in December 1966. But it had its limitations. While prohibiting the 
"use" of chemical weapons, it did not specifically forbid their production, 
distribution or stockpiling. In June 1990, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. signed a 
bilateral agreement to destroy chemical stockpiles . This Bilateral Accord 
required the U.S. and Russia to destroy their existing stocks of chemical 
weapons and to cooperate on destruction technology. A major issue that had 
to be resolved prior to the final signing of the treaty had to do with the Bush 
Administration's wish to retain 2% of the stockpile as security. In May, 1992, 
however, the administration relented and the U . S. abandoned this 
requirement. 
Finally, on January 13, 1993, the first comprehensive ban of chemical 
weapons was signed in Paris. Representatives from more than 130 countries 
attended the ceremonies . The Multilateral Chemical Weapons Convention 
(CWC) is historic in the scope of its provisions. The CWC p rohibits the 
development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention and transfer of 
CW; the use of CW against anyone, State Party or not {A State Party is a 
country which has signed and ratified the Convention); and the encouraging, 
assisting or inducing anyone to en gage in activities involving chemical  
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weapons. In addition, the Convention requires all CW and CW p roduction 
facilities to be declared, declarations to be checked, and al l  CW to be 
eliminated within 10  years, with storage and destruction monitored through 
on-site challenge inspections. (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
1993). Despite all the good intentions of previous treaties, none contained the 
rigorous verification regimes incorporated in the ewe and therefore, 
enforcement a lways remained p roblematic. The CWC contains two 
verification regimes to enhance security of State Parties to the Convention 
and preclude the possibility of clandestine CW production, storage and use. 
The first includes a routine monitoring regime; the second regime, challenge 
inspections, allows State Parties to the treaty to request and have conducted 
an international inspection of any facility or location in another State Party in 
order to clarify and resolve questions of possible noncompliance. Despite its 
requirement to destroy existing stocks within ten years, the treaty does not 
contain any provisions concerning destruction technology. However, because 
every Party (nation) to the treaty must destroy their existing stocks, eyes will 
inevitably turn to the United States in terms of technology transfer. Profits 
are likely to be great to nations /corporations who get their foot in the door 
first. 
1 .6 History of Chemical Weapons Production 
Poison gas research in the United States began during World War I. 
The term "poison gas" refers only to vesicant (i .e . ,  blister) agents, such as 
mustard gas and phosgene---the nerve agents were developed later. In fact, 
there is no mention of nerve agents at al l  in a book called, The War Gases 
(Sartori 1 939) written in 1 939. However, the term "chemical weapons" 
I 8 
generally refers to the entire array of lethal weapons, both vesicants and 
nerve agents. 
The conventional wisdom holds that gas research was begun during 
the patriotic fervor of WWI and then abandoned soon after the Armistice. 
This view has been challenged in a paper written by Whittmore ( 1975) in 
which he contends that while many Americans rejected the legitimacy of 
poison gas, American chemists themselves embarked on a campaign to 
preserve poison gas research, pressuring Congress to preserve the Chemical 
Warfare Society. Whittmore argues that the 'research' ethic took on a new 
and emboldened meaning in academia and there soon developed a research 
ethic that embodied both a "pure" and an "applied" component. In addition 
to this, a public service ideal was also incubating which was to further 
influence the growth of gas research in the U .S. Whittmore ( 1975) contends 
that, "The combination of a research ethic and a concern for a major social 
role, perhaps even a sense of mission, led American scientists into the war 
eager to fulfill long-standing expectations" (Whitmore 1975, p. 147) . 
Although some American chemists were sent to Europe, the bulk of  
America ' s  poison gas research was done at home. Ironically, these efforts 
began in a civilian agency, The Bureau of Mines. Brophy and Fisher (1959) 
report that a national laboratory for " investigation of problems connected 
with the use of noxious gases in warfare" was authorized under the direction 
of the Bureau of Mines on June 8, 1917  (Brophy and Fisher, 1959, p. 5). This 
authorization was the result of the Army's attempt to acquire gas masks to 
protect the troops in Europe. Because of its previous work on mine gases, the 
Bureau of Mines was thought to be best qualified for such a task. At first, 
university chemists were called upon to assist in branch laboratories at their 
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universities. A liaison committee of eminent chemists was created to shuttle 
non-classified p roblems to students in university laboratories (Whittmore 
1975).  Harvard had such a laboratory working by September 191 7 (Jones 
1969) .  However, a larger and more efficient operation was required. Large­
scale production of mustard gas was undertaken at Edgewood, Maryland at 
what is now the Aberdeen Proving Ground. Whittmore ( 1975)  reports that 
"by the time of the Armistice the Edgewood Plant was producing thirty tons 
of mustard gas a day" (Whittmore 1 975, p. 151 ). 
After the war the, Chemical Warfare Service was reorganized under 
the Army Corps of Engineers, and later the Army Chemical Corps, greatly 
diminishing its importance and activities. American chemists fought back 
with robust lobbying activities directed at Congressional attempts to place a 
moratorium on further gas research. The importance of research for national 
security was heavily emphasized. It was at this time that the argument for a 
retaliatory stockpile as a deterren t first took shape. Whittmore ( 1975) also 
indicates that chemists defended the humanity of gas warfare citing battlefield 
casualty statistics which indicated that the survival rate of soldiers suffering 
gas wounds was twelve times that of those suffering from conventional  
weapons (Gilchrist 1928). In the ultimate defense of chemical weapons, Lewis 
( 1922) argued that, "It is the most efficient, most economical, and most 
humane, single weapon known to military science" (Lewis 1 922, p.  840). 
Additionally, the strategic value of poison gas was emphasized . As one high­
ranking military officer put it, "The wound-producing weapon has a greater 
strategic value than the one which kills outright" (Gilchrist 1928, p. 149). The 
argument given is that a dead soldier could be left, while a wounded solder 
absorbed extensive resources . Arguments such as  these were obviously 
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instrumental in gaining support fo r the Chemical Warfare Service .  
However, the majority of military and political leaders, as well as the general 
public, retained an aversion to the idea of waging chemical warfare. 
During WWI, research and development were oriented to producing 
more effective delivery means. Additionally, the use of gas masks soon 
proved to be standard necessary battlefield equipment. Brown (1968) observes 
that the Allies naively assumed that once the troops were masked they were 
safe. On July 12,  19 17, this situation drastically changed.  The Germans 
unleashed mustard gas, again in a surprise attack at Ypres. Mustard gas was 
particularly dangerous because it could disable by coming in contact with the 
skin; hence, the masks were of no use against mustard . Its effects d id not 
surface for sometime later, sometimes hours, at which point it was too late. 
Moreover, mustard gas was persistent and could, under favorable conditions 
retain its debilitating properties for several weeks. 
Recently, military thinking has changed regarding the strategic value of 
chemical weapons. Some experts argue that their u npredictability (i .e. , their 
dependence on the correct meteorological and topographical conditions) 
makes them less than ideal. As one high-ranking Pentagon official put it, 
"Chemical weapons are very inefficient weapons" (Personal Communication: 
Army Official 7/29 /91) .  
The Second World War saw the creation of a new and deadlier form of 
poison gas, i .e . ,  the nerve agents, commonly known as "nerve gas." German 
scientists discovered nerve agents while conducting research on pesticides to 
which nerve agents are chemically related .  Briefly, nerve agents are 
organophosphate esters and are not really gases at all. Actually, the word 
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"gas" in this context is a misnomer. They are odorless, colorless liquids and 
are usually dispersed as vapor. They can be lethal either through inhalation 
or  through skin absorption, making gas masks necessary but  not sufficient 
protection. The first agent to be developed was (GA) Tabun, later GB (Sarin) 
and VX ("V" is for venom) were developed. The U.S. unitary stockpile 
contains both GB and VX, which are two of the most lethal agents known to 
exist. VX is said to be orders of magnitude more toxic than the most potent 
pesticides. 
Without fanfare and without public scrutiny, the United States CW 
program expanded during the 1960s (Hayes Holgate 1990). It was directed by 
the Army Chemical Corps (ACC). The ACC launched a public relations 
campaign to bolster support for continuing chemical /biological weapons 
(CBW) research and funding, again citing the superior Soviet threat. A new 
modernization program was proposed in which binary weapons---supposedly 
safer to produce and destroy---would supplant the existing, obsolete unitary 
stockpile. By the seventies, binary weapons research/production was in full 
swing at the Pine Bluff Arsenal, Pine Bluff, Arkansas. Binary weapons, which 
contain precursor chemicals which mix upon firing, were thought by the 
Army to be the answer to a prayer because they answered many of the 
arguments posed by environmentalists and they could be portrayed to the 
public as "safer;" i.e., easier to store and destroy. Hayes-Holgate (1990) reports 
that "The ACC lobbied vigorously, aware that without production of binaries, 
its very existence was in question. Its efforts finally resulted in Congress 
writing initial funding for a binary factory in the 1980 Department of Defense 
Authorization Bill" (Hayes Holgate 1990, p. 19). The U. S. produced a reported 
69 tons of binary shells before halting production in 1990 (Morrison 1991). 
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1 .7  History of  Chemical Weapons (CW) Destruction 
Prior to 1969, obsolete or unserviceable chemical agents and munitions 
were routinely disposed of by open pit burning, land burial, atmospheric 
dilution or ocean dumping. These disposal methods were used extensively 
dating back to World War I without any casualties or adverse public reactions 
(Rogers 1990) .  At one time, even nuclear detonation was considered by the 
Army; however, that plan was abandoned on the advice of the National 
Academy of Sciences who studied the p rob lem of disposal of chemical 
weapons. The Ad Hoc Committee stated in their report that 
burying of the clusters in a deep cavern, followed by 
the explosion of a small nuclear device there, could 
incinerate and detoxify the clusters. However, the 
hazards involved in various states of this operation 
and the time required for its completion make this 
an undesirable p lan (National Academy of Sciences 
1969, p. 5) .  
Another popular disposal strategy involved draining chemical agent 
from weapons, called, "Drill and Transfer." The Drill  and Transfer System 
(DATS) was first used in 1979 at an Army facility in Utah where sixty 
munitions were demilitarized with no apparent consequences (Riddell 1981) .  
Later in 1981 ,  the Army proposed bringing in a DATS to the Lexington-Blue 
Grass Army Depot (LBAD) to dispose of 1 14 unserviceable rockets containing 
nerve gas and mustard agent. Basically, the DATS is similar to a semi-trailer. 
It's mobility makes it very useful for this type of operation. The trailer is set 
up in a secure area of the depot to insure the safe transfer of chemicals and 
explosives contained inside each rocket. Once a rocket is secured inside the 
DATS, machinery will drill a hole in the rocket casing to d rain out the 
chemical agents and then detach the explosive apparatus from the rocket. 
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According to the Army, the chemicals will be processed into relatively 
harmless salts and stored. Explosives will be taken to a secure part of the 
depot and detonated. 
Open pit burning was another popular destruction method .  Between 
1 949 and 1 965, the Army got rid of mustard-gas projectiles stored at the 
Lexington Blue-Grass Army Depot by throwing them in a hole and setting 
them on fire (Lexington Herald Leader, November 26, 1 984) . According to 
this same article, the open burning of chemical weapons that took place in 
this country was not publicized. 
In the 1 950s, Great Britain decided it wanted out of the nerve-gas 
business and began eliminating their entire stockpile by burning it in pits and 
sinking it in ships.  The argument for this method was that it released a very 
small amount of toxic material into the atmosphere which "simp ly 
dissipated," according to Brad Roberts, an analyst for the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. 
(Lexington Herald Leader, November 26, 1984) .  
Following Britain's lead, and unhappy with the slow progress in 
disposing of unusable chemical weapons stockpiles, the Army devised a plan 
(1948) to dispose of unserviceable chemical weapons by dumping them at sea. 
"Sea dumping had been accomplished previously, but before this time, 
munitions were generally loose dumped from barges," an Army document 
explains (CSDP Chemical Weapons Movement History Compilation 1987, p .  
10 ) .  However in  this case the Army decided to  fill a World War I I  merchant 
ship, load it up with chemical weapons, haul it out to sea and scuttle it. This 
work was assigned the code name, "Operation Geranium" (Lewisite has an 
odor like Geraniums). Although the Navy's use of  code names fell into 
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disuse, the Army revived the practice in the early 1 960s. The name that 
eventually came to apply to the planned sea dump of the 27,000 tons of 
unitary chemical weapons was code named , "Operation CHASE. " CHASE 
was a U. S.  Navy acronym for "Cut Holes And Sink 'Em." The Navy had 
been sea dumping conventional high explosive ammunition at sea. One 
series of these dumps were known as the CHASE dumps. The first chemical 
weapons CHASE dump, was made in May /June 1 967. The material dumped 
was bulk mustard ton containers and GB filled M55 rockets. The rockets were 
placed in steel vaults which were then filled with concrete. These "coffins," 
as they were called later, were placed aboard a merchant hulk ( the S .  S. 
Corporal Eric Gibson) and then sunk in deep water off the continental shelf. 
The second CHASE operation involving chemical weapons took place in 
May-June 1 968; the third involving chemical weapons took p lace in June of 
1 968. The cargo in this case was one-ton containers contaminated with 
mustard and filled with water. In 1969 the Army planned the ocean dumping 
of some 27, 000 tons of unserviceable chemical weapons that made up the 
unitary s tockpile. The plan involved the disposal of unserviceable 
chemical/biological weapons (CBW) stored at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, CO. , 
Edgewood, MD., Anniston, AL. ,and Richmond, KY. The weapons were to be 
encased in concrete "coffins" ( similar to earlier CHASE operations) each 
weighing roughly six and a half tons. They were to be transported by rail to 
Earle, New Jersey (the route being kept secret), and then loaded aboard four 
surplus WWII Liberty ships, towed out to sea and sunk 250 miles off the New 
Jersey shore beyond the continental shelf at longitude / latitude 390 38'N; 710 
O'W. In previous CHASE operations conducted between 1967 and 1968 a total 
of 1 ,706 such "coffins" were sunk in a similar location. However, the 27,000 
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tons in question were to be dumped at sea at a depth of 15,000 feet, twice the 
depth of previous disposals. 
According to reports, the Army tried many ways to free the containers 
from the concrete before considering another ocean-dumping scenario, 
including trying to neutralize the gas through openings. They tried soaking 
the concrete in highly abrasive acids. This failed. Then the Army tried using 
diamond saws to drill into the concrete but abandoned this plan because of 
fears that  the saws would set off detonators in the warheads. Next, they tried 
baking of the concrete to what the Army said would be a point where it would 
crumble and slip away. The concrete didn't budge. Col. Jack Curry (1970), 
then commander of the Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot, concluded, "The 
most logical way of disposing of the gas is still the sea dump" (Powell 1970) .  
Experts acquainted with the process, however, warned that the concrete 
would erode over a long period of time, and at some d istant time, the 
containers themselves would erode away causing small amounts of nerve gas 
to leak into the ocean. In response to objections raised by environmentalists 
on this very issue, Dr. Conrad Cheek, veteran oceanographer, said in 
Washington that  if 66 tons of nerve gas to be ocean dumped were released in 
water at the same time only two ounces of it would be toxic in ten days 
(Powell 1970) .  
However, when the news broke about operation CHASE and the public 
learned of the plan to dump 27,000 tons of chemical weapons in the ocean, a 
great hue and cry went out from many quarters in protest .  First, citizens 
protested transporting the lethal weapons through their communities. The 
Army assured critics that it had moved large quantities of chemical weapons 
over many years with relatively few problems and pointed out that "there has 
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never been a chemical accident fatality associated with such movement' ' 
(CSDP: Chemical  Weapons Movement History Compilation, 1 987, p . 1 ) . 
Environmentalists questioned the wisdom and the ethics of d umping toxic 
chemicals in the ocean, and the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), the 
agency set up to monitor compliance with the newly-framed National 
Environmental Policy Act (1969) NEPA, also raised objections. 
To begin with, Carter ( 1 970) observed that "the Army's Impact 
Statement minimized the possibility of major environmental damage 
resulting from Operation CHASE" ( 1970, p. 1298).  Next, the Council on 
Environmental Quality (CEQ) disputed the Army's claim that "the resulting 
toxicity of the sea should be highly localized" (Ad Hoc Advisory Committee 
1969, p. 10) .  The Army claimed that there was very little marine life at the 
16,000-foot depth and no fish of commercial value. However, the Council 
countered by stating that present knowledge of sea life at that depth was 
incomplete and listed several examples to support their case. For example, 
the CEQ argued that: ( 1 )  carnivorous fishes are found at that depth; (2) there 
are numerous deep-water fish whose eggs rise to or near the surface; (3) many 
organisms make seasonal migrations from shallow to deep waters and from 
coastal to deep waters; and (4) flounder, which occur in shallow waters off the 
Southeastern coast of the U.S., migrate into deeper waters in winter. (Ad Hoc 
Advisory Committee 1969) . Finally, the National Academy of Sciences 
suggested that ocean dumping be abandoned and suggested chemical 
neutralization2 of nerve agent GB and incineration of the vesicant agents H 
and HD. Incineration of hazardous waste was an emerging technology at that 
2 The term "neutralization" i s  u sed in the generic sense to mean a chemical 
reaction th at counteracts the toxic  effect of the chemical agent, y i elding an 
innocuous product (FPEIS , 1 98 8 ,  Vol. 3, p.  D-3) .  
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time and was thought to be an environmentally benign method capable of 
completely destroying waste materials (Flamm et al, 1 987) . Part of the 
Academy's report read: 
We wish to suggest to the Department of Defense 
(DOD) that it adopt basically the same approach to 
chemical warfare agents and munitions that the 
Atomic Energy Commission has adopted toward 
radioactive waste products from nuclear reactors. It 
should be assumed that all such (chemical warfare) 
a gents and munitions wil l  require eventua l  
disposal and that dumping a t  sea should be  avoided 
(Ad Hoc Advisory Committee 1969). 
In August of 1 970, Congress finally called a halt to ocean dumping 
(CSDP: Chemical Weapons Movement History Compilation, 1987). 
1 .8 Overview: The Creation of the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program 
(CSDP) 
In the early 1980s, the Army appealed to Congress for funds to proceed 
with a new generation of Chemical Weapons---binary weapons, which they 
claimed were safer to store and destroy. This modernization program was 
necessary, they argued, because the unitary stockpile was obsolete and 
deteriorating and no longer represented a credible deterrent. Congress 
required the destruction of the unitary stockpile as a quid pro quo for funding 
binary weapons research. The Army informed Congress that it could destroy 
the stockpile by 1994, at which point Congress then set the Army's self­
imposed deadline into law. Congress then created Public Law 99-145, The 
Departmen t of Defense Authorization Act of 1 986, which mandated the 
destruction of the entire unitary stockpile by September 1994 in conjunction 
with the acquisition of binary weapons. This sequence of events is significant 
because the Army has used the Congressional mandate many times to 
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conjure up an image of the "absolute" necessity of destroying the stockpile 
quickly because of some arbitrary deadline imposed by Congress. In fact, 
Congress was simply responding to what they were told by the Army. The 
original timetable for the destruction of the unitary stockpile has been revised 
several times at the behest of the Army (see Table 2 .1 for destruction schedule 
by site) .  For example, in September 1 988, the Army received an extension 
from Congress of the 1994 deadline to April 30, 1997; however, the final date 
for the destruction of the stockpile has been extended to approximately the 
year 2004. 
Initially, the stockpile destruction effort was to have been limited to the 
M55 rockets, but Congress and the Army expanded the program to include 
other obsolete weapons as well. According to a background paper prepared by 
the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA 1992),  the M55 rockets are 
considered the most dangerous items in the current stockpile, s ince the M55 
is a fully assembled munition containing either agent VX or GB, along with 
fuses, burster charges, and propellant in a configuration that cannot be easily 
separated. 
The M55s were produced during the 1960s in groups known as  " lots ."  
During one short period of  manufacture, some M55s were filled with a GB 
agent which had purity specifications. According to the FPEIS ( 1988) "these 
lots have leaked far more frequently than others" (FPEIS, 1988, p .2-9) and, for 
this reason, the Army monitors them very carefully. Fortunately, the Office 
of Technology Assessment (OTA) report indicates that "the Army ' s  
monitoring program has yet to identify trends of increasing deterioration" 
(OTA, 1992, p. 5 ) .  Nevertheless, the MSS's  have b een the focus of major 
concern since the beginning of the stockpile d isposal program. The GB-filled 
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rockets were manufactured at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Colorado, between 
1961 and 1 965, and the VX rockets were manufactured at Newport Army 
Ammunition Plant, Indiana in 1964 and 1 965. The M55 was shown to be 
erratic and undependable, and the Army declared it obsolete in 1981 (Army 
Independent Evaluation / Assessment of Rocket, 1 15mm: Chemical Agent (GB 
or VX} M55). 
The Congressional law that created the stockpile destruction program is 
known as Public Law 99-145, i .e., the Department of Defense Authorization 
Act, 1986. The Act reads: 
( 1 )  Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, 
the Secretary of Defense (hereinafter in this section 
referred to as the "Secretary" )  shall, in accordance 
with the provisions of this section, carry out the 
destruction of the United States' stockpile of lethal 
chemical agents and munitions that exists on the 
date of the enactment of this Act. (2) Such 
destruction shall be carried out in conjunction with 
the acquisition of binary weapons. 
(PL99-145, p. 99 STAT.747) 
The law further stipulates that: ( 1 )  The Secretary shall provide for: 
(A) maximum protection for the environment, the 
general public, and the personnel who are involved 
in the destruction of the lethal chemical agents and 
munitions referred to in subsection (a) ;  . . . (2) 
Facilities constructed to carry out this section may 
not be used for any purpose other than the 
de struction of lethal chemical weapons and 
munitions, and when no longer needed to carry out 
this action, such facilities shall  be cleaned, 
dismantled, and disposed of in accordance with 
applicable laws and regulations. (PL 99-145, 1985 p. 
99 STAT.747) 
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However, studies have been commissioned to study the feasibility of 
the continued use of the incinerators once the stockpile is destroyed . To begin 
with, the 1 984 National Research Council (NRC) study, alluded to earlier, 
actually suggested "that the life-cycle costs of incinerators could be 
substantially reduced i f  after destroying chemical weapons they were used by 
federal, state, and local governments and private industry to dispose of 
hazardous wastes" (C & E News, August 13, 1990, p. 15) .  Additionally, m 
November 1 989, the House and Senate Appropriations Committee of  
Confereers3 directed the Army "to investigate and report on the feasibility 
and desirability of using chemical weapons disposal facilities for other 
purposes" (Goldfarb, 1 991,  p. xv), leading citizens to speculate that the 
facilities will never be dismantled for a variety of reasons, not the least of 
which is the cost involved in construction and the enormous backlog of 
hazardous waste produced by the military. When questioned about the 
possibility of the "future use" of the incinerators, a high-ranking government 
official assured the author that the incinerators would be dismantled "Pac 
Man style" . 
Finally, a study, conducted by the MITRE Corporation (1991 ) entitled, 
"Engineering Analysis for Future Use of Chemical Agent Demilitarization 
Plants: Feasibility and Desirability," suggested numerous possibilities for the 
future use of the facilities given certain reconfiguration requirements, but 
emphasized that "in order for the chemical demilitarization facilities to be 
3 Title VI of the 1 990 Defense Appropriati ons Conference (DAC) Report 1 0 1 -345 , 
entitled "Chemical Agents and M unit ions Destruct ion,  Defen se . "  
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used for other non-stockpile chemical items . . .  the law would have to be 
changed" (Goldfarb, 1991 ,  p .  2-5) . This, in fact, is exactly what the citizens fear­
--a permanent hazardous waste facility in their midst that will operate in 
perpetuity. 
Public Law 99-145 also authorized the creation of a management 
organization within the department of the Army to oversee the destruction 
process. "The Department of the Army, as executive agent for the DOD, 
established the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization (PM Cml 
Demil) as the agency responsible for implementing the disposal program" 
(Carnes1 989, p .  280 ) .  Initially,  a Program Manager for Chemical 
Demilitarization was appointed to head the program. Recently, a new federal 
agency has been created i.e., the United States Army Materials Destruction 
Agency, headquartered at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Edgewood, Maryland 
and headed by Brigadier General Walter Busbee. This agency is charged not 
only with oversight for the CSDP but also is responsible for directing the 
destruction efforts of other weapons and munitions not directly related to the 
unitary stockpile. This expansion of the program scope to agency level is 
certain to have ramifications beyond the destruction of the unitary stockpile 
and does not bode well for those who fear that the incinerators will be used 
beyond the destruction life cycle. 
1 .9 The Army Decides: The Evolution of Incineration as the Technology of 
Choice 
With the suspension of the planned sea dump, the Army requested the 
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to conduct a study of alternatives. In 
1982, the Undersecretary of the Army, James Ambrose, asked the National 
Research Council (NRC) for a study to recommend the most effective, 
3 2  
economical and safest means for disposing of the Army's unitary chemical 
weapons stockpile. A committee was formed under the Board on Army 
Science and Technology in 1 983. According to a memo obtained from the 
Kentucky Environmental Foundation, this was the first non-governmental 
group to study the chemical weapons situation since the National Academy 
of Sciences Report (NAS) in 1969 (KEF Memorandum, 1 /4/92) . 
According to the Deputy Program Manager and Technical  Director, 
"the Academy said, 'You need to build complex industrial type disposal 
facilities for each site . '  The Army said, 'OK."' Following the NAS report, we 
are told that "the Army launched an extensive program that involved the 
development of new disposal concepts and process technology" (Army Public 
Affairs Officer:  No Date) .  Under the Academy's new guidelines, Rocky 
Mountain Arsenal became the the first site to dispose of nerve agents through 
neutralization. A knowledgeable Army technical expert boasted that the 
Army had disposed of "over nine (9) million pounds of GB and over six (6) 
million pounds of mustard through incineration" at the Rocky Mountain 
Arsenal (RMA) facility. 
However, neutralization was found wanting. As the Deputy P M and 
Technical  Director for the CSDP explained: "We were not p leased with 
neutralization," he said, 
We created six lbs .  of organic waste for every one lb. 
of organic material we destroyed. We were adding 
too much junk. We felt that we were producing 
too many impurities . It [agent GB] was too easily 
reformed .  If conditions were not carefully 
controlled it would revert. Primarily for those 
reasons we decided we had to look at alternatives. 
The rationalization for abandoning neutralization was b ased on a 
number of perceived factors according to a document prepared for Greenpeace 
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International: ( 1 )  The alleged complexity of the neutralization process as 
compared with incineration which was emerging as the preferred industrial 
technology; (2) the sensitivity of the process to numerous parameters that 
would slow the reaction or even promote hydrolysis reversal, reforming GB; 
(3) the quantity and nature of the waste; 4) the high capital costs of 
neutralization (at this time, incineration was regarded as a simple and cheap 
process) and various cost calculations showed a net cost benefit if incineration 
were to be adopted (Picardi 1991 ) .  For these reasons, in March of 1 981 ,  the 
Army officially decided to abandon neutralization and adopt incineration as 
the method of choice for the destruction of chemical weapons. According to 
Picardi ( 1991 )  "the decision was highly influenced by early drafts of the 
National Research Council ( 1984) report" (Picardi,1991 ,  p. 6) . 
The Army already had a test incineration facility in Tooele Army Depot 
near Salt Lake City, Utah, which had been in operation since 1979---the 
Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal Sys tem (CAMDS) . Experimental 
thermal destruction of agents began around 1981 at this facility. CAMDS was 
a high-temperature incinerator facility specially designed to handle nerve 
agents . It was a prototype, (one-third size) not a full-scale fac ility. The 
CAMDS incineration technology is the model for the entire CW disposal 
program, but the facility has experienced numerous problems. For example, 
in May of 1 986, a drain clogged, causing a chemical agent to overflow to the 
floor of a containment area and again in January 1 987, nerve agent escaped 
into a work area. The release exceeded health standards but was not reported 
to the public for two days. The Army boasted that it had disposed of over s ix 
million pounds of chemical agents and over sixty thousand munitions and 
containers by incineration at the CAMDS and at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal 
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(RMA) .  However, the facility has experienced numerous problems. The 
Army did finally admit to a "simultaneous failure of three containment 
systems" (Courier Journal, September 12, 1984, p. 1 ) .  
When Amoretta Hoeber, then Under Secretary o f  the Army, spoke a t  a 
public meeting at Eastern Kentucky University in January of 1986, she assured 
those assembled that no decision had been made regarding the ultimate 
disposition of the chemical weapons stored at the Army depot at LBAD, 
despite mounting evidence that the Army had already decided upon thermal 
destruction. "We're not here to announce any sort of a decision," she said, 
"No decision has been made" (Transcript of Public Meeting EKU, Richmond, 
KY. January 1 986, p. 4). After the publication of the Draft Environmental 
Impact Statement (DEIS) in July of that same year, which announced 
incineration of the weapons as the "Preferred Alternative," the Secretary of 
the Army John 0. Marsh, Jr. repeatedly stressed that the July 1 Draft was not 
necessarily the final word . "I am not here to speculate on what the final 
decision will be," he said, "I am here to tell you that the Army has simply 
presented a preferred alternative. It is not fair to the process to speculate on 
what might be the results" (Lexington-Herald Leader, July 10, 1986, p . 1 ) .  
Throughout the process ,  citizens have been wary of  the Army's 
attempts to garner support from allegedly "objective" scientific bodies in 
support of its decisions. For example, the National Academy of Sciences 
(NAS) study conducted in 1984 concluded that: "The Army has already 
selected thermal destruction as the most appropriate method.  The committee 
supports this d ecision" ( Memorandu m :  Kentucky Environmental  
Foundation, Inc. {KEF} January 4, 1 992) .  The exact wording of the National 
Research Council report reads: 
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When compared to disposal by incinera tion, 
chemical neutralization processes are s low, 
complicated, produce excessive quantities of  waste 
that cannot be certified to be free of agent, and 
would require higher capital and operating costs . 
The panel agrees with the Army's decision to 
abandon chemical neutralization in favor of 
incineration. (Na tional  Academy of Sc iences 
Study, November 1984) 
The Deputy Program Manager (PM) and Technical Director for the 
Chemical Demilitarization (CHEM ) program explained it this way: He said 
that the Army was pleased with the results of their experiments and went 
back to the National Research Council in 1984 to see "if we [ the Army] were 
doing the right thing." He then added, "The NRC endorsed our decision to 
destroy both nerve agents and mustard; in 1986, Congress asked us to destroy 
the whole stockpile" (4/24 /92). It is just this endorsement of existing policy 
by supposedly "objective" scientific studies that has continually rankled 
citizens who oppose the Army's current destruction plan. 
Recently, a statement appeared in the Preface to an Army publication, 
entitled, STAR 2 1 :  S trategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty-Firs t 
Cen tu ry ,  which seems to lend credibility to the charge that Academy of 
Sciences (NAS) and the National Research Council (NRC) may not be the 
objective scientific bodies that they claim to be. In the book we read the 
following: "The National Academy of Sciences, the National Research 
Council,  and the STAR Study Committee wish to acknowledge their 
indebtedness to the U.S. Army for its continuous and generous support and 
encouragement throughout the STAR study" (National Research Council 
1992). This "continuous and generous support" also extends to the copious 
funds made available to the NAS and the NRC for evaluation of the CSDP. 
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Nevertheless, despite the ample evidence that the Army had already 
made up its mind concerning the choice of technology, no "official" decision 
was released until Secretary Ambrose's formal declaration in 1 988, i .e . ,  the 
Record of Decision (ROD) which recommended the on-site destruction 
alternative and thermal destruction of the stockpile. According to reports, 
Ambrose preferred not to use the word "decision" feeling more comfortable 
with the idea that it was more of a "judgment call," because a decision 
implied to him something based on "quite definitive information, factual 
information, well quantified, by logical process or algorithm of some kind to 
get from input to the output" (Carnes 1 989, p .  445) Instead, he said the 
decision was based on "a lot of highly uncertain material . . .It was a judgment 
call" (Carnes 1989, p. 445). 
1 . 10 Description of the "Baseline Technology" 
The Army's current plan which calls for the weapons to be destroyed 
on-site in specially-designed high-temperature incinerators, is known in the 
literature as the "baseline technology."  Quite simply, this refers to the 
Army's decision to designate incineration as the technology of choice. It is 
essentially a reverse-assembly process, whereby munitions wil l  b e  
automatically disassembled and drained o f  chemical agents by computer­
controlled machines before being fed into the incinerator Is .  At this point we 
find it necessary to make a clarification. We read that the Army's plan, i .e . ,  
the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP) calls for siting eight 
incinerators on Army depots around the country, but in reality we are not 
speaking about one incinerator at each site, but an incinerator complex. The 
baseline technology involves constructing an incinerator complex at each 
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depot site --- each with up to four separate incinerators to complete the 
process of destruction of the unitary weapons. Andy Mead reporting on the 
Army's plan in 1 986 wrote, "The 'nerve gas incinerator' the Army proposes 
to build in Madison County {Kentucky) would, depending on how you count 
them, be four or eight incinerators" (Lexington-Herald Leader, July 2, 1 986, p .  
A-14). One type would be used to burn only liquid nerve agent that has been 
drained from weapons or stored in ton containers (the liquid incinerator); 
another would burn the metal parts (the metal parts furnace); another would 
burn the explosive parts of rockets (the deactivation furnace) ; and a fourth 
would burn contaminated packing material, wooden pallets and used 
protective clothing (the dunnage incinerator system) (Department of the 
Army, U . S. FPEIS 1988, Volume 3, p. C-12) .  
A report drawn up by Greenpeace, long-standing opponents of 
incineration technology, states that "the extremely high temperatures at 
which the incinerator chambers operate, ranging from 1 ,600 degrees to 2,700 
degrees F, place stresses on the hardware and require constant monitoring 
and frequent maintenance," and it questions the ability of the incinerators to 
meet the rigid 99.9999 per cent "destruction and removal efficiency" standards 
set by the federal government, except perhaps in one-time trial burns. (Seigel, 
Draft, 1990). The Greenpeace document asserts that, "Commercial hazardous 
waste incinerators have suffered serious accidents. At the CW disposal sites, 
an accident would be catastrophic" (Seigel, Draft, 1990, p.8) .  
1 . 10.1 Cryofracture 
As a more cost-effective alternative to the "baseline" technology, a 
process known as "cryofracture," was suggested by the Army in 1 986.  
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Cryofracture, in which munitions are first frozen, smashed and then burned, 
was considered an alternative to the "baseline" technology of disassembly for 
the destruction of the chemical weapons. The Army's original enthusiasm 
ended in 1 989 when work on this technology was terminated . The Army's 
reluctance to aggressively pursue a cryofracture program was b ased on its 
strong belief in the viability of the b aseline technology. Opponents of 
cryofracture do not see it as an alternative, since it still uses incineration 
technology. As of May 1995, the cryofracture program is defunct according to 
the Director of the Kentucky Environmental Foundation (Telephone 
interview: 5/ 4/95). 
1 .1 1  JACADS (Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System) 
In 1 985, when Congress approved the program, the Army began to 
design a versatile, full-scale reverse assembly and incineration system on a 
small island in the South Pacific, approximately 71 7 nautical miles southwest 
of Hawaii. The facilitly is known as the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent 
Disposal System or (JACADS). It is three times the size of the Army's 
stateside facility at Tooele, Utah known as CAMDS (The Chemical Agent 
Munitions Disposal System) .  The JACADS project is administered by the 
Army's Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization (PM Cml Demil) .  
The operations manager and maintenance contractor is the United 
Engineers and Constructors, Inc. In December 1987 Congress required that the 
Army evaluate full-scale disposal  operations at JACADS before constructing 
similar facilities in the continental United States. Congress wanted proof that 
the baseline process at the JACADS facility was safe and environmentally 
sound before it permitted construction and operation of similar facilities at  
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the continental U.S.  sites. Operations Verification Testing (or "OVT") was 
begun in October 1989 and testing concluded on March 6, 1993. A report on 
OVT was published in May 1993; the Secretary of Defense certified successful 
OVT completion to Congress on August 25, 1993 (Annual Status Report: DA, 
December 15, 1993, p. iv) . The JACADS facility has experienced numerous 
technical difficulties and has experienced extensive down time. As of this 
date (May 1995) JACADS continues to have problems. So far there have been 
four live agent releases .  However, they were only fined for one because it 
exceeded "acceptable levels." (Interview: 5/4/95 activist) . Thus far they have 
b een assessed fines totalling $ 1 75,000 for numerous environmental  
violations . 
Before the certification to Congress can be made, the Army has to take 
JACADS through four separate campaigns. The first is the disposal of the 
M55 rockets containing GB. The second is disposal of M55 rockets filled with 
the persistent nerve agent VX. The third phase is disposal of bulk containers 
containing mustard agent. The final phase is the destruction of mustard gas 
artillery shells. The MITRE Corporation was selected to prepare criteria for 
the evaluation of OVT, to perform the evaluation, and to prepare a report on 
the results (Menke 199 1 ) .  The report cited numerous mechanical problems 
resulting on one occasion in live agent being released into a worker area, 
failure to meet production schedules, and sited frequent worker turnover 
(averaging about 45 per cent per year) as a continuing problem. However, the 
MITRE Corporation report asserted that, "taken as a whole, the GB campaign 
did show that the basic JACADS technology is safe, can be operated within 
environmental limits, and is capable of operation for at least short periods at 
close to the projected rates" (Menke, 1991,  p. 4-9) .  Supposedly, "lessons 
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learned "  from JACADS will be applied to the construction and operation of 
the continental United States (CONUS) facilities. 
1 .1 2  Geography and Distribution 
The chemical weapons (CW) stockpile is located on eight Army bases 
around the country (see figure 1 . 1 ,  Appendix A), and at Johnston Atoll, a 
small island in the South Pacific. The distribution of the stockpile is given in 
Table 1 of Appendix B.  
1 .1 3  Agent Characteristics 
The unitary chemical weapons stockpile under consideration, consists 
of both nerve and vesicant or blister agents. Nerve agents were discovered by 
German scientists while conducting insecticide research during the Second 
World War.4 The organophosphate nerve agents include GA ("tabun"),  GB 
("sarin"),  and VX ("V" stands for "venom") .  These agents are among the 
most deadly chemicals known to exist. VX for example, is said to be orders of 
magnitude more potent than the most toxic insecticide to which they are 
chemically related. GB, also known as Sarin, vaporizes instantly. When 
inhaled it can kill in a minute. A document prepared by Greenpeace states 
that "The explosion of an artillery shell containing 6 pounds of GB will kill 
most unmasked personnel within an area the size of two football fields" 
(Seigel, Draft 1 990, p .  7) .  Additionally, nerve agents can also be absorbed 
through the skin, so donning a gas mask is necessary but not sufficient to 
protect a person from exposure. It has been found that in comparison with 
GB human exposure estimates, VX is estimated to be approximately twice as 
4 Tabun was d iscovered in  1 936 by an I .G .  Farben chemist.  
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toxic by inhalation, 1 0  times as toxic by oral  administration,  and 
approximately 1 70 times as toxic following skin exposure (National Research 
Council 1984) .  
The nerve agents are all organophosphate esters that directly affect the 
nervous system. Their mechanism of action involves the inhibition of 
acetylcholinesterase (AChE), an enzyme that prevents the accumulation of 
the neurotransmitter acetylcholine (ACh). After exposure to nerve agent, 
AChE is inhibited and ACh accumulates; at high doses, the results are 
convulsions and death due to paralysis of the nervous system (FPEIS, 1988) .  
As acetylcholine (ACh) builds up at the nerve endings, death comes in 
seconds. Watson (1989) writes: 
When ACh accumulates, the following symptoms 
can result: drooling, increased bronchial ( lung) 
secretions, bronchoconstriction, miosis (pupillary 
c onstriction),  excessive sweating, vom iting, 
d i arrhea,  ab dominal cramping, involuntary 
u r i n a t ion ,  and h e a r t b e a t  i r r e g u l a r i t i e s  
(arrhythmias) (Watson 1989, p .  337). 
In addition, "ACh accumulation can affect the brain and spinal cord, 
resulting in headache, anxiety, confusion, restlessness, giddiness, (EEG) 
changes, or even convulsions and coma, depending on the agent and dosage" 
(Grob and Harvey 1953). In relative terms, VX is more toxic and GB, which, 
in turn is more toxic than GA (soman).  Watson (1989) argues that "because 
agent GB is highly volatile, an unplanned release could disperse toxic 
concentrations over a large area.  With the less-volatile agent VX, toxic 
concentrations would not disperse widely , but could persist in the 
environment long after an unplanned release" (Watson 1 989, p. 337) . 
However, in terms of emergency response, an accident involving agent GB 
4 2  
would present the most problems because it has the potential to affect a wider 
area. 
The mustard or "blister agents" in the stockpile include H, HD and HT. 
as well as small quantities of Lewisite (L) which are held for research 
purposes. The major toxic chemical [bis (2-chloroethyl) sulfide] in both H and 
HD is also known variously as (1)  as mustard gas, or (2) sulfur mustard, or (3) 
simply "mustard."  According to Watson (1989), vesicants are cellular poisons 
that destroy individual cells in target tissues. Accordingly, the vesicants 
present quite a d ifferent picture of acute toxicity when compared with nerve 
agents . For example, the vesicants are not as acutely lethal at similar low 
doses as are the nerve agents under comparable exposure conditions (Watson 
1989). 
In an article which appeared in the "Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists," 
Freeman (1991)  describes mustard gas---"as a kind of 'jelly' which is extremely 
toxic both as a liquid and as a vapor, causing severe eye injury as well as skin 
burns on all parts of the body, but especially the genitals, underarms, and 
tender skin of the joints, hands, and face" (Freeman, 1991, p.34 ) .  The effects 
of mustard, especially the vapor effects on skin, rise sharply with 
temperature. Mustard gas can also cause severe systemic effects such as 
vomiting, prostration, and even death. Mustard g a s  is especially pernicious 
in that its effects appear several hours after exposure. Although not as lethal 
as the nerve agents, the mustard agents have properties that make contact 
with them extremely hazardous, not the least of which is the fact that they are 
proven carcinogens. Watson (1989) writes that, "Epidemiological evidence 
and results of animal studies both indicate that mustard agent can c ause 
cancer" (Watson 1989, p. 342) . Freeman (1991) reports that, "in 1980, the U.S.  
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Department of the Army asked the National Academy of Sciences to study the 
long-term effects of exposure to chemical-warfare agents for 6,720 soldiers 
who participated in experiments at Edgewood Arsenal from 1 955 to 1 975. The 
resulting report mentions a statistical correlation between chronic mustard­
gas exposure and cancer" (Freeman, 1 99 1 ,  p .38) .  Mustard gas has also been 
known to produce various kinds of chromosomal structure damage, and its 
mutagenic properties have been demonstrated in laboratory studies (Fox and 
Scott 1980). 
1 .14 The Political Economy of Chemical Weapons Destruction 
The political economy of hazardous waste d isposal and that of the· 
destruction of chemical weapons are related phenomena .  In this section we 
will provide an overview of the emerging political and economic factors that 
provide the context for the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP).  
1 . 14 .1  Life Cycle Cost 
The sheer scope of the stockpile disposal program makes it a fit object 
for study. To begin with, there have been massive cost overruns . In 1985, the 
Army estimated the total cost of the disposal program would be $ 1 .7 billion; 
"by 1992, the projected life-cycle cost of the CSDP had jumped to $8 billion---a 
nearly five-fold increase in seven years" (Opening Statement: Mike Synar {D­
OKLA . }  Congress of the U. S. ,  June 16, 1992). In 1993, the Army reported that 
"As a result of program schedule extensions encountered in FY 1993, the 
estimated life-cycle cost has increased again, this time to $8 .6 billion" (Annual 
Status Report, DA, 1 993, p. 22). Costs continue to escalate as of this writing, 
for example, the total cost of JACADS has soared in just three years from $298 
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million to $587 million and continues to grow (Department of Defense 
Authorization Bill, 1 992, p. 233) . 
Although the Army is coordinating and d irecting the disposal 
program, the facilities will  be designed, constructed and operated by 
commercial contractors who stand to  profit even further if PL 99-145 is 
amended to allow the facilities to be reconfigured to process other hazardous 
waste. Although the Deputy Program Manager (PM) and Technical Director 
for the CSDP assured the author that "the Army is not going into the hazmat 
{ i .e . ,  hazardous materials) business," there is nothing to prevent them from 
turning around the selling the incinerators back to the very people who are 
profi ting in their construction (Memorandum: Common Ground, April 
1992) . 
Although we have some information on who the maJor contractors 
are, e.g, "the Ralph M. Parsons Company of California is the designer of the 
facilities and CH2M Hill, Inc. has assisted in permitting to date" (Interview: 
Deputy PM for CHEM DEMIL, April 24, 1992) . There are innumerable other 
contractors involved in the construction aspect of the program, many of 
whom are former defense contractors, e .g. ,  Bechtel National, Inc. ;  Raytheon; 
(M.K.)  Morris-Kinutzen; A.J .  Little; MITRE Corp ., to name only a few.  
Information regarding the bidding process i s  not  available to  the public, 
although it  is not, strictly speaking, "classified" information. However, the 
Deputy PM and Technical Director declined to release that information when 
asked commenting that it would be "bad business. ' '  
The number of federal, state and local agencies involved with the 
chemical demilitarization program is staggering. The Chemical Stockpile 
Disposal Program (CSDP) which, for the sake of brevity, is often referred to as 
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the II demil" program (the term II demilitarization" meaning --- to render 
unusable for any military purpose), involves not only top military officials at 
the Pentagon, but several federal agencies including: (1)  the Department of 
Defense (DOD); (2) the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); (3) 
The U.S. Army Toxic and Hazardous Materials Agency (USATHMA); (4) the 
Occupational Health and Safety Association (OSHA); (5) the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA); (6) the Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS); and last but not least (7) the Department of Energy (DOE) .  In 
addition, some of of the nation's most prestigious national laboratories are 
involved with the CSDP, e .g . ,  Los Alamos National Laboratory (NM), 
Argonne National Laboratory (IL), Sandia National Laboratory (NM), 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (CA), Pacific Northwest National 
Laboratory, and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (TN). Additional support 
is provided by their subcontractors around the country, such as Schneider 
E ngineers, Harrisburg, PA; Dynamac Corporation, Rockville, MD, and 
Westinghouse Corp . The usual procedure is  for the Army to award a contract 
to a national laboratory, e.g. ,  to assist in the preparation of Environmental 
Impact Statements (EISs) .  The laboratories in turn subcontract out certain 
p arts of the projects . For example, the subcontractor might collect data 
relevant to population of schools, hospitals, nursing homes, etc. 
Many colleges and universities around the country are involved with 
the CSDP, among them are the following: University of  P ittsburgh, 
University of Southern Ca lifornia { Institute of Safety and Systems 
Management} ,  University of Colorado, University of Delaware, Michigan 
State University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), University of 
California at  Los Angeles and Northern Illinois University. 
4 6  
Additionally, numerous environmental laws impact this program . 
The most famous of these is, of course, NEPA, the National Environmental 
Policy Act ( 1969) ;  then there is RCRA, the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act ( 1976), the National Toxics Control Act (1976) and, finally, the 
Clean Air Act of 1970 (as amended) .  In addition to these, a number of other 
laws have been passed through the years that deal specifically with chemical 
weapons disposal; they include: ( 1 )  the Department of Defense Authorization 
Act of 1 986 (Public Law 99-145)  which mandated the destruction of the 
unitary CW stockpile; (2) the National Defense Au thorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 1 988 and 1 989 (Public Law 1 00-180) in which Congress directed the 
Secretary of Defense to issue the final Programmatic Environmental Impact 
Statement on the chemical stockpile destruction program by January 1, 1988. 
The law further required that the Secretary provide proof in writing to 
Congress that the overall concept plan included an evaluation of alternative 
technologies and full-scale operational verification tests of the selected 
chemical weapons disposal technology. In addition the law required the 
Army to establish an ongoing program for surveillance and maintenance of 
the stockpile; (3) The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1 988 
and 1 989, (Public Law 1 00-456) extended the stockpile elimination deadline to 
April 30, 1997. It also required the Army to complete Operational Verification 
Testing (OVT) of its test facility at Johnston Atoll, i .e . ,  the Johnston Atoll 
Chemical Agent Disposal System OACADS) before full-scale disposal facilities 
were constructed in the continental United States (CONUS).  The Nationa l  
Defense Au thorization Act  for Fiscal Year 1 99 1  (Public Law 1 0 1 -510 )  also 
addressed the Chemical Weapons demilitarization program. This law pays 
particular attention to the safety status and the condition of the stockpile. It 
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requires the Secretary of Defense to develop a contingency plan which would 
detail the steps the DOD would follow if the chemical weapons stockpile 
began an accelerated rate of deterioration or i f  any other question of its 
integrity arose. We should also mention the almost-forgotten Fore ign  
Military Sales Act Amendmen t (Public Law 91-672), passed in 1 971 ,  which 
prohibi ted the transportation of chemical weapons from the Island of  
Okinawa to  the United States . It further directed the DOD to destroy these 
chemical weapons outside the U.s .s (Office of Technology Assessment 
Report {OTA) 1992 ) Currently, legislation involving the Chemical Weapons 
Demilitarization Program addresses the delays in the program and proposed 
deadl ines. Both the House and Senate bills for Na t iona l  Defense  
Au thorization for Fiscal Year 1 992 and 1 993 (S. 1507 and H.R. 2100) propose 
extending the stockpile deadline to July 1999. 
The fact that industry is intimately connected to this latest military 
venture is nothing new in the annals of American political economy. The 
symbiotic relationship between the military and the economy, better known 
as "the military-industrial complex," became widely recognized during the 
Cold War when American corporations reaped huge profits from the 
production and sale of weapons systems. Sherman (1989) argues that " to 
measure the full extent of the military impact on the economy, we must 
recall that the U.S. Department of Defense is the largest 'planned economy' in 
the world today outside the [former] Soviet Union" (Sherman, 1989, p. 297) . 
Profit rates for corporations involved in the production of military hardware 
5 In 1 97 1 ,  the U . S .  Army moved chemical weapons from Okinowa to storage 
fac i l it ies at Johnston Island; in March of 1 990, the U . S .  chemical weapons that 
had been stored in West Germany ( 1  00 tons)  were transferred to Johnston Atoll 
for destruction amid v igorou s protest from European Green s .  
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sometimes reached as high as 56.1 per cent according to a study conducted by 
the General Accounting Office (GAO) in 1969. Not only were the profit rates 
on military spending extraordinary, but the profits mostly went to relatively 
few firms. Sherman (1989) reports that almost all military contracts go to just 
205 of the top 500 corporations, and that just 100 of these firms get 85 per cent 
of all military contracts. 
After peres t ro ika and the final break up of the Soviet Union, the 
rationale behind the Cold War rhetoric d isappeared and the whole colossus 
threatened to come to a grinding halt. However, into the breach c ame some 
of those same contractors to handle the military's  problem of toxic waste 
d isposal .  Names like Bechtel National, MITRE Corporation, E .G .  & G 
Instruments, Raytheon---names that we normally associate with the military­
industrial complex, are still at it; only the game has changed .  Now, these 
behemoths have shifted into the business of hazardous waste disposal. Van 
Voorst ( 1992)  reports tha t  at a time of shrinking defense bud gets, 
environmental c leanup is the fastest-growing ca tegory of  mil it ary 
expenditure --- up 18%, from $2.9 billion last year to $ 3.4 b illion in new 1993 
funding. 
One of the foremost of these contractors is  Bechtel National Inc .  A n  
article which appeared in the Richmond Regis ter  o n  December 1, 1988 
discussed the Army's first contract award for the CSDP. The headline read, 
"BECHTEL TO OVERSEE NERVE GAS DISPOSAL," and the article began, 
"The U.S. Army has awarded Bechtel National Inc. the first installment of a 
$284 million, nine-year contract to dispose of chemical weapons stored at  the 
Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot and seven other sites around the nation" 
(Richmond Regis ter, December 1, 1988, p. 1 ) .  
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The Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP) with its projected 
life-cycle cost now approaching $9 billion dollars is well-positioned to fill in 
part of the void left by the reductions in the military budget. To begin with, 
whatever destruction technology the U.S .  develops is destined to have 
international ramifications. As mentioned earlier, one provision of the 
b ilateral agreement (1990) signed between the former Soviet Union and the 
United States commits both sides to cooperate on destruction technology. In  
addition, the Russian stockpile of  unitary chemical weapons exceeds that of  
the U.S. Estimates vary, but Russia i s  presumed to  have around 50,000 tons, 
although it was once alleged that their stockpile was on the order of 300,000 
tons ! However, in an article appearing in the French newspaper Le Monde 
(29 December 1987), the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs affirmed that the 
chemical arms reserve of the USSR "does not exceed 50,000 tons of toxic 
substances" (Defense Technical Information Center "DTIC" {database} ,  1 987, 
p .10). 
The Russians do not as yet have a program to destroy their chemical 
weapons. They have experimented with neutralization in the past, but 
abandone d  the practice. In 1989 their sole CW destruction facility a t  
Chapayevsk (about 500 miles southeast o f  Moscow) was shut down b y  citizen 
protests . Mikita P. Smidovich, the deputy head of the Soviet delegation to the 
Geneva Conference on Disarmament explained what happened.  In what 
amounts to a masterful understatement, he said: "The Chapayevsk facility 
was completed last year but the public objected to it, citing environmental 
concerns, so the government decided to close it" (Ember, 1990, p . 18) .  The 
closing of Chapayevsk leaves the Soviets without a chemical weapons 
destruction facility . Rep.  Larry J. Hopkins (R.-Ky) estimates it will take them 
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another three to five years to develop an operational chemical weapons 
disposal facility. 
The Russians are looking to the United States to provide the necessary 
technology and expertise for destroying chemical  weapons.  The 
impoverished state of the Russian economy makes it necessary for them to 
look around for assistance with this enterprise. The U.S. Congress has already 
allocated $800 million to help Russia destroy chemical weapons . But 
whoever p ays, the destruction is l ikely to involve lucrative contracts .  
Already the German company Metallgesellschaft AG is angling to destroy the 
chemicals stored in Kambrak. According to The Wall S tree t Journal, "So 
fierce is competition among U.S. engineering firms eager to help the 
Russians---with U.S. tax dollars---that the Pentagon still hasn't  chosen from 
among the 32 concerns that expressed interest last year" (Wall S treet Journal, 
February 25, 1993) . 
It is well known that  Russian CW experts have already been given 
guided tours of the U.S. chemical weapons destruction facility at Tooele, Utah 
In fact, in the fall of 1993, six Russians were invited to participate in a Russian 
Intern Program sponsored by the Army for the purpose of training Russian 
specialists in our chemical demilitarization technology . According to a report 
p ublished by the Army, those participating in the program are made up of 
both chemical disposal managers and plant operators and will be the first 
p articipants in the 'Russian Familiarization Program, '  one of several 
provisions contained in a 1 992 Memorandum of Agreement between the 
Department of Defense (DOD) and President Boris Yeltzin's Committee on 
Conventional Problems of Chemical  and Biological Weapons . The article 
states that " the U.S .  Army Chemical Materials  Destruction Agency's 
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(USACMDA's)  philosophy is to provide the maximum opportunity for 
information exchange as the Russians formulate their disposal p lans" 
(Chemical Demil i tarization Upda te, July 1993, Vol.2, Issue no. 3, p .  4) .  A 
knowledgeable U.S .  source argues that the Soviets are not primarily 
interested in our destruction technology (i.e., incineration), but in our safety 
and pollution-control technology. Still, that hasn't prevented western 
engineering firms from trying to interest the Soviets in incineration 
technology. Among U. S.  firms making such p itches are Combustion 
Engineering, General Atomics, and Stearns and Rogers, a subsidiary of 
Raytheon (Ember 1990).  
However, the U.S. military's toxic waste problem extends far beyond 
the weapons that make up the unitary stockpile. Indeed, according to 
numerous reports, the Department of Defense (DOD), is the United States 
number one polluter. The military's toxic legacy is described most aptly by 
Lenny Seigel (1991 ) of the National Toxics Campaign. He observes that "the 
military-industrial establishment, i .e . ,  the facilities of the DOD, military 
contractors, and the Energy Department's  nuclear weapons production 
complex have accumulated a monstrous collection of toxic waste sites" (Seigel 
et al, 1991,  p. ii ) and that "in 1989, DOD estimated that it generated about 900 
million pounds of hazardous wastes, as well as 17 b illion pounds of 
wastewater, much of it contaminated with toxic chemicals" (Seigel et al ,  1991, 
p .  ii) . To make matters worse, until very recently, federal facilities were 
exempt from the enforcement powers of environmental regulators. Seigel 
( 1991 ) and his colleagues argue argue that the Pentagon's  environmental 
record has been abysmal. "At facility after facility," they write, "DOD has 
concealed or denied the impact, extent, and even the existence of toxic 
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contamination. Moreover, DOD's growing military cleanup program is 
dwarfed by the enormity of its other missions" (Seigel et al, 1991, p.  iii) . One 
could make a case that the security of having destruction facilities located on 
federa l property rather than on private property, gives the military a better 
chance of dealing with its enormous hazardous waste problem because 
federal facilities are often exempt from the rigors of certain environmental 
laws. 
1 . 15 The Political Economy of Incineration: Recent Trends 
The Army's decision to use high-temperature incineration as the 
baseline technology is in line with recent trends in the hazardous waste 
industry. This is spurred on, no doubt, by the Environmental Protection 
Agency which virtually mandated incineration for certain kinds of hazardous 
waste . In 1988, revenues from the manufacture and sale of incineration 
equipment were estimated at $1 .6  billion, while income from "incineration 
services" was estimated at $370 million (Fredonia Group 1990). Growth in 
each sector's revenue has averaged more than 30 percent each year, while 
projected growth through 1993 is 20 percent for both sectors (Fredonia Group 
1990) . Costner and Thornton (1990) argue that the EPA has been the driving 
force behind the incineration industry 's rapid expansion. The United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) encourages incineration as the best 
available "permanent" cleanup method for many types of contaminated soils 
and other materials (Costner, 1990) .  
Greenpeace points out that much of the incineration industry's future 
and profits are going to come from taxpayer's money since a large share of 
expenditures will be necessary to clean up contaminated industrial sites on 
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the Superfund list (see Appendix D) and at government sites owned by the 
Department of Defense and the Department of Energy. The total cost of 
Superfund cleanup has been estimated at $500 billion dollars over fifty years 
(Office of Technology Assessment 1989) .  Cleanup costs for inactive DOE sites 
alone have been estimated at $35 billion to $65 billion (Gruber 1990) . E P A  
administrators and industry executives have maintained close ties not unlike 
those traditionally found between the Pentagon and other industry moguls. 
The close relationship between the hazardous waste disposal industry and 
EPA has been alluded to by Costner and Thorton (1990) in what they call the 
"revolving door" phenomenon by which former EPA officials take lucrative 
jobs in the incinerator industry and the Department of Defense and the 
Department of Energy. "Neither department," they point out, "has had an 
encouraging record of public disclosure, compliance with environmental 
laws, or efficient spending in its contract decisions" (Costner, 1990, p. 48) .  
They are also quick to point out that despite rhetoric about the importance of 
"recycling" and of reducing waste, this rush to burn only exacerbates the 
problem by providing lucrative incentives to continue producing more waste .  
The rate of hazardous waste generation in the U.S .  is  rising by at least 5.5 
percent per year (Costner 1991)  and an ever-increasing share of this growing 
quantity of waste is now being directed to incinerators as opposed to land 
burial. 
1 . 16  Summary 
The Army's current plan for the disposal of the lethal unitary stockpile 
has drawn fire from many quarters. On one hand, the Army is defending 
incineration, with the full weight of the regulatory machinery tending to 
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support the status quo decision; on the other hand, we have citizen activists 
in the host communities who oppose incineration and insist that alternatives 
be explored. Not surprisingly, the Army holds that their incineration plan is 
"safe" and they have financed an elaborate protective action program, the 
Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) to handle any 
chance chemical accidents (in the unlikely event of an "unplanned release" of 
chemical agent) related to the incineration program. However, they have 
never addressed the issue of the hazards of incineration per se in any of the 
documents relating to this program other than to assert that the incinerators 
will comply with a certain stringent clean air requirement as determined 
from trial burns . 
Congresswoman Pat Schroeder eloquently foreshadowed the dilemma 
presented by the Army's present plan to destroy the United States' arsenal of 
chemical weapons . In speaking to radiation burn victims, she once observed 
that "Our nuclear weapons program was built in the name of national 
security---protecting the lives of Americans . Now these very weapons, which 
were designed to protect citizens from some unnamed enemy, pose d angers 
to the very citizens they were designed to protect. One can't help but wonder, 
who was protected and at whose expense" (Schroeder, et al. 1987) .  Like our 
nuclear program, our chemical weapons (CW) program was created to protect 
Americans from some unnamed enemy and today we wonder, at whose 
expense will they be destroyed. 
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Chapter 2 
The Nature of Power: Machiavelli to Lukes 
2 . 1  The Nature of  Power 
This is a study of power; more specifically, it is a study of state power 
and the uses to which it is p ut in the context of contemporary American 
society. Studies of power and the state have been the mainstay of thoughtful 
philosophers and social scientists throughout the ages. The concept of power 
is perhaps the most fundamental in the whole of political science --- and 
perhaps the most contentious. The political process is the shaping, 
distribution, and exercise of power. Debates about power d ate b ack to 
Machiavelli (1532) and probably to Socrates' dialogue with Thrasymachus in 
the fifth century B.C.E. This study of power is not intended to be exhaustive 
and we will not be launching into a full exposition on the concept; rather, we 
will limit our attention to the extended debate on the subject that has been 
waged in the literature of American social science with emphasis on the ways 
in which Machiavelli 's unique perspective can shed light on the present 
study. 
Power, like "democracy" is what W. B. Gallie once referred to as an 
"essentially contestable" concept (Emerson 1983, p .58) .  It is an inherently 
debatable and changeable idea l ike "freedom," "equality," "justice," or 
"human rights," and, as such, is subject to numerous interpretations and 
definitions (Arblaster 1987) . The most widely used definition of power in the 
social sciences is that of Max Weber. Weber wrote that, "We understand by 
'power' the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in 
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a social action even against the resistance if others who are p articipating in 
the action" (Wrong 1979, p .  21 ) .  Or to paraphrase Weber, you have power if 
you get what you want. 
Domhoff (1983) argues that the partiality shown to Weber's definition, 
has the disadvantage of harboring within it the implicit theory that at bottom 
the basis of power is the ability to use force or coercion on the other person or 
group. It, therefore, prejudices what should be a question open to empirical 
study. The point is made pithily in Allen Drury 's  novel, A Shade of 
D ifference  , "The more real power you have, the less you can afford to 
exercise it, and the less real power you have, the more you can throw it 
around"(Drury 1962, p .82). 
In order to avoid the problem inherent in Weber's definition, we 
prefer the definition put forth by Bertrand Russell :  "Power is the capacity of 
some persons to produce intended and foreseen effects on others" (Russell, 
1 938, pp. 1 0- 1 1 ) .  This definition avoids the temptation to view power as one­
dimensional and allows for a broader structural analysis of power processes. 
Marx saw economic power as the source of all power; however, Bertrand 
Russell disagreed with this notion. He argued, "It has been customary to 
accept economic power without analysis, and this has led in modern times, to 
an undue emphasis on economic as opposed to war and propaganda quite as 
much as upon the factors usually considered in economics" (Russell, 1938 pp . 
1 20,135) . He further argues that, "Power has many forms such as wealth, 
armaments, c ivil authority, influence on opinion. No one of these can be 
regarded as subordinate to any other, and there is no one from which the 
others are derivative" (Russell 1938, pp. 1 3-14) . Lasswell (1950) reiterates this 
sentiment in the first of his 'propositions' on power. "The forms of power," 
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he says, "are interdependent: a certain amount of several forms of power is a 
necessary condition for a great amount in any form. and none of the forms of 
power is basic to all others" (Lasswell and Kaplan 1950, p .  92,94).  Paulo Friere 
( 1972) also supports this view, he argues that power is accumulative in 
nature, each d imension serving to reinforce the other (Friere, 1 972) .  
However, Parenti challenges these arguments. He writes, "Far from the fluid 
interplay envisioned by the pluralists, the political efficacy of groups and 
individuals is largely determined by the resources of power available to them, 
of which wealth is the most crucial," and he continues, "those who control 
the wealth of society enjoy a persistent and pervasive political advantage" 
(Parenti 1980,p . 304) . .  This point was made eminently clear by an activist who 
commented, "The Army has nine billion dollars; we have bake sales! "  
A number o f  scholars (Frederick 1937; Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950; 
Tawney 1931 ;  Dalh 1957) argue that power should be defined relationally, not 
as a simple property. Hence, 'political power' is distinguished from power 
over nature as power over other men. Frederick ( 1937) emphasizes this point 
by devising an "axiom" regarding power stating that, "It is a certain kind of 
human relationship" (Frederick 1937,p . 12-14) .  Tawney's definition similarly 
reflects this emphasis regarding the relational quality of power. He says, 
"Power may be defined as the capacity of an individual, or group of 
individuals, to modify the conduct of other individuals or groups in the 
manner which he desires . . .  " (Tawney 1931, p. 230) .  Lasswell agrees that 
power should be defined relational ly, not as a single property ( 1950) . H e  
argues that unless some connection exists between A and B, then no power 
relation can be said to exist. Dahl also agrees with this formulation, "First let 
us agree, he says, "that power is a relation, and it is a relation among people" 
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(Dahl, 1 957,p . 80) .  In elaborating on what he calls his ' intuitive v1ew of 
power', Dahl writes that power "seemed to involve a successful attempt by A 
to get a to do something he would not otherwise do" (Bell et al . 1969, p .82) . 
Lasswell and Kaplan extend their concept to include participation in the 
making of decisions and they also note that, "the amount of power tends to 
increase ' til limited by other power holders" (Lasswell and Kaplan 1950,p. 94). 
We will return to this notion later on in this analysis. Further, they point out 
that a power relation can exist only if one of the parties can threaten to 
invoke sanctions: power is "the process of affecting policies of others with the 
help of (threatened) severe deprivations for nonconformity with the policies 
intended" (Lasswell, 1950, p.76) . 
Power is often confused with "force," "coercion," "authority," and 
" influence ."  While force is sometimes used by the powerful to obtain 
compliance, Parsons argues that, "securing compliance with a wish, whether 
it be defined as an obligation of the object or not, simply by threat of superior 
force, is not an exercise of power" (Bell, et al .  1 969, p. 251 ) .  Bachrach and 
Baratz ( 1962) use "power" in two distinct senses. On the one hand, they use it 
in a general way to refer to all forms of successful control of A over B ---that 
is, of A 's  securing B's compliance. Lasswell (1950) argues that it is the threat 
of sanctions which differentiates power from influence in general .  He points 
out that, "Power is a special case of the exercise of influence; it is the process of 
affecting policies of others with the help of (actual or threatened) severe 
deprivations for nonconformity with the policies intended." Lukes ( 1974) 
notes that among pluralists, "power" and "influence" tend to be used 
interchangeably, on the assumption that there is 'a primitive notion that 
seems to lie behind all of these concepts' (Dahl 1 957 in Bell, 1 969 p. 80) . 
5 9  
According to Lukes , "Who Govern s ?  "speaks mainly of ' influence' , while 
Polsby speaks mainly of 'power"' (Lukes 1974, p .  12) .  
The foregoing d iscussion can easily lead one to conclude that the 
concept of power is really of little theoretical utility, however, we feel that this 
is not the case. We must be clear, however, that we are concerned with state 
power, which is a collective phenomenon, not the individual exercise of  
power. The state has enormous resources at its d isposal (both overt and 
subtle) to see that its prerogatives are fulfilled, and unless checked by a 
formidable counter force, will pursue its own agenda. In the modern state, 
part of the process of retaining power is to cloak its decisions in the mantle of 
concensus. This brings us full circle to a discussion of  the insights of 
Machiavell i .  
2.2 Machiavelli: Prophet for a Modern Age 
We begin with Machiavelli, and properly so, for he was the first 
modern analyst of state power. In his eloquent Introduction to The Prince 
and the Discourses (1940) Max Lerner writes, "We live today in the shadow of 
a Florentine, the man who above all others taught the world to think in 
terms of cold political  power" (Lerner 1940, p .  xxv). Machiavelli's interest was 
not so much in defin i ng power as in describing how to u s e  power--­
particuarly, state power. His whole life was bound up with a passionate 
fascination with the idea of state power. Gauss ( 1952) argues that The Prince 
should now become required reading for all who wish to understand some of 
the central problems of our day, e. g., what is, or should be, the relation of the 
citizen to the state, and what is, or what ought to be, the relations of the states 
to each other, and finally, and most importantly, what are the sources of, and 
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the limits, if any, to the power of the state. According to Gauss ( 1952) 
nowhere in The Prince do we find any limit placed upon the power of the 
state; yet it was this problem of limiting state power that was the primary 
concern of Thomas Jefferson. 
Now, one may ask what a person who lived four centuries ago can 
contribute to our understanding of technological society in the 20th century. 
First, Machiavelli lived during the dawning of what we now refer to as the 
"nation-state" system. He lived in a period when economic growth had gone 
so far as to burst the bounds of existing political forms. Nineteenth century 
man expressed ultimate faith in progress and the nation and was inclined to 
regard the world of the nation states as a kind of utopia. If there was no other 
law over the sovereign, there did remain what has sometimes been called the 
first law of nature---that of self-preservation. Many crimes were committed 
in its name. No state could afford to see its neighbors become too strong; 
therefore, various forms of imperialism, colonialism and even "preventive 
wars" were undertaken in the name of the national interest or "for reasons of 
state." This became, in fact, the only law (Gauss 1952). Christian Gauss (1952) 
argues that in regarding the state as a dynamic expansive force, Machiavelli 
was closer to reality and 'Rea lpol i t ik ' than much nineteenth and early 
twentieth-century thinking and in this respect must be considered a distinctly 
modern thinker. In fact, Gramsci's concept of hegemony embodied concepts 
strikingly similar to Machiavelli .  According to David Forgacs ( 1988) who 
edited a collection of Gramsci's writings, the concept of hegemony is linked 
by Gramsci in a chain of associations and oppositions to ' civil society' as 
against 'political society' ,  to consent as against coercion, to 'direction as 
against 'domination' "These binaries," he writes, "draw on the coercion-
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consent opposition in Machiavell i  and some other political thinkers" 
(Forgacs 1988, p.  423) .  
In Max Lerner's Introduction to The Prince and the Discou rses, he 
argues that, "Machiavelli wrote a grammar of power, not only for the 
sixteenth century but for the ages that followed" (Lerner, 1 950, p. xxxiv) .  
Lerner observes that when Machiavelli wrote his grammar o f  power, he came 
close to setting down the imperatives by which men govern and are governed 
in pol i t ica l  communities whatever the epoch and whatever the 
governmental  structure .  Lerner (1950) argues that Machiavelli ' s  thinking 
amounted to something akin to a revolution in political thinking. He 
eschewed the humanists' writings about princes because these writings were 
ridden with theology and metaphysics, and instead he concentrated on 
writing about the actual politics of his time. Machiavelli concluded that the 
core of the state was power, and he conceived of the state as something not  
outside of  our human world. "The particular form of the state under which 
men live is not imposed by either God or the devil," as Christian Gauss 
observed in his Introduction to Machiavelli 's , The Prince. (Gaus 1 940, p .  xi) . 
Machiavelli argued that to some degree, at least, the state is man's creation, 
and like other human creations, subject to his revision, i .e . ,  the particular 
formation of the state was not inevitable nor accidental .  In this he 
forshadowed Marx. 
Machiavelli 's true legacy is his lack of illusions about the state. As the 
author of the concept of "for reasons of state" (raison d '  e ta t  ) , he viewed the 
state as a necessary evil rather than as a benign entity, and in this, he opened 
up a window on how later analysts of state power might approach the subject. 
In speaking about Machiavelli 's unique perspective, Lerner ( 1950) writes, "He 
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had the clear-eyed capacity to distinguish between man as he ought to be and 
man as he actually is --- between the ideal form of institutions and the 
pragmatic conditions under which they operate" (Lerner, 1950, p. xxxii) . 
"Where others looked at figureheads," Lerner maintains, "he kept his eyes 
glued behind the scenes. He sought the ultimate propulsion of events. He 
wanted to know what made things tick; he wanted to take the clock of the 
world to pieces and find out how it worked" (Lerner, 1950, p.  xxvi) . Thus, he 
forshadowed later theorists who refused to accept the conventional wisdoms 
(i.e., that of the pluralists) regarding the operation of power in contemporary 
society. In particular his emphasis on "structure" as opposed to "personality" 
has become an important feature of later developments in conflict theory. In 
employing the metaphor of the stage, Michael Albert ( 1992) described 
Machiavelli's perspective perfectly: "What we have to understand," he said, 
"is the script that lies behind the actors, and the script in this case flows from 
the interstices of institutional power, not from the will of some malevolent 
conspirators operating outside the bounds of the system or even against it" 
(Albert, 1992). 
Machiavelli recognized four things as essential components of state 
power which are germane to our analysis: ( 1 )  the centralization of power; (2) 
the importance of appearances ["It is not, therefore, necessary for a prince to 
have all the above-named qualities, but it is very necessary to seem to have 
them" (Machiavelli { 1532} 1940, p. xxxii) ] ;  (3) the need for allowing citizens a 
mechanism for venting grievances " without having recourse to 
extraordinary measures" (Machiavelli { 1 532} 1940, p .  133); and (4)  the need to 
build consensus---hence, the modern state's need for propaganda and other 
institutional methods for what has euphemistically been referred to as 
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"maintaining citizen concurrence ."  With regard to the importance of  
consensus building he said, "Well ordered states and wise princes have 
studied diligently not to drive the nobles to desperation, and to satisfy the 
populace and keep it contented, for this is one of the most important matters 
that a prince has to deal with" (Machiavelli / 1532 } 1940, p. 59) .  
Machiavelli lived at the dawning of what we have come to refer to as 
the nation-state system . Lerner ( 1940) writes that  two elements were 
historically to enter into the composition of the nation-state system: one was 
national unity and the idea of a common culture and common economic 
limits; the second was a concentration of power at the center. According to 
Lerner, "Machiavelli only dimly foresaw nationalism, but he was keenly 
aware of the necessity for the concentration of power from the center in order 
to maintain unity and he wrote about the methods by which this could be 
achieved" (Lerner 1940, p.34). Although history has not been kind to the 
memory of Machiavelli, his contribution to the understanding of the 
dynamics of the modern state and our understanding of political power, as it 
is actually exercised, cannot be underestimated . Unfortunately, the common 
sense view of Machiavelli, i .e ,  the notion of "Machiavellian" tactics or a 
Machiavellian "personality" does not do  justice to his truly structural 
perspective --- this above all is his legacy. We see in his "Prince" a metaphor 
for state power. 
Lerner ( 1940) observes that power politics existed before Machiavelli 
was ever heard of and will exist long after his memory. What he did was 
recognize its existence and subject it to scientific study. And so his name has 
been associated with it. As we progress through the analysis of the empirical 
data, Machiavelli 's contribution will become clearer. 
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2.3 The Three Faces of Power 
The analytic framework for this research is that of Steven Lukes ( 1974), 
a British sociologist, and his formulation of what he termed, The "Three 
Faces of Power". According to Lukes ( 1974), there are three ways of analyzing 
power in capitalist societies. Using what he terms a "three dimensional 
view," his schema provides a useful framework for understanding the 
dialectics of power and dissent, particularly because his approach emphasizes 
structural constraints rather than individual action. It should be emphasized, 
however, that the dimensions of power should not be construed as operating 
separately. Instead, it should be understood that the separation of power into 
three faces or d i m e n s io n s  is purely for heuristic purposes. The three 
dimensions, although discussed separately, are to be thought of as occurring 
simultaneously. A useful metaphor for understanding the operation of  
power as  described by Lukes would be peeling away the layers of an onion. 
The first dimension according to Lukes' ( 1 974) formulation defines 
power (known as the pluralist view) as the ability of A to prevail over B in 
formal political decision-making on one or more key issues over which there 
is observable conflict (Lukes 1 974) .  The second dimension includes the first, 
but expands to include the ability to determine what is to count  as an issue 
where there is observable conflict and the third d imension involves the 
ability of A to shape the conceptions of the situation of the powerless and 
"this may happen in the absence of observable conflict, which may have been 
successfully averted" (Lukes 1974, pp. 24-25) . According to Gaventa, the third 
dimension is "by far the least developed and least understood mechanism of 
power--at least within the field of political science" (1980, p. 15) .  The present 
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study falls somewhere between the second and third dimensions of power 
according to Lukes' (1974) paradigm. 
2 .4 The First Dimension of Power: The Pluralists 
The study of power in the United States has focused on community 
studies and has been dominated largely --- at least in political science---by the 
pluralists ' school of thought, as exemplified in the works of Robert Dahl, 
Wolfinger and Polsby (Dahl 1961 ;  Wolfinger 1971 ;  Polsby 1 963) . The 
community power literature is not particularly helpful in understanding the 
operation of power at the national level in the modern state. Power in local 
communities is said to be fractionated and d iffuse, by all accounts of the 
pluralis ts. However, pluralists do not confine their analysis of the nature of 
power to local community structures, but use this paradigm to explain the 
operation of state power as well. Pluralists argue that power is not held by 
one group, but plurally by many groups. They affirm that: 
The power structure of  the Uni ted States is highly 
complex and d iversified (rather than unitary and 
monolithic) ,  that  the political system is more or less 
democratic, that in political processes the political elite is 
ascendent over and not subordinate to the economic elite 
(Rose 1967, p. 492) . 
Dahl's study of New Haven is the exemplar of pluralist philosophy and 
methodology. He studied three "issue areas" in New Haven politics to see 
who prevailed in the decision-making process: party nominations, urban 
redevelopment and public education (Dahl 1961) .  He concluded that no one 
elite controlled the politics of New Haven. On the contrary, he argued that 
different groups exercise influence over issues of specific concern to them. 
Thus, b usiness leaders in New Haven were influent ia l  in urb an 
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redevelopment of the downtown business area, smce this was of clear 
concern to them. However, business leaders "did not control education, hold 
a large number of political offices, or greatly influence political nominations 
in New Haven" (Sherman and Wood 1989, p. 273) .  Hence, he concluded that 
democracy thrived in New Haven and he argued that no "ruling class" can be 
seen to dominate. 
Dahl's central method in Who Governs ? was to 'determine for each 
decision which p articipants had initiated alternatives that were fina lly 
adopted, had vetoed alternatives initiated by others, or had proposed 
alternatives that were turned down. In Merleman's words, the pluralists 
"studied actual behavior, stressed operational definitions, and turned up 
evidence. Most important, i t  seemed to produce reliable conclusions which 
met the canons of science" (Merelman 1968,p . 451 ) .  The focus on observable 
behavior in identifying power involves the pluralists in studying decision­
making as their central concept. Polsby writes that, "Power may be studied by 
examining 'who participates, who gains and loses, and who prevails in 
decision-making" (Polsby 1963, p .  55) . "The key to the definition is a focus on 
behavior --- doing, participating --- about which several assumptions are 
made . . .  First, grievances are assumed to be recognized and acted upon . . 
Secondly, participation is assumed to occur within decision-making arenas, 
which are in turn assumed to be open to virtually any organized group" 
(Gaventa 1 980,p. 5) .  It  is further assumed that the decisions involve direct, 
i .e., actual and observable conflict. Thus, for Dahl, power can be analyzed 
only after "careful examination of a series of concrete decisions" (Dahl 1958). 
The p luralist focus on "observable behavior," i .e. ,  decisions reached over 
specific issue areas, has its basis in the theory of logical positivism prevalent 
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at the beginning of the twentieth century and venerated by pluralist thinkers 
and many social scientists alike. Positivists argued that only observable 
behavior i .e . ,  behavior that is measurable ( like voting) constituted valid 
k no w l e d g e .  Following behaviorist principles, pluralists believe that 
individuals' interests can be discovered by seeing which policy options they 
choose; hence, pluralists tend to ignore many features of the operation of 
power that lay hidden beneath the surface, arguing that you can't study what 
you can't measure. Dahl's findings have not gone unchallenged, however. 
Domhoff ( 1978)  has challenged Dahl on behaviorist grounds and other 
studies (Lyon, et al .  1 981; Tabb and Sawers 1978) support this critique. In an 
interesting rejoinder to the pluralists' insistence on studying only "observable 
phenomena," Michael Parenti writes, "Now I, for one, have no quarrel with 
the dictum that we observe only the observable, but it may be suggested that 
what the pluralists have defined as "observable" is not all that meets the eyes 
of other researchers" (Parenti 1970, p .  504). 
In his critique of pluralist methodology, Floyd Hunter said, "They { the 
p luralists} have begun their structure at the mezzanine without showing us a 
lobby or foundation, i .e . ,  they have begun by studying the issues rather than 
the values and biases that are built into the political system, and that, for the 
student of power, give real meaning to those issues which do enter the public 
arena"(Hunter 1 953) 
As the foregoing discussion makes clear, the pluralists concentrate 
their attention, not upon the sources of power, but upon its exercise. Power 
to them means "participation in decision-making," and can be analyzed only 
after a c areful examination of a series of concrete decisions. (It has been 
pointed out, however, that using pluralist methodology, it is possible to come 
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to some very non-pluralist conclusions) .  The model takes no account of the 
fact that power can be and often is exercised by confining the scope of the 
decision making to relatively "safe" issues. In brief, the one d imensional 
view of power cannot reveal the less visible ways in which a pluralist system 
may be biased in favor of certain groups and against others. "A deeper 
analysis," Lukes suggests, "would concern itself with all the complex and 
subtle w ays in which the inactivity of leaders and the sheer weight of 
institutions--political, industrial, military, educational, keep people from 
even trying to get into the political arena" (Lukes, 1974, p .  1 ) .  And I would 
add, once there, keep them from participating in substantive ways in the 
decisions that affect their lives. 
Dahl did not limit his conclusions to the municipal  government of 
New Haven, but extended his findings as evidence that the entire American 
political system was similarly open based on the fact that groups compete for 
power. He wrote: "The independence, penetrability, and heterogeneity of the 
various segments of the political stratum all but  guarantee that  any 
dissatisfied group will find spokesmen in the political arena" (Dahl 1961,  p .  
9 3 ) .  Similarly, Polsby writes, " in  the decision-making of  fragmented 
government--and American national, state, and local government are 
nothing if not fragmented--the claims of small intense minorities are usually 
attended to" (Polsby 1963, p .  1 18). 
The notion that competing groups in society can and do  act as a 
restraint on tyranny has wide acceptance. Indeed, even Machiavelli spoke 
about the equalizing effect of various competing groups within society. He 
wrote, "In fact, when there is combined under the same constitution a prince, 
a nobility, and the power of the people, then these three powers will watch 
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and keep each other reciprocally in check" (Machiavelli 1 940,p . 1 15 ) .  
Similarly, the English pluralist, David Nichols, argued that the existence of  
diverse groups in society, e.g., "cultural, religious, economic, civic and others, 
constitute . . .  the principal bulwark against state absolutism" (Nichols 1974, p .  
2 ) .  C .W.  Mills referred to this as the idea of  "the great balance." He wrote: 
"The idea of the great balance, { italics mine} in all its various forms, is now 
the prevailing common-sense view of public affairs" (Mills 1956, p. 336) . 
Sherman and Wood ( 1989) point out that a newer and more qualified 
version of the pluralist conception has emerged in the work of Dye ( 1983), as 
well as Orum(1967) and Knoke ( 1982). Pluralists now make the argument 
that "America is ruled by various competing elites" (Kourvetaris and Dobratz 
1 982) . The new pluralists vision admits some inequality, but still sees a 
resulting political democracy that roughly reflects and arbitrates the desires of 
many conflicting groups. However, Sherman and Wood write: 
They {pluralists }  find it necessary to emphasize,that 
political power is to a large degree independent of and 
superior to economic power. The reason, of course, is that 
economic power is so unequally distributed .  I f  the 
d istribution of political power exactly followed that of 
economic power, the degree of inequality would leave 
little to call democracy (Sherman and Wood 1 989, p. 268) .  
2.5 Elite Theory 
Counterpoised to pluralist theory is another view of power, known as 
elite theory which postulates a ruling class model of power. Elite theorists 
(Domhoff 1 983; Hunter 1953; Mills 1956) argue that there is a social upper class 
in the United States that is a ruling class by virtue of its dominant role in the 
economy and government. Further, Domhoff (1978) argued that this ruling 
class is socially cohesive, has, its basis in the large corporations and banks (and 
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the military), plays a major role in shaping the social and political climate, 
and dominates the federal government through a variety of organizations 
and methods. Leaders within the upper class join with high-level employees 
in the organizations they control to make up what will be called the power 
elite. Domhoff writes: 
This power elite is the leadership group of the upper class 
as a whole, but it is not the same thing as the upper class, 
for not all members of the upper c lass are members of the 
power elite and not all  members of the power elite are 
part of the upper class . It is members of the power elite 
who take part in the processes that maintain the c lass 
structure . Domination does not mean total controt but 
the ability to set the terms under which other groups and 
other classes must operate. (Domhoff 1978, p. 2) 
Against the elitist approach to analyzing power several criticisms have 
been levelled .  For example, Dahl and others, while not denying the existence 
of elites, maintain that their power is checked by other elites.  Dahrendorf 
( 1959) writes, "If there are elites in our society, the p luralists say, they are 
numerous and specialized, and they are checked in their demands by other 
elites" (Dahrendorf 1959, p. 67) . According to Dahrendorf, pluralists argue 
that no one group can press its advantage "too far" and any group that is 
interested in an issue can find a way" (Dahrendorf 1959, p. 67) . To this 
assertion Parenti replies, "Not only are elites often unchecked by public 
authority on the most important issues affecting them, but in many instances 
public decision making authority has been parcelled out to private interests 
on a highly inegalitarian basis" (Parenti 1970, p. 503). Dahl has criticized the 
power elite thesis on other grounds as well. He erroneously conceives of elite 
domination exclusively in the form of a 'conscious cabal '  exercising the 
power of decision-making and vetoing. "In doing so/' argue Bachrach and 
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Baratz, "he overlooks a more subtle form of domination, one in which those 
who actually dominate are not conscious of it themselves, simply because 
their position of dominance has never seriously been challenged" (Bachrach 
and Baratz 1962, p .  952) . 
Elite theorists claim that in every institution there is an ordered system 
of power, a "power structure" which is an integral part and mirror image of 
the organization's stratification, and they imply that this power structure 
tends to be stable over time. Polsby disagrees with this formulation and he 
writes, "It has been assumed (by elite theorists) that power is as predictably 
distributed in the population as the other stand-bys of stratification analysis, 
c lass and status seem to be" (Polsby 1963 p.232) .  It is also argued that elite 
theorists wrongly equate reputed power with actual power (Bachrach, 1 962) . 
Dahl ( 1958) maintains that one can only strictly test the hypothesis of a ruling 
class if there are, " . . .  cases involving key political decisions in which the 
preferences of the hypothetical ruling elite run counter to those of any other 
likely group that might be suggested, and . .  .in such cases, the preference of 
the elite regularly prevail" (Dahl 1958, p. 466) . Finally, Frey (1971 ) makes "a 
plea for a decent burial" of the elitist/pluralist controversy, in order to launch 
a joint assault on the important, yet outstanding problems of community 
power analysis (Frey, 1971 ). Eventually, the controvrsey was put to rest, but its 
spirit escaped the grave and remains alive, embodied in new terminology. 
2.6 The Second Dimension of Power 
One of the most important aspects of power, Parenti suggests, is not to 
prevail in a struggle but to predetermine the agenda of struggle--to determine 
whether certain issues ever reach the competition stage (Parenti 1 970) .  This 
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point of view was elaborated first by Schattschneider (1960) and then later by 
Bachrach and Baratz (1970). 
According to pluralists, power is exercised when "A" gets "B" to do 
something that "B" would not otherwise do. However, power is also 
exercised when "A" devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and 
political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political 
process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively 
innocuous (i .e . ,  "safe" issues) .  Lasswell ( 1930) first commented about the 
importance of limiting the scope of conflict. "The problem of politics," he 
sa id, "is less to solve conflicts than to prevent them" (Lasswell 1930,  
p . 1 96, 1 9 7 ) .  Following Lasswell, Schattschneider ( 1960) wrote about the 
importance of containing or limiting the scope of a conflict. He said: "The 
scope factor overthrows the familiar simplistic calculus based on the moral 
tug of war of measurable forces" (Schattschneider 1960, p.S) .  
Power holders manage this in a variety of ways. One of the ways 
Schattschneider describes is through, what he termed, the "mobilization of 
bias." He wrote: 
All forms of political organization have a bias in favor of 
exploiting some kinds of conflict and the suppression of 
others because organization is the mobilization of bias . 
Some issues are organized into politics while others are 
organized out" (Schattschneider 1 960, p. 71 ) .  
The term 'mobilization of bias' as described by Bachrach and Baratz 
refers to, "a set of  predominant values, beliefs, rituals, institutional 
procedures (i .e. ,  "rules of  the game")  that operate systematically and 
consistently to the benefit of certain persons and groups at the expense of 
others. Those who benefit are placed in a position to defend and promote 
their vested interests" (Bachrach and Baratz 1 970, p .  43) .  More often than not, 
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the status quo defenders are a minority or elite group within the population 
in question. 
Pluralists assert that power is reflected only in concrete decisions, 
however, Professor Schattschneider reminds us that, "to the extent that a 
person or group consciously or unconsciously creates or reinforces barriers to 
the public airing of policy conflicts, that person or group has power" 
(Schattschneider 1960, p .  96). He argued that the crucial problem in politics is 
the management of conflict. He wrote: 
All politics, all leadership, all organization involves the 
management of conflict . . .  the consequences of conflict are 
so important that it is inconceivable that any regime could 
survive without making an attempt to shape the system. 
In the interest of their own political survival, therefore, 
leaders and organizations must make sure that issues 
which threaten their existence, their own allocations of 
political space, are not admitted to the political arena 
(Schattschneider 1960, p. 71 ) .  
Following Schattschneider, Bachrach and Baratz ( 1962) developed the 
concept of "power's second face" by which power is exercised not just upon 
participants within the decision-making process but also towards the 
exclusion of certain participants and issues altogether. In effect, they argue 
that the p luralists : ( 1 )  focus upon " issues"; (2) p rovide no way of  
d istinguishing " important" from "unimportant" issues; and (3 )  are blind to 
the values and biases built into the political system that give real meaning to 
those issues which do not enter the political arena. 
The second d imensional approach looks at blockages that prevent 
grievances from emerging into conflict within the organization. For 
Bachrach and Baratz ( 1962) it is crucially important to identify potential issues 
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which nondecision-making prevents from becoming actual. They argue that 
"the d istinction between important and unimportant issues cannot be made . 
. . intelligently in the absence of an analysis of the 'mobilization of bias' in the 
community which consists of an analysis of the dominant values and the 
political myths, rituals and institutions which tend to favor the vested 
interests of one or more groups relative to others" (Bachrach and Baratz 1962, 
p. 950) .  They argue that in the interest of their own political survival, leaders 
and organizations must make sure that issues which threaten their existence, 
their own allocations of political space, are not admitted to the political arena. 
This is done in a variety of ways: (1) through invoking the 'mobilization of 
bias'; (2) through creating barriers to participation, e.g., agenda setting ; and (3) 
through decisions and 'nondecisions. '  Nondecision-making is a term used 
to refer to the practice of limiting the scope of actual decision-making to 
"safe" issues by manipulating the dominant community values, myths, and 
political institutions and procedures. A a non-decision is defined as: 
A decision that results in suppression or thwarting of a 
latent or manifest challenge to the values or interests of 
the decision maker.  To be more nearly explicit ,  
nondecision-making is a means by which demands for 
change in the existing allocation of benefits and privileges 
in the community can be suffocated before they are 
voiced, or kept covert; or killed before they gain access to 
the relevant decision-making arena; or, failing all of these 
things,  m aimed o r  destroyed in the dec i s ion­
implementing stage of the policy process (Bachrach and 
Baratz 1970,p. 44) . 
They suggest several ways in which this may be accomplished: (1)  by 
force; (2 )  threat of sanctions ( 'negative or positive' )  ' ranging from 
intimidation . . .  to co-optation' ;  (3) the invocation of an existing bias of the 
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political system, e.g., a norm, a precedent, a rule or procedure; (4) reshaping 
or strengthening the mobilization of bias through the establishment of new 
barriers or  new symbols against the challengers efforts to  widen the scope of 
the conflict (Gaventa 1980). Such processes may take direct observable forms; 
however, Gaventa suggests that, "there may be other processes of non­
decision-making power which are not so explicitly observable" (Gaventa 1980, 
p. 15) .  He refers to two processes, one which he terms 'decis ion less decis ions '  
and the other which he terms, ' the rule of anticipated reactions .  "The first of 
these,'decisionless decisions' ,  he says, "grows from institutional inaction, or 
the unforeseen sum effect of incremental decisions" (Gaventa 1980, p . 15) . A 
second process has to do with the ' rule of anticipated reactions,' "situations 
where B, confronted by A who has greater power resources decides not to 
make a demand upon A, for fear that the latter will invoke sanctions against 
him" (Bachrach and Baratz 1970, pp . 42-46) . 
An example of an empirical work which makes use of the concepts of 
"nondecision-making" is Matthew Crenson's book, The Unpolitics of Air 
Pollu tion: A Study of NonDecision-making in the Cities (Crenson 1 971 ) .  He 
concludes that the a ir pollution issue tends not to flourish in cities where 
industry enjoys a reputation for power. 
Lukes has criticized Bachrach and Baratz' view of p ower on the 
grounds that they follow the pluralists in adopting a too methodologically 
individualistic view of power. "As students of power and its consequences," 
they write, "our main concern is not whether the defenders of the status quo 
use their power consciously, but rather, if and how they exercise it and what 
effects i t  has on the political process and other actors within the system" 
(Lukes 1974, p .  21 ) .  Lukes argues that the bias of the system is not sustained 
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simply by a series of individually chosen acts, but also by the social ly 
s truc tured and culturally patterned behavior of groups, and the practices of 
institu tions which may be manifested by individual actors (Lukes 1974) .  In 
his classic work 1 984, Orwell expressed it similarly when he said : 
The essence of oligarchical rule is not father-to-son 
inheritance, but the persistence of a certain world-view 
and a certain way of life, imposed by the dead upon the 
living. A ruling group is a ruling group so long as it can 
nominate its successors. The Party is not concerned with 
perpetuating its blood, but with perpetuating itself. Who 
wields power is not important, provided tha t the 
hierarchical  structure rema ins a lways the same .  
(emphasis in original) (Orwell 1992, p .  153) .  
To sum up, Bachrach and Baratz resolutely reject the idea that a sound 
concept of power can be predicated on the assumption that power is totally 
embodied and fully reflected in "concrete decisions" or in activity bearing 
directly upon their making. The second dimensional view of power asserts 
that A constructs barriers to the participation of B through non-decision 
making and the mobilization of bias. 
2.7 The Third Dimension of Power 
The second view has been extended by a third v1ew (Lukes 1974), 
which suggests that power not only may limit action upon inequali ties, it 
may also serve to shape people 's  minds so that they do not see certain 
problems. Lukes reminds us that daily life work involves the incorporation 
of a basic world view and this view is determined largely by members of a 
ruling class. Lukes' definition of power differs from that of the pluralists. 
Whereas the pluralists define power as the ability of A to get B to do 
something he would not otherwise do, Lukes ( 1974) writes: "I have defined 
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the concept of power by saying that A exercises power over B when A affects B 
in a manner contrary to B's interests" (Lukes 1974, p .  34). Later, he adds that 
whether or not B is conscious of his interests is irrelevant. Thus, an analysis 
of the third face (or the third dimension) of power seeks to specify the means 
through which power influences, shapes, or determines conceptions of the 
necessities, possibilities, and strategies of challenge in situations of la tent 
conflict. Such an analysis would include a study of myths, language, symbols 
and how they are shaped or manipulated by power processes. It would also 
delve into the area of "official ideologies" and "social legitimations," i .e . ,  the 
ways in which the powerful cloak the plans/programs they favor in ways that 
make them seem reasonable and worthy of consideration---even necessary. 
"It may involve, in short, locating the power processes behind the social 
construction of meaning and patterns that serve to get B to act and believe in 
a manner in which B otherwise might not, to A's benefit and B's detriment" 
(Gaventa 1980, p. 16) .  
J .  Allen Whitt's (1982) study of the transportation issue in Los Angeles 
illustrates the utility of going beyond a s imple view of power. Whitt 
compared three different models of political power with one another in order 
to determine which best explains the empirical data. He argues that a class­
dialectical model provides the best explanation for the data in his study. The 
class-dialectical model shares many features in common with Lukes' three 
d imensional model. It employs a view of power that stresses structural 
components while examining the built-in biases of political systems; i t  also 
resonates well with what we have referred to as the third d imension of 
power. Whitt (1982) argues that our whole system of transportation tends to 
be privatized "lending legitimacy and psychic inevitability to the idea that 
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automobiles are the most natural and efficient mode of transport" (Whitt 
1982, p .  204). 
Another empirical study which Lukes (1974) says lies on the borderline 
of the two-dimensional and three-dimensional views of power is Matthew 
Crenson's  study of air pollution politics . He concludes that the air pollution 
issue tends not to flourish in cities where industry enjoys a reputation for 
power (Crenson 1971) .  Lukes ( 1974) comments that, "Crenson's analysis is 
impressive . . .  because there is reason to expect that, other things being equal, 
people would rather not be poisoned" (Lukes 1974, p .45). We are reminded 
that each dimension of power tends to reinforce the o thers . As Lukes put it: 
"The d imensions of power, each with its sundry mechanisms, must be seen 
as interrelated in the totality of their impact" (Lukes 1974, p.  20) . 
Another example of recent research which employs a power theory 
framework is that of Michael R. Reich's  (1991)  Toxic Politics . In his book 
Reich presents case studies of persons and communities who have been 
poisoned in one way or another by various toxics. Reich's study focuses on 
the difficulties involved in obtaining redress for grievances -after the fact. His 
study is important as it sheds light on the power processes at work which are 
similar to those encountered in our study of the Chemical Stockpile Disposal 
Program. However, the present study differs from Reich's (1971)  in that we 
are looking at power processes that occur "before the fact" rather than after an 
emergency has already occurred. This is one of the features that distinguishes 
the present work from that of others who have labored with a similar 
research problem. 
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2.8 State Power 
Some of the most interesting debates in political science and sociology 
in the last few decades have to do with questions regarding the nature and 
character of state power. Questions regarding the nature and operation of 
state power have a direct bearing on the current research; therefore, i t  is 
necessary that we deal b riefly with some of the i mp ortant d ebates 
surrounding the subject of "the state ." Ralph Miliband once said, "A theory 
of the state is also a theory of society and of the distribution of power in 
society" (Miliband 1 969,p . 2). With that in mind we turn to a consideration of 
some of the major ways of thinking about the state and about the distribution 
of power therein. For the purposes of this study, we shall be speaking about 
" the modern state" which, admittedly is an abstraction, an "ideal type " i.e., a 
model such as Max Weber described . 
The modern state is a European, or more exactly, western European 
creation which emerged gradually in the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries and found its first mature form in the seventeenth. It emerged in 
the same time period as, and is coincident with the development of  
capitalism (Lubasz, 1964).  Miliband refers to  the modern state as a cap i ta l is t  
state. In Jessop's words, the "determinate conjuncture" of the modern state of 
which we speak, is the fact that it is enmeshed in a capitalist economy. The 
western state system evolved along with capitalism; therefore, capitalism has 
influenced the character and nature of the modern state to which we refer in 
this work. Speaking about "the modern state/' Heinz Lubasz wrote: 
The first thing to be said about the modern state is that it 
does not exist and never has existed. What has existed 
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historically is a great number of modern states, with very 
varied constitutions, internal  pol it ical  l ives, and 
international careers. When, therefore, we speak of the  
modern s t a te, we speak of an abstraction concocted of 
common denominators, of features common to many or 
most such states much of the time, but certainly not to be 
met with in precisely the same forms in all such states. 
(Lubasz 1964, p. 1 )  
Lenin once commented o n  the "treacherous bog" that characterizes 
theorizing about the state. In lecturing to his students, he remarked, "You 
will scarcely find another question which has been so confused, both 
deliberately and not, by representatives of bourgeois science, philosophy, 
jurisprudence, political economy and journalism, as the question of the state" 
(Lenin 1929, p . .  3) .  He remarked that, " it should first of all be noted that the 
state has not always existed . There was a time when there was no state" 
(Lenin 1929, p .S). Later, he added : "History shows that the state as a special 
apparatus for coercing people arose wherever and whenever there appeared a 
division of society into classes" (Lenin 1929, p .7). 
The community power literature is  not p articularly helpful in 
understanding the operation of power at the national level in the modern 
state. Power in local communities is said to be fractionated and diffuse, by all 
accounts of the pluralists. However, p luralists do not confine their analysis 
of the nature of power to local community structures, but use this paradigm 
to explain the operation of state power as well .  
Pluralists advocate methodological individualism which asserts that 
all hypotheses about human collectivities can and should ultimately be 
reduced to statements about individual agents . This implies that we can 
understand the operation of state power by studying the behavior of 
individual actors (Elster 1982; Lukes 1974) .  Expressing a similar idea, Lasswell 
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(1950) argued that the 'power of the state' cannot be understood in abstraction 
from the forms of power manifested in various types of interpersonal 
relations. Both of these reductionist views fail to capture the real nature of 
the state, for the state has an institutional quality that puts it beyond the pale 
of agency alone. 
Weber argued that there was no one task which specifically determined 
the state. Therefore, one had to define the state in terms of the specific means 
which it employed and these means were, ultimately, physical force 
(Schwarzmantel 1987) . "The state," Weber wrote, "is a human community 
that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force 
within a given territory" (Weber 1970, p. 78) .  His view comes closer to a view 
of power that stresses its structural components. We maintain that  the 
individual use of power cannot be held as a metaphor for state power. 
In a paper dealing with the relation between capitalism and democracy, 
Jessop ( 1978) talks about the character of the state. He argues that :  " In 
discussing the nature of the state, three points merit special emphasis: (a) the 
state is a structural ensemble rather than a subject; (b) the state is a system of 
political domination rather than a neutral instrument; and (c) state power is a 
complex social relation that reflects the changing balance of social forces in a 
determinate conjuncture" (Jessop 1978, p . ll ) .  
A review of the literature reveals that the state has  been variously 
conceived :  (a) as a force of divine origin, or as Hegel put it, "The idea made 
actual," p art and parcel of God's journey towards self-realization" (Dunleavy 
and O'Leary 1987, p .7) ;  (b) as an instrument of the ruling class ---" the 
instrumentalist," i .e., the Marxist view, or as Lenin put it, "as a machine for 
maintaining the rule of one class over another" (Lenin 1 929, p . l l ) ;  (c) as a 
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neutral agent (Birch 1964); (d) as an autonomous arbiter among contending 
"interest" groups, i.e, "the broker state" (Allison 1971; Halpern 1975); (e) as 
relatively autonomous (Skocpol 1980); (f) and as a fully autonomous entity 
(Block 1980); and (f) as a fully autonomous entity (Skocpol, 1993). 
According to Dunleavy and O'Leary ( 1987), the pluralists really have 
no theory of the state. In their view, the state becomes a neutral or benign 
entity. Using the "weathervane" or "cipher" model described by Dunleavy 
and O'Leary ( 1987), p luralists assume that the state simply mirrors or 
responds to the balance of pressure group forces in civil society. State 
organizations are seen as mainly inert recipients of pressure from interest 
groups. This image suggests a state highly responsive to political parties. 
Dunleavy writes, "Cipher pluralists regard both elected politicians and 
administrative elites as malleable and passive people whose actions conform 
to the prevailing patterns of pressure" (Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987, p. 5 1 ) .  On 
the other hand, in the "broker" state model, the state does not mirror its 
society, nor neutrally follow the public interest; it is an interest group state in 
which elected party government is only ' first amongst equals, as if contending 
groups were equally balanced---which is not the general pluralist assumption, 
as Dunleavy reminds us (1987, p.  47) . The broker state is not passive, neutral, 
or a black box. It should be noted, however, that much goes on outside 
political p arties and the electoral process, a fact which the p luralists 
summarily dismiss out of hand as either non-existent or as unimportant, i .e . ,  
trivial .  
Contrasting these views are those of the Marxist school. Marx and 
Engles expressed their basic premise on the nature of the state in T h e  
Communis t  Man ifes to: ( 1848): "The executive of the modern state is but a 
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committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie" (Marx 
and Engles { 1 848} 1971 ) .  Three perspectives have characterized work on the 
state in the Marxist tradition. They are: ( 1 )  the instrumentalists; (2) the 
structuralists ; and (3) the Hegelian-Marxists . Gold, Lo and Wright ( 1975) 
argue that, "Regardless of which of these traditions is drawn upon most 
heavily, virtually all Marxist treatments of the state begin with the 
fundamental observation that the state in capitalist society broadly serves the 
interests of the capitalist class" (Gold, et al. 1975, p. 31 ) .  
The classic instrumentalist position as originally articulated by Marx 
and Engles says the state is the instrument of the bourgeoisie (Baran and 
Sweezy 1 966; Domhoff 1 967; Miliband 1 969; Mills 1 956) . From this 
perspective, the ruling class is seen to utilize the government rather directly 
for its own benefit. It should be noted, however, that Domhoff vigorously 
denies being a member of this camp. In an article entitled ,  'I  am not an 
Instrumentalist," Domhoff insisted that instead of focusing solely on the 
political power of the capitalist class he made class struggle (italics mine) basic 
to his analysis (Domhoff 1976) . Structuralists stress the "relative autonomy" 
of the state. While still retaining the overall context of the determinant 
nature of the objective capitalist environment, structuralists seek to elaborate 
how state policy is determined by the contradictions and constraints of the 
c ap italist system, while instrumental manipulation remains a secondary 
consideration. Two of its most well-known formulators are Nicos Poulantzas 
(Poulantzas 1973; Poulantzas 1974; Poulantzas 1 975) and Louis Althusser 
(Althusser 1 971 ) .  
The Hegelian-Marxist tradition places its emphasis on consciousness 
and ideology while the link to accumulation and instrumental manipulation 
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stays in the background. To the question, "What is the state?" the Hegelian­
Marxist answers that the state is a mystification --- a concrete institution 
which serves the interests of the dominant class but which seeks to portray 
itself as serving the nation as a whole thereby obscuring the basic lines of 
antagonism. 
With respect to the present study, the relative autonomy position 
appears to be the best fit. The Army seems to operate quite automously from 
the direct control of capitalists, yet it is the capitalist sector that the Army 
defends. 
2 .8 .1 The Problem of Centralization 
A number of political theorists argue that state activity has grown in 
scope and become increasingly centralized (Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987).  In 
the United States, this trend has historical roots in the early days of the 
republic in the split between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists. From 
1 776 to 1 787 America under the Articles of Confederation was, in reality, no 
more than a loose alliance of sovereign independent states. Most Americans 
agreed with John Adams who wrote, "No one thought of consolidating the 
vast continent under one national government" (Butterfield 1 962, p. 352) . 
The inalienable rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness referred to 
in the Declaration of Independence were, it was assumed, best protected by 
small and local state governments. Kramnick asserted that, "The spirit of 
Rousseau hovered over these Anti-Federalists as they identified with small ,  
simple, face-to-face, uniform societies" (Kramnick 1 987, p .  60) . The federal 
government was formed only to defend the whole against foreign nations in 
case of war and to defend the lesser states against the ambitions of the larger.  
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The Confederation was seen merely a temporary expedient, required to wage 
war against Britain, which would fade with the coming of peace . (Kramnick 
1987 ) . 
The Continental Congress was the sole integrative institution created 
at the center under the Articles. With the cessation of hostilities in 1 783, the 
Continental Congress became virtually impotent with al l  effective power 
residing in the states. Additionally, there was no executive branch provided 
for the central government by the Articles. "The Revolution, a fter alt was 
against authority and power" (Kramnick 1 987, p . 19 ) .  In one after another state 
constitution drafted after 1 776 a clear expression of the "politics of liberty" was 
the fear of rulers and of magisterial a uthority. The new state constitutions 
also severely limited grants of executive authority. With the exception of one 
state, South Carolina, all the new state constitutions totally eliminated any 
role for the governors in the legislative process. It became common practice 
to require that any changes in the state constitution be approved not by the 
state legislatures but l2:}c the people themselves in convention. Kramnick 
writes that: 
the 'politics of liberty' under the Articles. . . expressed 
itself in an aggressive egalitarianism. The suffrage was 
extended from 1 776 to 1 789 in most states so that from 70 
to 90 percent of all white adult  males became eligible to 
vote .  Religious o aths were complete ly el iminated 
(Kramnick 1987 , p .  23) .  
Many voices arose lamenting this egalitarianism, e .g . ,  John Otis had 
warned in 1 776 that "when the pot boils the scum will rise," a frequently used 
metaphor for the "politics of liberty" under the Articles. In 1 788 Madison 
wrote that the state legislatures were filled with "men without reading, 
experience or principle" (Kramnick { 1 788} 1987, p. 24) . They were men whom 
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Jay, his fellow author of the Federalist, thought "wisdom would have left in 
obscurity" (Wood 1972, p.  476) . 
Kramnick argues that virtually all traditional notions of the separation 
of powers were abandoned in the states under the Articles. In the 
Pennsylvania constitution, b ills could not become law until after their first 
reading in the legislature; they were then publicized throughout the state, 
d iscussed and approved by local conventions and then voted upon in the 
next legislative session. "The very notion of representation, of being 
governed by officials, even elected officials, however frequently elected, came 
under attack in the states" (Kramnick { 1 788} 1 987 , p. 22). In many states the 
legislatures had virtually taken over the administration of justice. In 
Vermont, for example, the legislature reversed many court judgments, stayed 
executions, and even intervened in cases involving land titles, contracts and 
debt. The state legislatures appeared to many to be tyrants in liberty's cloak, 
even causing Thomas Jefferson to comment that, "One hundred seventy­
three despots would surely be as oppressive as one . . .  An elective despotism 
was not the government we fought for" (Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the 
S ta te of Virginia, p. 1 95 as cited in Kramnick 1 987,p . 310) .  Jefferson forcefully 
supported the idea of the separation of powers embodied in the new 
Constitution. He saw this system of checks and balances as essential to 
preserving liberty. It was this problem of limiting state power that ultimately 
consumed Jefferson and about which he wrote so eloquently. 
The Articles of Confederation were ultimately replaced in 1 787 by the 
Constitution. The fear of popular sovereignty, combined with the severe 
financial crises faced by most states after the war, created an atmosphere 
where the ideas embodied by the federalists seemed the only logical  solution. 
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The new Constitution represented the triumph of the center over the 
periphery, and Madison, writing in Federalist No. 1 0, left no doubt that the 
new Constitution with its eclipse of the periphery and shift of power to the 
central government would "secure the national councils against any d anger 
from . . .  a rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division 
of property, or for any other improper or wicked project" (Boyd 1950,p . 246) . 
The trend toward centralization has continued throughout our history, 
and intensified after the second world war. It is an integral feature of the 
modern state. Numerous writers have shared the view of the inevitability of 
centralization, for example, George Orwell warned, "What is coming is the 
centralized state, and the new World War will only hasten its arrival" 
(Orwell 1 992, p .  1 93) .  Additionally, Dunleavy observed that, "Weber and 
later organization theorists shared the common assumption that a single 
hierarchical ordering of the state organizations is an ineluctable, but generally 
desirable, feature of the modern state" (Dunleavy and O'Leary 1987, p. 1 76) . 
Poulantzas ( 1978) identified the rise of authoritarian statism as the 
principal trend in contemporary liberal democratic politics and defined it as 
"intensified state control over every sphere of socio-economic life combined 
with a radical decline of the institutions of political democracy, and with 
d raconian and multiform curtailment of so-called " formal"  l iberties" 
(Poulantzas 1 978, pp. 203-4) .  Commenting on the consequences of this trend 
towards centralization, C.W. Mills once wrote, "That the facilities of power 
are enormously enlarged and decisively centralized means that the decisions 
of small groups are now more consequential" (Mills 1956, p. 23) .  
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2.8.2 The Rise of the Pentagon 
One area of state power that has received scant attention in the 
literature is that of the Pentagon. Mills (1956) was writing about the time of 
post-WWII America when the growing power of what President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower termed the "military industrial complex" was beginning to be 
recognized . Mills ( 1956) argued "that postwar military elites wielded 
unprecedented influence and have joined with the d irectors of capitalist 
firms and high-ranking civilians in the federal government to form the 
power elite" (Mills 1956, pp. 212-13). 
While Mills has been criticized for offering an overly-psychological 
interpretation of power elites, many agree with his claim the the military has 
played a relatively autonomous role in the postwar structure of state power. 
In a recent article dealing with the unprecedented and largely unexamined 
rise in the power of the Pentagon, Gregory Hooks (1990) decries the fact that 
the Pentagon ' s  s ignificant ( though not unlimited) power and its 
implementation of a "de facto" industrial policy have received insufficient 
attention. He argues that despite the fact that the military " in theory" is 
subservient to the Congress, it has become relatively autonomous, a fact 
alluded to by C.W. Mills in 1 956 when he wrote, "Since Pearl Harbor those 
who command the enlarged means of American violence have come to 
possess considerable autonomy, as well as great influence, among their 
political and economic colleagues" (Mills 1956, p .  198) .  Hooks argues that the 
Pentagon has established a "de facto" industrial policy and is, for all intents 
and purposes an autarky --- a separate, autonomous entity c apable of 
independent action, garnering enormous resources and setting its own 
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agenda.  Hooks examines the microelectronics and the aeronautics industries 
and concludes that military requirements are increasingly at odds with the 
industry's  commercial development. He contends that the defense program 
hinders the competitiveness of U.S. firms. "As noted," Hooks writes, " in the 
case studies of aeronautics and microelectronics, the Pentagon has been the 
dominant influence in research and development, but its goals have been 
and continue to be remote from civilian applications" (Hooks 1990, p. 399) . 
This, he concludes is a clear case of the state's pursuing an agenda d istinct 
from that of the dominant class . In making this claim, Hooks overlooks an 
important fact  about state power namely "that the different elements of the 
state need not be in harmony" (Schwarzmantel 1987,p. 4). Whatever the 
relative merits of Hooks' analysis may be, he makes one point that is relevant 
to the present study, and that is an appreciation for the enormous power 
(about which we know very little) wielded by the Pentagon (see Hooks for a 
review of the literature) . 
2.9 Summary 
The following work is divided up into seven chapters each treating a 
separate issue relating to the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program. Chapter 
One will present an overview of the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program 
(CSDP) as well as a glimpse at the historical record in terms of use of chemical 
weapons throughout various cultures throughout history. It will also discuss 
the framework for the Army's initial decision to use on-site incineration as 
the technology of choice. Chapter two will discuss the various theoretical 
orientations that guide the research, namely, the Three Dimensions of Power 
framework developed by Steven Lukes, Bachrach & Baratz and Gaventa. In 
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Chapter three we will look at the history and dynamics of the citizen 
opposition movement that developed in Kentucky at the Lexington­
Bluegrass Army Depot (LBAD), specifically in Berea and Richmond, KY. as 
well as the seven other sites. We will also touch upon the international 
d imensions of the problem. Chapter four will deal specifically with the 
regulatory process, specifically The National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) and the various "extra-legal" devices the Army developed to deal 
with citizen unrest. Chapter five deals with Army discourse surrounding the 
issue. We explore various myths, ideologies and 
legitimating devices employed by the Army in defense of their decision to 
incinerate the weapons /munitions . Chapter six describes the ponderous 
propaganda machine that evolved in unison with CSEPP ---the Army's 
national protective action program which has been developed in conjunction 
with the Federal Emergency Management Corporation (FEMA) .  Chapter 
seven investigates the potential theoretical import of the research, discusses 
possible limitations of the study and poses some questions for further 
research. 
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Chapter 3 
The People of Madison County: 'Causing a Great Tumult' 
Suffer not yourselves to be betrayed with a kiss . . .  Shall we try argument? Sir, 
we have been trying that for the last ten years . .  .Shall we resort to entreaty 
and humble supplication? What terms shall we find, which have not been 
already exhausted? We have petitioned---we have remonstrated---we have 
supplicated---we have prostrated ourselves before the throne . . .  There is no 
longer any room for hope. I wish to be free . .  .Is life so dear, or peace so sweet as 
to be purchased at the price of slavery? Forbid it Almighty God! I know not 
what course others may take, but as for me give me liberty or give me death! 
Patrick Henry, Richmond, Virginia. St. John's Church, March 
23, 1775 (in Fawn M. Brodie. 1974. Thomas Jefferson:  An 
Intimate History, p. 122) 
3 . 1  A Short History of Two Small Places --- Richmond and Berea, KY. 
With very little modification, Patrick Henry's famous speech delivered 
in Richmond, Virginia could serve as emblematic of the struggle with the 
Army over the chemical weapons destruction p ro gram that began in 
Richmond, Kentucky two centuries later. Although the towns of Berea and 
Richmond evolved differently, their destinies are intertwined and an 
examination of their early history provides the necessary cultural context 
which should help shed light on the conduct of the present controversy. 
Berea and Richmond are in Madison County, Kentucky, which is 
situated only three miles from the Cumberland Plateau. The Bluegrass 
section of Madison County, Kentucky lies in Eastern Kentucky 130 miles 
south of Cincinnati, Ohio, and 40 miles southeast of Lexington. Madison 
County Kentucky is known for two things: Berea College and the Lexington-
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Bluegrass Army Depot (LBAD) . Richmond, which borders LBAD on the 
northwest, is the county's largest city. Berea is eight miles southwest of the 
Depot. The 1990 census figures estimate that roughly 57,000 people reside in 
Madison County, of that number, 9,126 live in Berea and 21 ,  155 in Richmond 
(U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1990, Washington, D. 
C.) .  
The c i tizens of Madison County, Kentuc ky are no s trangers to 
controversy. The early histories of Berea and Richmond, KY are intertwined 
in a way that makes their present cooperation on the nerve gas issue seem 
improbable. Although both are allied in their current opposition to the 
Army's planned incinerator, they evolved quite differently, and colorful 
stories abound about the towns' early rivalries. 
Berea evolved as the more liberal community; Richmond the more 
conservative. The leaders of the citizen opposition groups that formed in 
these cities reflect this dichotomy. The first, Concerned Citizens of Madison 
County (the Richmond group), is headed by two individuals whose roots go 
deep in the Richmond aristocracy--- the one a recognized community activist, 
the other a noted author, Harvard graduate and war correspondent. 
Common Ground, or the Kentucky Environmental Foundation, Inc . ,  ( the 
Berea Group) is lead by an experienced environmental activist and Vietnam 
War veteran. As principals in one of the nation's longest-running 
environmental struggles, these people do not suffer fools gladly. To those 
citizens of Madison County who attended one of the Army's first public 
meetings on this issue, it appeared to them that the Army had indeed sent 
fools to talk to the communities about their plan to destroy the chemical 
weapons that were in storage at the Army depot just a stones throw from an 
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elementary school and a major shopping mall. A brief history of each town 
will suffice to illustrate the context for the development of the present ethos 
of the groups that eventually formed to oppose the Army's stockpile disposal 
p rogram. 
Berea's history is bound up with with the founding of Berea College. 
Its roots go back to the Civil War period ( 1855) .  Cassius M. Clay, an 
influential land owner and rabid abolitionist, founded Berea College. C lay 
owned considerable land in the Bluegrass section of Madison County, 
Kentucky. In the early 1850s he sold off much of this land in an attempt "to 
demonstrate the advantages of life without slavery" (Peck 1982, p. 1 ) .  In 1 855, 
Clay hired John G. Fee, a country minister---also an abolitionist---to head a 
school based on Clay's ideals of freedom and democracy. A one-room school 
was built in 1855 which eventually became Berea College. The constitution of 
Berea Col lege reads, "This college shall be under an influence strictly 
Christian, and as such, opposed to sectarianism, s laveholding, caste, and 
every other wrong institution or practice" (Berea College Admissions 
Brochure, July 1 991 ,  p .  4). It was the first college to integrate after the Civil 
War and to this day remains true to the ideals of its founders. Tuition is kept 
to a minimum. Student expenses for tuition, room and board, health and 
incidental fees are $2,245. Every student works at least 1 0  hours a week in any 
one of a number of affiliated student industries, e.g. ,  the famous Boone 
Tavern Hotel, located prominently in the city square, is staffed 80% with 
Berea College students. 
The City of Berea has gained national recognition as a haven for artists, 
and small artisan shops decorate its main streets. Berea has become known as 
a citadel of Appalachian Crafts and a repository for many otherwise lost arts. 
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The City attracts thousands of visitors yearly and hosts several seasonal craft 
fairs. The college has really been the driving force behind the culture that 
later developed in Berea which includes an emphasis on face-to-face contact, 
stresses economy of scale ( there are numerous small  family-owned 
businesses), and makes social justice issues of paramount importance. It has 
much in common with what Ferdinand Toennies ( { 1887} 1963), the German 
sociologist, described as a Gemeinschaft society. The Berea In terfaith Task 
Force for Peace, a local organization which meets monthly and is devoted to 
peace and justice issues, is one example of the town's culture. Many of its 
citizens share a heightened interest in environmental issues, harbor a strong 
commitment to the idea of "community" and many take an active interest in 
local politics. This is a politically aware community. It is not at all unusual to 
have issues of concern hotly debated in the local newspaper, The Berea 
Citizen, or at Papa Lino's restaurant, a small deli which serves as a gathering 
place for locals. Citizens take an active interest in examining � new 
initiatives that may affect this small community, whether that be a question 
regarding the installation of bicycle paths along the main thoroughfare, 
recycling trash, or how to dispose of the nerve gas stored at the Lexington­
B luegrass Army Depot. If there were one concept that sums up the 
weltanschauung of Berea, it would be "Question Authority! "  
Richmond, o n  the other hand evolved as a more conservat ive 
community, and members of the group "Concerned Citizens of Madison 
County" describe themselves as "solid citizens. "  The roots of the city of 
Richmond date back to the days of the American Revolution around 1 775 . 
According to a history of Madison County, those pioneers, once established, 
"formed a close-knit coterie of families and gathered unto themselves control 
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of local government, commerce and central institutions" (Ellis 1985,p . xv).  
The original settlers, ninety percent of whom were from Virginia, (the 
balance were from the Carolinas) were mainly farmers, hunters and perhaps a 
few businessmen. According to the archivist in charge of Special Collections 
at Eastern Kentucky University, most had fought in the revolution and had 
been given land in return for their service. They first settled along the 
Kentucky River in a town called "Boonesborough," named, of course, for the 
celebrated Daniel Boone. However, they soon became disenchanted with 
Boonesborough and in 1 790 relocated to Richmond. Richmond, was not, 
however, the original county seat --- that was Milford ( 1786). There arose a 
dispute over whether to move the county seat from Milford to Richmond. 
The dispute was settled by a wrestling match (Ellis 1985). Incidentally, the 
Kennedy family was instrumental in the first settlement of Richmond, 
Joseph Kennedy being its first sheriff! Key members of Concerned Citizens of 
Madison County are descendants of these first families, and as such, they 
have a fierce attachment to the land . What this means is that they love the 
land, they are attached to the land, and they will defend the integrity of the 
land to the bitter end . Ellis ( 1985) has written, "If there is any one social and 
cultural characteristic which has been historically notable among Kentuckians 
generally it has been their ready and positive identification with a specific 
physical place in the universe, their home county" (Ellis 1985, p. xvi) .  He 
further qualified this statement by saying: 
They have attached their loyalties and sense of  
geography not so much to  an area with political 
boundaries as to a specific social background and 
provincial  rura lity . In this vein they have 
sometimes been vehement in their reactions to 
broader state public issues, in casting their votes at 
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the polls, and in reacting to conditions of changing 
times (Ellis 1985, p. xvi) .  
According to  the the archivist in charge of Special  Collections at  the 
Berea College Library, Richmond and Berea share an historic rivalry which 
sterns from their d iffering positions vis-a-vis the question of slavery. 
Richmond was steeped in a thriving 'slavocracy,' according to Ellis (1985), 
while Berea was horne to missionaries who were rabid abolitionists. This set 
the stage for the bitter conflicts that ensued. One particular incident in the 
towns' early histories is illustrative of their early difficulties. The story is told 
that in 1 859, after John Brown's raid, Rev. Fee spoke, "We need more John 
Brown's," he said, "if not in fact, at least in spirit." As the story goes, Fee was 
quoted out of context as only having said, "We need more John Browns !" At  
that point, "sixty of the finest of  Richmond's citizens horsed up and gave Fee 
thirty days to clear out." According to a Berea College archivist, "Rev. Fee and 
other founders of the college were often harassed by locals on drunken sprees 
(from Madison and surrounding counties ) and, in 1 859 a vigilante 
committee ordered them to leave. The governor refused to do anything. The 
committee forced Fee to pack up and ninety Bereans left after Christmas. This 
was known as "The Exile." They stayed away for the duration of the Civil 
War. According to a Berea historian, "The rivalry sterns from the fact that we 
exist. Periodically, the rivalry surfaces in county politics ." Ellis ( 1985) notes 
that despite such incidents, Madison County's "various social and economic 
groups, white and black, have lived together, with the exception of the Berea 
troubles, with little class conflict and rivalry" (Ellis 1985, p. xvii) . 
To the dismay of many activists, the university located in Richmond, 
Eastern Kentucky University, has maintained a low profile concerning the 
CSDP. As one activist lamented, "This university {EKU} is the only major 
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institution that did not take a stand on incineration . "  Although EKU 
facilities have been used for a few public meetings, "official policy" of the 
college has been one of silence on the issue. However, the faculty senate has 
publicly announced its support of the citizen opposition effort. On April 14, 
1 984, the Richmond Regis ter carried a Letter to the Editor from the Chair of 
EKU's Faculty Senate. The letter read: "The Faculty Senate of  Eastern 
Kentuc ky University urges that  the aforementioned obsolete chemical  
weapons and agents be transported elsewhere, to a less populated area, for 
destruction" (Richmond Register, 4 / 14/84, Editor's Mailbag). 
Despite the Army's suppositions, there is no evidence to support the 
belief that Berea College is the moving force behind the citizen opposition 
that developed at the Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot (LBAD) regarding the 
chemical weapons controversy. This is not a student issue. However, one 
cannot escape the notion that the culture of the towns, heavily influenced by 
their historical traditions, has created a climate supportive of citizen activism. 
A member of Common Ground offered this analysis of the differences 
between the two groups: "Their styles evolved out of this historical context. 
Berea considers itself the cultured folk; Richmond aren't sure the folks in 
Berea are quite upstanding." 
3.2 The Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot (LBAD) 
Located on U. S. Route 25, six miles south of Richmond, "LBAD," as it 
is commonly referred to in the literature, was established in Madison County, 
Kentucky in the early 1940s at about the same time the United States became 
involved in World War II. According to the DPEIS ( 1986), approximately 
3,000 people live adjacent to the Northern boundary. LBAD stores the 
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smallest percentage of the unitary stockpile of chemical weapons ( 1 .6%), 
consisting of approximately 70,000 M55 rockets containing nerve agent GB 
and VX. The rockets are stored in igloos (earth-bermed bunkers) and are 
carefully monitored for leaks. Madison County is very densely populated 
with 57,000 people living within a 10 k radius of LBAD. Additionaly, the 
depot is s ituated in the midst of a $5 b illion dollar thoroughbred horse 
industry. The proposed incinerator complex is to be located one mile from 
the Clarke-Moores Middle School. 
Originally the depot occupied two sites: one in Lexington and one in 
Richmond, i .e., the Bluegrass Depot. "The two sites were almost completely 
autonomous," according to an Army officer at LBAD, "as they each had 
different functions, however, they were under one commander" (Telephone 
interview: Chief Public Affairs Officer, LBAD, January 4, 1 994) . It is now 
referred to simply as the Bluegrass Army Depot. The weapons stored at the 
Bluegrass Depot at the Lexington facility have been phased out. Throughout 
this report, however, we will continue to refer to the Bluegrass Depot in 
Richmond, KY as LBAD as this is consistent with its use in documents 
relating to the CSDP. 
The Mayor of Berea reports that the Depot was built in 1942 and that 
the Army took 15,000 acres. "At the time, there was very little opposition", he 
said. According to the Mayor, "many beautiful mansions were torn down." 
After WWII and the Korean War, LBAD became a storage depot.  The last 
shipments of nerve gas came in 1 962. According to a local political elite, 
"Nobody knew; nobody cared" .  "In the mid 1960s" he said, "they { the Army} 
started looking to get rid of it ." The M55 rockets were brought to LBAD in 
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Richmond, KY by rail in the early to mid 1960s and have been in storage in 
igloos since then. 
The Army was seen as a good neighbor for many years. During the war 
years, according to one Richmond long-time resident whose father was 
involved in the original construction of the Depot, "The Depot would send 
its fire truck out to help the community. The Ordinance (as the Depot is 
sometimes called) employed a lot of people---including women---during the 
war. There was no way that people would question the Army because they 
needed the jobs. There were no jobs!" Communi ty I Army relations have 
changed since then. 
As a general rule, the Army has a his tory of being less than candid with 
the public with respect to accidents resulting from Army operations. Citizens 
point to a particularly newsworthy event which took place in 1979 at LBAD 
which certainly has contributed to the erosion of the public trust once held by 
the Army at this site; however, it would be a reduc t io ad abs u rdum to 
suppose that this one incident was the driving force behind the citizen 
mobilization there. The incident we are referring to is known as "The Smoke 
Pot Incident. " On August 1 6, 1979, a large dark cloud generated by the 
burning of 288 smoke pots moved over Peytontown, KY and on past to 
Interstate highway 75 where it slowed and stopped traffic. Forty-five persons 
were hospitalized for burning eyes, difficult breathing and general illness. 
Community residents suspected the fumes were corning from the depot, 
however, in calls to the Ordinance ( i .e., LBAD), the Army at  first denied any 
knowledge or responsibility for the incident. When later presented with 
evidence, the Army admitted that it  was the source. As the story goes, an 
inventory of "smoke pots" had been declared obsolete and ordered to be 
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destroyed.  However, because of the impending visit of the Inspector General, 
Army personnel began burning three times the usual number of smoke pots, 
resulting in this "off-post" incident. The Richmond Regis ter (June 27, 1980, 
Terry Lee Vogt) reported that, "Manpower shortages and inadequately trained 
personnel contributed to the smoke cloud incident." In recalling the incident, 
the Mayor of Berea, who is also a physician, said, "We didn't know what we 
were treating. Dr. Lang (his associate) called the Ordinance and the Army 
denied it ." On another occasion, according to this informant, two cows and a 
deer were found dead. Blood samples were positive for nerve agent. Again, 
the Army originally denied responsibility and then later recanted their story. 
On October 18, 1982, traces of nerve agent GB were registered by monitoring 
equipment at the depot. However, no public announcement was made until 
October 21st, according to a newspaper account in The Berea Citizen (October 
28, 1982, Jack Hall ) .  The Army later contended that there was no actual leak 
but only a faulty reading of one of the gauges. 
3.3 Army Credibility Problems 
While these incidents surely contributed to the erosion of the Army's 
credibility at  this particular site, there is a more general problem with Army 
candor regarding chemical accidents in general. The "Smoke Pot Incident" is 
not an isolated incident. The Army has a history of denying responsibility for 
accidents. Two of the most egregious examples will suffice to make the point. 
The first incident occurred in March 1 968 at the U. S. Army Dugway Proving 
Ground in Tooele, Utah when a chemical-warfare agent test went awry and 
accidently killed 6,000 sheep --- called "The Dugway Sheep Kill," the incident 
was reported in all the papers. Apparently, the sheep died as a result of 
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ingesting forage contaminated on March 1 3, 1968, with the chemical warfare 
agent VX (Van Kampen et al 1 970) .  For over a year the Army refused to 
admit any responsibility for the deaths, however, mounting evidence forced 
them to admit some culpability. Eventually, II After seventeen months of 
steadfast denial, the U. S. Army finally admitted responsibility for the sheep 
kill incident" (Technology and Socia l  Shock, p. 365) . The admission came 
during a Congressional Hearing in Washington during the summer of 1969 . 
Several articles have been written about the incident in venues ranging from 
prestigeous academic journals to news magazines and newspaper stories (Van 
Kampen et al 1969,1970; Brodine 1969; Boffey 1968a,1968b; Tanaka 1988;Science 
Magazine 1989 and Newsweek 1969) .  
Another noteworthy incident where the Army was  less than candid 
with the public occurred on April 1 8, 1986 at approximately 1 0: 15 A.M. when a 
Titan rocket exploded at Vandenburg Air Force Base near Lampoc, California. 
The explosion created an 8000 foot white-orange cloud of hydrazine rocket 
fuel .  The sheriff's office called the Air Force base to confirm the occurrence of 
an explosion, but to no avail. Emergency personnel were hesitant to make 
any recommendations to the public due to uncertainty stemming from the 
lack of information about the explosion. Police, fire, and sheriff's department 
personnel were able to get information only through monitoring radio traffic. 
With very little information to guide them, emergency responders advised 
people to II stay put ."  Several hours l ater, the Air Force released a 
communication that a cloud of toxic gas was moving out to sea and posed no 
real danger (Rogers 1990, p. D-7) . 
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3.4 The Army Decides 
Though the Army incinerated chemical weapons during the 1970 's, it 
did not put all of its eggs in the incinerator basket until 1982, when it selected 
thermal destruction as the method of choice for the destruction of the entire 
stockpile of M55 rockets. Seigel ( 1990) reports that "At the time, incineration 
seemed---to the Army, at least---like the quickest, cheapest, and simplest way 
to get the job done" (Seigel 1 990, p.4). "To a large degree, the Army's decision 
to use the reverse assembly, high temperature incineration process was based 
on the limited knowledge of disposal technologies in the 1 980s," states a 
report coming from the General Accounting Office (GAO), the federal 
watchdog agency (Eas t Oregon ian ,  July 6, 1992) . However, a number of 
concerned citizens argue that "incineration is a Neanderthal way of getting 
rid of waste." Nevertheless, in 1 979, the Army began testing a p ilot 
incinerator, i .e. ,  The Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System (CAMDS) at 
the Tooele Army Depot, near Salt Lake City, Utah. In 1982, the Army selected 
incineration as its demilitarization and disposal method for the entire M55 
rocket stockpile. In 1985 when Congress passed PL 99-145 expanding the scope 
of the destruction program to the entire unitary stockpile at all eight sites, the 
Army had already committed a large portion of its energy and resources to 
incineration technology. As one activist put it, "It {the Army} is such a big 
bureaucracy and its got an awful lot of momentum built up.  Literally 
thousands of people are involved .  Many people 's  entire professional careers 
ride on the success of this program." 
In the summer of 1984, the Army took its plan to the people. Several 
teams of Army personnel traveled around the country from depot site to 
depot site telling the people of its plan to build nerve-gas incinerators in the 
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communities that host the aging stockpile. They encountered pretty much 
what they expected at most of the depot sites, i .  e. apathy and /  or acquiescence­
--but not in Kentucky. As one informant explained: 
Previously, this group of Army personnel had been 
in Anniston the night before and 15 people showed 
up. They {The Army} carried on for perhaps two 
hours before anyone could talk .  They used 
overheads and sketches. This attorney, Charles Coy, 
stood in the back of the room. He listened (8 P.M.-3 
A.M. ! ) ;  he asked to speak. He said, "I don't need a 
microphone." He said, "If you will observe, you 
have misspelled 'demilitarization." '  I t  brought the 
house down. From that we set up Concerned 
Citizens. 
The Army representatives were not prepared for what they found in 
Kentucky. "We' re used to being the guys in white hats," said an Army 
technical expert . Then he added, "I've never seen anything like this before." 
(Courier Journal, July 1 1, 1984) .  Specifically, the meeting was to discuss the 
final disposition of the 69, 512 M55 rockets containing nerve agents GB and 
VX which had been stored at the depot since the mid sixties, and which the 
Army claimed were leaking dangerously. As soon as news of the Army's 
impending p lan reached the local newspapers, the surprised and shocked 
citizenry immediately began telephoning neighbors and friends and in a short 
time, a fa irly sizeable segment of the local population was alerted to the 
meeting. One activist who participated in mobilizing the community at that 
time proudly reported, "We got 500 people to show up!" Another member of 
Concerned Citizens had this to say about these early public meetings: "The 
Army sent around a team of people who had only master's degrees in science. 
We were left with the impression that you wouldn't buy a used car from 
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these people." After what was described by many as a "canned presentation," 
one member of Concerned Citizens vividly recalled that first Army briefing. 
After the presentation, the public comment period 
opened. It hit me that these guys were serious about 
building an incinerator to burn nerve gas. Their 
disclaimer was that this was to be the first in {a series 
of public hearings on the issue} . . .  Immediately after 
the presentation, I realized that they had already 
decided . The decision had already been made. 
But the Army assured citizens that they were there to take "input" 
from the public and stated that no decis ion had yet been made on the 
d isposition of the stockpile. A decision was to be forthcoming pending the 
results of the Army's M-55 Rocket Assessment Program. At one point during 
this early period,  Amoretta Hoeber, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 
Army, came down to LBAD (Kentucky) to meet with the citizens . The 
meeting was set up at the Army Depot cafeteria. As one resident recalled: 
She came into the cafeteria . .  .She came across as if to 
say, 'Look, what we are doing is the best that can be 
done and you peasants ought to be glad.  We must 
all bite the bullet' she said, as she stepped on to the 
p lane to fly back to Washington at taxpayers 
expense. 
3.5 The Army Delays Announcement 
On March 7, 1985, a headline appeared in the Lexington-Herald Leader 
that read: "ARMY IS DELAYING NERVE-GAS DECISION." The story went 
on to d iscuss the fact that the Army decision on the final  disposition of the 
70,000 nerve-gas rockets stored at LBAD would be delayed for at least nine 
more months. Rep. Larry Hopkins, R. Lexington, KY., and ranking member 
of the House Armed Services Committee, expressed frustration with the 
delays. "The Army was very quick to drop an incinerator proposal on us a 
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year ago," he said . The Mayor of Berea reacted differently to the delays. He 
said, "We've got the upper hand now . . .  I think this delay has made us more 
determined to get some answers." Hopkins remarked that, "When we began 
questioning that decision { to incinerate the rockets on site } ,  we got nothing 
but delays and failure to make deadlines."  One of the co-founders of 
Concerned Citizens speculated that the Army's delayed decision was 
deliberate. It  was suggested that the delay might be a sham. She said that she 
"worried that the Army was attempting to slow down the process to see 
whether people would lose interest." Other people blamed the delays on the 
untimely death (January 14, 1985) of Brig. General Bobby Robinson. Gen. 
Robinson was the chief spokesperson for the Army and principal  l iaison 
officer with the communities hosting the stockpiles .  (Lex i ng t on-Hera ld  
Leader: March 7, 1985) . 
The Army's Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, 
released July 1 ,  1986, indicated that it had not made a final decision, but only a 
tentative one, and that circumstances could lead them to change their mind 
(See Executive Summary, page xv of the Report styled Chemical  Stockpile 
Disposal Program Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact  Statement, July 
1, 1986). A final decision, called the Record of Decision (ROD), was issued on 
January 30, 1987 and presented to Congress in February 1988.  The ROD 
indicated that on-site destruction was the Army's "preferred alternative." 
That meant incineration. In a comment which typ ifies the Army's 
insouciance regarding the community' s  fears about incineration in the early 
years of this struggle, Amoretta M. Hoeber, the Deputy Under Secretary of the 
Army wrote in a letter to a member of Concerned Citizens, "Incineration is 
the safest, most efficient, and most environmentally acceptable method for 
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destroying nerve agents today" (19 March 1986, Letter to member of CC from 
Amoretta M. Hoeber, Department of the Army). 
3.6 INCINERATION . .  NOT! Grassroots Opposition to Incineration 
Citizen opposition movements to the siting of hazardous w aste 
incinerators, often known by the label "NIMBY" for "not-in-my-backyard" 
have become a familiar feature of the American political landscape in the 
1980s and 1990s. However, incineration has not been confined to land-based 
facilities . In the United States during the mid-1980s, ocean incineration 
emerged as one of the most hotly debated issues within the emotionally 
charged field of hazardous waste management. Incineration of hazardous 
wastes at sea was proposed as a technology that would helpl solve the unique 
handling and disposal problems posed by liquid organic wastes (Bailey and 
Faupel 1989) .  Bailey and Faupel ( 1989) argue that opponents of ocean 
incineration were extraordinarily effective in blocking adoption of a new 
technology that had been clearly favored by the EPA and powerful industry 
interests. They recognized four factors as being crucial to their success: ( 1 )  
opponents were convinced that local risks far outweighed any conceivable 
local gains; (2) there was broad-based opposition; (3) they engaged in coalition­
building with other environmental groups; (4) there existed a complex legal 
environment, e .  g., operations at sea are governed by international laws, 
including the 1972 London Dumping Convention, to which the United States 
is a signatory (EPA, 1985d). 
In more recent times, the most famous of the "not-in-my-backyard" 
movements is focused on closing down the Waste Technologies Industries 
(WTI) facility, in East Liverpool, Ohio which is the largest commercial  
hazardous waste facilitly in the world.  In 1 992, twenty residents staged a 
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hunger strike to protest lack of EPA action regarding their grievances against 
WTI (Pittsburgh Against Toxic Incineration Newsletter, no date) . 
At  the forefront of these efforts is an organization called Citizens' 
Clearning House for Hazardous Wastes or CCHW. CCHW was started in 1981 
by a housewife, Lois Marie Gibbs. The clearinghouse provides information, 
organizing assistance, outreach and technical assistance to groups a ttempting 
to mobilize in opposition to any of several environmentally questionable 
projects, and their work includes efforts to ass ist  those who oppose 
incineration as well . 
As  a result of these c itizen movements, it has become increasingly 
difficult to s ite hazardous waste facilities . In instance after instance, citizen 
opposition has succeeded in either delaying or in outright preventing the 
siting of incinerators. Benford (1993) points out tha t  public conflict over 
s iting noxious facilities is the rule rather than the exception and the number 
of studies devoted to this topic has proliferated (Wolpert et al 1972; Centaur 
Associates 1979; Ley and Mercer 1980; Mazur 1981; Smith and Hanham 1981;  
Powell 1984; Mitchell and Carson 1 986; Cairncross 1 990; Freudenburg and 
Pastor 1992; Bailey and Faupel 1992) . 
Counterposed to the growing incinerator industry is the dual problem 
of the contraction of landfills. According to reports, NIMBY movements 
have forced the closing of over two-thirds of the operating landfills since 1979 
(Wasson, 1987; Frumkin 1989; EPA 1979) .  As a result, much has been written 
on the subject of how to encourage community acceptance (Anderson 1977; 
O 'Hare 1977; Powell 1 984; Sorensen et al 1 984; Carnes 1 982, 1 983; Inhaber 
1992) . Several  studies have dealt with community organizing efforts (Wilson 
1989; Knoll 1 990; Hudson 1990; Christrup 1 990; Thompson 1990), and Cohn 
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( 1982) who has done a critical review of the literature. However, Ladd and 
Laska (1991)  point out that there is a lacuna in the literature with respect to 
the "pre-implementation" phase of siting controversies. Their research 
addresses this problem in a study of a Louisiana community faced with a 
proposal to build an incinerator in its backyard . Freudenburg and Grambling 
( 1990) support their critique and have urged sociologists not to ignore the 
"impacts that take place before the first shovel of dirt is turned" (Freudenburg 
and Grambling 1990, p .  2) . Reich (1991)  argues that although a number of 
single-case studies exist for a number of chemical disasters for Love Canal 
(Levine 1982), Bhopal (Shrivastava 1 987), Seveso (Conti 1977; Whiteside 
1979), and Michigan's PBBs (Chen 1979; Eggington 1980), "none adopts an 
explicitly comparative approach and none places the issues of power and 
powerlessness at the center of the analysis" (Reich 1991,  p. 14) .  The present 
research is an attempt to satisfy the needs expressed by Freudenberg and 
Grambling ( 1990) and those of Reich (1991) by presenting a case study of the 
"pre-implemention" phase of a siting controversy where the issue of power 
and powerlessness is at the center of the analysis. 
3 .7 The Emergence of Grassroots Opposition to the CSDP 
Four entities emerged in Kentucky in opposition to the Army's plan to 
build a nerve-gas incinerator complex in Madison County, Kentucky. There 
were two major groups, "Concerned Citizens of Madison County" and 
"Common Ground:  Kentuckians for Moving the Nerve Gas" (which later 
evolved into the Kentucky Environmental Foundation, Inc . (KEF } ), and two 
smaller groups, "Other Voices" and "Common Ground of Fayette County ." 
While Concerned Citizens and Common Ground hold the high-ground in 
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terms of visibility in this struggle, we feel that these other groups also deserve 
to be included in the chronicling of citizen activism at LBAD. 
3 .7 .1  Concerned Citizens of Madison County 
If  one were to try and pinpoint the beginning of the opposition 
movement in Kentucky, i t  would most likely be Feb r u a ry 1 6 . 1 9 8 4 .  
"Concerned Citizens of Madison County" was the name chosen b y  the first 
group to become active . They mobilized almost immediately and as a direct 
result of the Army's first public briefing. One of the founding members of 
Concerned Citizens observed, "We were the only game in town then (1984) ." 
The first meetings took place in the office of a photographer. One of the 
founders of Concerned Citizens described their fledgling mobilization efforts: 
"We were trying to figure out how to get a grip on this issue," she said . "We 
were educating ourselves. We were totally away from any national interest. 
Congressman Hopkins got involved; Robert Rangel was appointed by 
Hopkins to keep us informed."  
Philosophically, Concerned Citizens are very different from the other 
group: the former conservative and wanting to play uby the rules" and the 
latter of a decidedly more liberal bent, claiming to have more global 
environmental concerns . In describing their different philosophies or 
"styles,"one of the founders of Concerned Citizens said, /'They {Common 
Ground}want the Army scalped; I want the threat l ifted from this 
community." Despite their differences, which in many cases are strengths, 
the groups have worked together successfully for almost nine years. Their 
complementarity has allowed them to reach different constituencies and 
through their various and sundry social networks, enabled them to put 
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together a fairly formidable force in opposition to the Army's plan. However, 
despite appearances to the contrary, Concerned Citizens and Common 
Ground are both tied ideologically and culturally to the prevailing system of 
power. Both view the Army's incineration decision as a "glitch" in the 
system rather than as a direct result of the operation of the system, although 
some members of Common Ground would dispute this allusion to their 
being in the "mainstream." One of the co-founders of Concerned Citizens 
expressed their ideology quite succinctly: "When all is said and done," he 
said, " we have civilian control of the military in this country, and the 
Army's plans can be changed as they need be, if enough of us will speak up 
and let our elected officials know how we feel" (Richmond Regis ter, January 
26, 1988, p. 1 ) .  
The Steering Committee of Concerned Citizens is drawn heavily from 
upper middle class families who are also long-time residents of Richmond. 
In fact, several families of founding members are distinctly upper class. This 
is not the typical profile of citizens who protest against the government; and 
Concerned Citizens are preoccupied that they not create the impression of  
"Army bashing." There is  a strong belief here that "the system works;" hence 
their strident attempts to put pressure on elected officials to reel in the Army 
and make them accountable .  But one can also d iscern a growing 
disenchantment with the "system" as the perception grew that the avenues 
set up for citizen participation were simply props. As one activist put it, "We 
have lost all faith in the process as meaningful to the decision, other than it 
builds up in their minds as 'The Scoping Game."' 
Among members of Concerned Citizens of Madison County, there is a 
famous author, Harvard graduate and former war correspondent; the 
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d aughter of a bank president who is an avid environmental and social 
activist, a homemaker, a photographer, two real  estate brokers, a city 
magistrate, an insurance executive, the Mayor of Berea (who 1s also a 
physician), the Chief of Staff of the Pattie A.  Clay Hospital, a retired 
newspaper reporter; a current newspaper reporter, a prominent orthodontist, 
two professors at Eastern Kentucky University (EKU), the president of a small 
environmental company etc. One of the founders likes to point out that both 
Republicans and Democrats fill their ranks and notes with pride, that within 
the functioning of the group, women have equal status with men. There is a 
fierce sense of  community here, as in Berea. One of the founders of  
Concerned Citizens describes their early beginnings: 
The notice about  a public meeting appeared as a 
small notice in an obscure part of the newspaper. 
They {The Army} do not do one bit more or less 
than they are required to do. The article said: 'The 
Army plans to do this and you are invited to come 
and hear about what we are going to do. '  
Lifestyle tends to determine how much time members can devote to 
the group's work. Members assert that the group shares a certain rapport that 
has developed as a result of friendships that span decades. They speak about 
the high degree of trust which allows them to openly disagree without fear of 
being ridiculed or shut out of the group . "We've been through a lot 
together," one member mused, "we have a lot of respect." They also describe 
their meetings as "very disorganized in an organized sort of way." "We listen 
to each other. . . sometimes we agree to disagree." This informant confessed 
that she has walked out of meetings many times because of frustration. Still, 
Concerned Citizens goes on. They grabbed hold of this issue like a ferret on a 
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snake and the Army has not been successful in dislodging them even though 
they have tried many times to "redirect" their energy into more "acceptable" 
channels .  
Concerned Citizens have been on the cutting edge of this issue from its 
inception and have been responsible for bringing the citizens' concerns to the 
attention of decision makers at the state level, in the Pentagon and in 
Congress. Their strategies have focused primarily on intensive letter-writing 
campaigns---financed at their own expense---and lobbying efforts directed at 
local, state and federal officials both at the Pentagon and in Congress. It wa 
through the efforts of the founders of Concerned Citizens that  a very 
prominent law firm in Lexington, Kentucky allowed one of its finest 
attorneys to do a considerable amount of pro bono work for the movement. 
Summing up their resolve, one long-time resident of Richmond and 
prominent member of Concerned Citizens said, "I think we all pretty much 
know, we are not leaving and we are not living with an on-going incinerator. 
Our great grandparents lived here." 
3.7.2 Common Ground: Kentuckians for Moving the Nerve Gas 
Although Concerned Citizens had been around for several years, 
citizens of Berea were also becoming heavily involved in the nerve gas 
controversy. It was becoming obvious to concerned residents of the Berea 
community that another group was needed---one that represented their 
unique perspective on the issue. In the Fall of 1987, a second group formed at 
LBAD (Kentucky) calling itself, "Common Ground: Kentuckians for Moving 
the Nerve Gas." As the name implied, their early efforts were focused on 
getting the Army to transport the weapons out of LBAD and away from that  
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community. According to a member of the Steering Committee of Common 
Ground, the name "was chosen to emphasize the commonalties of the two 
groups { i. e . ,  Concerned Citizens of Madison County and Common Ground } 
despite their ideological differences. An activist who spoke out at the Army's 
1984 briefing, commented later, "It d awned on me rather quickly that the 
powers that be were counting on the acceptance (quiescence) of their idea 
because of their prestige." He recalled an incident which precipitated not only 
his own entrance into the struggle, but also set the stage for the later 
formation of Common Ground. He recalled: 
I got up to speak. I said I was a veteran and so I had 
some insight into how the Army operates generally. 
I felt that the people in the community were being 
shortchanged. I felt they were not being told the 
whole story. I felt that if people knew more, they 
would not allow the Army to go ahead with this 
plan unchallenged. Everyone stood up and clapped. 
It was my cameo performance. The response was 
overwhelming. 
As this brief example illustrates, charismatic leaders have played a 
significant role in the formation of the opposition groups at  LBAD. In fact, 
both groups have their share of charismatic leaders. It could easily be argued 
that the Steering Committees of both groups are comprised of nothing b u t  
charismatic personalities . A t  the very least, they are all leaders in their own 
right. Although very different in their styles, the groups have been able to 
use their d ifferences to their adv antage, drawing upon very d iverse 
c onstituencies and serving as  reality checks on the Army's  v arious 
pronouncements and documents . However, this i s  not to say that the 
emergence of strong personalities is responsible for the emergence of these 
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key opposition groups. The very strong pre-existing social network ties are at 
least as important (if not morel in the mobilization of these groups. 
As interest in the controversy grew more and more intense, an activist 
gave this account of her experiences at a Steering Committee meeting of 
Concerned Citizens. As she explains it: 
I went to a meeting. Nobody was interested in who I was. 
They had their own agenda. This was about power .  To 
them it was a techn ical problem. I was concerned that 
people couldn' t  get involved .  They {CCs) didn't want to 
face the fact that they . . .  I brought it up ... the idea of doing a 
petition drive to bring this to the attention of the public. 
Our Peace group worked on the petition drive. We were a 
little group of 10 .  We obtained 7000 signatures. We did it 
very intensely--one month. It illucidated the issue. 
Later, she added, "I just couldn't see any way for ordinary people to get 
involved in the Concerned Citizens group." It became obvious that a new 
group was needed to accommodate Berea citizens' concerns. "What I was 
looking for," she confessed, "was a totally different style . . .  We made efforts to 
involve people." However, another member remarked that, "this was never 
seen as a group in antagonism to Concerned Citizens." Common Ground 
advertised their meetings in the newspaper, held their meetings in the local 
bank and opened meetings up to the public immediately. "Once the group 
got established, we would have meetings ad hoc," according to one of the 
founding members . Speaking about the differences between Common 
Ground and Concerned Citizens this respondent replied: "Concerned Citizens 
are more affluent (some have been here for generations) ;  Common Ground 
are more transplants . Many are not even Kentuckians; however they have 
strong ties to the community." As one member expressed it: 
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Common Ground is  more grassroots type--­
concerned with public education, public awareness 
of the issue. If the nerve gas is moved, Concerned 
Citizens would dissolve. Common Ground have 
broader goals. They oppose incineration; whereas 
the focus of Concerned Citizens is completely local. 
Common Ground has more global concerns. 
Another member of Common Ground made this observation about 
the differences in their strategies: He said, "They {Concerned Citizens) believe 
they can win this way. Their political strategies are based on small-town 
Kentucky politics. Strategy equals Good Ole' Boy--Sit Down and Talk . . .  " 
While Concerned Citizens' social network ties include a small cadre of 
very close friends and business acquaintances, Common Ground draws 
members from a social network that revolves around a small community 
organization devoted to peace and justice issues, the Berea In terfaith Task 
Force for Peace . One Common Ground activist describes h is early 
introduction to the movement through this organization. "General interest 
carne first," he said. "I belonged to a group, the 'Berea Interfaith Task Force for 
Peace ' .  A group where all l ike-minded ex-hippies met in the Union church 
every Saturday night. The task force held a peace vigil at the depot site every 
Saturday morning." 
Included in their ranks is a formidable array of d iverse talents and 
interests drawn from many social classes . Their membership includes :  a 
former Vietnam veteran, a college professor, a nurse, several carpenters, two 
ex-priests, a community organizer, and an assortment of artists and musicians 
all committed to the conviction that the Army will not build a nerve-gas 
incinerator in Madison County. All share a strong sense of "community", a 
passion for this cause, and a belief that they will succeed.  Both Concerned 
1 1 6 
Citizens and Common Ground's early efforts were directed at getting the 
Army to move the nerve gas out of Madison County to either a central facility 
(i .e. Tooele, Utah) or to a regional facility (Pine Bluff, Arkansas) . Initially, 
transporting the weapons o u t  of LBAD was the defining goal of both 
Concerned Citizens and Common Ground alike. This was the single issue 
around which both groups entirely agreed. However, at one point, Common 
Ground's rhetoric became more strident calling for a broader commitment to 
close down the Army's entire Chemical Weapons Destruction Program. This 
reflected an on-going debate within the group which involved deciding at  
what level to  fight the Army's plan: whether to  a im at  closing down the 
whole program or whether to focus on their individual site. The latter won 
out. "We will shut down this program! ! "  gave way to, "There will be no 
nerve-gas incinerator in Madison County !"  
In an effort to  educate the community about the issue, Common 
Ground has sponsored petition drives, two rock concerts, and several public 
meetings . Steering Committee members have participated in radio and 
television talk shows, held public debates with Army personnel, and written 
letters to the editors of all the local papers. They have put a great deal of effort 
into coalition building with other like-minded anti-incineration groups, e.g. 
Greenpeace and the Citizens Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste, to mention 
only a few, and they have served as advisors to opposition groups at other 
sites in their efforts to organize against the Army's plan. Although external 
organizations have been helpful, they were not the driving force behind the 
c i tizens ' opposition movement in Kentucky, or elsewhere . As a 
spokesperson for Greenpeace once remarked when this controversy was in its 
early stages, "If Greenpeace disappeared, this opposition would not go away." 
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In 1 990, Common Ground incorporated under a new name, "The 
Kentucky Environmental Foundation" or KEF, Inc. KEF was granted legal 
non-profit status (501c3) in 1991 .  KEF's stated purpose, according to Common 
Ground ' s  newsletter, Com mon Sense, "is to disseminate information and 
educate the public on environmental issues." And, "since the most pressing 
environmental issue in Central Kentucky is the proposed nerve-gas 
incinerator, KEF has identified the nerve gas issue as its focus." Currently six 
people are serving on the KEF board, all from the Steering Committee of 
Common Ground. When asked why they didn't just incorporate Common 
Ground, a KEF spokesman replied that tax laws place restrictions on the 
activities of non-profit corporations, particularly in regard to political action. 
Thus, Common Ground could remain independent in its political and 
lobbying a ctivities (Common Sense  Newsletter, no d ate) . KEF, Inc . ' s  
executive director explained that their position regarding strategy was to  take 
a tiered approach which included intensive lobbying efforts with federal and 
local officials, monitoring Congress and grass-roots activities. It was felt that 
working at the local level exclusively would not be sufficient to achieve the 
goals of the organization. Common Ground leadership agree in principle 
that some form of d irect action may be required at some future time; 
however, they argue that at  this point in time, it is not yet warranted . It is 
conceivable that Common Ground 's  incorporation as  the Kentucky 
Environmental Foundation, Inc. will mitigate further their willingness to 
risk direct action. 
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3 .7.3 Common Ground/Fayette County 
This branch of Common Ground was started by a Lexington Realtor, 
twenty-year resident of the area, and member of the Berea Interfaith Task 
Force for Peace. He commented that it was particularly difficult mobilizing 
people in Fayette County, possibly because the media has portrayed the issue 
as a Madison County problem. Nevertheless, in response to requests from 
the leadership of Common Ground, with whom the respondent has 
maintained a long-standing friendship, the citizens of Fayette County were 
enlisted in the struggle against the Army. In speaking about how the group 
got off the ground, the leader replied, 
My first thought was, of course, getting the message 
out. So I went to groups, anywhere people gathered 
together---Kiwanis C lubs, Peace Groups, City 
Government, the Environment Commissions--­
anywhere. During the Gulf War even though it was 
not related, it was related. 
In addition to these forays into public education on the issue, the group 
wrote articles, passed resolutions, helped advertise scoping meetings and, on 
occasion dealt with the media. One problem mentioned by the group 's  
founder was the fact that "Everybody is spread pretty thin, keeping a life and 
job ." Not many people are aware of the existence of this little group, but the 
existence of  an Army opposition group in Fayette County is important 
because of the low visibility of this issue there and because of  the multi­
million dollar thoroughbred race horse industry which has refused to 
acknowledge that the incinerator problem could potentially affect them. This 
attitude has been aided by the media who repeatedly refer to the nerve-gas 
incinerator as the Madison County incinerator. In an unusual stance for a 
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Kentucky activist, this informant expressed the opinion that to argue to 
transport the weapons elsewhere was a narrow point of view. 
3.7.4 "Other Voices" (People United for Environmental Justice) 
The entity "Other Voices" took shape in 1 99 1 .  It evolved out of  
Common Ground, in  response to  ideological differences with both Common 
Ground / KEF and Concerned Citizens. The founder of "Other Voices" felt 
that Common Ground was losing touch with the people and expressed 
frustration with both groups' "reactive" stance vis-a-vis the Army. Believing 
that a more frontal attack was called for, the founder mobilized like-minded 
women sympathetic to the goal of preventing the Army's p lanned 
incinerator complex in Madison County . In describing her feelings for 
forming the new group, the founder replied, "I am so d amn sick of 
responding to the Army---why can't we in itia te something! " There were 
other gender-related issues which contributed to the split, as did questions 
about power shifts away from Common Ground ' s  earlier democratic 
practices. The initiator of "Other Voices" single-handedly embarked on an 
ambitious campaign attacking the Army's emergency preparedness plan, 
known as CSEPP (The Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program). 
A plan was formulated to place an advertisement in the local  
newspaper questioning the adequacy of the Army's emergency plan for the 
community. Call ing the Army's emergency plan, "Grand Illusions," the 
article critiqued the Army's latest publicized emergency plan which had been 
recently d isseminated to the public that summer in the form of a glitzy, high­
gloss, scenic calendar. Several hundred individuals and organizations 
sponsored the advertisement which appeared in the local newspaper. (Berea 
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Citizen, August 14, 1992) . At one point, the leadership of "Other Voices" with 
the help of a few like-minded citizens, sponsored a demonstration at the 
depot site which was attended by the author and several members of 
Common Ground. "Other Voices" also feel differently about the value of 
direct action. Whereas leaders of Concerned Citizens prefer "working in the 
trenches" to accomplish their goals and view any type of direct action with 
derision---i .e . ,  "showboating," leadership of "Other Voices" sees non-violent 
direct action as "the right of the citizens to demonstrate their feelings on an 
issue." "Other Voices" attempts to attack the myths surrounding the CSDP, 
and is deeply committed to the importance of drawing people into the 
struggle. And the movement is all the richer for their participation, for 
through their efforts to view the controversy from another perspective, they 
mitigate many of the Army's myths of all powerfulness. Perhaps it is this 
diversity that gives the movement at this site such vitality. 
3.7.5 The Chemical Weapons Working Group (CWWG) 
In November of 1991 ,  Common Ground and Concerned Citizens 
sponsored the first International Meeting of Citizens opposed to the Army's 
incineration plan. In addition to representatives from all eight CONUS sites, 
the conference included delegates from the organized opposition against the 
Army's JACADS facility (Hawaiian Islands) as well as a representative from 
the former U.S .S.R. Greenpeace Action also sent representatives. The media 
was very much in evidence. .  The purpose of the conference was to d iscuss 
strategy and share ideas. The meeting, held at the Richmond, KY Holiday 
Inn, lasted the entire weekend. The groups are linked together nationally as 
the Chemical Weapons Working Group (CWWG), communication is either 
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by telephone or via ECONET, an environmental electronic bulletin board . As 
a result of the conference, delegates developed an Accord which outlined the 
group 's  thinking about the task of disposing of chemical weapons . The 
following are a few of the recommendations contained in the document 
entitled, "The International Citizens' Accord on Chemical Weap ons 
Disposal" (November 1 0, 1991) :  
Al l  use of incineration or plans to use incineration 
or any other open ended-as opposed to fully 
contained-disposal system for chemical weapons 
destruction should be halted at once; 
Defense Department should immediately expand 
its investigation into alternative technologies; 
The Army should commission site-specific studies 
at each chemical weapons site; 
There should be greater citizen involvement in all 
d ec ision-making processes and internat ional  
treaties and conventions; 
Environmentally unsound technologies for the 
demilitarization and disposal of chemical weapons 
must not be exported; 
In negotiating international chemica l  weapons 
agreements ,  the imp a c t  on people  and  
communities must be  a central concern; 
If, as a last resort, transportation of chemical 
weapons must be undertaken, it should be only for 
final  treatment and / or disposal, a fter necessary 
s tabi l izat ion, wi th the consent of a ffec ted 
communities, and be consistent with the above­
stated goals. 
The transportation issue caused some consternation, however, because 
transportation out of LBAD had been the cornerstone of the citizen 's  
opposition movement in Madison County, KY. However, this last accord 
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demonstrates the utility of the conference as this issue was hammered out 
and d issected for many hours. Eventually, the conference arrived at a 
compromise position, which was acceptable to most participants. 
The foregoing account of the conference is not intended to be a 
comprehensive account of the events of that week-end. The conference was a 
learning experience and a valuable opportunity to share concerns, offer 
support and create feelings of empowerment. It was an exercise in coun ter 
hegemony .  In the end, "Not in My Backyard" evolved into "Not in Anyone's 
Back Yard" (Silton 1993) . Since then, other similar conferences have taken 
place. 
3.8 The evolution of Issues and Non-Issues 
Several issues have evolved as "key" in the minds of citizens who 
oppose the Army's plan to incinerate nerve-gas weapons at the LBAD. 
Among them are the following: ( 1 )  programmatic vs. site-specific studies; (2) 
· public safety; (3) chronic effects of low level exposure to by-products of 
incineration; (4) continued use of the incinerators; (5) transportation of the 
stockpile out of LBAD; (6) alternative technologies. 
3.8.1 Programmatic vs.  Site Specific Approach 
Issues evolved as time went by and it is fair to say that a central "core" 
of issues has remained throughout the history of the struggle.  Foremost 
among these (although there really isn't a "first") is the Army's decision to 
use a generic approach to conducting the risk assessment associated with the 
d isposal plan. This is referred to as a "programmatic" approach. Basically, the 
Army decided to lump together all eight sites for the purposes of developing a 
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risk assessment. The "issue" here is that citizens wanted the Army to conduct 
site-specific studies, i .e, studies that would take into account the unique 
features of each site, such as population density, topography, etc. before 
building an incinerator at that site . The final report of the Kentucky 
Community Review Support Contract, (the Army-funded community study 
group in Richmond, KY) discussed this issue. The report states: 
Making a PROGRAMMATIC (generic) decision with 
limited site-specific information means that many 
of the deep and troubled concerns of this area get 
"defined out." People are site specific and safety is 
site specific. Shouldn't a PROGRAM be designed 
with those in mind? (Blackwell et al, Kentucky 
Community Review Support Contract, November 
1987, p .  19) 
The evolution of this issue (i.e., the SSEIS) is a story in its own right and will 
be examined more fully in Chapter four in the context of the NEP A process. 
3.8.2 Public Safety 
"Safety first, and by the way, no incinerator too," wrote Travis Flora in 
an article dealing with the citizen opposition to incineration at LBAD (Berea 
Citizen, October 14, 1993). Concern over public safety is at the height of citizen 
concerns about the CSDP. One person asked, "Do those who make decisions 
then live with the possible consequences or does extensive bureaucracy mean 
that some decide and others endure?" (Blackwell 1987, Kentucky Community 
Review Support Contract, p. 19) .  Another Concerned Citizen commented 
that 
health and safety should be given prim acy over 
every other factor--'way ahead of whatever is in 
second place. ' This primacy must pervade the 
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choice of alternatives, the planning to follow, and 
the implementation of the plan .  I t  must be 
operational, not just rhetorical !  (Blackwell 1987, 
Kentucky Community Review Support Contract, p .  
19) . 
3.8.3 Chronic Effects: The Anatomy of a Non-Issue 
The Army has focused on catastrophic accidents in preparing its 
emergency preparedness plans for the communities who host the stockpile, 
but has ignored completely the chronic effects to the communities from low 
level exposure to the by-products of incineration. The main point of 
contention is whether small but lethal amounts of nerve agent and toxics like 
d ioxin would escape from the incinerator into the atmosphere. A spokesman 
for Greenpeace Toxics Campaign flatly charges that "the dioxin issue has been 
suppressed" (Personal Communication 7 /30/91) .  The Army says that federal 
regulations a llow a tiny amount of nerve gas to be released into the 
atmosphere---52 parts per trillion. "That's equivalent to destroying 99.9999 
percent of the nerve gas and letting the rest escape to be dispersed by wind" 
( The B irmingham News, Sunday, May 31,  1992, p.  C 5) .  Indeed, the Army 
brags about the fact that the incinerators will destroy agent to the level of "six 
nines"; however, knowledgeable experts admit that even under the most 
ideal circumstances, this level of efficiency is difficult to achieve. And 
considering that these incinerators will be operating twenty-four hours a day, 
seven days a week for at least a year---longer in some cases, it stretches 
credulity to believe that the Army will be able to maintain that standard .  The 
Army says it can't measure amounts smaller than 52 parts per trillion and 
assures skeptics that they have never monitored nerve gas coming out of 
their stacks. 
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In fact, the Army has completely foreclosed even any d iscussion of 
"incineration" per se, except to defend it as the "safest" and "most efficient" 
method for destroying nerve agent. This "decision by fiat" is typical of how 
the issue (which has, of course, become a "non-issue") has been handled . 
Nowhere in any of the CSEPP (Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness 
Program) documents is there any mention of the dangers of incineration. 
Indeed, the Army has routinely dismissed the community's expressed fears 
regarding stack emissions by simply repeating the phrase, "The Army will 
comply with all applicable environmental laws and regulations." 
3 .8.4 Future Use of Incinerators 
"If you build it, it will stay," so predicted Ben Haskell, one of the 
organizers of an opposition group at the Anniston Army Depot (New York 
Times, Thursday, September 24, 1992, p .  A-16) . His wry remark sums up the 
feelings expressed by most citizens who oppose the Army's nerve gas 
incinerator plans . 
A l though Public  Law 99- 1 45,  the "Department o f  Defense 
Authorization Act of 1986," mandates that the incinerators be razed once the 
stockpile is destroyed, few believe they will be destroyed. PL 99-145 stipulates 
that "Facilities constructed to carry out this section may not be used for any 
purpose other than the destruction of lethal chemical  weapons and 
munitions, and when no longer needed to carry out this function, such 
facilities shall be cleaned, dismantled, and disposed of in accordance with 
applicable laws and regulations" (PL-99-145, November 8, 1985: Section 1412, 
p .  99 STAT. 747) . The Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army assured the 
author that  they would be destroyed "Pac-Man style" (Persona l  
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Communication: Acting Assistant Secretarty of the Army for Installations, 
Logistics and Environment to author, July 29, 1991) .  
However, laws can be changed and many doubt that a multimillion 
dollar facility with state-of-the-art technology will be scrapped .  The 
incinerator complex at LBAD alone is estimated to cost half a billion dollars 
(Richmond Register, May 30, 1991, p. 2) ! In fact, in the words of a member of  
Concerned Citizens, "Future use is  a foregone conclusion." Voicing concerns 
about the escalating costs of the program, Congress commissioned studies on 
the feasibility of the continued use of the incinerators. The MITRE report 
issued in January of 1991 entitled, "Engineering Analysis for Future Use of  
Chemical Agent Demilitarization Plants: Feasib ility and Desirability," 
suggests several uses for the future of these facilities, thus adding fuel to the 
fire on this issue (MITRE Report 1991 ) .  A brief quote from that report (which 
one activist subtitled, "How to Circumvent the Law with regard to the Future 
Use of Facil ities," p resents a chill ing specter {from the comm u n i ty ' s  
perspective, of course } o f  what may come to pass. The following are some 
possible alternative uses for the facility at Umatilla Depot Activity (UMDA) in 
Oregon as outlined in the MITRE report: 
It has a lso been suggested that the chemical  
demilitarization p lant be made avai lab le for 
commercial hazardous waste d isposal a fter i ts  
mission is  completed .  The Hermiston Development 
Corporation is particularly interested in exploring 
the possibility of having the facility turned over to 
the private sector for this purpose (Persona l  
C ommunication) . There is  a market for such 
services in the area . . .  Another possible use would be 
to m aintain the facili ty intact and under Army 
control for use in the disposal of military hazardous 
waste . .  (MITRE Report 1991, p. B-81 ) 
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Management alternatives for future use include: (a )  Government 
Ownership and Operation; (b) Government Ownership and Contractor 
Operation;  (c) Transfer to Nongovernment Ownership and Operation 
(MITRE report 1991, p .  6-12, 6-13) .  Ironically, the latter is the a lternative 
citizens fear most. In discussing the possible transfer of the incinerators to 
non-government ownership, the report states that, "This option is best suited 
to cases where the demilitarization plant is located at an installation 
scheduled for realignment (PUDA, UMDA and the Bluegrass Activity of 
LBAD) and for which the government has not identified a feasible or 
desirable future use" (MITRE Report 1991, pp. 6-12;6-13) .  
Two laws however, affect the demilitarization plant future use options: 
Public Law 98-407 and its corresponding Army regulation (AR 200-1 ,  1-35 [a] 
[6]), prohibit the use of any DOD facility for the storage or disposal of any non­
DOD toxic or hazardous wastes (MITRE 1991 ) .  Beyond Public Law 98-407, 
RCRA has the largest potential to affect the demilitarization plant future uses. 
The MITRE Report states that "RCRA's comprehensive and prescriptive body 
of regulations introduce uncertainty and complexity in determining the 
regulatory desirability of any future use" (MITRE report 1991 ,  p. 6-10) .  
Congress recently commissioned the MITRE Corp . to conduct another 
"Future Uses" study. This latest assessment is scheduled for delivery to 
Congress in FY (fiscal year) 1994 (U.S. Army Materials Destruction Agency: 
Annual Status Report on the Disposal of Lethal Chemical Weapons and 
Material, Department of the Army, December 15, 1993) .  
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3 .8.5 Transportation 
"FLY IT OUT," was the conclusion of the independent citizens' review 
committee set up to study the problem of the disposition of the chemical 
weapons at LBAD. The cornerstone of the opposition efforts, the raison d 'etre 
of both Concerned Citizens of Madison County and Common Ground / KEF 
was the transportation alternative. They forcefully advocated transporting 
the stockpiled weapons out of LBAD to either a national or a regional site, 
c iting the Army's excellent record in transportation of chemical weapons . 
The groups point out that there has never been a fatality involving the 
transportation of nerve agent and cite the Army's considerable experience in 
this area (See Chemica l S tockp ile D isposal Program :  Chemica l Weapons  
Movement History Compilation .  June 12, 1 987). Opposition groups at LBAD 
are quick to point out the Army's unmitigated success in transporting the 
U.S. stockpiles of chemical weapons from the Federal Republic of Germany to 
the facility on Johnston Atoll. Citizens at LBAD cry out for "equal treatment 
with the Germans ."  (For a fuller description of this effort, see article: 
"Removal of U.S.  Stocks from Germany Sparks Debate," August 13, 1 990, 
Chemical and Engineering News, pp. 1 0,1 1 ) .  
Indeed, the Army did conduct transportation studies early on, although 
these studies only involved the movement of the M55 rockets. The Army's 
Chemical Stockpile Disposal Concept Plan ( 1 986) d id  discuss severa l  
transportation options and concluded that airlift using C141B  aircraft would 
be a possibility for supplying regional plants, "although the potential benefit 
of using higher-capacity aircraft requires additional study" (U. S.  Army CSDP 
Concept Plan 1 986, p. B-23). This study concluded that munition trains would 
be the best mode of transport. The FPEIS did include expanded studies on Air 
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Transportation and on the partial-relocation option. The FPEIS states that 
"The partial relocation alternative would require from 900 to 1200 flights for 
shipment of the APG inventory and from 1200 to 1500 flights for shipment of 
the LBAD inventory" (FPEIS 1988, p. xiii) . In each case, the destruction 
technology would remain the same as that employed on Johnston Atoll 
(JACADS), i .e., incineration in separate furnaces for each of  the several 
components o f  the weapons, e.g. ,  agent destruction, exp losive and 
propellents, metal decontamination, and dunnage disposal .  Under the 
section titled, "Key Findings," the FPEIS reads, "Continued storage, national, 
and p artial relocation alternatives are rejected from further consideration 
based on the methodology's first stage of human health impacts. Basically, the 
comparisons are made first, for human health impacts and then for 
ecosystem and environmental impacts" (FPEIS 1988, p. xvii). On this basis, 
the "environmentally preferred" alternative is selected .  In this case, the 
A rmy's  c alculus showed on-site incineration to be preferable to 
transportation. 
Initially, " the Army determined that the costs of the transportation and 
on-site incineration options were comparable" (Richmond Regis ter, May 30, 
1991,  p.  1 ) .  However, one of the founders of Common Ground / KEF argued 
that "based on information he has reviewed, the cost of transportation would 
be about a fourth of the cost of on-site disposal" (Richmond Regis ter, May 30, 
1991, p. 2) . However, cost was not the only variable considered in the Army's 
decision to go with on-site destruction over transportation. When word of 
this possibility reached people in states adjacent to the transportation route, 
numerous negative messages carne from political figures decrying the Army's 
intent to move weapons through their territories. The Army, bowing to this 
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pressure, decided against transporting the stockpiled weapons. The Army 
insists that "Cost has never been the d riving factor in this program" 
( R i ch m o n d  R egis ter, May 30,  199 1 ,  p .2) .  However, there is evidence to 
support the contention that, initially, incineration was selected because it was 
thought to be the most efficient and cost-effective method for destroying the 
weapons. In a document obtained form the Defense Technical Information 
Center (OTIC) [A d ata base not available to the general p ublic, but only to 
Army contractors and subcontractors],  Army personnel clearly indicate that 
cost was indeed a big factor in the selection of incineration. In speaking about 
the "baseline technology" i.e., inc inera t ion ,  the Army said, "The life-cycle 
costs will ultimately determine the demilitarization system configuration" 
(Lurk 1 984) . 
3.8.6 Alternative Technologies 
Up until 1 992, when Congress mandated that the Army consider 
alternatives to on-site incineration, the Army had simply dismissed the issue 
of alternative technologies out of  hand ( Incineration Alternatives Act of  
1 992) . The issue was "defined out," and any and a l l  discussion of alternatives 
focused on w h e re the destruction by incineration w as to take place.  
Questions about whether incineration was the best choice were not on the 
agenda by the time the citizens were brought into the process. The FPEIS 
( 1988, Section J . 1 .2 . 1  The Disposal Alternatives ) l ays out the "alternatives" 
considered by the Army, they were: On-site disposal, Regional Disposal or a 
Central or  National Disposal Center. Under the regional a l ternative, 
munitions stored in the eastern region of the country would be shipped by 
rail to Anniston Army Depot, Alabama, while those in the west would be 
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shipped to Tooele Army Depot, Utah. Under the national (or central facility) 
alternative, all munitions in the continental U.S. would be shipped by rail to 
Tooele Army Depot for destruction (FPEIS January 1988) .  A "no-action" 
alternative was also considered and the report stated that "the major risk 
elements { relevant to continued storage} are relatively rare, externa l  or 
natural catastrophic events, such as tornadoes and aircraft crashes. Storage­
related accidents are typically very low in their probability" (FPEIS 1988, p. J-4) . 
In speaking about the risk of continued storage, one of the co-founders of 
Concerned Citizens reported that the Army had conducted a study of the state 
of the stockpile at LBAD. She said, "The Army refers to 'deteriorating' or 
' aging stockpile' . Our stockpile has the safest, lowest rate of leakage. There is 
some pitting. We at LBAD had the least amount of pitting. The Army looked 
at propellant; they were most concerned because over time the stabilizer 
evaporates, but what they said was that in another 25 years, all that stuff 
would have to be given another hard look because of the stabilizing stuff. 
They set up a system for examining the stockpile on a routine basis ." Yet in 
other documents, the Army states that continued storage is the alternative 
with the highest risk. This seeming contradiction is due to the fact that the 
risk assessment was done on a programmatic (generic) basis, and not on a site­
specific basis. The "programmatic" risk analysis identified the "continued 
storage" alternative as the one with the highest risk. However, this is not the 
case at LBAD. 
Citizens repeatedly have criticized the Army for failure to consider 
alternative technologies, only to be told that other methods had been tried 
(for example, the neutralization method used at Rocky Mountain Arsenal 
discussed earlier ) and found wanting. The Army quickly dismissed other 
1 3 2 
methods, e.g. ,  those suggested by Greenpeace as "Blue Sky" technologies, 
meaning untried, unproven (See Picard i 1991 , Alternative Technologies for 
the  Detoxifica t ion of Chemical Weapons :  A n  Information  Docu men t  
prepared for Greenpeace International) .  The one aspect o f  all these 
alternatives that remains key is the "closed loop" concept. This means that 
nowhere in the process is there an outpouring of emissions or waste products 
into the environment. Several methods have been suggested as alternatives 
to incineration. They include: 
• Biological Method s- where microorganisms 
are used to break down organic chemicals by using 
them as nutrients 
• N e u  t r a l i z a  t i o n - a variety of chemical 
reactions designed to de-activate the chemical 
agents 
• Plasma Arc- A ful ly contained thermal 
p rocess that insures comp lete destruction of 
organic chemicals. 
• Superc r i t i c a l  W a t e r  O x i d a t i o n - uti l izes 
temperatures and pressures of water above the 
critica l point of water, in a closed system, for 
hazardous waste treatment. 
• Photochemical Degredation- exposure to UV 
radiation as a method of breakdown of CW agents. 
• Electrochemical Oxidation- electric current 
passed through a solution of silver nitrate, the 
water molecules form highly reactive hydroxyl 
radicals which can oxidize substances. 
• S t e a m  Detox i f i ca t ion- Steam reforming 
chemistry . 
(Source : Kentucky Environmental Foundation, Inc . Prepared Statement, 
Executive Director, to Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, June 16, 1 992.) 
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T he Army's intransigence regarding the issue of  a l ternative 
technologies has been noted by several authors . For example, in reviewing 
the Army's Global Commons Environmental Assessment (EA) in which the 
Army recommended using incineration at the Johnston Atoll facility, Hardy 
( 1990) argued that: 
The Army's failure (in the SSEIS, the globa l  
commons EA, and in  Germany) to  even consider 
a lternative disposal methods is unreasonab le .  
Incineration is  not the only means by which 
chemical weapons can be disposed of. Recently, new 
methods using biology and new kinds of organic 
chemistry have been util ized to break d own 
chemicals such as those stored in the European 
stockpile. (Hardy 1990, p.  7) 
He suggested that these alternatives (which embody the "closed loop " 
concept) could be used in two ways. "First," he wrote, "they could be used for 
on-site destruction of the chemical agents. Second, they could be used to 
reduce the nerve agents' toxicity--by thousands of times--before shipping 
them over seas to their final disposal area" {or to a central or regional facility 
as in the case of the CONUS stockpile) (Hardy 1990, p. 7). 
In 1992, Senator Wendell H.  Ford asked the Office of Technology 
Assessment to conduct a study into alternative technologies for the 
detoxification of chemical weapons. The OTA reported that present work 
with alternative technologies is focused on treatment of hazardous wastes 
other than chemical weapons and suggested that market forces alone could 
not be expected to lead the development of alternative CW destruction 
technologies beca use the U.S .  stockpile of chemical weapons is small 
compared to industrial chemical waste. "If an alternative is to be developed," 
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writes OTA, "government will have to be depended on for at lease some of 
the support" (Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) 1992, p.9). 
On February 7, 1994, the National Research Council, the operating 
agency of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of 
Engineering, released its long-awaited report from the Committee on 
Alternative Chemical Demilitarization Technologies (NAS 1994). The report 
is a 200-page document which took one and one-half years to develop . It is 
available to the public through the National Academy Press for $40.00 .  
Members of the Citizens Advisory Commission (CAC) appointed to evaluate 
the report, had only two weeks to formulate a response. Those who have had 
an opportunity to review the report are disappointed claiming that "they (the 
NAS} focused on validating incineration" (Personal Communication: Co­
founder Concerned Citizens of Madison County to CGD: 2 / 13 /94). 
Activists from other sites also got the impression that the Army wasn't 
seriously considering alternative technologies. Persons in attendance at a 
Public Meeting in Anniston, Alabama in the summer of 1993 came away with 
the impression that alternatives weren't  being seriously considered .  In 
recording her impressions of the meeting, one researcher wrote, "This sense 
that the Army is not really considering alternative technologies but rather is 
trying to bolster their decision to incinerate was evident throughout the 
evening" (Field Notes: Cathy Solheim 1993: U.S. Army Public Meeting on the 
CSDP, Anniston, Alabama). Finally, with respect to the issue of alternative 
technologies, Lenny Seigel ( 1992) from the National Toxics Campaign made 
this observation: 
Three issues stand out. First, the continuation of 
the present program is automatic once the Army 
submits its reports. The problem is that the Army 
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would consider any change in technology to be an 
admission of error. Thus, it has a bureaucratic 
imperative to recommend against a l ternatives 
(Letter: Lenny Seigel, Pacific Studies Center to 
Executive Director, KEF, Inc., August 27, 1992). 
The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) committee studying 
a lternative technologies works under the Board of Army Science and 
Technology which is chaired by John Longwell (MIT) and Gene Dyer 
(Bechtel); thus, the outcome of the Alternative Technologies study can hardly 
be surprising in light of the fact that Bechtel National, Inc. is one of the prime 
contractors for the CSDP. The U.S.  Army awarded Bechtel a $240-million 
dollar, nine-year contract in 1988 to dispose of the chemical weapons stored at 
LBAD and the seven other sites around the country (Berea Citizen, December 
1, 1988) . 
The la test development in the quest to find an al ternative to 
incineration, and perhaps the answer to the opposition movement's prayers, 
comes from a small company in Rockwell, Texas---Aquron Corp . Aquron has 
developed a brand-new "alternative" to incineration for the destruction of 
chemical weapons and they have presented their findings to the Army (The 
Berea Citizen, September 1 6, 1993) . Apparently, this new technology is a 
neutralization process . The president of Aquron said in an interview, "We 
can build a mobile unit. The whole thing could be mounted on an 18-wheel 
trailer and hauled around from site to site," thus reducing the need for the 
construction of permanent facilities .  "The process involves a four-stage 
process. We are prepared to neutralize the whole stockpile for 3% to 5% of 
the current incineration program. Plus, we can neutralize the whole 
stockpile in a year and be gone . . .  We can neutralize the whole stockpile for 
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the cost of two sites," says the President of Aquron. (Telephone Interview 
9 /20/93). 
Obviously, if what he says is so, it would have profound implications 
for the Army's current CSDP which is built around on-site incineration. 
However, Aquron faces difficult hurdles in its quest to get the Army to pay 
attention to this new process, not the least of which is the fact that they 
cannot get l ive agent to demonstrate the efficacy of the process. Thus far, they 
have worked their process only on small quantities available through the 
local university. However, this informant said that the Army was planning 
to provide them with the means to conduct some demonstration tests before 
Army personnel involved with the CSDP. 
3.8.7 Decontamination: The "Other" Non-Issue 
The idea of decontamination has not even emerged as an issue by the 
great majority of citizens who oppose the CSDP. Even the most highly­
informed proactive of the citizens are likely unaware of the possibility of such 
a need. The Army has assiduously avoided any mention of decontamination 
in public education materials and the Army keeps a tight lid on what 
information does reach state emergency managers, much less the general 
p ublic . Despite the Army's claim that there is a low probability of  any 
significant off-post contamination, decontamination procedures are being 
studied at length (Munro et al 1991; U.S. Dept. of Health 1990; Watson and 
Munro 1990; Watson et al 1991) .  Much of the Army's thinking on the subject 
comes from researchers at the national laboratories, e .g . ,  The Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory, TN. 
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A good deal of research on decontamination for the CSDP remains 
hidden away in some of those obscure government planning documents that 
remain at the DRAFT level so that they cannot be released for public review. 
The concern for continued study of decontamination is driven by the fact that 
"Neither safe levels of residu al contamination, acceptable monitoring 
methods, nor acceptable and effective decontamination methods have yet 
been promulgated for the general population" (Shumpert and Watson 1991,  
p. 3-4) .  Bear in mind that what l ittle is known about nerve-gas 
contamination is derived from d ata obtained from military training manuals 
which based their conclusions on projections of what would happen to 
healthy, adult males under battlefield conditions, and studies with agent 
simulents under controlled laboratory conditions. In the "unlikely" event of 
an off-post release (i .e., an accident where a plume of nerve or mustard agent 
traveled beyond the Army depot into a nearby community), l ittle is known 
about what could be done to prevent contamination of waterways, foliage, 
pets, foodstuffs, houses, etc. In some cases, people may not be able to reenter 
their homes for weeks---possibly months . Although such an accident is 
unthinkab le, the Army admits there is a small probability that it could 
h appen. 
3.9 Depth and Breadth of Community Support 
From its earliest beginnings in 1984, support for the movement to 
oppose the Army's incineration plan at the LBAD site was broad-based and 
substantial. Where people at many sites were only dimly aware of the CSDP 
until fairly recently, a random telephone poll of 100 Madison County 
residents conducted in 1984 showed 77 percent (77%) of those polled would 
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not favor an incinerator at the depot or in the county. Only fifteen percent 
( 15%) would support building the facility; eight percent (8%) were undecided 
(Richmond Register, August 27, 1984) .  
As a result of the collaboration of the two complementary groups, the 
movement quickly moved from "reactive" to "proactive" and in the process, 
garnered enormous community support. What happened in Madison 
County is similar to McAdam's ( 1982) account of groups in the Civil Right's 
Movement of the 1960. He wrote, "By confining their attacks to targets that 
were narrowly defined,  both substantively and geographically, movement 
groups were able to concentrate their forces so as to offset the basic resource 
d iscrepancy between themselves and their opponents. The result was a 
narrowly circumscribed, highly focused, effective insurgent camp aign" 
(McAdam 1982, p. 151) .  
The l ist  of political persons and organizations m support of the 
citizens' opposition to the Army's on-site incineration plans for Madison 
County, Kentucky includes officials in local, county and state government. 
The following government officials came out m support of the citizens' 
opposition and against the Army 's  plan: U. S.  Representative Larry J .  
Hopkins; Senator Wendell Ford; Senator Mitch McConnell; Senator Walter 
"Dee" Huddleston ( 1984); Governor Martha Layne Collins; and Lieutenant 
Governor, Steven Beshear. In a letter (July 22, 1986) to Chairman Nichols, 
Congressman Hopkins and Members of the House Armed Services 
Committee, Senator Ford stated his objections most vigorously . He wrote, 
"Let me offer a few words in perspective . . .  The materials were brought here 
without consent of and without consultation with the people. I think it is 
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high time that the Army listen to them." Senator Ford 's  sentiments are 
typical of those expressed by other political figures. 
Community organizations opposing the Army's plan include: The 
Richmond City Board of Commissioners (Resolution No. 84-13); Health Help, 
Inc. ;  The Madison County Fiscal Court (Resolution, May 7, 1984); The 
Richmond Chamber of Commerce; Kenvirons, Incorporated; The Kentucky 
Resources Council; Lexington-Fayette Urban County Council ( May 16, 1985, 
Resolution); the Faculty Senate of Eastern Kentucky University; the Faculty 
and corporate officers of Berea College; The Kentucky Fair Tax Coalition, and 
Local Lodge 859 of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace 
Workers AFL-CIO. National organizations supporting the opposition 
include: The Sierra Club (Cumberland Chapter); Greenpeace Action; The 
National Taxies Campaign, Citizens' Clearing House for Hazardous Waste, 
and the Highlander Center. At one point, a petition carrying 172 signatures of 
Madison County teens and pre-teens opposing incineration of the weapons at  
LBAD was delivered to  Congressman Hopkins. 
However, one organization, The Madison County Grand Jury 
supported the Army's plan to build a nerve-gas incinerator in Madison 
County. In an article which appeared in the Richmond Regis ter (December 
19, 1984), the Grand Jury cited the reported deterioration of the rockets as a 
reason for its recommendation. 
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3 . 10  Community Review Studies: The Co-optation of  Citizen Protest 
As a result of the hue and cry that went out from the citizens of  
Madison County, two community study groups were eventually formed there 
to study the nerve gas issue: ( 1 )  the Madison County Task Force on Chemical 
W e apo n s ,  appointed b y  U .  S .  Congressman Larry J .  Hopkins (ranking 
Republican on the Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed 
Services Committee) in June of 1 984, and (2) the Kentucky C o mm u n i ty 
Review /Study Group (1987)---the latter study was supported by Army funds. 
In this section we will briefly describe the origin of these independent 
community study teams, describe their funding, and discuss some of their 
conclusions as well as the Army's response to their findings. As we review 
these studies, the length of time they took, their economic cost and learn 
about what the Army finally did with their conclusions, it is useful to recall 
G aventa's observation that "increased participation it is assumed, will not 
meet power constraints" (Gaventa 1980, p .  8) .  
3 .10 .1  The Madison County Task Force on Chemical Weapons 
U. S.  Congressman Larry J. Hopkins, ranking member of the House 
Armed Services Committee called into being the Madison County Task Force. 
Rep. Hopkins appointed a fifteen member team, broadly representative of 
Madison Countians to study the nerve gas issue . The study took 
approximately a year and a half to complete Qune 1984-May 1 986). Meetings 
were held twice a month and were open to the public . Several members of 
the Task Force traveled (at Army expense) to the Army's prototype facility in 
Tooele, U tah, CAMDS (Chemical Agent Munitions Destruction System) 
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which is a one-third size prototype of the incinerator planned for LBAD. In 
describing the group 's  work, one Task Force member talked about his 
experience: 
The Army sent us copies of all the documents we 
requested .  They never held back. I never had the 
feeling that anything was withheld . We attended 
some contractors meetings. When our schedule 
permitted, two of us would go. I attended two in 
Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), one in Tooele 
Army Depot (TEAD), and one at the Oak Ridge 
National Lab . We had enough money for travel. 
We asked questions at the sites. I respected the 
openness of the Army. Our input was received 
courteously. Of course, one never knows whether it 
was received courteously and then dismissed. 
While most members of the Task Force remained somewhat skeptical 
of the Army's plan (and its motives!) ,  some members were duly impressed by 
the Army. As one task force member (President of the Richmond Chamber of 
Commerce) stated, "I  was impressed by the Army's marshalling of  their 
forces . .  .I haven't made up my mind (on incineration) yet" (Courier journal, , 
July 11 ,  1984, p.  1) .  
After nearly two years of study, the Task Force made the following 
recommend ation: 
We have by majority vote concluded that building 
an incinerator in Madison County for the disposal of 
chemical weapons would be wrong and that 
transportation to a Regional site (Anniston) or 
National site (Tooele) by train is the best local and 
also national solution to the problem. It also is the 
most ethical and moral solution to a miserable 
situation anyway one looks at it. (Statement -On 
Chemical Weapon Disposal :  Dr. Oris Blackwell, 
Speaking for the Madison County Task Force, May 
21, 1986). 
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According to Task Force Members, the Army never directly responded 
to their conclusions, although their findings are summarized in Volume 3 of 
the FPEIS (U .  S .  Department of the Army, Chemical Stockpile Disposal 
Program: Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, 1 988, Vol. 
1 ,2,&3). 
3 .10 .1 .1  The Trip to Tooele 
Periodically the Army has flown citizen groups to Tooele, Utah, to tour 
their prototype facility---the Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System 
known as CAMDS In August of 1 984, the Army flew twenty-seven 
Kentuckians---including nine members of the Madison County (Citizens ' )  
Task Force o n  Chemical Weapons, and a n  assortment of community leaders 
to the Tooele site for an intensive workshop and tour. The trip was set up in 
order that Kentuckians could gage the the facility's safety first hand, according 
to various news reports. According to Brigadier General Bobby Charles 
Robinson, who led the tour, the reaction to the trip was "so encouraging." He 
said, "the Army was glad to pick up the tab because it wanted the public to be 
' totally informed of the issues' surrounding the military's efforts to get rid of 
the obsolete rockets . . . " (Lexington-Herald Leader, August 19, 1984, p.  A-18) .  
The Courier Journal  reported on the trip as follows: "A largely 
skeptical  group of Kentuckians received a red-carpet welcome in Utah 
yesterday from Army officials who want to build a nerve-gas incinerator in 
Madison County" (Courier Journal, August 16, 1984, p .  3) .  In addition to the 
nine members of the Citizens' Task Force were deans and professors from 
both Eastern Kentucky University and the University of Kentucky, 
administrators from Pattie A.  Clay and Berea Hospitals, state environmental 
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officials (Courier Journal, August 16, 1984, p .  3) .  Participants were housed at  
the Hilton Hotel in Salt Lake City and, prior to  their tour of the facility, were 
invited to attend a Discussion Workshop in which they were introduced to 
some o f  the principal technological  concepts, processes and personnel 
involved in the CSDP. One newspaper reporter wrote, "They are receiving 
free air fare, meals, lodging, and elaborate briefings in a cavernous hall at the 
Salt Lake City Hilton Hotel" (Courier Journal, August 16, 1984, p. 3). The 
article continued, "Officials of the Army Material Command, which is footing 
the bill, said yesterday they did not know how much the trip will cost." 
Since this particular contingent was made up of citizens from among 
the most vocal opposition, every attempt was made to accommodate their 
questions and concerns. The Army reassured them that the final decision on 
the destruction technology had not yet been made and that their visiting this 
site at Army expense was completely consistent with NEPA. At one point in 
the discussion workshop, General Bobby Robinson, in an attempt to reassure 
the skeptics, said, "You see, the community and the state officials and the 
Army are partners in whatever decision is made. And, indeed, we will be 
partners in whatever decision is made, not only at Lexington Bluegrass, but 
also at other installations where several items are being stored.  They will 
have to be disposed of in some manner" (Transcript: Tooele Army Depot 
CAMDS Overview and Discussion Workshop, August 15, 1984, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, p .  1 17) . 
The Army arranged for several such trips over a period of years. 
Cit izen activists from other communities have been invited and various 
government and community leaders, both local and national, have toured 
the facility, including a delegation from the former Soviet Union. All  
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visitors to the site upon arrival were supplied with gas masks along with 
atropine kits. 
On one such trip in 1985, an alarm went off indicating the presence of 
agent in the p lant's ventilation system. At that time, 40 visitors from 
Kentucky and four other states were touring the facility. All were quickly 
evacuated. The story was picked up by the Associated Press and was carried in 
the local newspaper, the Richmond Register. The headline read :  TOOELE 
ARMY DEPOT, Utah, (AP) "NERVE GAS LEAK PROMPTS EVACUATION 
OF VISITORS" The story began, "Community leaders from five states, getting 
a first-hand look at a prototype plant for destroying nerve gas weapons, were 
evacuated when alarms warned of a nerve agent leak" (Richmond Regis ter, 
Wednesday, May 1 5, 1985, p . 1 ) .  Fortunately, none of those present were 
injured .  
The Army immediately turned the event into a publicity coup. They 
claimed that the incident proved they could handle any such eventuality. A 
number of citizens who were present during the tour voiced their approval of 
the Army's handling of the situation, which turned into positive feelings 
regarding the nerve-gas incinerator in general. One said, ''I 'm personally 
convinced that on-site destruction is the best method" (Richmond Regis ter, 
May 1 4, 1985, p. 1 ) .  Brad Park, then director of the Richmond Chamber of 
C ommerce sa id ,  "I was very impressed with the seriousness and 
professionalism of the people out there . . .  The system goes off when there's  
just the tiniest bit  of agent in the air, even if it is not enough agent to kill a 
flea," he said (Richmond Regis ter, May 14, 1985, p .  1 ) .  But others were not 
impressed.  A local political elite commented, "It's obvious they haven't got 
the bugs worked out yet. ." An activist stated that the incident was "the most 
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d ramatic possible demonstration of our concerns about this h ighly 
experimental incinerator;" . . .  then he added, "This is exactly the same process 
they want to put right here in an area where 17,000 of our young people go to 
school within four miles of where they would put the smokestack of a nerve­
gas incinerator" (Richmond Register, May 14, 1985, p. 1 ) .  
Upon returning from that trip, several members were interviewed by 
the press and asked to  discuss their impressions. The Mess inger Inquirer 
(Friday, Sept.20, 1985) ran a story which read,"TOUR DOESN'T SWAY 
GROUPS OPPOSITION TO INCINERATOR." And, indeed, at least one 
member of the Task Force continued to express misgivings about the plan. He 
said, "Having visited the plant in Tooele, I can say this is an experimental 
process . . .  This is a bad site. I t  is a bad decision" (Testimony: Discussion 
Workshop, Salt Lake City, Utah, August 15,  1984, p. 210) .  Several other 
members of Concerned Citizens remained very skeptical  despite trips to the 
Tooele facility. 
But not everyone remained skeptical. It is safe to say that a number of 
people were influenced positively by what they saw at Tooele . For one, 
Umatilla Mayor Don Armstrong said, 'Tm personally convinced that on-site 
destruction is the best method.  I 'd really like to see the project proceed as 
expeditiously as possible" (Richmond Regis ter, May 14, 1985, p. 1 ) .  The 
minutes of the Task Force meeting held on August 28, 1 984 (after the Tooele 
trip) record one Task Force member saying that he was "quite impressed with 
the technology at Tooele. He was impressed with machines that measure in 
parts per trillion, and the personnel were very thorough in explanations of 
their areas, always willing to answer any questions asked by the group" 
(Minutes: Madison County Task Force on Chemical Weapons, August 22, 
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1 984, p .  4) .  However, a year later, this individual 's  position hardened 
somewhat against the idea of incineration. He was quoted in the newspaper 
as having said, "For the people of Tooele, i t  is comforting that the alarms go 
off at a level of reasonable safety but  it is small comfort to people 
contemplating the possibility of a similar installation in a populous area like 
central Kentucky (Richmond Register, May 15, 1985, p. 1 ) .  
Another member o f  the Task Force, Judge Botner was  also favorably 
impressed with the Army's Tooele Facility. At the Public Meeting held by the 
Task Force to d iscuss their trip, he contrasted the attitude of personnel in 
Utah with those in Richmond. According to the record, he stated that, 
"Everyone he talked with locally at Salt Lake City seemed to trust the Army 
and all seemed to work together. He felt that some of our citizens had lost 
their trust here in Richmond and Madison County" (Memo: Announcement 
of Task Force meeting in Richmond, Kentucky, August 28, 1984, p. 3). These 
statements, along with those from representatives from other sites, leave no 
doubt about the efficacy of efforts at co-optation. 
3 .10 .2 Kentucky Community Review /Study Team 
The idea for an independent citizens' study of the CSDP grew out of a 
public hearing on the Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement 
(DPEIS) which was held in August of 1986. At that meeting, a member of  
Congressman Hopkin's Task Force posed a question to  the Undersecretary of 
the Army who was present at the meeting. She asked, "Why can't there be a 
local independent study-review group funded by the Army to make the 
communities' concerns, interests, and suggestions known to the Army teams, 
contractors, and sub-contractors in a timely fashion for possible inclusion in 
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the Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement?" (The question is 
paraphrased and the person who posed it also mentioned a dollar amount--­
$100,000) (Final Report: Kentucky Community Review Support Contract, 
1987, p. 3). 
Undersecretary Ambrose agreed immediately to fund such studies 
saying he "thought it was a good idea and that i t  should be possible" 
(Blackwell 1987, p. 3) .  The group was to be a technical Peer Review Team 
under the d irection of an expert in the area of environmental health and 
would be composed of primary reviewers in the area of chemical  
demilitarization, risk assessment, meteorology, and other technical personnel 
on an as-needs b asis. In the letter, it was suggested that this study be 
conducted "concurrently with the development of  the Programmatic 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and the Site-Specific Impact  
Statement." 
Subsequently, on January 23, 1987, the Army's first community study 
contract totalling $116,000.32, was awarded to Eastern Kentucky University for 
the purpose of establishing a citizens' study group that  would provide 
independent and objective public input into the problem of d isposal a t  the 
local level (Final Report: Kentucky Community Review Support Contract, 
1 987) . Dr. Oris Blackwell, Professor and Chair of Eastern Kentucky 
University's Department of Environmental and Health Science, was asked to 
chair the study. Five people served on the study team. The contract was 
entitled, "Kentucky Community Review Support Contract" . Members 
traveled to Tooele, UT, to Oak Ridge National Laboratory to meet with people 
p reparing Environmental Impact Statements, and to other sites. One 
member recalls, "We had enough expense money to cover travel. We were 
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sent notices of meetings. When our schedules permitted, one or two of us 
would try to go . . .  We asked questions at the sites. I respected the openness of 
the Army. Our input was received courteously."  Team members also met 
with contractors. A member recalls, "EKU gave us a place to meet and places 
to store files . . .  Dr. Blackwell was the number one person---the boss. He carried 
enormous clout." 
After ten-months of intensive study, the Community Review Team 
issued its report. The report concluded, "The overall conclusion of the Study 
Team is that the 1 .6% of the U. S. Chemical Weapons stockpile currently 
stored at Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot should be airlifted to Tooele, 
CAMDS facility for destruction" (Final Report: Kentucky Community Review 
Support Contract 1987 p. 3) .  Upon release of the report, Dr. Oris Blackwell, 
principal investigator, expressed optimism that the Army would be receptive 
to the citizens' concerns. He told a reporter, "The Army has been listening 
very carefully," and later he added, "They have both encouraged and allowed 
us to feel a part in the problem solving process. Our opinions have been 
sought and listened to" (Berea Citizen, November 25, 1987, p. 1 ) .  
Following completion of  this community study effort, a member of the 
study team was approached by the Army to write an article for "The 
Environmental Professional" ---a journal of the National Association of 
Environmental Professionals. The Army was hoping to gain political capital 
by touting its willingness to go above and beyond the call of duty in fostering 
p ublic p articipation in the program. C a l l ing these groups a form of 
"unconventional public participation," Carnes ( 1989) indicated tha t  the 
Army-funded study teams went beyond what is required by NEPA, and this is 
probably correct since NEPA does not require that the entity that plans the 
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action pay for potentially-impacted communities to conduct their own 
independent studies .  This p articular issue of The E n v i ro n m e n ta l  
Professional ( 1989) was dedicated to the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program 
and the professor was asked to write about the Army-funded study groups, 
which he did .  The article he wrote was entitled, "Public Input To the 
Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program NEPA process" (Hindman 1989). In the 
article, professor Hindman praised the groups' inclusion in the process. He 
wrote, "The team was authorized by the command structure to participate in 
the process. The team was not an "outside" group. Army staff had orders to 
assist the team in identifying and getting access to documents, information, 
and meetings. Team members rarely sensed that individual staff members 
were being circumspect or withholding information" (Hindman 1989, p. 295) .  
"Other study teams," he argued: 
stayed outside the process and analyzed the results 
in written reports. . . In contrast, the team became a 
part of the group that developed the FPEIS. Their 
views became part of the debates that led to 
decisions on what topics would be studied and how 
data would be evaluated . Professional staff had to 
justify conclusions not only to professional peers, 
but also to informed citizens before the conclusions 
were accepted. (Hindman 1989, p. 295) .  
When questioned about how he carne to write the article, the author 
replied, "The article I wrote was at the request of Oak Ridge. They fed me 
some information . . .  They were interested in how public input could be 
quelled / controlled .  They wanted to get it off their backs so they could get on 
with their jobs ." The experience had a positive impact on this professor in 
terms of his perception of the Army. "I changed my opinion of the Army," 
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he said, " in that they are just a bunch of people doing their job . . .  I (don't) see 
them as a monolith nor as unstoppable. Stereotypes got broken down." 
However, the inference to be drawn from all this is that the Army had 
gone "above and beyond the call of duty" to involve people in the process---a 
notion which the facts call into question, for regardless of the money the 
Army produced for community-based independent studies, the people were 
still left out of the decision-making loop, and the conclusions of the studies 
were largely ignored when they went against Army prerogatives. Hindman's 
( 1989) insistence that the Citizens' Study Team had enormous impact on the 
Army because of their inclusion in the "process" is curious in lieu of what 
the Army actually did with the information. 
3 . 11  Army Response to Community Study Groups' Conclusions 
Citizen activists greeted these newly-created study groups with great 
optimism if not euphoria .  However, their happiness over what appeared to 
be a victory for the communities was short-lived. Despite the rhetoric of 
" inclusion," the report issued by the "Kentucky Community Study /Review 
Team" met with the same fate as the report issued by the "Madison County 
Task Force on Chemical Weapons." Basically, it got filed and largely ignored .  
When questioned about the ultimate d isposit ion of the  Kentucky 
Community Review Final Report, another member of the Study Group 
remarked, "The final report was duly sent to the Army and they duly noticed 
it ." Another member of the study team speculated on why the Army didn't 
do more with their report. He said, "They ( the Army) listened to us and 
changed things . November 1 987 everybody (i .e . ,  all the Army-funded 
community study groups) had to have them in al l  (at) the same time. 
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However, the FPEIS was due within a month or two. The Army was so tied 
up in generating this other document {i .e. ,  the Final Programmatic EIS } that 
they were either too busy or not interested in reading {it } ."  A knowledgeable 
attorney assigned to assist the community activists in their opposition efforts 
said of the Army, "They have tried to buy their silence with financing their 
study group then ignoring it." 
Some of the issues the citizens raised were incorporated in an 
Appendix to the FPEIS (see FPEIS 1988, Volume 3, Appendix R, Evaluation of 
Communi ty Groups ' Inputs), together with the Army's responses. Appendix 
R of the FPEIS contains a brief, site by site, overview of the issues and 
concerns expressed by the community study groups, followed by the Army's 
response. However, the Army did not act on the substantive issues raised. 
The Army used a variety of strategies to divert attention away from the fact 
that they were not going to alter their "Preferred Alternative." For example, 
they would often point out that the FPEIS, "is written now in clearer 
fashion"(FPEIS 1988, Volume 3, p.  R-10), responding to criticisms that the 
DPEIS was unclear about many important issues. Another favorite stratagem 
was to direct the reader to another section of the three-volume report for a 
"fuller discussion" of the topic at hand, or i t  was stated that the Army had 
a lready studied this particular issue (for example, the transportation 
alternative) and found it wanting, thereby fulfilling their requirement to 
"respond" to citizen inquiries. A typical example of the former comes from 
the NAAP Community Study. The group at Newport raised concerns over 
the risk analysis and associated assumptions regarding the probabilities of 
risks, to which the Army in the FPEIS ( 1988) responds: "The methods and 
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assumptions of the risk analysis are detailed m the risk analysis report 
{Appendix J }"  (FPEIS 1988, Vol . 3, p. r-16) .  
Last but not least, and probably most pernicious, is  the tactic of assuring 
the public that an issue would be more fully elaborated in a future document, 
for example, in a site-specific study, even going so far as to say that, "Data cited 
in the community study may be useful in the site-specific NEP A document."  
Since the issue of  detailed site specific studies was foremost in  the minds of 
citizen activists, this dodge was very effective because it gave false 
reassurances. 
3 .12 Community Review Studies at Other Sites 
The Army offered local citizens at the seven other sites an opportunity 
to undertake their own local studies (Fed. Reg .. 52:4646, Feb . 1 3, 1987) ,  but only 
four others took them up on the offer: ( 1 )  Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), 
MD., (2) Pine Bluff Arsenal (PBA), Arkansas, (3) Umatilla Depot Activity 
(UMDA) in Oregon,(4) and Newport Army Ammunition Plant (NAAP) in 
Indiana (Personal Communication: Public Affairs Officer, Office of the PM for 
Chern. Demil. , Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. 1 /9 /94) (See Table C-3; C-4) . 
With their Army funds, the citizens at the Aberdeen Proving Ground 
(APG) hired E.A. Engineering of Towson, MD. to conduct the study for them. 
E.A. Engineering concluded that, "the concerns of the citizens were valid and 
that the Army should go b ack and look at alternative technologies." The 
Aberdeen, Maryland group of Concerned Citizens reported a similar 
disaffection with the whole public participation process. 
The Citizens' Study Team assembled at the Umatilla (Oregon) site also 
expressed concerns about the fate of their study. They suggested a need for 
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professional conferences in order to bring the matter to the attention of the 
broader scientific community and to validate their results through the 
normal peer-review process. In their report they stated, "Our review is a ' one 
shot' affair. It's too easy for Army personnel to dismiss a criticism by saying, 
' Oh, that subject is covered in a report that will be out next month" '  
(Umatilla Study Group 1987, p.  A-42) . And, indeed, that i s  exactly how the 
Army handled many of the concerns raised by the community studies, largely 
by indicating that things would be dealt with in a vaguely distant future site­
specific document. 
Ultimately, though, the Umatilla Study Group came out in support of 
the Army's incineration plan. The make-up of  the team may have had 
something to do with it .  Rather than being composed of concerned citizens 
from the community, the team was made up of civil engineers and 
toxicologists from the local university---Oregon State University . They 
concluded, "The study team feels that the operation {sic) in the demil facility 
are well thought out and should be as risk free as possible . . .  The incineration 
(demil) permit is thorough and should be approved .  The projected 
atmospheric emissions are attainable and not hazardous to  human health" 
(Umatilla Study Group 1987, p. iii) . 
The Pine Bluff Arsenal (PBA) community study also supported the 
Army's decision. Working out of the University of Arkansas at Pine Bluff, 
they wrote, "Based upon our findings, conclusions and other pertinent 
recommendations, we firmly support the Army's "preferred" programmatic 
disposal alternative: The On-Site Disposal Alternative" (Demecs et al, 1987: 
PBA Community Review Study, p .  i i) .  However, under Section 1 . 1 ,  under 
1 . 1 .3 Recommend ations,  the study group called upon the Army to begin 
1 5 4 
immediate site-specific studies of the PBA area. It should be noted that the 
Army-funded community study at Pine Bluff Arsenal was performed many 
years before there was any organized opposition at the Pine Bluff site. The 
document is b asically a rubber stamp for the Army's program, and is 
definitely not a thoroughgoing critique of the existing policy. 
In Newport, Indiana, the site of the Newport Army Ammunition Plant 
(NAAP), the Concerned Citizens of Vermillion, Parke, Vigo, Fountain and 
Tippecanoe Counties also took advantage of the Army's offer to conduct an 
"independent" citizen's review of the Draft Programmatic Environmental 
Impact Statement (DPEIS) which included plans for an incinerator at that site. 
In addition to concerned citizens from the above-names counties, this group, 
similar to APG, hired expert consultants to advise them, but the citizens 
remained in control of the process. They concluded, "If safety considerations 
are, indeed, meant to outweigh all other concerns surrounding the nerve 
agent disposal project, the national disposal option, especially in the form of a 
desert siting of the incinerators (see p .  22 of report) would emerge as the 
option of least risk" (Community Review Final Report (NAAP} 1987, Section 
1 1 : Major Recommendations, p.  25) .  
The Newport team also accused the Army of  obfuscation in the way 
they handled queries from citizens. They observed that in response to much 
criticism regarding the Army's Draft Environmental Impact Statement 
(DEIS) , the Army produced (mostly during 1987) "a steady stream of rewrite 
volumes. These are generally of a much improved quality, but prevented us 
from arriving at an overall evaluation of the disposal plan" (Community 
Review Final Report (NAAP} 1987, p. 5). Specifically, they argued that "the 
newly developed addenda to the EIS, although much superior to the July 1986 
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statement, still leave many questions unanswered,  and above all ,  h ave 
obstructed many issues by the addition of  reams o f  quantitative risk 
assessments that tend to impart to the study an air of objectivity and reliable 
risk assessment" (Community Review Final Report 1987, p. 5) .  
Considering al l  the time and money (at  least $500,000) spent on these 
independent community studies, and the fact  that the studies produced in 
excess of 1 ,000 pages of text, one could reasonably ask what was accomplished . 
On the one hand, the studies are claimed to be evidence o f  the Army's  
willingness to involve citizens in  the process, and indeed, Army Public 
Affairs moguls point this out at every opportunity. On the other hand, as one 
of the co-founders of Common Ground (Kentucky) commented:  "Immediate 
and since, almost nothing---except PR for the opposition (i .e . ,  the Army). 
{There are } cumulative effects however . . .  As we proceed, perhaps we will find 
later that it { i .e . ,  the report} will carry weight in a federal court as evidence. 
It' s  valuable rhetorically, but not substantively. " 
3 .13 The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 
The Army's  half a million dollar Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 
at LBAD has been another source of controversy adding to the Army's 
complications in dealing with the population at the Kentucky site. In the fall 
of 1989, the Army appointed retired Brig. General Merwyn Jackson to oversee 
the County's  emergency plans for the CSDP at LBAD. A fifteen-member 
community team was assembled to assist in making decisions regarding the 
EOC which included local political elites and c itizen activists . .  The 
government agency FEMA (The Federal Emergency Management Agency) is 
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funding the $555,670 project, according to the local newspaper (Berea Citizen, 
September 13, 1989, p .  1 ) .  
A citizen and member of the EOC panel accused the local Army 
representative of  making unilateral decisions and not consulting the 
committee. There were bad feelings created because the facility was slated to 
be built in Richmond on North Keeneland Drive rather than at the Madison 
County Airport, which was argued to be a more central location. An activist 
from Berea echoed a comment that rings throughout this controversy, "The 
steamroller is still rolling," he said, "I feel the committee was left out. We felt 
it was already decided when we started talking" (Berea Citizen, September 13,  
1989, p .  1 ) .  
The ostensible reason the Army gave for building the facility was  to 
enhance emergency preparedness capability in the area. However, citizen 
activists who are also medical personnel have questioned the wisdom of 
putting so much money into building an EOC. As one physician/ activist put 
it, "We're not ready. There are five (5) respirators at Berea Hospital and five 
(5) at Pattie A .  Clay Hospital in Richmond; . . .  The staff are not trained ."  
Another issue that irked members of the citizens' committee appointed to 
work with General Jackson on matters relating to the EOC, was the fact that 
he set the meetings at inconvenient times, e.g. at 1 :30 P . M .  in the afternoon. 
One member of the committee remarked, "I  requested several times in 
writing, 'Please have meetings at a different time" On one occasion, a citizen 
said he wrote to the Pentagon requesting sixty gas masks for his people to use 
in case of an emergency. The Pentagon told him he could "buy them from a 
surplus store . "  (Personal Communication: activist to author 1 / 1 7  / 92) . 
Another member of the study team told me that although the citizens' 
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opinions were not taken into account in terms of "whether" or "where" to 
site the EOC, however, they were given the opportunity to select the saying 
that was to go on a plaque which was to be affixed to the building. After some 
deliberations, the committee selected Thomas Jefferson 's  famous quote, 
"Eternal Vigilance is the price of freedom." Marcuse ( 1968) has commented 
on just these types of limited choices, which he says are indicative of a kind of 
democratic "unfreedom" prevailing in advanced technological society .  He 
wrote, 
Under the rule of the repressive whole, l iberty can 
be made into a powerful instrument of domination. 
The range of choice open to the individual is not the 
decisive factor in determining the degree of human 
freedom, but what c a n  be chosen and what z s  
chosen by the individual" (Marcuse 1968, p.  7) . 
Allowing citizens to select the quotation for the EOC plaque (and calling that 
c it izen participation),  while preventing them from having any say 
whatsoever in whether they want the EOC and all  it stands for, is  ludicrous 
in terms of what is at stake. 
Community leaders continue to speculate on a possible "hidden 
agenda" for the expensive EOC. Notwithstanding its potential usefulness in 
the "unlikely" event of an "off-post" release of nerve agent, the Mayor of 
Berea was quoted in the Berea Citizen as saying, "the money could be better 
spent upgrading medical facilities and stockpiling drugs that could counteract 
the effects of the deadly nerve gas, which is stored underground at the depot" 
(Berea Citizen, September 13, 1989, p .  10) .  There is little room for doubt that  
the community's suspicions may be quite accurate when we examine the 
Army's list of functions for the EOC . For we discover, that in addition to 
establishing "a communications network 'of surprising magnitude,"' the EOC 
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was also designed "to establish a public-relations effort to quell what Jackson 
called, ' rumors constantly floating' . 'This may be the largest challenge," '  he 
said (Berea Citizen, September 13, 1989, p. 10) .  
3 .14 The 'Colonized' and 'Colonizer' : The Army Depot as a Colony of the 
Pentagon 
The relationship between the communities a djacent to the Army 
depots and the Pentagon is similar to that of 'colonized' and 'colonizer' as 
described by Gaventa (1980), Memmi (1967) and Balandier (1966) . Gaventa 
( 1980) writes: 
The establishment of dominance includes the 
development of an administrative relationship by 
the dominant society over the dominated,  either 
through the direct control of the representatives of 
the former, or through the development of  
collaborators or mediating elites amongst the latter . .  
. In short, the colonization process involves the 
development of a mobilization of bias ---a set of 
predominant values,  bel iefs and institutional 
procedures that operate systematically to the benefit 
of the colonizer at the expense of the colonized .  It is 
the development of a second-dimensional power 
relationship (Gaventa 1980, p.  32). 
The events surrounding the Army's b u ilding an E mergency 
Operations Center (EOC) at the Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot show clear 
evidence of power processes at work. The depot (e .g . ,  LBAD) is in a 
dependent position vis-a-vis the Pentagon, by virtue of (a) myths about the 
power of the Pentagon and, (b) by sheer force of economics. Military leaders at 
the Pentagon are in a position to dictate what happens at Army depots. In the 
case of the EOC controversy, retired Brig. General Merwyn Jackson, stands 
between the Army and the community ,  and while appearing to be 
representing the interests of the community in terms of preparing the 
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emergency response plan, he is in reality representing the Army's interests. 
Because LEAD is the most recalcitrant site in the entire CSDP, it became 
important for the Army to establish a way of "mitigating" (one of the Army's 
favorite euphemisms) the very vocal opposition. 
Gaventa (1980) has written at length about the role of what he called 
mediating elites in maintaining power processes. He writes : "The dominant 
institutions and social values that affect the Valley from beyond have often 
been found to be mediated by a local or regional elite" (p. 258) .  There is ample 
evidence that the Army's  media t ing el i te used the position to further 
promote the Army's preferred alternative, i .e., incineration. Members of 
Common Ground reported seeing Gen. Jackson on a T.V. program talking to 
local school bus drivers about the merits of incineration. They thought this 
curious and wondered what his {Jackson 's )  remarks had to do with 
emergency management, since ostensibly that was his primary function. 
According to reports, General Jackson was also seen giving informational 
talks to ladies clubs, business and civic groups on incineration. Gaventa 
(1980) has written, "Though appearing from within as spokesmen for the 
local situation, the elite are intertwined in interests and outlook with the 
absentee forces upon which their own relative dominance in the local 
situation depends" (Gaventa 1980, p .  258) . At the present time, the 
incinerator complex at LEAD has been placed on hold pending a permit from 
the state of Kentucky, and may, in fact, never be constructed . As Memmi 
( 1967) reminds us, "In order for the legitimacy to be complete, it is not enough 
for the colonized to be a slave, he must also accept this role" (Memmi 1967, p .  
88-9) .  I f  such i s  the case, then the Army has its work cut out for it in Madison 
County. 
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3 .15 Building a Movement: Opposition Grows at Other Sites 
The local ized citizen opposition at LBAD has rapidly grown into a 
nationwide movement against chemical weapons incineration. While this 
research is largely confined to examining the forces at work at the Lexington­
Bluegrass Army Depot, it is incumbent on us to at least briefly describe the 
situations at the other seven sites that house the CONUS stockpile . We will 
also examine other protest actions such as the one in the former Soviet 
Union at Chapayevsk and the Hawaiian Islanders opposition to the Army's 
JACADS facility located on Johnston Atoll (Kalama Island) in the South 
Pacific. 
3.15 .1  Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG) {Maryland } 
Aberdeen Proving Ground, situated on the Chesapeake Bay twelve 
miles northeast of Baltimore is within an eighty mile radius of Washington 
and Philadelphia. The Proving Ground is a major research and development 
center for both chemical and biological weapons and employs 20,000 civilians 
and military personnel. The agent are stored here represents only 5% of the 
total stockpile. No nerve agents are stored at Aberdeen, only ton containers 
of mustard agent which are stored in the open adjacent to an airstrip (Weide 
Field) which has recently become the subject of heated debate between the 
Army and the citizens. The Army's new training facility for the CSDP is also 
situated at APG. 
Second only to LBAD in the ferocity and level of sophisticated 
organization, is the citizens' opposition movement at the Edgewood Area of 
Aberd een Prov ing Ground . Founded in 1 98 6  by a fe i s ty 
1 6 1 
homemaker I environmental activist, they first ca lled themselves, the 
"People's Environmental Coalition" which later became "Concerned Citizens 
for Maryland's Environment, Inc. (CCME) ." Fearing that they would become 
"the East coast's hazardous waste site," citizens began organizing around the 
theme of getting the Army to do site-specific studies of the area, which they 
felt certain would demonstrate to the Army that the Aberdeen site was not an 
appropriate place to build an incinerator, noting that "there is a lready a 
Superfund site here ."  They also vigorously supported the idea of  
transporting the stored mustard gas out of APG. 
The founder of CCME recalls that after the release of the Army's 
programmatic decision, the Army told them "Not to worry---It's just a draft," 
and indicated that when they released the site-specific programmatic 
statement, things might change. She indicated that the Army said that the 
transport report would be considered .  As a result of these promises, she 
recalls: 
We were quiet for two years . We were not 
organized . . .  We were sitting for two years doing 
nothing but talking to the Army I 1984-1986} . . .  We 
suspect the Army made the decision to incinerate 
first . . .  We were not organized as a community. We 
were just a bunch of little groups." 
Another activist expressed similar sentiments in describing the early briefings 
held by the Army at the Aberdeen site . "In the beginning, " he said, "the 
Army held regular monthly meetings at a conference center at the arsenal 
and then little things started to irk me." He continued: 
I went religiously once a month !between 1985-1986} .  
To be  honest, it's hard to  sustain the drive. It 's hard 
to keep up. That's the beauty from the Army's point 
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of view. They've learned their lessons well. They 
were wearing us down. It's like a big headache that 
won't go away. Sometimes you get so frustrated. 
Both of  these citizens were members of the Army-funded ($1 00,000) 
community review study team at the Aberdeen site. When asked what the 
Army did with the report, he commented, "File 13 ."  "Then we really got 
angry," he said, "we went into the community and got some positive results ." 
In his study of young radicals, Kenneth Keniston (1968) made an 
observation that might serve as a summary description of the experiences of 
the citizen's group "Concerned Citizens for Maryland's  Environment."  He 
wrote, "What is most impressive is not their secret motivation to have the 
System fail, but their naive hope that it would succeed, and the extent of their 
depression and dissolution when their early reformist hopes were frustrated" 
(Keniston 1968, p. 127) . 
In 1986, CCME went about building a grass-roots organization. They 
went door to door handing out flyers, people donated both time and 
resources, e .g, printing. The founder of CCME describes their early efforts . 
She said: 
At first, when the Army states that there will be 
scoping meetings, nobody comes. Now, I call up and 
we go into the community. You've got to get out! 
In February we filed with the authorities . . .  People 
only respond by being yelled at. We used to think 
you could sit back---you have to get out there! 
They also began linking up with other like-minded entities, e .g . ,  Common 
Ground / KEF, Inc. in Kentucky. At one point Citizens' C learinghouse for 
Hazardous Waste (CCHW) invited them down to participate in a workshop 
on incineration and Greenpeace was  helpful in providing technical  
information as well as moral support. They looked to the Kentucky groups 
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for leadership and support and began forging communication lines and 
developing strategy. They wrote letters to the editor and sold buttons at 
scoping meetings. The media in the vicinity of APG has reportedly been 
"very cool, very conservative, very much in favor of the Army." In terms of 
strategy, CCME decided that " the boss of the Army is Congress . . .  so we've 
targeted Congress." In January 1991, CCME was still asking the Army to 
conduct site-specific studies. In a letter to the Honorable Helen Delich 
Bentley, the President of CCME said, "the Army must go back and do site­
specific environmental impact studies for each of the eight sites and treat each 
s ite as the unique site that i t  is" (Letter from President CCME to the 
Honorable Helen Delich Bentley, July 22, 1991 . )  
Another problem faced by Concerned C itizens for Maryland ' s  
Environment (CCME) involves the loss o f  political support. The founder of 
CCME talked openly about the possible co-optation of a political leader who 
was formerly a strong supporter of the citizens' opposition. This is how she 
explained it: "We lost a valuable person. She changed sides. Used to be 
vehemently against the Army. She was waiting for an appointment from 
the county executive. Now she is on the Army's side." 
More recently, a second opposition group has joined the struggle 
against the Army's incineration plans at the Aberdeen Proving Ground.  
Calling itself the "Coalition for the Safe Disposal of Chemical Weapons," the 
group 1s composed of citizens from Kent County and the surrounding 
environs .  This group mobilized in 1992 shortly after 60 Minutes aired its 
segment on the Johnston Atoll incinerator and the CSDP. At first people 
began searching for informa tion and asking questions of the Army. 
According to one of the founders of the Kent County group, "The Chern-
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Demil Program at Aberdeen responded to the people not by answering their 
questions, but by sending stacks of documents like the Emergency Evacuation 
Plan prepared by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the Record of Decision, 
the MITRE evaluation of the GB rocket campaign and others" (Statement by 
John E .  Nunn III before Committee on Government Operations, Second 
Session, 1 02nd Congress, Chemical Stockpile Program, June 1 6, 1 992, p .  2) .  
In a bold action, the Kent County group once persuaded the local 
politicians to refuse federal money for emergency preparedness related to the 
CSDP. They later recanted this position. They set up a speaker's b ureau 
which sent speakers to schools, rotary clubs, private clubs and business 
associations to talk about the proposed incinerator. However, things have 
not always gone smoothly at the APG site .  As one activist and 30-year 
resident of the Edgewood area commented, "This is not a popular issue. The 
real estate people in Harford County are against us. {Out of } 1 80,000 people ---
7500 to 8000 work at Edgewood Arsenal. APG comes in second only to the 
port of Baltimore which brings in about 1 .5 billion to the area; APG pulls in 
about a billion." 
In April of 1 992, the Kent County group sponsored a symposmm at 
Washington Col lege in Chestertown, Maryland in which they invited 
individuals from several government agencies. The Army elected to send 
the Deputy Program Manager and Technical Director for the Chemical 
Demilitarization Program who has a reputation among the activists for being 
extremely witty and personable, but nonetheless 1 00% behind incineration. 
The meeting was well attended --- over 1 000 people. However, it did not 
prove fruitful for the citizens and many questions went unanswered .  As a 
result of this meeting, an activist said, "a handful of citizens grew almost 
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overnight to over 8,000 people" (Statement by John Nunn 1992, p .2) .  Later on 
in his statement, John Nunn reported that over 4,000 people signed a petition 
opposing the incinerator and advocating exploration of alternatives to 
incineration at Aberdeen. In addition to these individuals, the Kent County 
group mobilized opposition from twenty-four other local groups in the 
Aberdeen area including: The Chamber of Commerce, Farm Bureau, Kent 
County PTA, Kent Conservation, Kent County Commissioners, Mayors and 
many more. Construction of the APG incinerator facility is scheduled to 
begin in 1 997  according to the latest version (June 1 994) of the CSDP 
Implementation Schedule (see Appendix C) .  
3 . 15.2 Newport Army Ammunition Plant (NAAP) {Indiana)  
The Newport Army Ammunition Plant is situated m Vermillion 
County, in west central Indiana. The installation is located approximately 24 
miles southeast of Danville, Illinois and 26 miles north of Terre Haute, 
Indiana. The chemical storage area and proposed CSDP site is located in the 
eastern part of NAAP approximately half way between the installation's 
northern and southern borders. The nearest residential community is located 
approximately 4 km from the site (DRAFT, Evacuation Time Estimates for 
Newport Army Ammunition Plant and Vicinity 1 991 ) .  
Army documents describe the area surrounding the  NAAP as  
predominantly rural in  character. The nighttime population within 5 km of 
the proposed site is estimated to be about 935, with approximately another 
3,560 within 10 km; 21 ,000 within 20 km; and about 80,000 live between 20 and 
35 km of the plant site . (Emergency Response Concept Plan for Newport 
Army Ammunition Plant and Vicinity 1 989) .  A member of the Newport 
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Citizen's Study Group accused the Army of spending big money to wm 
residents '  support for incineration, c i ting the Army's  budget for an 
Emergency Operations Center in the Rockwell area which is estimated to cost 
approximately $400,000. Another EOC is going up in nearby Clinton, and the 
town's former mayor was recently designated as its director.  The Army's 
tactics, a citizen claims, are seen as "nothing more than a bribe" (The Salt Lake 
Tri bu n e  , Utah, Sunday, January 3, 1993, p. A-8 ) .  Construction of the 
incinerator facility at Newport is tentatively scheduled to begin in 1998. (See 
Table C-2).  
3 .15 .3 Tooele Army Depot (TEAD) {Utah} 
Tooele Army Depot in Tooele Utah, with the largest amount of the 
nation's stockpile of chemical weapons (42 .3 %) ironically has the least 
c itizen's resistance to the Army's grand plan. Currently Tooele Army Depot 
is the largest employer in Tooele County and the second largest federal 
employer in the state of Utah (Proceedings of Discussion Workshop, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, August 15, 1984, p.  3) .  The Depot occupies 44,092 acres in Tooele 
County, Utah and lies about 36 miles south-southwest of Salt Lake City. The 
depot consists of two areas 20 miles apart. The North Area is three miles 
southeast of Tooele City, the county seat. The South Area, approximately 45 
miles from Salt Lake City contains 19,364 acres and is horne to the Army's 
Chemical Agent Munitions Disposal System (CAMDS) . Tooele County is the 
second largest county in Utah, containing over 4 .4 million acres . The 
county's  population is roughly 32,800, 19,000 of whom l ive in Tooele City 
(Richmond Regis ter, Saturday, August 1 8, 1984, p. 1 ) .  Tooele stores ton 
containers of nerve agent as well as mustard and an assortment of rockets 
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and /or spray tanks containing either HD, HT (mustard) or (nerve agents) GB 
or VX. Additionally, a small amount of Lewisite is stored at TEAD. 
Obviously, the Army is a major presence, and despite the negative 
press caused by the Dugway Sheep Kill in 1968 when 6000 sheep died as a 
result of an Army chemical weapons test gone awry (Van Kampen et al 1968), 
the people are somewhat blase about the Army's activities. TEAD already has 
been horne to the Army's first trial facility, i.e., the Chemical Agent Disposal 
System (CAMDS) for many years. According to the paper, the attitude about 
the plant that destroys deadly agents seems to be "It's in Tooele" rather than 
its 45 miles from Salt Lake City and Provo" (Salt Lake Tribune, January 3, 
1993, p.  A-8) . Tooele was the unanimous choice for a Western incinerator. 
Opposition to the Army's plan isn't non-existent, though. Currently, 
there are two active opposition groups at this site. One is an outgrowth of the 
Sierra club and another, more recent group calls itself, "the Downwinders." 
The Tooele groups have done some interesting things to bring the matter to 
the attention of the populace. Their strategy has been to attack the Army's 
emergency preparedness plan. They have charged that CSEPP, the Army's 
emergency preparedness plan for the storage sites is, " like the fallout 
preparedness plan of the SO's, being prepared by government officials, with no 
public input" (Utah Sierran, June/July 1992, p .  6) .  According to activists in 
Utah, during the three years the Army has been working on the plan, 
millions of federal dollars have be poured into increasing the CSEPP staff, in 
replacing an outmoded computer system, and in sponsoring monthly 
meetings at a local hotel conference room, complete with all the amenities. 
Instead, activists insist the money would be better spent on training medical 
personnel or hazardous-materials response teams. Additionally, they fear 
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that with other sites lobbying to have their stocks transported out, Utah will 
become the central disposal facility for the stockpile. 
At one time, activists placed bandages (as if bandages would be of any 
use with nerve gas) in packages destined to be handed out by the Boy Scouts 
during the summer of 1992---the Army's "Yellow Bag Program" ( U t a h  
S ierran :  June/July 1992) . These packages were intended to b e  used b y  the 
Army as "educational" material concerning emergency preparedness; thus, 
mocking the Army's credibility on the "safety" issue and causing Army Public 
Affairs moguls some consternation. They worried that this group 's "militan t  
" tactics would spread to other sites (Field Notes: ORNL Tasking Meeting, 
1993). And worry they should, because as Gaventa (1980) has pointed out, 
"Once the patterns of quiescence are broken, the likelihood of further action 
by B increases and the options for control wielded by A decrease" (Gaventa 
1980, p. 25) . Marcuse (1968) has also theorized about why this type of tactic is 
often so effective. He writes, "Their opposition hits the system from without 
and is therefore not deflected by the system; it is an elementary force which 
violates the rules of the game, and in doing so, reveals it as a rigged game" 
(Marcuse 1968, p.256) .  
Despite the creativity of the citizens' opposition movement at this site, 
the Army has completed construction of the first full-scale nerve-gas 
incinerator in the continental United States at Tooele, Utah and has begun 
the next step called "systemization" which involves testing the various 
components of the system. 
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3 . 15.4 Pine Bluff Arsenal (PBA) {Arkansas) 
Second only to Tooele Army Depot, Pine Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas has 
the largest percentage of unitary chemical weapons with some 12% of the U.S.  
stockpile. When the Army was considering regional sites, Pine Bluff was 
cited as a likely candidate for disposing of weapons east of the Mississippi, 
although their first choice was Anniston, Alabama.  A variety of agents are 
stored at PBA including the nerve agents VX and GB and mustard agents H, 
HD, and HT. All are stored in earth-covered ammunition bunkers called 
i gloos .  
The Arsenal i s  at the heart of Pine Bluff, a city of 60,000. Little Rock, 
Arkansas capital with a population of 180,000 is 35 miles to the north. Pine 
Bluff Arsenal is in a decidedly rural area where poverty is a fact of life . The 
citizens' opposition movement in that area--Families Concerned About 
Nerve Gas Incineration--is led by Regina Dooley who worries about the 
environmental effects of an incinerator on the local citizenry. "It only hurts 
us worse because we're poor," she said in an interview in the Pine Bluff 
Commercial (Sunday, August 2, 1992, p. 1 ) .  Dooley explained that people in 
the area are "so busy trying to stay alive that they don' t have concern for what 
is going on around them." She stresses the need to educate people on what 
has been going on. However, judging from remarks made by one of the local 
political elites who said, "I  can't understand where you're coming from. I 
trust the experts to protect the citizens" (Pine Bluff Commercial, Thursday, 
August 20, 1992, p .1 ) ,  there is more than just the fact of poverty driving the 
quiescence of the people of Pine Bluff. It is quite obviously an "Army town." 
General sentiment favors the Army's view and people are supportive of the 
incineration plan .  According the Army's latest implementation schedule 
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(CSDP Implementation Schedule, June 1994), construction of the incinerator 
complex at PBA is scheduled to begin in September of 1995, testing in 1998, 
and operation is to begin in 1999. 
3 . 15.5 Anniston Army Depot (ANAD) 
Anniston's stockpile of rockets, mortars, land mines and containers of 
nerve and mustard gas represents 7.1% of the U.S.  total stockpile of unitary 
chemica l  weapons, and, like Pine Bluff, some site preparation for an 
incinerator has been funded and is proceeding. The nearest city to the storage 
facility is Anniston, a town of 27,000 people, eight miles east of the depot. 
Birmingham is 60 miles west of the Army base; and Atlanta is 90 miles east. 
Although the Army's disposal program for the chemical weapons has 
ignited formidable opposition elsewhere, the newspapers report that, " it 's 
stirred barely a ripple of interest in Calhoun County. Elected officials have 
been unanimously supportive. Public hearings have been scantily attended" 
(The Annis ton S tar, June 15, 1992, p. 3A) . The Salt Lake City Tribune also 
reported on the situation at Anniston with regard to the chemical weapons 
program. In August of that same year (1992), a story appeared in the NATION 
section of The Salt  Lake Tribune, having been p icked up from the L o s  
A ngeles Times . The story, entitled, "Pending Chemical-Weapons Destruction 
Raises Fears," described the relationship between the Army and the 
townspeople in the vicinity of the Anniston Army Depot. It began with these 
words: 
The folks here have always been friends with their 
military neighbors. God-fearing and patriotic, this 
quiet corner of the Deep South, halfway between 
Atlanta and Birmingham, Ala. ,  is proud to be home 
to Fort McClellan and the Anniston Army Depot, 
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the area's largest employer. (The Salt Lake Tribune, 
August 16, 1992, A-12). 
The article goes on to say that evidence of this support exists in the 
form of six monuments to the veterans of every conflict from the Civil War 
to the Vietnam War which grace the center of town. So when "Families 
Concerned About Nerve Gas Incineration" began organizing, they had their 
work cut out for them. According to opposition leaders, "many people don't 
even know that Anniston Army Depot will be one of eight U.S. sites where 
the munitions will be burned" (The Annis ton Star, June 15, 1992). "Very few 
people knew what was going on," another activist commented.  However, in 
the summer of 1992, housewives began learning about VX and GB chemical 
agents and M55 rockets. The newspaper reports that, "Business people and 
blue-collar workers, braving the resentment of a conservative and pro­
military majority are starting to organize" (The Salt Lake Tribune, August 1 6, 
1 992, p .  A-1 2) .  According to reports pro-military feelings in Anniston run 
very high and public officials all support incineration. The Salt Lake Tribune 
reports that "Nowhere have pro-military feelings been as great as in 
Anniston, which got its chemical weapons in the 1960s and where local 
officials today all either support the incineration plan or have not taken a 
stand" (The Salt Lake Tribune, August 16, 1992, p .  A-12) .  
Those who oppose incineration have been supported in  their 
organizing efforts by the activists in Kentucky, specifically, the leaders of 
Common Ground and the Director of  the Kentucky Environmental  
Foundation, but it has been an uphill battle. Vickie Tolbert, a member of  
"Families," speculating on why organizing was so difficult at this site said, 
''I 'm not really sure why there's been so little public involvement . . .  The only 
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thing I can think of is that we have a history of being a little bit apathetic and 
trusting as far as being taken care of around here" (The Anniston Star, 
6/15/92, p. 3A). 
A noted scholar who has written extensively about grassroots 
environmental movements around the issue of hazardous waste disposal has 
followed the activities of citizen groups involved with the CSDP in Anniston, 
Alabama. (Bailey 1989; 1992; 1993; 1994) . In the course of his work, he has 
come across two groups in Anniston who have mobilized around the CSDP. 
One group opposes the Army's incineration plan ("Families Concerned 
About Nerve Gas Incineration') the other supports the Army---the 
countermovement! He characterizes the citizen opposition group there as "a 
fairly urb an, urbane and cosmopolitan group . "  The pro-Army group at 
ANAD, called "Citizens for SPRING" (which stands for "S afe Proven,  
Reliable, Incineration of  Nerve G as"), has an  executive director and seven 
standing committees. According to Professor Bailey (whose field notes of the 
Army's public meetings have provided keen insights into the forces at work 
at ANAD), SPRING is led by a retired Army employee whose wife is the 
Protocol Officer at the Depot. In August of 1993, "Citizens for SPRING" 
sponsored a public forum in which they brought in the Army's "heavy 
artillery," i .e . ,  the Deputy Program Manager and Technical Director for the 
CSDP and the Public Affairs Officer from Program headquarters at Aberdeen 
Proving Ground, MD. Citizens for SPRING published a flyer in which they 
detailed their beliefs about  the safety of incineration and the dubious 
prospects of finding an alternative technology. The document prominently 
d isplayed a quotation from Franklin D. Roosevelt which says: "The only limit 
to our realization of tomorrow will be our doubts of today" (Citizens for 
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SPRING, no date, 853 Brookhaven Road,  Anniston, AL. 36201 ) .  This is 
similar to the military's use of Thomas Jefferson's quote, "The price of 
freedom is eternal vigilance," being used to defend the ideology of deterrence! 
Professor Bailey and his staff concluded what others have also deduced, 
that the Army is really not interested in exploring anything other than 
incineration. During the question and answer session at a public meeting 
which was held on August 15, 1993, at Anniston City Auditorium, someone 
inquired whether equipment had been ordered for the Anniston incinerator. 
The answer given was, "Yes, ordered before alternative technologies report. 
1 7  million dollar investment. Will NOT be a factor in decision about 
Anniston" (Field Notes, Bailey 1993, p .  4). Construction of the ANAD facility 
is scheduled to commence in 1995; testing is to begin in 1997 and the facility is 
to be fully operational by 1999 (CSDP Implementation Schedule, June 1994). 
3 . 15.6 Umatilla Depot Activity (UMDA) {Oregon) 
Umatilla Army depot sits in a semi-arid corner of northeastern Oregon 
six miles from the Columbia River. The nearest city is Hermiston, 
population 1 0,000.  Within a 65-mile radius, however, are Walla Walla,  
Washington and Pendelton and Richland, Oregon. Umatilla ' s  5,200-ton 
stockpile of lethal munitions is 1 1 .6% of the total stockpile. According to a 
statement made in a report issued by the Army-funded community study 
group at UMDA, "There is strong support from the majority of the citizens 
for this project. The Army has good credibility in the area around Umatilla" 
(Umatilla Study Group: Final Report 1987, p. A-18) .  However, there 1s a 
viable and well-organized group of citizens who oppose the plan. The 
citizens' group called "Citizens for Environmental Equality," worries that 
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dioxins will end up in the food chain. Given that Hermiston is an 
agricultural-based economy, this is  a prime concern to activists at UMDA. 
The design work for the proposed incinerator at Umatilla was about 90% 
complete as of April 1993, however, further work was put on hold until after 
the Alternative Technologies report. According to the Army's timetable, 
construction of the incinerator facility complex is scheduled to begin during 
1 995, testing through 1998, and incineration is to commence in 2000 (CSDP 
Implementation Schedule, June 1 994) .  
3.15.7 Pueblo Depot Activity (PUDA) {Colorado} 
Pueblo Depot's 9.9% of the nation 's  stockpile haunts some of the 
1 00,000-plus residents of Pueblo 14 miles to the west. The public is skeptical of 
the Army's motives, according to one member of the Sierra Club who heads 
the citizen protest group at PUDA. He reports that "enormous sums of 
money are being pumped into 'sustaining incineration' which is an archaic 
and unreliable technology" (The Salt Lake Tribune, January 3, 1993, p .  A-8). 
However, the incumbent congressman for the district would rather the 
weapons be destroyed on site than transport them over land, although he 
admitted not being wedded to the concept. Recently, the Rocky Mt. Chapter of 
the Sierra Club has been permitted to have representation on Governor 
Romer's  CW Advisory Committee, as part of powers granted to governors 
under the 1992 Defense Authorization Act. Finally, a second opposition 
group has formed in Colorado: "Citizens for Safe Chemical Weapons" 
(Common Sense: A Newsletter of Common Ground funded by KEF, Inc . ,  
April 1 993). 
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3 .16 The Case of Chapayevsk: Citizen Opposition in the former Soviet 
Union.  
Like the United States, the former Soviet Union has amassed its own 
deadly arsenal of chemical weapons---approximately 50,000 tons according to 
the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs (DTIC, Le Monde, 29 December 1987) . 
These weapons were produced and stored at the military complex at Chikany, 
which is, in the words of one military expert, "without doubt the largest 
chemical warfare complex in the world"  (DTIC, International Defense Review 
1987, p .  6) . "Chikany is located about 600 km to the southeast of Moscow, on 
the Volga, in the immensity of the Russian steppes" (DTIC, In terna tiona l  
Defense Review 1987, p .6) .  (The population of Chiknay i s  about 5000 ) .  
According to reports, there are not less than nineteen different types of  Soviet 
chemical ammunition stored there---everything from artillery shells to 
technical missile charges. The new Multila teral Chemical Weapons 
Convention, (CWC) mandates the destruction of these weapons as well as 
those of the United States and requires that the U. S. and Russia cooperate on 
destruction technology. 
The Russians have tried neutralization as one method of destroying 
their CW stockpile. In October of 1987, a group Western experts were invited 
to tour the Russian complex and to witness an example of their l atest 
destruction technology, i .e, neutralization. In 1987 the Russian government 
began construction of a large chemical weapons destruction factory (utilizing 
a neutralization process) at Chapayevsk (population 90,000) about 500 miles 
southeast of Moscow---and then promptly closed it because of c itizen 
opposition. "The Chapayevsk facility was completed last year but the public 
objected to it, c iting environmental concerns, so the government decided to 
close it," explained Mikita P .  Smidovich, the deputy head of the Soviet 
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delegation to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (News Focus :  
Chemical and Engineering News, August 12, 1990, p.  18 ) .  Commenting on 
the unusual situation in the former Soviet Union, Chemical and Engineering 
News editors commented that: 
Such ecological concerns, almost de rzgueur in the 
United States are hardly expected in the Soviet 
Union. But the fact is, Soviet green movements are 
baring their teeth and closing down chemical and 
neutralization facilities in increasing numbers" 
(Chemical & Engineering News, 1990, p. 18) .  
The Wall S treet Journal reported that, "In Russia, every aspect of 
destruction--- from how to do it, to how to pay for it, from who should do it 
to where it should be done---is embroiled in debate" (Wall Street Journal, 
February 25, 1993, p. A-6, Col. 2). Changes in the social structure brought 
about by peres troika have severely impacted the State's ability to implement 
any plans regarding the destruction of both chemical and nuclear weapons. 
As one Russian Parliamentrian complained, "We can't make any decisions 
now without the consent of the locals . . .  We underestimated the changes in 
society and the role of the mass media, so we didn't pay enough attention to 
the people" (Wall S treet Journal, February 25, 1993, p. A-6, col. 2). The lastest 
government plan for the destruction of chemical weapons is running into a 
similar minefield of opposition, according to observers of the Russian scene. 
"Even before the Russian Parliament began debating the plan last month, the 
legislature in Chuvash rejected a destruction facility on its territory," writes 
House and Revzin (Wall S treet Journal, February 25, 1993, p. A-6) .  The 
success of grassroots efforts to halt destruction technology in the former 
Soviet Union does pose questions worth pondering: Is not the Jeffersonian 
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ideal of 'government by the people' more alive now in the former Soviet 
Union than perhaps in the United States which advertises i tself as a 
democracy? Will the government of the United States learn from them and 
accede to the will of the people, or, will the Russians learn from our 
government how to quell citizen uprisings through co-optation and 
propaganda? 
3 . 17  Hawaiian Islanders oppose Kalama Island (JACADS) facility. 
"Remoteness is Just a State of Mind," so said the delegates from 
Hawaii, members of the Chemical Weapons Working Group, the group of 
citizens who met in 1992 in Richmond, KY. to share ideas and exchange 
information about the Army's  Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program.  
Johnston Atoll (otherwise known as  Kalama Island),  which lies 2,109 nautical 
miles from San Francisco and 717 nautical miles southwest of the Hawaiian 
Island chain, is home to the U.S .  Army's  first fully-operational chemical 
weapons disposal facility---JACADS---the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent 
Disposal Facility, which has been conducting Operational Verification Testing 
(OVT) on chemical weapons since 1990 . However, to the peoples of the 
Pacific Region, Johnston Atoll is in their backyard, and they are quick to point 
out that the U.S.  military's insouciance regarding their complaints about 
being the dumping ground for every conceivable military toxic waste is now 
legendary. "The Army has not been truthful or forthcoming and have 
covered over their decision with jargon," the Hawaiian delegate said . 
But the JACADS facility is not the first insult to the environment 
perpetrated by the U.S. military on Johnston Atoll. During the Second World 
War, the island was reportedly used as a nuclear test site, and, according to 
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Greenpeace, Johnston Island has also been the site of the acciden tal sinking of 
nuclear weapons (Greenpeace Pacific Campaign map 1989) .  After the Second 
World War, the atoll played an important role in testing and storing 
American chemical weapons. Some 300,000 artillery shells containing nerve 
and mustard gas have been kept there since 1971 (New York Times,  July 27, 
1990) . The island is very small---only 3,000 feet by 600 feet. It remained 
unclaimed until 1 858 when C. J .  Johnston, a British mariner d iscovered it 
along with another tiny sister island in a semi-circular coral reef. The atoll 
has been designated a national wildlife refuge and is operated by the Defense 
Nuclear Agency and the Department of the Interior.  The island is 
uninhabited, save for the Army personnel who work at the $240 million 
dollar incinerator facility complex; however, this does not mean that the 
surrounding marine environment and the people of the surrounding islands 
are not affected by what goes on there (Ember 1990) .  
In theory, U.S .  bases abroad are required to meet the environmental 
standards of stateside installations. However, in reality, no U.S .  or foreign 
agency has the authority to enforce or even monitor  the environmental 
compliance at U.S .  installations lcoated outside of the United States . U.S .  
b ases abroad are governed by status of forces agreements with each host 
country, and those agreements say l ittle about environmental protection 
(Seigel et al, 1991 ) .  Greenpeace has long been at the forefront of a campaign to 
make the U.S.  military accountable for its actions in the Pacific. Since 1971,  
Greenpeace has been actively working with the peoples in the region to create 
a nuclear-free, pollution-free Pacific. 
The Army has turned a deaf ear to the pleas from the people of the 
Pacific Region for a moratorium on activities at Johnston Atoll . The latest 
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insult sterns from the U.  S. Department of Defense's  planned shipment of 
the U.S.  stockpile of chemical weapons stored in the Republic  of West 
Germany. A representative from the Office of Hawaiian Affairs wrote, "It is 
an affront to Pacific peoples that there has been no consultation about this 
U .S . -West German agreement . Among others, the government o f  
Micronesia (as reported b y  Hawaii Public Radio Pacific Islands News) strongly 
condemned the unilateral decision by the United States Government to 
destroy these highly dangerous substances in the Pacific without consulting 
Pacific peoples . This is a very heavy-handed colonial a ttitude and 
undermines any overtures towards trust and equality in establishing 
democracies in the Pacific" (Akaka 1990, p . 1,2) . 
The term 'subaltern classes' used by Spivak (no date) when referring to 
the peoples of the Third World, applies to the inhabitants of the Pacific  
Islands. She asks, 'Can the Subaltern Speak'? and answers in the negative--­
'the subaltern cannot speak' (Spivak, no date), because Western forms of 
d iscourse (and this includes the Military) construe these people as "other" 
with all the attendant negative baggage that entails . The end result is not to 
take them seriously and to trivialize and marginalize their concerns. They 
are the victims of a virulent form of white racist imperialism and 
technocratic colonialism. 
3 .18 Countermovement Activity (The Backlash) 
No chronicling of the history of the citizen opposition to the Chemical 
Stockpile Disposal Program would be complete without a look at the backlash 
that erupted .  Mottl (1980) argues that the analysis of  reaction, as an 
ineluctable part of social conflict and change, has not received sufficient 
analytical treatment in the social movements literature. She defines a 
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coun termovement as a particular kind of protest movement which is  a 
response to the social change advocated by an initial movement. As stated 
earlier, c itizen opposition movements against  incineration at the various 
depot sites have been gaining momentum and strength; therefore, it is not 
surprising that a reaction should occur, particularly in view of the fact that 
many of the communities adjacent to the storage sites could be described as 
"Army towns," in which c itizens are linked both economically and 
ideologically to the existence of the depot. 
The first indication of what  could be termed "countermovement 
activity" occurred at  LBAD (Kentucky) in the winter of 1992. Several "Letters 
to the Editor" began appearing in local newspapers in and around the 
Berea / Richmond / Lexington area supporting the Army's incineration plan. 
Often, these letters were signed by retired Army people or retired depot 
workers. Members of  Common Ground /KEF and Concerned Citizens 
responded to these editorials once they began appearing. Keeping up with 
this type of work is extremely tedious and yet it is important to keep the issue 
before the people. Unfortunately, many of these letters were relying heavily 
on "facts" supplied by the Army, and as with all propaganda, were filled with 
half-truths often mouthing the Army's own standard legitimations for the 
program, stressing the safety of incineration and the al leged d angers of  
continued storage (e.g. see "Letters to  the Editor," Berea Citizen, February 27, 
1992) 
In terms of collective countermovement a ctivity, Anniston Army 
Depot (ANAD) seems to be the first site where an organized group effort has 
evolved in support of the Army. Although we have described this group in 
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great detail in a previous section, it may be useful to examine the phenomena 
further within the context social movements theory. 
Mottl (1980) argues that "movements and countermovements ought to 
be seen as elements of common social processes of collective action centering 
on reform" (Mottl 1980, p. 620) .  This implies a dialectical relationship, and 
indeed, such an analysis can be justified when looking at the 
"movement/countermovement" activity with regard to the Army's CSDP. 
Mot t l  ( 1 980 )  o u tl ines sever a l  pos tu la tes thought  to  desc r ibe 
countermovements. According to  Mottl (1980), movements challenge groups 
higher up in the stratification hierarchy, while countermovements are 
oriented against challenges from below. This can be readily demonstrated 
with respect to the Anniston Army Depot groups "Families Concerned About 
Nerve Gas Incineration" and "Citizens for SPRING. "  Opponents of the 
Army's plan ( i .e . ,  "Families")  generally try to influence Congress and 
sometimes even the Pentagon in their efforts to halt  incineration; whereas 
SPRING directs its efforts to citizens in the communities at large in an effort 
to "prevent" the opposition from stopping the construction of the 
incinerator, which they believe would mean loss of jobs in the community 
and which would set a dangerous precedent for Army /Community relations. 
Additionally, Army prestige in the community is being challenged by the 
opposition forces, and with it, the status of military personnel. This challenge 
goes against the grain in this historically "Army" town. Since the leader of 
the countermovement in Anniston comes from the military ,  we might 
analyze this as a form of s ta t us poli tics . An entire literature on "sta tus 
politics" has emerged to explain how such threatened groups defend their 
" lifestyles" (Gusfield 1963; Zurcher et al 1971; Page and Clelland 1978). Ferree 
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and Miller ( 1979) .  argue that ' a  definitive feature of countermovements is the 
use of a single idea as an ideological  lever for the mobilization of disparate 
constituents to preserve the status quo '(Mottl 1980, p. 621 ) .  The ideological 
lever used by the countermovement at Anniston is the all-too- familiar one 
which exaggerates the dangers of continued storage while insisting that 
incineration is the only viable alternative. They have also cleverly played on 
people's fears about chemical weapons being transported to Anniston from 
other sites. "Citizens for SPRING Agree that ANAD Should Not Become a 
Regional Disposal Site. We Don't Want Other States' Stockpiles! "  proclaims 
their newsletter .  This is a theme which resonates well within the 
community and is a salient rallying point. Not surprisingly, SPRING enjoys 
the wholehearted endorsement of the depot commander who once said in an 
interview, "Take away incineration and it could take the Army anywhere 
from eight to fifteen years to come up with another means to destroy its 
chemical weapons . . .  the risk of storage is far greater than the risk of 
incineration" (The Annis ton S tar, August 21 ,  1 992) .  As the opposition 
movement continues to grow, we can expect to see more of this type of 
activity develop at other sites. 
3 . 19 Movement Update 
What began in Kentucky in 1984, as a small grass-roots effort of a few 
committed activists, has grown continuously throughout the decade to 
include all eight sites. Since 1991 ,  the movement has gained momentum. 
Tooele, Utah has two groups who oppose the current incineration plan. Pine 
Bluff Arsenal now has a very vocal, organized opposition group with a 
steering committee of at least twelve. Maryland has two very strong groups 
and is in the process of drafting restrictive permitting regulations similar to 
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Kentucky and Indiana. A second opposition group has formed in Colorado-­
"Citizens for Safe Weapons Disposal." Alabama's opposition to the nerve-gas 
incinerator is growing and legal action is being considered by ANAD 
incineration opponents because, according to charges, the Army violated 
NEPA and RCRA regulations by beginning site preparations at  the Anniston 
site without a permit. In addition, construction of the incinerator facility at 
that site, will be delayed at least 15 months after House-Senate negotiators 
barred spending for the project in September of 1 992. The Ann is ton S tar  
reported that "the ANAD provision i s  one of  several congressional proposals 
that could further hobble the controversial incineration program" (Th e 
Annis ton S tar, September 9, 1992, p .  1 ) .  Not only have several new groups 
formed, but the political climate has shifted somewhat in the direction of the 
anti-incineration camp. According to the New York Times (5 / 18 /93),  "the 
Clinton A dministration plans to bar the development of new hazardous 
waste incinerators for 18 months." Additionally, both Kentucky and Indiana 
have now passed very restric tive laws regarding hazardous waste 
incinerators' stack emissions. According to an article which appeared in The 
Village Voice: : 
The law, passed by the Kentucky General Assembly 
32-0 in March of 1992, requires the Army to show 
that 'no a lternative method of treatment or 
d i sposa l ,  inc lud ing,  b u t  not  l i m i te d  to ,  
neutralization and transportation to a less populated 
site, exists that creates less risk of release or harm to 
the public or the environment. '  (The Village Voice, 
October 6, 1992, p. 18) 
The law requires the Army to prove its process would destroy 99.9999 
percent of the material burned, making it difficult to obtain the necessary 
permits to begin construction. Indiana has passed similarly restrictive laws 
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concerning stack emissions; other states have similar plans. A further piece 
of legislation that bears on the CSDP is the Federal Facilities Compliance Act 
(FFCA) signed by President Bush in 1992. Within two years of its signing, the 
law stipulates that federal facilities (such as the Lexington Bluegrass Army 
Depot et al) will be regulated by the same environmental compliance laws as 
U.  S. private industry. This is significant, because up until this time, federal 
facilities have been exempt from federal environmental laws. However, the 
Army has said it will "voluntarily" comply with existing state and federal 
laws. Up until now, there has been no way to enforce such regulations. Now 
there will  be .  The most recent development involves the Defense 
Authorization Act of 1993 which requires the Army to certify that on-site 
incineration is indeed the safest method of disposal a fter seriously 
considering alternatives. The reports are due later this year (1994) . 
Nevertheless, despite the apparent successes of the opposition, the 
Army's incineration plan for the destruction of the U. S. stockpile of unitary, 
chemical weapons marches inexorably onward. While citizen groups may be 
able to forestall deployment of incinerators at one or two of the sites, the 
Army's Implementation Schedule (see Appendix D) gives no indication that 
a shift away from incineration is in the offing. Indeed, the Army is not bound 
to take the advice of the studies commissioned to investigate alternative 
technologies.  In a letter to the Director of the Kentucky Environmental 
Foundation, a representative from the Pacific Studies Center argues that, 
"The problem is that the Army would consider any change in technology to 
be an admission of error .  Thus, it has a b ureaucratic imperative to 
recommend against alternatives" (Letter from Lenny Seigel, Pacific Studies 
Center to Executive Director, KEF, Inc. 8 /27 /92). But the struggle is far from 
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over, and as of this writing, (May 1995) there is evidence that the opposition 
movement may be gaining supporters in Congress. 
3.20 Summary and Conclusion: 
In terms of the grassroots opposition movement that began in 
Kentucky, indigenous social networks played an important role, not only in 
mobilizing people against the CSDP but in sustaining an effective level of 
insurgency throughout the many long years of organizing on the issue.  In 
the language of the leading theoretical paradigm for analyzing social 
movements, the Resource Mobilization perspective (McCarthy and Zald 1982; 
Gamson, 1968; Gerlach and Hines 1970; Heberle 1951;  Klandermans and 
Oegema 1987; Morris 1981;  Walsh and Warland 1983; Cable, Walsh and 
Warland 1988; Aveni, 1978) the local social justice organizations in Berea and 
the closeknit network of friends and business acquaintences in the respective 
communities provided both a b asis for social action and the necessary 
indigenous resources to carry out effective insurgency. The groups recruited 
from different social networks, thus adding strength and diversity to an 
already well-established tradition of political action. While these are not 
fundamentally "charismatic" movements, charismatic leaders do play an 
important role in this movement. Their penchant for coalition building and 
their abilitly to develop effective strategies to counter the Army rhetoric 
spewing out of the Pentagon Public Relations offices, appears to have 
contributed to their success as well. 
In conclusion, a fitting slogan for the citizen-led opposition effort 
comes from the words of one of Concerned Citizens leading spokesman, 
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quoting Marshall Foch, the French General who said, "We fought to the end, 
and then we fought beyond the end of the end." 
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Chapter 4 
The Second Face of Power: 
NEPA, The Army, and the Myth of Public Participation 
'But the people were given the immense satisfaction of having been consulted, of 
having been given a chance to debate, of having --- so it seemed to them --- their 
opinions solicited and weighed. This is the democratic appearance that no 
authoritrian government can do without. 
Jacques Ellul 1965. Propaganda: The Formation of Men 's Attitudes 
4.1  NEPA: The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
4 .1 .1  Background 
The late s ixties and early seventies were a time of unprecedented 
heightened public awareness about environmental issues. Indicative of this 
new consciousness was the celebration of EARTH DAY (April 22, 1970), which 
drew two hundred fifty thousand people to Washington D.C. and involved 
"teach-ins" and speeches all over the country all united "in what amounted 
to be the equivalent of a national town meeting on America's environmental 
future" (Manes 1990, p .45) .  Commenting on EARTH DAY, Christopher 
Manes ( 1990) wrote, "Even in a time of mass protests against the Vietnam 
War and racial injustice, Earth Day represented an impressive d isplay of 
p ublic  support for a political ideal---the preservation of America ' s  
deteriorating environment" (Manes 1990, p .45) .  Riding this crest of  popular 
support for the preservation of the environment, the last few years of  the 
1 960s, and the following decade of the seventies, ushered in remarkable 
successes for environmentalists both in the legal and political arena (Manes 
1990) .  Several  new laws affecting the environment were passed, e .g . ,  The 
Clean Air Act 1970, The Clean Water Act 1972, The National Toxics Control 
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Act 1976, and The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act {RCRA} 1 976. 
First and foremost among these new legislative initiatives was the law for the 
p rotect ion o f  the environment known a s  NEPA---The Na t i ona l  
Environmental Policy Act of 1 969 (Public Law 91-190 a s  amended) .  Signed by  
President Nixon on  January 1 ,  1 970, the Act was hailed a s  the answer to  our 
environmental woes and characterized as "A comprehensive 'national 
charter for protection of the environment"'(Hunscher 1983, p. 336) .  At  last 
the country was facing up to its obligations to live in harmony with the 
planet. 
Caldwell (1979) argues that by the late 1 960s there was widespread belief 
among environmentally concerned and politically active citizens that federal 
agencies and programs were themselves leading factors in environmental 
degradation. He argues that "Environmental issues had pitted organized 
citizen groups against governmental agencies responding primarily to what 
their critics perceived as relatively short-term and narrowly defined economic 
interests" (Caldwell 1979, p. 1 ) .  The National Environmental Policy Act 
( 1969), for better or for worse, was going to change the way federal agencies 
dealt with the environment---or so it seemed. 
4 .1 .2  The NEP A Review Process: An Overview 
The first step in the NEP A review process for an action for which an 
EIS is required is  the publication of a Notice of Intent in the Federal Regis ter . 
This notice states how scoping (the pub lic involvement process) will be  
started . The preparer of an EIS can be a federal agency, a state agency or local 
agency in conjunction with a federal agency (such as a state DOT), or a third 
party contractor, such as a national laboratory. After the public notice appears 
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in the Federal Regis ter, meetings are held to determine the major issues to be 
addressed; then a DRAFT Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is prepared .  
This i s  normally followed by a 45-day public comment period . Comments are 
submitted and all substantial concerns are supposed to be addressed.  A 
FINAL EIS is then published followed by a Notice of Availability (NOA) 
which appears in the Federal Regis ter. There is a review period of 30 days 
before the Record of Decision (ROD) is published.  The ROD includes 
mitigation obligation and is the decision on the action (Bear 1987) . Under 
certain circumstances, for example, heightened public scrutiny and concern, 
or if potential for extreme danger to publics exists, then a supplemental EIS is 
often required. There are exceptions to these rules; however, we will not go 
into those at this point. 
NEPA has been fraught with misunderstanding and controversy; 
therefore it is important to understand the limitations of the Act---what it is 
not. According to Lynton Caldwell, a leading expert on the law: 
NEPA is not primarily (a) a full disclosure law; (b) a 
vehicle for citizen involvement; or (c) a regulation 
of agency procedures.  The Act contributes 
importantly to each of these objectives, but they are 
incidental to its main purpose and none were 
primary reasons for its enactment. NEPA is what its 
title declares: a policy act. Its purpose was to state 
for the first time and in a single place, a 
comprehens ive national comm itmen t to protec t ion 
of the e n v i ro n m e n t and to b ack up that 
commitment with a corresponding reorientation of 
specific policies and programs of the administrative 
agencies of the United States government (Caldwell 
1979, p. 1 ) .  
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Because it is strictly a policy act, i t  lacks enforcement mechanisms and 
I S  therefore subject to widespread misunderstanding and d iverse 
interpretation, if not outright abuse by powerful vested interests who then 
make a fetish of complying with the procedural requirements as mandated by 
the Council on Environmental Quality. Commenting on NEPA'a lack of 
enforcement mechanisms, one activist remarked: 
NEPA says that out of concern for the environment 
people must have input Overall, it is without teeth. 
Yes, the input is there, but there is nothing there to 
make ! the Army live up to its obligations} .  
In addition to preparing environmental impact statemen ts, NEPA 
called on the lead agency to consult with and obtain comments from any 
other federal agency possessing jurisdiction or having special expertise with 
respect to the environmental impacts involved in the proposed action. These 
agencies are referred to as "cooperating agencies. "  Cooperating agencies for 
the CSDP include the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), as well as innumerable state and local agencies 
involved in the process of emergency response. The purpose of requiring 
input from cooperating agencies is to reduce agency bias or "tunnel vision," 
as well as to balance the differing goals of federal agencies and meet the Act's 
overall goals of protecting and enhancing ecological values (Wilson 1 987) . 
4 . 1 .3 CEQ: The President's Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) 
The agency created to implement NEPA and to create regulations and 
procedures is the President's Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) . 
Section 202, Title I I  of the Act states that: "There is created in the Executive 
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Office of the President a Council on Environmental Quality (hereinafter 
referred to as the "Council")" (Bregman 1992, p. 203) .  The functions of the 
Council shall be as follows:  ( 1 )  Assist the President by preparing an 
Environmental Quality Report; (2) gather timely, authoritative information 
concerning the conditions and trends in the quality of the environment; (3) 
review and appraise the various programs and activities of the Federal 
Government in light of Title I of the Act; (4) develop and recommend 
national pol icies to foster the improvement of the environment; (5)  
document and define changes in the natural environment, etc .  (Bregman 
1992) . 
The Council ' s  role is a coordinating one; it is not a commenting 
agency in the sense that its comments are attached to impact statements. 
Thus, no inference of approval or disapproval can be drawn from CEQ's 
failure to comment on either draft or final statements. In short, the CEQ is 
responsible for setting up policies and procedures that federal agencies must 
comply with in regard to NEPA. As long as a statement is made available to 
CEQ, that agency will be able to fulfill its role of internal adviser to the 
Executive Branch and to the President as outlined by NEPA (EPA 1976) .  
Among other things, the CEQ is  responsible for setting up guidelines 
regarding the preparation of NEPA documents and has suggested that 
agencies take steps to reduce excessive paper work as well as reduce delays. 
Specifically, they encourage agencies to " integrate the NEPA process with 
other planning at the earliest possible time to insure that planning and 
decisions reflect environmental values, to avoid delays later in the process 
and to head off potential conflicts" (Bregman 1992, p. 215) .  
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4. 1 .4 The E.I .S ( Environmental Impact Statement) 
The backbone of NEPA is the now-infamous Environmental Impact 
Statement, commonly referred to as an "E .I .S ." NEPA was designed to 
basically answer the question, "What is the impact of the planned project and 
how can it be minimized" (Bregman 1992, p. 2)? The Environmental Impact 
Statement or EIS, is designed to help answer this question. The idea for such 
a document came from Professor Lynton K. Caldwell of Indiana University at 
Bloomington. Professor Caldwell has written extensively about NEPA and its 
ramifications (Caldwell 1977; 1979; 1983; 1988; 1989; 1990). 
Each Environmental Impact Statement must include: (1) a detailed 
description of the proposed action; (2) discussion of the probable impact on 
the environment; (3) any adverse environmental effects that cannot be 
avoided and possible mitigation measures; (4) alternatives to the proposed 
action; (5) an assessment of the cumulative, long-term effects of the proposed 
action including its relationship to short-term use of the environment versus 
the environment's long-term productivity (EPA 1976) .  Not every planned 
federal project requires an EIS, however. The CEQ has established guidelines 
so that when there is doubt, entities (also referred to as the "potentially 
responsible parties") can perform an Environmental Assessment (EA) first. 
The EA is reviewed by the lead agency and, on occasion, by the U . S .  
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) .  I t  determines whether there may 
be negative impacts on the environment, in which case a full EIS is involved.  
If the EA shows no impacts worth considering, then a Finding of No 
Significant Impact (FONSI) is published in the Federa l Regis ter, and the 
project moves forward (Manes 1992) . 
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Basically, an Environmental Impact Statement is supposed to do 
exactly what the name implies, and that is, provide input on possible impacts 
from a given project. According to paper prepared by the Environmental 
Protection Agency, "NEPA requires each Federal agency to prepare a 
statement of environmental impact m advance of each major action, 
recommendation or report on legislation that may s ign ifican tly affect the 
quality of the human environment" (EPA 1 976, p. l ) .  "The statement 's  
primary purpose," the EPA continues, "is to disclose the environmental 
consequences of a proposed action, thus alerting the decision-maker, the 
public and ultimately Congress and the President to the environmental risks 
involved" (EPA 1 976, p. l ) .  The actions for which federal agencies must 
prepare impact statements must be both "major" and "significant ." 
As first conceived, an EIS was to be long enough to discuss the 
potential impacts of a project comprehensively, but not so long or complex as 
to preclude understanding by any literate person. The framers envisioned a 
document of reasonable length. For example, Council on Environmental  
Quality (CEQ) regulations stipulate page limits on EISs. Section 1502.7 of CEQ 
regulations reads:  "The text of final environmental impact statements (e . g. ,  
paragraphs (d)  through (g) of  1502 .10) shall normally be less than 150 pages 
and for proposals of unusual scope or complexity shall normally be less than 
300 pages" (Bregman 1992, p .  225) .  However, for a variety of reasons, EIS 
documents have grown both in complexity and scope to atrocious lengths. 
The FPEIS for the CSDP includes three volumes and runs to several thousand 
pages. And this is typical of EISs for major projects at this level of complexity. 
Caldwell (1977) decries the fact that EISs have grown to such proportions. He 
once wrote that, "It is regrettably true that the Environmental Impact 
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Statement has been misused . . .  Abuse of the EIS has resulted primarily from 
either misunderstanding of the Act or from attempts to evade or subvert it" 
(Caldwell 1 977,  p. 1 1  ) . Reflecting on its early history, he added, "No one 
that was involved in the Act had any idea of what it would become."  He 
observes that "they are putting too much into them." "I  don' t  think you need 
sixteen documents. Some of that is done deliberately, " he says," to get 
through the courts . Someone can a lways say, 'Oh, you forgot this 
species . " ' (Telephone Interview 6 / 1 2 /92) .  Bregman ( 1 992)  has also 
commented on the disparity between the ideal and the real use to which EISs 
are put. He wrote, "Ultimately, of course, it is not better documents but better 
decisions that count. NEPA's purpose is not to generate paperwork---even 
excellent p aperwork---but to foster excellent action" (Bregman and 
Mackenthun 1992, p .  215) . .  
Preparing EIS 's  has now spawned a brand new growth industry, 
complete with professional conferences, journals (e.g. ,  The Journal of EISs ) ,  
and the potential for huge profits for professional contractors (for example, 
national laboratories) who undertake EIS preparation for the government or 
industry . This "professionalization" has serious implications for citizens 
who wish to challenge a proposed agency action, not the least of which is the 
fact that the average citizen seeking to question the efficacy of a particular 
project often has to contend with mountains of obfuscating quantitative data 
gathered by "experts" whose paychecks are signed by the entity that plans the 
project. One contractor, familiar with the inner-workings of preparing EIS's 
for the Army's CSDP at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Oak Ridge, 
Tennessee), estimated the cost of preparing one EIS at around $1 .7  million 
dollars (Field Notes, ORNL, May 1993). 
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4.2 Programmatic: The Generic Approach to Environmental Impact 
Assessment 
On July 1, 1986 the Army released the Draft PElS which outlined their 
plan to develop a generic approach for the disposal of the weapons, i .e ,  
"programmatic" vs. site specific . (see Executive Summary, p .  xv of report, 
"Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program:  In defense of the Programmatic 
Approach"n .d . ) .  The Army also took the opportunity in the FPEIS to again 
defend its choice of a "programmatic" approach with statements such as this: 
"This statement is programmatic rather than site-specific because the 
proposed action to dispose of the stockpile is both national in scope and 
involves a number of separate but related activities" (FPEIS 1988, Vol . 1, p. 1 -
7) .  "Moreover," the report continues, "the decision to  begin the NEPA 
process on this program with a programmatic statement was made in 
consultation with the President's Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) 
(See Appendix I)" (FPEIS 1988, Vol. 1, p .  1-7). The Associated Press reported 
that the Army said, "It is a logical step to prepare one environmenta l impact 
statement to cover the demilitarization of the entire stockpile" (R ich m o n d  
Regis ter, October 3 ,  1985) .  "Translated into plain language", Congressman 
Hopkins ( 1986) once remarked," 'Programmatic' means the Army took all 
eight sites in the United States where chemical weapons are stored, lumped 
them together, ran them through a computer, hired some consultants to 
interpret the results, and then hired an expert in double talk and government 
euphemisms to write a report hardly anyone could read,  much less 
understand" (Testimony, U.S. Rep . Larry Hopkins: Field Hearings before the 
Investigations Subcommittee, House of Representatives, House Armed 
Services Committee, July 25, 1986) . 
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The rationale for utilizing a generic approach is spelled out fairly 
clearly by Gustafson ( 1985) who spoke at a conference on environmental 
assessment and waste management. He wrote, "One mechanism for 
expediting the process without taking any shortcuts or ignoring relevant 
issues is to prepare programmatic or generic environmental impact 
statements dealing with key issues. The EIS's could serve as the basis for rule­
making which process when complete in essence says: "This is the way things 
are going to be done, the matter is settled and will not be the subject of further 
debate or legal action"(Gustafson 1985, p. 60) !  The article goes on to describe 
exactly how this process works to preclude from consideration any and all 
issues which the entity does not want openly discussed by publics. "Site­
specific, process specific environmental assessments," he writes, "may then 
tier from the programmatic and generic EIS's and the results of the rule­
making process, thereby identifying the issues which are OPEN FOR DEBATE 
and negotiation" (Gustafson 1 9 8 5 ,  p . 60 ) .  Therefore, the use of  a 
programmatic approach can be deliberately employed to limit public discourse 
to consideration of what are "safe" issues for power holders . 
One of the issues "defined out" by the Army's NEPA process for the 
CSDP include (among other things) choice of destruction technology. No EIS 
was ever prepared on the choice of technology to be used . All attempts to 
have this dec ision (on-site incineration) reviewed have given rise to 
innumerable bureaucratic stumbling blocks both legal and "extra legal ." We 
will describe some of these measures in subsequent sections . Briefly, they 
inc lude the creation o f  new " inst i tut ional  b a rriers ,"  e . g . ,  the 
Intergovernmental  Consultation and Coordination Board (ICCB) and the 
addition of new steps in the NEP A review process 
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4.3 Criticisms of NEPA 
Criticisms of the Act come from two directions : agencies which must 
prepare EISs, and citizen groups attempting to penetrate the process. On the 
one hand, agencies responsible for complying with the procedural  
requirements of the law charge that "NEPA burdens the agencies with an 
unreasonable search for alternatives" (Caldwell 1979, p.6) ,  to which Caldwell 
responds, "The requirement that agencies consider alternatives to proposed 
action reinforces what should be in any case considered as good planning and 
budget practice" (Caldwell 1979, p.  6). 
Other criticisms of the Act stem from frustration between the rea l i ty 
and the idea l .  Three major criticisms are leveled a t  NEPA . First and 
foremost is the charge that it is simply a procedu ra l  law. To this charge, 
Caldwell ( 1979) argues that an agency does not fulfill NEPA's requirements 
simply by preparing an EIS---"unless the test of adequacy includes agency 
consideration of the substantive goals declared by Congress, along \vith the 
systematic and interdisciplinary balancing of values that the Act requires" 
(Caldwell 1 979, p .4) .  The second criticism stems from the fact that "the 
potentially responsible party, " i .e . ,  the entity that proposes the action, is 
empowered to prepare the environmental impact statement, which is a little 
like the fox guarding the hen house. A third, and perhaps less obvious 
weakness is to be found in the operation of the law and that is, the NEPA 
process, specifica lly as it relates to the CSDP, acts like a gigantic "filtering" 
mechanism, similar to the one described by Chomsky (1988) in conjunction 
with analyzing the effect of media frames on the dissemination of modern 
forms of propaganda.  This filtering system allows for the suppression of 
certain issues by ' defining them out' while allowing "safe" issues to be 
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examined . We will describe this process in more detail later in the section 
dealing with the Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement 
(FPEIS). 
4.4 The NEP A Process and the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program 
The Army's NEPA process for the Chemical Stockpile Disposal 
Program resembles the Hydra, the many-headed monster of Greek 
mythology, slain by Hercules. Each head of which when cut off was replaced 
by two others . The dictionary metaphorically refers to the Hydra as "a 
multifarious evil not to be overcome by a single effort" (Webster 's Seventh 
New Collegiate Dictionary 1965, p. 406) .  The likeness is most apt when 
speaking about the Army's NEPA compliance (or "non-compliance") for the 
Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program. Every time citizens thought they had 
been able to keep the Army's moves in check, the Army would bring forth yet 
another obstacle ,  create another esoteric institution (e .  g . ,  the 
Intergovernmental Consultation and Consulting Board-ICCB) or invent new 
steps in the NEPA process, i. e., PHASE I and PHASE II Site Specific EISs . All 
these steps are designed to retard and I or impede any real progress on the 
issues citizens raised; all are designed to maintain the status quo. 
The Army's NEPA process for the CSDP actually began with versions 
of disposal programs that predated the Congressionally mandated CSDP 
(Carnes 1989) .  In 1984, the U. S. Toxic Hazardous Materials Agency, the 
predecessor to the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization or PM 
Cml Demil, published a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the Federal Regis ter to 
prepare an EIS related to the disposal of MSS rockets stored at three 
installations: Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot (LBAD), Anniston Army 
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Depot (ANAD), and Umatilla Depot Activity (UMDA) .  Scoping meetings 
were held in the respective towns adjacent to these facilities . In April of 1985, 
the Army's NEPA activities were redirected to include two additional 
installations storing M55 rockets: Pine Bluff Arsenal (PBA) and Tooele Army 
Depot (TEAD) (Carnes 1989) .  By the time Congress came around to 
mandating the destruction of the entire stockpile, the Army was well 
rehearsed in NEP A regulations. 
As with a ll NEP A projects requiring an EIS, the first step is the 
publication of a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the Federal Regis ter. Consistent 
with this requirement, In January 1986, the Army published a Notice of Intent 
to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the disposal of the 
total chemical warfare stockpile currently in storage at eight Army 
insta llations within the continental U. S .  Next a draft report was prepared . 
The Army selected the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Oak Ridge, Tennessee) 
as the prime contractor to prepare the EIS documentation for the CSDP, 
although other subcontractors assisted in collecting data ( e .g . ,  S .E .  
Technologies ) .  
4.4.1 DPEIS: The Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement 
(DPEIS) 
The first NEPA documentation to be released was the DPEIS (July 1 ,  
1 986) . The normal 45-day public comment period was extended (July 1 -
September 23) to two full months because o f  the high level o f  public concern 
with the program. The DPEIS considered the following options: (a) continued 
storage; (b) on-site disposal; and (c) off-site transportation of the stockpile 
(Carnes 1989). 
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Almost from the day of its release, the DPEIS came under heavy 
criticism. After reviewing the document, a staff attorney for the Kentucky 
Resource Council, said the document was riddled with "conceptual flaws and 
informational gaps." He went on to charge that "The Army has not complied 
facially or substantively with the requirements of NEPA" (R i c h m o n d  
Regis ter, August 29, 1986), and suggested that the environmental scoping 
process now under way for the program be abandoned because it was "so 
flawed that it is impossible to patch it up" (Richmond Regis ter, August 29, 
1986, continued from page 1 ) .  
Citizens in  Madison County were up in  arms . The R ichmond Regis ter 
reported:  "Madison Countians who spoke at the environmental scoping 
meeting which Ambrose opened made the situation even more disagreeable 
for the Army launching a fusillade of criticisms at the Army-prepared Draft 
Environmental Impact Statement.  Many called the document ' fata lly 
flawed " '  (Richmond Regis ter, August 29, 1986, p. 5). First and foremost 
among the criticisms leveled at the Army with respect to the DPEIS had to do 
with the choice of a "programmatic" vs. a site-specific approach and 
particularly the generic nature of the risk assessments . In his criticism of the 
DPEIS, Senator \Vendall Ford said, in a letter to the House Armed Services 
Committee, "This one-size-fits-all attitude of the Draft Environmental Impact 
Statement just doesn't work" (Letter, Senator Wendall Ford to House Armed 
Services Committee, July 22, 1986) . In defending the programmatic approach, 
the Army said that the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) advised 
them that a programmatic approach (i . e., a programmatic EIS and a Record Of 
Decision followed by site-specific  env ironmenta l  assessments or 
environmental impact statements) was the appropriate approach to ensure 
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full  compliance with NEPA (U.S. Army: CSDP Public Hearings, no date, p .  3) .  
In evaluating the choice of using a generic approach preparers of the 
DPEIS at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory admitted its shortcomings. One 
person wrote, "The generic approach adopted for the DPEIS did not work. . 
. The risk analysis information bordered on being incomprehensible; . . .  There 
was no defensible reason why relocation of a part of the stockpile (i .e. ,  from 
some installations but not others) was not viable" (Carnes 1989, p .  441 ) .  
Additional criticism stemmed from the fact that the risk assessments dealt 
with highly unlikely scenarios, e.g., lightening striking the igloos, rather than 
focusing on the much more likely possibility of an accident resulting from 
normal operations. Additionally, it was argued that there was l i ttle 
discussion about the risks to human health and the environment posed by 
incineration per se, and no discussion of cumulat ive impacts of long-term 
incineration, although consideration of cumulative impacts is required by 
NEPA regulations. Other criticisms were raised with respect to the Army's 
use of a destruction efficiency concept---the famous "six nines." This referred 
to the Army's assertion that the incinerators would burn nerve and mustard 
agent at an efficiency level of 99.9999% ("six 9 's")---a near impossible standard 
even under ideal conditions . Unfortunately, destruction and removal 
efficiencies (DREs) are not measured during actual, routine operations, but 
are determined during a one-time only "trial burn" (GREENPEACE Toxics, 
"N.d") .  The EPA Science Advisory Board (1985) expressed concern on this 
issue as follows: 
Research on the performance has occurred only 
under optimal burn conditions and sampling has, 
on occasion, been discontinued during upset 
cond itions which take place with unknown 
frequency . Even relatively short-term operation of 
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incinerators in upset conditions can greatly increase 
the total incinerator emitted load ings to the 
environment .  
Finally, i t  was charged that the DRAFT Programmatic Environmental 
Impact Statement (DPEIS) summarily rejected consideration of alternative 
destruction technologies referring back to the NRC (1984) report in support of 
incineration . All in all, the Army's presentation of the DRAFT document for 
the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (DPEIS) was a flash point for the 
monumental political struggle and cat-and-mouse game between the Army 
and the citizen opposition that is the centerpiece of this research. 
4.4.2 FPEIS: The Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement 
The Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (FPEIS) was 
released on December 30, 1987, and in January 1988 public hearings were held 
in Edgewood, MD; Newport, IN; and Richmond, KY. This document was 
supposed to answer the criticisms raised in the DPEIS and set the stage for 
further development of the CSDP. Shortly after the release of the FPEIS, and 
consistent with NEPA procedure, Secretary Ambrose issued a Record of 
Decision (ROD) ! February 26,  1988} stipulating on-site disposal of  the 
stockpile. The Army identified its "Preferred Alternative" which was also 
l isted as the environmentally preferred alternative---the on-site disposal 
option (FPEIS 1 988, Vol. 1, p. xviii ) .  The document, which ran to three 
volumes and several thousand pages, attemp ted to address the major 
criticisms leveled at the Draft EIS; and hence contained reference to 
"expanded" transportation studies (see MITRE Corporation 1987). The FPEIS 
carefully laid out the "alternatives" it weighed in selecting its "Preferred 
Alternative," they included: ( 1 )  Continued storage of the stockpile at each 
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existing storage location; (2) the on-site disposal alternative; (3) regional 
disposal centers located at ANAD and TEAD; (3) national disposal center 
located at TEAD; (4) partial relocation . "For each of the program disposal 
alternatives, the disposal technology would be the same as is to be employed 
at a facility under construction by the Army at Johnston Atoll where 
incineration in separate furnaces is to be used for agent destruction, explosive 
and propellent destruction, metal decontamination , and dunnage disposal" 
(FPEIS 1988, Vol . 1, p .  xiii ) .  In defending their decision to go with thermal 
destruction, the Army once again fell back on the 1984 NRC report. The 
FPEIS states, "Incineration is endorsed by the National Research Council as 
the best and safest method for destroying chemical agents" (FPEIS 1988, Vol. 1 ,  
p .  xiii) . 
In supporting the validity of the FPEIS, the Army declared that, "This 
document is supported by site visits by the authors (see Sect. 6) to each 
CONUS instal lation and its environs, meetings with c itizens and 
consultations with local, state, and federal agencies (see Table 1 .3 . 1  FPEIS), 
l iterature searches, and numerous studies prepared since publication of the 
DPEIS" (FPEIS 1988, Vol. 1, p. 1-1 1 ) .  More often than not, site visits turned 
out to be one-day affairs where Army personnel flew in, toured the depot and 
flew out. In short, data gathered from these types of "site visits " is 
questionable at best and is perceived as just "going through the motions ." 
Although the FPEIS outlined both the venue for the destruction of the 
weapons and the technology to be used, no EIS was ever prepared on the 
choice of technology. The discussion of "alternatives" is a most interesting 
one for two reasons: First, NEP A requires consideration of alternative modes 
of action, in fact, the heart of NEPA is comparison of alternatives . Second, 
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although the Army has carefully laid out "alternatives" (see Table C-6 FPEIS ) 
they have avoided the issue of alternative techno logies , dismissing out of 
hand any method other than incineration. As stated earlier, the Army did 
not prepare an EIS on the cho ice of technology, although there is every 
indication that not doing so violates at least the spirit of NEPA. Bregman 
(1992) describes how the process is supposed to work: 
After a review of the information m an EIS 
concerning the various alternatives, an intelligent 
decision concerning how to proceed can be made. 
Most of the time, the Preferred Alternative is 
selected, but mitigating measures are applied to 
minimize negative environmental effects.  . .On 
occasion (perhaps 5% of the time), one of the other 
alternatives is selected to replace the Preferred 
Alternative. In rare instances, the Do Noth ing 
alternative prevails and no action is taken (Bregman 
1992, p. 2) . 
In the case of the CSDP, we aver that the "decision" regarding the 
choice of technology was made prior to the publication of the FPEIS and even 
prior to the publication of the DPEIS, thus leaving the door wide open to the 
charge that the Army had successfully subverted the NEPA process to its own 
advantage. NEPA practices and procedures, while appearing to be dynamic 
components of social change, are in fact, mere pillars of the status quo . 
4 .4 .3 SSEIS: The Site-Specific Environmental Impact Statement (SSEIS): The 
Evolution of a 'Nondecision' 
No single issue has caused more rancor or provided a clearer window 
on the processes of power than the Army's refusal to conduct site-specific 
studies consistent with the expressed wishes of concerned citizens and state 
and local government officials. The odyssey began in 1986 with the release of 
the DRAFT PElS and continues to the present time . One citizen-activist 
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offered this opinion on the subject: "The Army has compromised itsel f on 
this issue. If I were going to have any moral indignation at all, it 's about this 
issue." 
If, as Gaventa ( 1980) argues, n o n -dec isio n s- ( i .  e . ,  what is not done 
because of institutional inertia or neglect ) must be considered a form of 
power, then the issue of the SSEIS is the quintessential example of n o n ­
decisio n .  making. Bachrach and Baratz ( 1970) in Power and Poverty , define 
a ' n on -decis io n '  as: 
A decision that results in suppression or thwarting 
of a la tent or manifest challenge to the values or 
interests of the decision maker. To be more nearly 
explicit, nondecision-rnaking is a means by which 
demands for change in the exis ting alloca tion of 
benefits and privileges in the community can be 
suffocated before they are voiced, or kept covert; or 
k il led before they gain access to the relevent 
decision-making arena; or, failing all of these things, 
maimed or destroyed in the decision-implementing 
stage of the policy process. (Bachrach and Baratz 
1970, p. 43) .  
To say that the Army has equivocated on the subject of  site specific 
studies is to be truly kind. The folly of placing a nerve-gas incinerator at 
Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot amid such a densely populated area (or at 
Aberdeen Proving Ground---also densely populated) and within one mile of 
an elementary school, seemed self-evident to everyone---excep t the Army. 
Opponents were certain that if the Army carne down and did a careful 
examination of the site, (i .e. , a "site-specific study") they would realize that 
the decision to burn the weapons on s ite was lud icrous---if not downright 
dangerous. Commenting on the Army's grudging compliance with the 
community's request, an activist remarked, "ORNL (i. e. the Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory) did slipshod work. They didn't come here and look at 
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our site. They came here for a half day. We've asked and Ambrose promised 
they would do an on-site study." 
The subject of a site-specific study was first raised at a public meeting 
held in Richmond, KY. January of 1 986 where U. S.  Congressman Larry 
Hopkins is reported to have said in answer to a query from a concerned 
citizen about the generic nature of the DRAFT document: "Let me, if I may, 
this morning, for the benefit of some of you who may not have been here, we 
were able to glean from the Army this morning a commitment now on the 
record and to this panel that they would give to us an on-site environmental 
impact statement" (Transcript of Field Hearings: 1986, p. 211 ) .  
At a subsequent public meeting held in May of 1 986, the Army 
emphasized that a decision had not been reached on the ultimate disposition 
of the weapons. They (the Army) indicated that once a decision was reached, 
they could be "flexible" and would still be able to treat each site as an 
individual case. The Army has continually held out the "carrot" that it might 
alter the programmatic decision if a certain set of circumstances proves 
different from the assumptions that underlay the EIS. For example, the Army 
stated, "The Programmatic EIS that is being prepared will offer the Secretary 
of the Army the flexibility to make alternative decisions b ased on the 
variability of the problems of the eight sites . . . For instance, it would be 
possible for the Secretary of the Army to make one decision for one site or 
one class of sites and a different decision for another class of sites" (U. S .  
Army, Transcripts of Public Meeting, May 1 986, Richmond, KY, p .  1 12,1 13 ) .  
To the uninitiated, this statement seems clear enough. I t  seems to  be  saying 
that it is possible for one site to have on-site incineration while another site 
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has their weapons transported out. And that certainly is how the citizens of 
Madison County interpreted it. 
Basking in the Army's assurances, the people of Madison County, 
Kentucky were, if not euphoric, guardedly optimistic. The local newspapers 
ran a spate of articles detailing this sea of optimism. For example, T h e  
R ichmond Regis ter ran a story which read: "As you know, the Army has 
agreed to prepare a Site-Specific Environmental Impact Statement (SSEIS) on 
the effects of an incinerator here in Madison County" (July 28, 1986, p. 4). U.S .  
Representative Larry Hopkins who had called for the field hearing in 
Madison County called it "a crucial breakthrough for us ." Later, he was 
quoted as saying the Army's announcement to do a site specific study was like 
"a new lease on life" for the area. (Lexington-Herald Leader, July 30, 1 986) . 
Later in the summer another article appeared which echoed similar 
optimism: "The Army has said that information gathered during the public 
comment period could influence the Army to choose one of the rejected 
alternatives or some combination of alternatives" (Rich mond Regis ter, 
8 / 27/ 86, p .  12 ) .  However, this optimism was short-lived as it became 
apparent that something quite different from what they had come to expect 
was taking place. The first blow came at a public hearing held by the Army in 
Richmond, Kentucky . The penultimate obfuscation came from one of the 
Army's EIS preparers who explained the Site Specific EIS process for the 
CSDP: 
If he (i .e., the Secretary of the Army) makes, say two 
alternative decisions based on some collection of 
variables: population density, ecologically sensitive 
areas, human health, those kinds of variables, there 
would then be, as required by NEP A and CEQ, . .  
. regulations and interpretations of those regulations 
that are requirements for a site specific NEPA 
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document and that document would address how 
the particular decision for that particular installation 
would be implemented. . . 
(Carnes, U.  S. Army Transcript of Public Meeting, 
Richmond, KY. May 1986, p. 1 13) .  
He went on to explain, "If it is determined . . .  that the decision is a {sic} 
on site disposal, the site specific NEPA document would look at how that 
particular alternative would be implemented and what is the best way of 
going about doing that" (Transcript, May 1986 Public Scoping Meeting for the 
CSDP: Richmond, KY. ,p. 1 13) .  In other words, site-specific studies would 
turn out to be collecting information (i.e. new data) which would facilitate the 
implementation of the Record of Decision (ROD) whatever that may be. In 
the case of the CSDP, it would answer the question of where would be the best 
place to site the facility on the depot (i .e. which parcel of land among the 
15,000 acres of LBAD would be best suited for the incinerator facihty), not 
whether on-site incineration was the best choice for this particular site. 
In the course of the public scoping meeting described above, the 
citizens became aware of the fact that what they were hearing was that the site 
specific studies were going to come AFTER a decision had been made. This 
seemed quite illogical to the citizen who posed the question. The exchange 
went something like this: CITIZEN: "It is possible, as I understand it, tha t  on 
July 1st we're going to hear, or we might hear, that the Army's preferred 
solution would be on site incineration at all sites . . .  That decision would have 
been reached without any kind of detailed Environmental Impact Statement 
from this area . Are we agreed so far? ANSWER: "Yes ." 
About this time, the normally conservative Lexington Herald Leader 
ran an editorial expressing doubts that the Army's  new initia tive would 
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change the status quo. The article read, "Another nerve gas study won't alter 
the political reality . . .  It's unlikely that yet another study will cause the Army 
to do an about face on all its previous work. . .  What the Army probably hopes 
is that the latest study will quell some of the local furor over on-site 
destruction and strengthen its defense should the issue wind up in court" 
(Lexington-Herald Leader 8/30/86) .  That statement proved to be prophetic.  
As time went by, rumors began surfacing that put the Army's intentions 
regarding the SSEIS into question. "What we are hearing now is that the 
Army claims that a site-specific study would be just for the purpose of 
"implementing" their decision. In other words, a study would not be in any 
way a fresh look at our unique problem, but would simply serve to justify 
their decision" (Richmond Regis ter- . January 26, 1988).  
Obviously, the citizens were convinced that an honest appraisal of 
their particular situation would result in a decision against using incineration 
and would make the transportation of the weapons out of LEAD more likely. 
And, indeed, there was good reason for them to believe this. A veritable host 
of Army generals, Pentagon officials and Army contractors gave every 
indication that such studies were in the offing---if not immediately, then 
surely somewhere down the line. Attempts to clarify the Army's position 
brought further reassurances from the Army that site specific studies would 
be done. What was not said, but could only be discerned by inference, was 
that these studies would be done a fter a decision had been made and not 
before such decision, as the citizens expected. 
The first of these reassurances came from a consultant at the Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory, the contractor charged w ith developing the EIS 
documentation for the CSDP. He said, "I would not be surprised if a site-
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specific  environmental impact statement would be required for the 
Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot"---a curious statement since si te-specific 
studies were already part of the Army's NEPA compliance program 
(Richmond Register, May 6, 1986, p .  1 ) .  In July 1986 after the release of the 
DPEIS, Lewis Walker ( Deputy for the Environment, Safety and Occupational 
Health Office, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations 
and Logistics :  Pentagon) testifying at the House Armed Services 
Subcommittee on Investigations Field Hearing (Richmond, KY. )  said that, 
"Regardless of the Record of Decision (ROD), the Army will conduct site­
specific environmental impact studies in the following circumstances: 
Where there is heightened public concern or controversy or when the 
hazards and risks are unique or great"(Richmond Regis ter, 7/25/86, p . 1 ) .  To 
which Congressman Larry Hopkins replied, "Given these factors, I 'm going to 
assume . . .  that a site specific analysis is going to be made here at the 
Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot ."  "Yes, we intend to do that here in 
Lexington," Walker replied, adding that "the local depot meets the criteria for 
a site-specific study" (Richmond Regis ter 7/27/86, p .  1 ) .  The Army's 
"mishandling" of the truth on the issue of site specific studies goes far beyond 
mere "waffling" and, as evidence will show, indicates a rather deliberate 
attempt to cloud over the issue with jargon designed to mislead citizens into 
believing they were being heard. Nothing could be further from the truth. 
In the following months, the local newspapers were rife with stories of 
citizen optimism regarding the impending site-specific studies.  On 
Sep tember 1 1 ,  1986, The Richmond Regis ter ran a story on page one which 
recounted Dr. Oris Blackwell 's address to the faculty of Eastern Kentucky 
University. During the luncheon lecture, Dr. Blackwell said that he was 
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beginning to sense "some cracks in the armor" of the Army's incineration 
plans. Blackwell cited recent Army concessions---like its a greement to 
prepare an environmental impact statement for the local depot---as evidence 
of the success of area citizens who oppose the construction of an incinerator 
there. Around that time, The Lexington -Hera ld Leader ran a story that 
began, "Last month incinerator opponents won an important concession 
when the Army agreed to commission a "site-specific" study for Madison 
County if Marsh (then Undersecretary of the Army) decided to build an 
incinerator there" (Lexington Herald Leader, August 1986, p. B-3) .  
A growing wave of op timism continued throughout 1 987.  In 
December 1 987, The Richmond Regis ter ran this head line: "On-Site 
Incineration Decision Expected ." The story went on to point out that "the 
decision may not be final in regard to the Richmond depot which has been 
promised a site-specific environmental impact study that would take into 
consideration economic, environmental, and safety features" (R ich m o n d  
Register, December 1987). 
In 1988 the Army put a new spin on the notion of site-specific studies. 
The discourse changed and the the Army began gradually referring to these 
studies as part of a "tiering process" tied to the Record of Decision (ROD). Col . 
E lray Whitehouse, (Commander of the Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot) 
speaking to the press, said that the Army was simply following the guidelines 
set out in the National Environmental Policy Act ( 1969) that the Site-Specific 
Environmental Impact Statement be tiered to the original programmatic 
decision. Army spokesmen stood by their position that "the site-specific study 
would be a ' tiering' process to implement the Record of Decision," scheduled 
for around February 13 (Richmond Regis ter, 2/2/88, p. 2) . This came as a big 
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surpnse to opponents of incineration who were firmly convinced that they 
were making progress with the Army on the issue relating to the choice of 
technology while hammering away at the uniqueness of each depot site. 
Indeed, according to CEQ regulations (1502.20), agencies are encouraged 
to tier their environmental impact statements to eliminate repeti tive 
discussions of the same issues and to focus on the actual issues ripe for 
discussion at each level of environmental review. Bregman ( 1992) writes that 
"tiering may also be appropriate for different levels of action" (Bregman 1992 
p. 230) .  Whether CEQ regulations requ ire that SSEISs be tied to the Record of 
Decision (ROD) in the manner described by the Army is another question. 
This may have come about as a result of Army contractor's tinkering with the 
NEPA process to make it fit the Army's needs. Army contractors admit to " . .  
. restructuring the EIS and making revisions associated with the new 
structure . . .  "(Carnes 1989, p. 443) . 
The fact that the site-specific studies were tied to the Record of Decision 
(ROD) meant that the long-promised studies would not be done until after a 
decision had been made on how to dispose of the weapons . Sort of like 
putting the cart before the horse. In a speech to the Madison County Fiscal 
Court on January 19, 1988, a prominent member of the community said, 
"The Army is now calling the site-specific statement a document to 
implement the programmatic at the local level. "It 's just to see how (the 
Army) is going to put it in. That looks like what's coming down the line" 
(Richmond Register 1 /25/88, p. 1 ) .  
Throughout 1988, citizens and government officials continued to press 
the Army for clarification on the status of the site specific studies. For 
example, on February 3, 1 988, Wallace Wilkinson, then Governor of  
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Kentucky, wrote a letter to Brigadier General Nydam in which he stated, "The 
Army needs to evaluate site-specific information prior to making a decision" 
(Letter: Governor Wilkinson to Brig. Gen. Nydam, February 3, 1 988) .  
Additionally, in a four-page critique of the three-volume FPEIS, the Kentucky 
Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet wrote: "We would 
like clarification of the Army's intentions in preparing site-specific NEPA 
documentation" (Kentucky Natural Resources Environmental Protection 
Cabinet, p. 1 ) .  During this time, the Army continued to reassure citizens that 
they were being heard. Speaking to the press, one Army spokesperson said, "I 
am reaffirming our commitment to do a site-specific environmental impact 
statement that would relook the impact of the record of decision (ROD) in 
eminent detail in the Madison County area.  . . However, the Army will not 
examine other alternatives once Undersecretary of the Army James R .  
Ambrose makes an official decision" (Richmond Regis ter 2/2/88) . .  
Finally, on April 10, 1991 ,  the Department of Defense (DOD) published a 
Notice of Intent to prepare a Site-Specific Environmental Impact statement 
on the CSDP. The first step in what was to be a two-stage process was to hold 
a public scoping meeting. The notice in the Federal Register read:  "This 
announces the Notice of Intent to prepare an SSEIS on the potential impact of 
the design, construction, operation and closure of the proposed chemical 
agent demilitarization facility at Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot, Kentucky . 
. . Notice is further given of the Army's intention to conduct a scoping 
meeting to aid in determining the significant issues related to the proposed 
action at Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot, as well as Federal, State and local 
agencies, participation and input are welcome." (Federal Register, Vol. 56, No. 
69, Wednesday, April 10, 1991 . )  
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4.5 PHASE I and PHASE II Site-Specific Environmental Impact Statements 
(SSEIS) 
Normally, the final step in the NEPA process is the preparation of site­
specific documents. However, in the case of the CSDP, that process has been 
divided into two parts or "phases": The Phase I Site Specific EIS (SSEIS) and 
the Phase II Site Specific EIS (SSEIS) . The first stage, the Army explained, 
would consist of gathering updated and new data at each of the eight sites and 
comparing that data with the data used for the original programmatic EIS. 
The second phase of the program would begin when the first phase was 
completed and would consist of the actual writing of the site-specific 
documents . 
The Army claims to have initiated the two-staged process at the urging 
of Representative Larry Hopkins, the congressman whose district includes the 
Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot. In a letter to Hopkins, John W. Shannon, 
Assistant Secretary of the Army for installations and logistics wrote, "As a 
result of several meetings with your staff, the Army has decided to begin a 
two-phased approach to conducting site-specific environmental documents" 
(Richmond Regis ter, May 12, 1988, p. 1 ) . Commenting on the plan, Hopkins 
stated, "Although this plan does not provide everything I wanted, it does 
move the Army away from its initial position of recklessly plowing ahead 
with its programmatic approach with little regard for site-specific concerns 
and characteristics" (Richmond Regis ter, May 12, 1988, p. 1 ) .  
In  trying to  clarify the rationale behind this approach, the Technical 
Director for Chemical  Demilitarization explained that the purpose of the 
Phase I Study was to say, "If I knew in 1988 what I know today, would I have 
made the same decision?" In speaking to the press he explained it this way. 
2 l 5 
In other words, "During that process, researchers would be continually 
running a check and balance of the wisdom of the original decision" (Berea 
Citizen 2/4/88, p .  1 ) .  At the same time, Army representatives reassured local 
residents that a site-specific study would closely examine the impact of the 
Army decision on the local area. However, if the Under Secretary of the 
Army's Record of Decision (ROD) was on-site disposal, the Phase I Site 
Specific Study would not revisit the transportation alternative. It would 
simply be for the purpose of collecting "new" and "updated" data bearing on 
the implementation of the Record of Decision. The Phase II Site Specific EIS 
Studies would then deal only with mitigation s tra tegies and disposal facility 
s it ing within the installation boundary. An activist asked General Nydam if 
the Army would take "a totally fresh look at how the decision would affect 
Madison County and the surrounding area ." "If you're asking if we would be 
relooking at the transportation aspects of it if the decision were made on-site, 
the answer is 'no '"  (Berea Citizen 2 /4/88, p. 1 ) .  However, the General later 
added, "Yes, we would take a fresh look at how that decision to build an 
incinerator on-site would affect Madison County" (Berea Citizen, 2/4/88, p. 1 ) .  
According to  a bulletin board display at the Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory which purports to explain the NEPA process for the CSDP, the 
Phase I report "bridges the gap between the FPEIS and the Si te-Specific EIS" 
and, using new data, "attempts to show on a site-by site basis that on-site 
disposal was not an incorrect choice" (emphasis added) (Field Notes, February 
1, 1993) .. If, the Army argues, the Phase I environmental report concludes that 
on-site disposal no longer looks l ike the environmentally preferred 
alternative, the Army will reassess the alternatives to the site . If however, 
the Phase I report supports or va l ida tes the selection of on-site disposal, the 
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Phase II Site-Specific Environmental Impact Statement (SSEIS) will deal only 
with the question of HOW BEST TO IMPLEMENT THE ARMY'S DECISION. 
When questioned about why such a staged approach was necessary, the 
Army responded that "sequencing will allow the Army to get the most 
updated and complete information for the site-specific environmental 
documents" (Commander, et al . May 12, 1988 p. 4) .  However, knowledgeable 
experts charge that Phase I and Phase II are "non-processes," and point out 
that there is nothing in NEPA which allows for a Phase I without having a 
Site Specific  EIS. There are indications from Army documents that they 
didn't expect any change in the original on-site incineration decision . Again, 
in defense of the two-staged approach, the Commander of the LBAD wrote: 
"If, as expected, the Site-Specific document doesn't change the on-site disposal 
decision, the faci lities still cannot be constructed until the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) permits are approved by the state" 
(Commander, et al. May 12, 1988 p. 5 )
. 
The Army gave reassurances that the PHASE I study would be 
reviewed by an "independent" agency (i .e . ,  the Argonne National Laboratory 
which depends heavily on Army contracts), and then certified to Congress. 
According to the Army, data used in the FPEIS to select the environmentally 
preferred alternative are identified, and more recent and more detailed site­
specific data of the same types are gathered . After re-computing the five 
measures of risk, the results will be examined to determine if on-site disposal 
is still the environmentally preferred alternative (Army Report: Chemical 
Stockpile Disposal Program Site Specific NEPA Review Phase I Criteria) .  
After comparing the risks, "If  no significant differences in the data bases are 
revealed, the Army validates the programmatic decision for that site and the 
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SSEIS is then developed as Phase II of the process" (General Busbee and 
Agency Statement: Before Subcommittee on Environment, Energy and 
Natural Resources, Committee on Government Operations, p .  5 ) .  
4.5.1 Data Collection for Phase I 
Data collection for the Phase I Report was undertaken by the Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory (ORNL) and the final reports were to be validated by the 
Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) .  In addition to serving as a quality 
assurance check on the original programmatic decision, data was also 
collected in support of the Army's massive emergency response program, the 
Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) . 
However, the data collection effort attained gargantuan proportions 
and is worth examining in its own right. In conjunction with the Phase I 
study, the Army planned to collect "new" and "updated" information of a site 
specific nature in order to weigh the impacts of the Record of Decision on the 
various sites.  The volumes prepared by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
in support of the Phase I Study, once assembled, filled several book cases. 
This "new" and "updated " site specific data contained,  for example, 
information regarding the general population and population trends 
surrounding each site; population figures for nearby counties; sensitive 
p opulations; d aytime population d istribution; nighttime p op ula tion 
distribution; transient populations, number of employers with more than 100 
employees; meeting and convention centers with total visitor seating capacity 
of at least 300; recreational facilities, annual events and attendance, state and 
federal public areas within 100 km of the site; schools and colleges with 100 
miles; day care facilities; nursing homes, hospitals and number of beds, etc . 
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etc. Additionally, the Phase I Reports for the Lexington-Bluegrass Army 
Depot (LBAD) contain an entire book devoted to each of the cities of 
Richmond and Berea respectively which give detailed lists of teachers, 
professors, etc. In addition to enrollment facts and resident student figures, 
the Berea College section contains information on the college's student 
demonstration policy (Field Notes 1993). The Army will argue that all this 
informa tion w as collected in support of their enhanced emergency 
preparedness effort, and indeed some of this data is plugged into the Army's 
plume dispersion models which are used to predict how far a toxic plume 
will travel should their be an accident involving an "off-site" release of nerve 
or mustard gas. However, it stretches credulity to argue that knowledge about 
the college's student demonstration policy is in any way remotely connected 
to effective emergency response. The question remains, what is the purpose 
of this over-kill data collection effort? 
4 .5.2 Phase I & Phase II: Non-Compliance with NEPA 
In addition to citizens ' complaints regarding the nature of the site­
specific studies undertaken by the Army, an environmental lawyer familiar 
with the controversy charged that the Army's Phase 1/Phase II process was in 
non-compliance with NEPA. In a letter to an Army representative at 
Aberdeen Proving Ground, the attorney wrote, "The apparent intent of the 
Department of the Army as indicated in the Notice is to use the "Phase I" 
process to supplement the record of the Programmatic Environmental Impact 
Statement released in January 1988 (FPEIS) .  This is in direct violation of 
NEP A which requires preparation of a supplemental programmatic EIS so as 
to conduct all decision making m a manner subject to public review and 
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comment and due process consideration" (Letter: Environmental Lawyer, 
Wyatt, Tarant & Combs to Ms. Marilyn Tischbin, Department of the Army, 
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD., April 25, 1991,  p. 5 ) .  The letter stipulates 
that 40 CFR § 1502.9 (c) ( 1 )  of The Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ") 
regulations state that agencies: 
shall prepare supplements to either d raft or final 
environmental impact statements if . . .  (i) there are 
s ignificant  new c i rcumstances or info rmat ion 
relevant  to environmental concerns and bearing on 
the proposed action or its impacts [emphasis added] .  
Furthermore, according to the complaint, "a plethora of new information 
which bears directly on the Department's decision to incinerate has arisen in 
the five years since the Army issued its Draft PElS" (Letter: Wyatt, Tarant & 
Combs to M. Tischbin, April 25, 1991, p .  3) .  Nor is this the only quarter from 
which criticism emerges. Lawyers for the Kentucky Resources Council 
(Frankfort, Ky.) also raised serious questions about the legality of the Army's 
Phase I & Phase II Site Specific Process. A lawyer who represents the Council 
wrote:  
I t  is the belief of the Council, grounded in NEP A 
and judicial interpretations of the law, that a site­
specific environmental impact statement which 
does not include a reconsiderat ion o f  the 
programmatic decision is inconsistent with law." In 
addition, "the promise of a Site-Specific EIS in the 
future is meaningl ess [emphasis added] if later 
analysis c annot consider  a l ternatives to the 
programmatic decision" (Fitzgerald, Comments of 
the Kentucky Resources C ouncil, Inc.  on Final 
Programmatic Environmental Impact  Statement 
Chemical Demilitarization Program, p. 2 ) 
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4.5.3 Phase I Conclusions 
To date, all Phase I studies have been completed although not all 
reports have been released for public review. Final Phase I reports for Tooele, 
Anniston, Umatilla and Pine Bluff Arsenal have been released although, 
according to an Army spokesman, the Pine Bluff Arsenal EIS has been 
restarted . All of the above validated the Army's selection of on-site 
incineration as the "preferred alternative . "  For example, the principal  
conclusion reached by the ANAD Phase I Report, and confirmed by Argonne 
National  Laboratory (ANL) was that "on-site disposal remains valid for 
disposal of chemical agents and munitions stored at the Anniston Army 
Depot" (Alabama) (Hunsaker Disposal of Chemical Agents and Munitions 
Stored at Anniston Army Depot, Anniston, Alabama, Final Phase I 
Environmental Report Alabama, Final Phase I Environmental Report) . 
The Phase I Reports from Pueblo (PUDA), Aberdeen (APG), Newport 
(NAAP), and Kentucky (LBAD), have been placed on hold (although Pueblo's 
should be out in the next two months) pending a review of the Alternative 
Technology report (April 1994) (Personal Communication: Marilyn Tischbin, 
Office of the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen 
Proving Ground, Edgewood, Maryland, May 3, 1994 to author) . These reports 
exist in a sort of "informational limbo" as DRAFT documents. However, the 
DRAFT documents give some indication of how the Army is leaning on the 
issue at these sites. For example, the Phase I DRAFT report for Pueblo Army 
Depot (PUDA) concluded that "on-s ite d isposal remains valid as the 
environmentally preferred alternative for PUDA" (U.S. Army, 1991 ,  STATUS 
DRAFT: Phase I Environmental Report-Disposal of Chemical Agents and 
Munitions Stored at Pueblo Depot Activity, Pueblo, Colorado). The report 
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states that, "If one adds the off-site transportation risks---addressed in the 
FPEIS, but beyond the scope of this Phase I Report . . .  the on-site alterna tive is 
clearly preferable . . .  " (U.S. Army, Phase I Report: PUDA 1991 ,  p. 6-18) .  In 
another example, the project leader in charge of overseeing the Phase I study 
for Aberdeen Proving Ground concluded also that nothing had changed and 
recommended that the original on-site decision stand, commenting that "If 
we cave in to one group, we'll have to cave into them all . "  (Field Notes : 
ORNL 8/26/91) .  
As stated earlier, if the Phase I Reports validate the original on-site 
decision, the Army will move to Phase II of the program which will simply be 
the implementation of the Record of Decision (ROD) . The momentum is 
building and there is every indication that when all is said and done, the 
contractors hired to perform these stu dies will  val idate the on-site 
incineration decision at every site---with the possible exception of the 
Lexington Bluegrass Army Depot (LBAD) in Kentucky. In this case, the 
RCRA permitting regulations will become the primary stop gap for citizens 
wishing to block the construction of the incinerators. 
4.6 'THE SCOPING GAME' :  "What Do These People Want? !"  
The role of  the Scoping Meeting as  a mechanism of  social control 
cannot be overstated. The process of "scoping" is defined by the regulations of 
the Council on Environmental Quality. Section § 1501 .7  of CEQ regulations 
states: "There shall be an early and open process for determining the scope of 
issues to be addressed and for identifying the significant issues related to a 
proposed action" (Bregman 1992, p .  219) .  According to the Council, scoping is 
defined as the identification of the range of actions, alternatives and impacts 
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to be considered in an Environmental Impact Statement. Scoping is the 
princ ipa l  method for involving publics in projects requiring an 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), and the scoping meeting has become 
the tool for both the dissemination of information about a project and an 
effective means of social control . For example, one of the well-known 
mechanisms of power described by Bachrach and Baratz ( 1970) {see Chapter 2 )  
i s  agenda setting. This tool was employed very effectively by the Army ( and 
on more than one occasion) at scoping meetings. A citizen activist gives this 
account of one such meeting which took place in Richmond, KY. in 199 1 :  
We're supposed t o  have input. We got t o  call who 
spoke when. We were supposed to initially. At the 
last second word came out that the Army had a 
"new game plan" { i .  e . ,  the order of speakers was 
arbitrarily changed) .  It scared us because, you never 
know what someone was going to get up and say. 
As it turned out, at least the citizens were full of 
passion, unrehersed spontaneous passion. 
According to Bear (1987), scoping is used to identify impacts that need 
to be addressed in the EIS and to identify impacts that are insignificant and 
can be eliminated from further consideration. The CEQ has published 
guidelines for federal agencies to follow with regards to scoping. As part of 
the scoping process, a lead agency is directed by the CEQ to "determine the 
scope ( § 1508.25) and the significant issues to be analyzed in depth in the 
environmental impact statement" (Bregman 1992, p. 219) .  Additionally, lead 
agencies are empowered to "Identify and eliminate from detailed study the 
issues which are not significant or which have been covered by prior 
environmental review (§1506.3), narrowing the discussion to these issues in 
the statement to a brief presentation of why they will not have a significant 
effect on the human environment or providing a reference to their coverage 
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elsewhere" (Bregman 1992, p .  219) .  Thus, the control over issues is placed at 
the outset in the hands of the lead agency ( in this case, the U.  S. Army) who 
is then free to "define out" of consideration issues which it  feels are not 
significant. This policy has disastrous implications for citizens who choose to 
oppose a particular project, for whoever defines the issues to be held up for 
public debate has the power to define out of existence any issues which it 
deems threatening to the status quo. Such restriction is exactly what has 
happened on numerous occasions with respect to the Chemical Stockpile 
Disposal Program. 
Some insight can be gained about this process by scrutinizing the 
transcripts of a typical scoping meeting for the Chemical Stockpile Disposal 
Program. The following examples, taken from the scoping meeting on the 
Phase I Site Specific Environmental Impact Statement (SSEIS) for the 
Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot (April 25, 1991, Richmond, Kentucky), are 
illustrative of the point. At the beginning of the meeting some introductory 
remarks were given by a consultant at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 
who was involved in preparing the Phase I Site Specific Report for the Army. 
As he explained to the assembled citizens: 
One purpose of the NEP A process is to provide the 
documentation . These are the environmen ta l  
impact statements, and the reason we're here 
tonight is to collect information for the preparation 
of a site-specific EIS for the LBAD. The EIS is 
intended to insure that the decision-maker (i.e., the 
A r m y )  is fully informed in regard to the 
environmental aspects and the environmental 
implications of this proposed activity . . .  As I said 
earlier, we're here to collect information" (U. S .  
Army, Transcript of Public Scoping Meeting, 
Richmond, Kentucky, April 25, 1991, pp. 18, 19) .  
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By emphasizing that the purpose of the meeting was l imited to "collecting 
information," it was made clear that this was not the proper place to discuss 
controversial issues such as alternative technologies, the continued use of the 
incinerators or the hazards associated with incineration, etc . Zimmerman 
continued:  " I  should like to emphasize that the environment is  only one 
element in that  dec ision process. I should also emphasize that the 
e n v ironment is the sole purpose that we're here tonight. Other 
considerations that enter into this decision process are ' technical factors . '  As 
the General mentioned, the ability of the JACADS high-temperature 
inc inerative process to meet regulatory standards, to meet munitions 
standards, to meet hazardous waste standards, is to be considered in a 
d ifferent forum and different process than what we are entered into this 
evening" (U. S. Army Transcript, Public Scoping Meeting, Richmond, KY, 
April 25, 1991, page 19, line 1-16) .  
As I said earlier, we're here to coll ect information. 
The purpose of this scoping meeting is to sol icit 
pub lic comment. It's to solicit comment on this 
proposed action in order to allow the development 
of a site-specific EIS, particularly a SSEIS that 
concentrates on significant issues while not wasting 
time or effort on those issues that are insignificant 
or of minor importance." (p . 19) 
One could ask---insignificant to whom? Of minor importance to whom? 
4.7 The Ambiguous Role of Public Participation and NEP A 
The role of public participation in the NEPA process with respect to the 
Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP) is highly contentious. Public 
participation, as such, is like the bogeyman to the Army, or at the very least it 
is viewed as a pain in the neck--- something to be dealt with and gotten over 
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with. Nevertheless, public participation is an essential part of the EIS process. 
Proponents of early public involvement argue that it has the potential for 
leading to a better project, as well as improving the possibility of a welcome 
from the residents of the project area. In order for projects to proceed 
smoothly, however, public participation must be handled " correctly" 
meaning, citizen opposition must be channeled effectively or else the whole 
project can become mired in delays . The principal vehicle for this proper 
channeling of citizen opposition 1s, of course, the scoping process and 
particularly, the scoping meeting. 
Some argue there has been an unusually high amount of public 
scrutiny and input into the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (Hayes 
Holgate 1 990; Hindman 1989), whereas others charge that said input is merely 
pro forma. The Army points to the funded community study groups as 
evidence of increased public participation in the program; but the suggestions 
and recommendations of these groups (when they go against Army 
prerogatives) are, more often than not, ignored as has been discussed in the 
preceding chapter. In defending the Army's "Decide-Announce-Defend" 
strategy with respect to the CSDP, a high-ranking political appointee at the 
Pentagon argued that, "NEPA allows them { i .e. , the people) to observe the 
decision, but not to make the decision." (Acting Assistant Secretary of the 
Army: Installations, Logistics and Environment, The Pentagon, July 29, 1991 ) .  
This attitude certainly flies in the face o f  the spirit of  the law, but i t  is one to 
which the Army subscribes. 
Some authorities claim that all that is required by the law (i .e .  NEP A) is 
that citizens have "input" into the process (the Army seems to interpret the 
law this way); while others insist that the spirit of the law is honored only if 
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citizens are involved in the decision-making process itself---a more radical 
interpretation which means citizens in a community would have veto power 
over projects. The truth lies somewhere in between these two extremes, 
according to experts knowledgeable about the law (Personal Communication: 
Lynton Caldwell 6 /21 /92) . 
According to Bregman ( 1992), public participation is both implicitly 
included in the NEPA process and explici tly mandated in CEQ regulations . 
Bregman (1992) writes that, "Public involvement requirements are specified 
for all NEP A reviews under 40 CFR Chapter V (Parts 1500-1508), as well as for 
particular programs" (Bregman 1 992, p .  37). However, he argues that NEPA 
does not absolutely stipulate that citizens participate in the decision-making 
(and there's the rub ! ) ,  only that citizens have INPUT. This input can take 
many forms, (e .g .  scoping meetings, community study groups, etc . ) .  
However, entities are not under any obligation to act o n  the information, 
only to listen and acknowledge such input. Within the scope of the present 
law as it stands, there does not seem to be any statutory way for citizens to 
have control of the decision-making process . The last word always devolves 
on the entity that proposes the action; in this case it's the Army. Bregman 
(1992) argues that only in rare cases is an action other than the preferred 
alternative taken. "Most of the time," he writes, "the Preferred Alternative is 
selected" (Bregman 1992, p. 2) . 
In conclusion, most NEPA experts and federal agencies recognize the 
potential benefits of public involvement, however, and firmly support the 
public participation component of the Act as public input often leads to 
improvements in design and better projects. Bregman (1992) suggests that the 
earlier in a study public participation is sought, the greater the likelihood that 
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the study will be completed on schedule and within budget and will be 
socially and politically acceptable to the local citizens (Bregman 1992, p.  44) .  
H e  further insists that "consultation with interested parties be undertaken 
before agency decisions are made" (Bregman 1992, p. 39) .  
4 .8  Summary 
The foregoing discussion adds considerable weight to the argument 
that the Army's response to citizen requests that each site be considered 
separately is purely pro forma. The studies in support of the Phase I Site 
Specific EIS began in 1991 and many are not yet completed as of this date. 
This has both positive and negative aspects . From the standpoint of the 
Army, there is considerable expense attached to undertaking these additional 
studies in addition to the delays in implementing the program. On the other 
hand, it buys time with which to fortify arguments for on-site incineration 
and to institute aggressive public "education" programs. From the standpoint 
of the citizens who oppose the Army's current on-site incineration plan, it 
seems obvious that the Army was simply going through the motions and was 
using the process to validate its earlier decision without really giving serious 
consideration to the many new developments both in destruction technology 
and in population density that could have (or should have) provided the 
evidence to support a redirection of the program. 
In conclusion, it should be noted that the citizen involvement 
component in NEPA, although weak in terms of changing outcomes, does 
allow putting vast amounts of sand in the gears of the decisional machine. It 
is a (moderate) triumph of previous struggles to put citizen input on the 
agenda. Clelland argues that, "The convoluted struggle to erase such input is 
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very expensive m time and energy and does drive superordinates crazy" 
(Personal Communication, March 1995) . 
In this chapter we have been looking primarily at second dimensional 
power relationships. Those which involve, among other things, the "rules of 
the game" which operate systematically and consistently to the benefit of the 
Army. In the next two chapters we will take up the subject of how patterns of 
power are maintained by attempts to control the universe of discourse. We 
will move into the realm of the third dimension of power, which Gaventa 
( 1989) says is "the least developed and least undersood mechanism of power" 
(Gaventa 1980, p . 15) .  We will examine the legitimations and the myths tha t  
support the status quo and attempt to  illustrate how these patterns are 
instilled, how they are maintained, and what happens when these patterns 
are challenged . 
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Chapter 5 
The Third Face of Power: 
Legitimations, Ideologies and Myths 
'Hobbesian state authority is masked for the multitude by a disp lay of images 
st aged for the p urposes of ratifying the peop le's sense of living in a Lockean 
society of maximum freedom and government on trust . '  
Frederick M. Dolan, 1991. " Hobbes and/or North: The Rhetoric of 
American National Security" in Arthur and Marilouise Kraker, 
Ideology and Power in the Age of Len in in Ruins, .  
5 . 1  The Third Dimension: Language and the Discourse of  Power 
In Power and  Powerlessness, Gaventa (1980) argued that the least 
developed and least understood mechanisms of power are those of the third 
dimension. In speaking of the third dimension of power, of course, we are 
speaking about the various means through which power "influences, shapes 
or determines conceptions of the necessities, possibilities and strategies of 
challenge" (Gaventa 1980, p .  15) . Applied to the problem under consideration, 
it means examining the way the Army attempts to shape the way the problem 
is framed through the production of myths, control of information, creation 
of ideologies (or reinforcement of existing ideologies) and legitimations. 
Powers third d imension can be c learly seen in this remark, which 
surprisingly, was made by one who is active in opposing the Army's plan: 
"The way the Army works is like a freight train. It has tremendous 
momentum. The best you can do is to alter its course."  
We will begin with a discussion of language and its central role in 
defining (or warping) reality. We will examine the various legitimations the 
Army has offered for the destruction program and the institutions created to 
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support this function, and finally, we will  analyze the p redominant 
ideologies and myths with some conjectures about their poss ib le 
consequences . Hence, we will examine the connections between language use 
and unequal relations of power, particularly in the United States with respect 
to the U. S. Army's Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program. Part of our task 
will be to examine Army discourse surrounding the issue and to expose the 
'taken for granted' aspects to language which hide underlying ideologies.  In 
addition to exploring some of the predominant ideologies that infuse the 
issue of the chemical weapons destruction program, we will look at  the 
production of myths, discuss the various legitimations and attempt to relate 
these to the emergence of institutional structures and practices that support 
Army prerogatives. 
5 . 1 . 1  Euphemisms of Domination: 
In a provocative article in which she examines the euphemisms 
employed by the military with respect to our nuclear arsenal, Cohn (1987) 
describes the rationale behind what she calls technos trategic discourse . Here 
we are referring to the all-too familiar phrases such as "collateral damage" 
and "friendly fire."  She notes that "men's reference point in technostrategic 
discourse is not themselves or even white men, is not human beings at all, it 
is the weapons" (Cohn, 1987,p . 162) .  She believes that such discourse 
functions as an "ideological curtain" disguising the real reasons for political 
decisions . This ''ideological curtain" functions to mask reality and serves to 
b lunt our realization of what is really taking place. It is the linguistic 
equivalent of the psychological defense mechanism known as "denial ." 
Similar processes are evident in the Army's discourse surrounding the CSDP. 
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For example, the choice of the phrase "a permitted operation," which came 
up several times at a community meeting on alternative technologies at 
Anniston Army Depot (Alabama), is a prime example. When referring to "a 
permitted operation," the Army was supposedly referring to activities 
surrounding the construction of the incinerator facility at  the depot .  
However, it was never explained what activity the phrase referred to or 
where the permission came from or exactly who gave the permission. It was 
left to the audience to infer that whatever activity the phrase was referring to 
had been legitimated by some higher authority, e .g . ,  the EPA (Auburn 
University: Field Notes for August 1993, Anniston, Alabama ANAD).  
Fairclough ( 1 989) raises another important issue with respect to the 
relationship between power and modes of discourse, and that is the question 
of access to discourse. Who has access to which discourse, and who has the 
power to enforce constraints on access. The most notable example of this 
with respect to the Army's Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program involves the 
"Response To Query" (RTQ) system. Developed under the auspices of the 
CSEPP Public Affairs Subcommittee, the system is designed to identify and 
respond to questions and concerns from the CSEPP community ( i . e . ,  
emergency managers in the states, Depot commanders, etc .) ,  the public, and 
the media.  The system works in this way: (1 )  Questions are solicited from the 
CSEPP community and fielded to headquarters in Washington; (2) Public 
Affairs personnel review the questions and come up with a pat answer: one 
which will answer the question in a way that is consistent with the Army's 
point of view; (3) the questions and their "correct" answers are then made 
available to a fairly wide audience consisting of emergency managers in the 
states---Depot commanders, liaison officers, etc. The questions and answers 
2 3 2  
are then incorporated in CSEPP documents that can be used to "educate" the 
public about emergency response and the CSDP in general. It should be 
stressed that at no time are answers formulated by personnel at the state or 
local level. The "correct" answers come from headquarters in Washington. 
What Response To Query (RTQ) is really about is standardization, control 
over the universe of discourse, and limiting access. The Army argues that 
this level of control is necessary: 
The decentralized nature of CSEPP, involving 1 0  
states, 32 counties, and a t  least five Federal agencies, 
demands a program-wide system to ensure that 
managers and staff at all eight CSEPP sites provide 
consistent, accurate, and timely responses to both 
public and news media queries. The RTQ system is 
intended to meet that need first, by identifying 
those questions and concerns already being asked of 
or anticipated by CSEPP managers and staff, and 
second, by providing the answers . (CSEPP Update, 
September I October 1991, p. 1 1 ) .  
They conclude with this statement which appears in italics in the text 
to emphasize its importance: "Information provided through the RTQ sys tenz 
is not in tended for proactive use" (CSEPP Update, September /October 199 1 ,  p .  
1 1 ) .  What does this statement mean in  terms of controlling access? I t  means 
that although the public will be permitted to hear some of the answers, they 
will not have input as to how the questions are framed at the outset. The lists 
of questions and answers are not meant for general distribution, but are 
meant to be used as tools to insure uniformity of response from all concerned 
parties. RTQ is not intended to open up new issues, nor can it be viewed as a 
real attempt at dialogue. Citizen groups do not have input or access to the 
Response-To-Query system. The RTQ system will be revisited later in the 
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discussion of Army propaganda at which time which we will attempt to 
explain how RTQ fits into the more global propaganda schema. 
5 . 1 .2 What Does the Word 'SITE' Mean? 
The Army's obsessive need to control the universe of discourse goes 
beyond merely employing euphemisms and extends to concern with the 
usage and mean ing of words as well . One example comes directly from an 
Army newsletter called, CSEPP Update, which reads: "The word SITE as it is 
used by the chemical surety community is often mislead ing and 
misrepresents what is actually intended by the writer. Why? There are 
numerous meanings for the word site. It 's actual meaning depends on how it 
is being used and the connotations used before and after its initial use" 
(Ellenberger 1992, p .  8) .  This document originates from the office of the 
A rmy's Chief Public Affairs Officer at FEMA (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency) headquarters in Washington, D. C .  The piece quoted 
above is from an article entitled, "What Does the word SITE mean?" 
El lenberger ( 1 992) argues, that the word "site" has  picked up s inister 
meanings when used in the context of emergency response and he wishes to 
advise those who are involved in writing documents for the Army's 
weapons disposal program, to be careful of its usage. He cautions that use of 
terms such as " incinerator s i te" may conjure up negative images in the 
minds of some people. He suggests that other words such as " location" be 
substituted for the word "site" whenever possible. So instead of 'stockpile 
site' or ' incinerator site', you speak a location instead .  The rationale for this 
suggestion is contained in the following paragraph which is reproduced here 
in its entirety despite its length: 
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The major concern is that . . .  If this meaning is 
prevalent in chemical emergency preparedness 
literature, continued use of the more generic 
meaning could lead to the wrong perception; 
(emphasis added} that is, the installation, facility, 
location, to include the surrounding civil ian 
community will equate to the problem area, when 
in fact nothing is further from the truth. These are 
the exact areas where emergency preparedness is 
being improved and these locations are being made 
safer to prevent them from becoming a SITE. 
Bottom line--Let's start using the NCP and the new 
AR 50-6 definition of the words site and on-site and 
eliminate the use of the more generic meaning of 
these words . . .  
In another example of this phenomenon, the use of the term "safe" has 
undergone transformation through the years. An Army document prepared 
in 1986 contained the words: "The U. S. Army is actively planning for the safe 
and environmentally acceptable disposal of obsolete and unserviceable 
chemical warfare agents and munitions" (ORNL 1986, Report No. 61 97, p. 1 ) .  
This contrasts markedly with later language usage where principals were 
directed to avoid the use of the word "safe" altogether (CSEPP Update 1991,  
which cautioned emergency managers and others concerned with the 
Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program to "Avoid the Word 'SAFE' when 
Talking About Risk"). The newsletter goes on to describe how participants at a 
professional development workshop on risk communication were opposed 
to using the term "safe" to define risk to the public, "whether it relates to a 
substance such as dioxin or to a plant or other site, like a landfill" (C S EPP 
Update 1991,  p .  9 ) .  One workshop participant cautioned, "If you mean safe is 
zero risk, then your credibility goes down real quick when there is some 
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exposure." The CSEPP article prescribes the following precautionary strategy 
to avoid the above-mentioned pitfalls: 
It's better to talk about m i n i m a l  or a c cep ta b l e  
levels of risk. Public affairs o r  public information 
practitioners should encourage discussions about 
risk between an organization and its neighbors in 
o rder  to bui ld  trust  ( C S E P P Up d a t e ,  
September /October 1991, p .  9) .  
5 . 1 .3 Army 'Newsspeak' and the CSDP: 
The Army has developed its own version of "newsspeak" for the 
Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP). The Army's stockpile disposal 
plan is known in the halls of the Pentagon as "chem demil" ---bland Army 
shorthand for an emotional issue---the destruction of 27,000 tons of unitary 
chemical weapons in specially designed high temperature incinerators, most 
of which are located near thriving population centers .  The term 
'demilitarization' (demil i tariza tion for short) is an Army term meaning "to 
render unusable for any military purpose" (Transcript, February 16, 1984, 
Public Meeting, Richmond, KY. p.  1 ) .  
In  classic Orwellian fashion, numerous euphemistic "inversions" 
appear regularly in Army documents relating to the CSDP. They also crop up 
in briefings, in newsletters, at scoping meetings, and in professional journals 
as well. Some of the more notable examples include the following (N. B .  This 
is not an exhaustive list, but it does provide a window of opportunity to see 
how language affects the way the problem is framed from the Army's point of 
view) . 
In the Army's carefully crafted rhetoric, one speaks of "selective 
incentives" (not bribes) to make hazardous waste facilities more appetizing to 
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local communities (Carnes and Sorensen 1983) .  The community opposition, 
which is in fact na tional in scope involving all eight storage sites, is labeled 
"locational conflict" or "localized resistance," and the vociferous citizen 
opposition is referred to as a "siting controversy," thus minimizing the 
central role of power. In terms of dealing with affected publics, otherwise 
referred to as "stakeholders," the Army speaks of "building consensus," 
"maintaining citizen concurrence," or "channeling opposition. "  In terms of 
the potential risks associated with the program, the Army talks about the 
need for "mitigating public concern," and about "perceived risk" (as if there 
were no real risk) . In this regard, the word "accident" is assiduously avoided; 
instead, we speak of a chemical "event," or an off-post "incident" (meaning a 
plume of deadly nerve gas which travels beyond the installation boundary),  
or an off-post "release. "  One never speaks of nerve gas, only "agent."  One 
never speaks about how many people might die as a result of a chemical 
even t, instead, we speak of "no-death downwind distance." One does not use 
the word weapons but "munitions ." The Army speaks about "Getting the Job 
Done," and about "Lessons Learned ."  The Army never lies, they just say they 
"mishandled the truth ."  "Public education" and "public outreach" become 
euphemisms for propaganda .  In speaking about the NEP A review process, 
professionals refer to agencies that initiate actions calling for the preparation 
of Environmental Impact Statements (EISs) as "potentially responsible 
parties," or PRPs; thus masking the fact that in the scheme of things, the deck 
is stacked in favor of this entity. 
Some other items worth mentioning in this lexicon of technostrategic 
discourse are the euphemisms employed to describe the toxicity of agent and 
probable fatalities. Terms such as LDso (Lethal dose to 50% of those exposed),  
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and LCtso (Statistically derived concentration-time integral, lethal for 50% of 
"reference population"), are derived from an older statistic, the "Mortality 
Index" which rated degrees of toxicity and was usually expressed as: ( 1 )  The 
lower limit of irritability; (2) The limit of supportability; and (3) The Mortality 
Product. The Mortality Product, also termed the Lethal Index or the Haber  
Product  W which: 
gives the toxic power of the asphyxiants and of 
those poisons absorbed through the skin . It cannot 
be experimentally determined on the human 
subject, and experiments are normally made on 
animals: cats, rabbits, calves and dogs" (Clark 1968, 
P· 3). 
Notice the deliberate banality of the term "reference population." Here 
we could be referring to infants (for example, newborns) ,  children, the 
disabled, or the elderly. The term "reference population" is denuded of the 
emotional impact that would be associated with speaking about death by 
nerve gas. Notice also that the more modern statistical terms have been 
stripped of their older references to "poisons" or "mortality," but the things 
that they refer to are no less dangerous. Finally, mention should be made of 
the curious linguistic practice of making verbs out of nouns, e.g, "task" 
becomes "tasking" or "tasked" as in "The Oak Ridge National Laboratory was 
tasked to study the problem of reentry." 
Fairclough (1989) who has explored the connections between language 
and power, posits a dialectical relationship between the two. He argues that 
the relationship between discourse and social structures is not a one-way 
relationship, but instead represents a dialectical one. He writes: 
It is because the relationship between discourse and 
social structures is dialectical in this way that 
d iscourse assumes such importance in terms of 
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power relationships and power struggle: control 
over orders of discourse by institutional and 
societal power holders is one factor in the 
maintenance of their power (Fairclough 1989, p .  37). 
He further argues that, "As far as the social world is concerned, social 
structures not only determine social practice, they are also a product of social 
practice" (Fairclough 1989, p. 37) . The language employed by the Army in 
documents and statements relating to the CSDP, attempts to: ( 1 )  limit the 
scope of the problem; (2) minimize the breadth and strength of the 
opposition; (3) minimize the threat and the consequences of a potential  
chemical accident; (4) redirect our attention away from public safety concerns 
by tauting its emergency preparedness plan as a panacea and ( 4) trivialize 
other issues the Army wishes not to discuss . At the same time, the Army 
focuses on its instrumental goal of destroying the weap ons in the most 
efficient way manner, and we would add---with the least possible interference 
from citizens. 
Following Fairclough's (1989) analysis, the Army's choice of discourse 
is directly related to the numerous challenges mounted by citizens who 
oppose the on-site incineration plan. Citizen opponents of the Army' s  
current disposal plan, being fully cognizant of  the centrality of  language in 
defining the problem, have mounted numerous challenges to the Army' s  
' definition of the situation' ,  through newsletters, circulating petitions, 
sponsoring public forums, writing letters to the editor, talking to reporters 
and newspaper editors, writing letters to friends and public officials, 
p artic ipating in public debates with Army representatives, educating 
Congress, sponsoring conferences, etc . They have attempted time and time 
again to force the Army to clarify its positions. They have challenged the 
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Army's rhetoric concerning the alleged "safety" of incineration on numerous 
fronts . Their attempts to expose the myths behind the Army's various 
pronouncements have been nothing less than heroic. Their stick-to-itiveness 
has been a source of great consternation to the Army, causing one Army 
spokesman to declare in desperation, "What do these people want? ! "  
5.2 The Function of Legitimation 
Legitimation is the process of "expla ining and j ustifying" the 
institutional order. The problem of legitimation has been examined by 
numerous scholars, most notably in the work of Habermas ( 1973) and Berger 
and Luckmann (1 967) from whom we take our point of departure. Berger and 
Luckmann (1967) begin their discussion of legitimation by reminding us that, 
"All social worlds are precarious. All social worlds are constructions in the 
face of chaos" (Berger & Luckmann 1967, p. 103) .  This said, they go on to 
assert the primary necessity for all societies to defend and promote their view 
of reality .  They distinguish between first-order and second-order 
objectivations (of meaning). First-order objectivations have to do with the 
"taken-for-granted" world view incorporated by the child in the process of 
primary socialization. During this process, the world view of the particular 
society into which the child is born is absorbed into consciousness in its 
totali ty----without question or need for justification. Berger and Luckmann 
( 1 967) point out that legitimation has both cognitive and normative 
elements. Not only does legitimation tell  an individual why a person should 
perform one action and not another, it also tells him why things are the way 
they are. Legitimation explains the institutional order by ascribing cognitive 
validity to its imperatives. Additionally, integration in one form or another 
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is also a typical motive underlying attempts at legitimation (Berger & 
Luckmann 1967) . Thus the Army makes much of the fact that the NEPA 
process, particularly the public scoping meetings, are there to bring people 
" into the process , "  when, in reality, they are part and parcel of the 
leg i t ima t ion  process for the Army's program. In fact, we argue that the 
NEPA process itself has been co-opted by the Army for the purpose of 
legitimation. 
The earliest and simplest forms of legitimation are those which simply 
affirm: "This is how things are done." The second level deals with theoretical 
propositions in rudimentary form: proverbs, moral maxims and wise sayings 
are common on this level. The third level of legitimation contains explicit 
theories by which an institutional sector is legitimated in terms of a 
differentiated body of knowledge, for example, rules of kinship as developed 
and administered by elders of a clan. Berger and Luckmann ( 1967) state that 
"with the development of specialized legitimating theories and their 
administration by full-time legitimators, legitimation begins to go beyond 
pragmatic application and to become 'pure theory" '  (p. 95) . Symbolic 
universes constitute the fourth level of legitimation . Berger & Luckmann 
(1967) write, "These are bodies of theoretical tradition that integrate different 
provinces of meaning and encompass the institutional order in a symbolic 
totality" (Berger & Luckmann 1967, p. 95). Here we enter the realm of 
language and types of "discourse" which serve to reinforce the "correct" view 
of reality. Berger & Luckmann (1967) stress the importance in understanding 
the "taken for granted" nature of these symbolic universes. They come to us 
as if they were inevitable and immutable laws, forgetting that they are human 
creations and must be sustained and reaffirmed from generation to 
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generation . This is the problem of legitimation. In The Sacred Canopy, 
Berger and Luckmann (1969 ) write: "The problem of legitimation is to 
explain why the particular arrangement that has developed in a particular 
society, in whatever sequence of historical accidents, should be faithfully 
adhered to, even if it is at times annoying or downright painful" (Berger 1969, 
p. 20 ). With respect to this point, the Army hides behind NEP A procedures 
to affirm its right to control the process. 
Yet another strategy for reinforcing power is the careful employment of 
the symbols and rituals of power. We are reminded of the centrality of these 
symbols of "ideological hegemony" from writers such as Habermas (1 975) and 
Lukacs (1971)  who wrote about the importance of symbols in mainta ining 
dominance : 
Legal privilege, deference, prohibitive ritual display 
and their many manifestations are means of  
d o minat ion which  are  e xerC i ses m the  
establishment of legitimacy. The key point here is 
that they come into being as a result of a l ready 
existing relations of super-and subord ination 
(Wenger 1980, p .  367) . 
The Army has made good use of its already-established position of 
dominance through the use of ritual displays . Anyone who has attended 
scoping meetings is familiar with the spectacle of Army personnel in 
uniforms and the profusion of American flags. A citizen from Richmond, 
KY., commenting on the early years of the opposition movement there said :  
W e  had lots of meetings with the Army . . .  There 
were lots of meetings. They were very intimidating 
to us .  They wore their uniforms. They were 
trained in a manner that was professional .  They 
didn't know our names. 
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Another interesting illustration of the use of symbols to legitimate the 
stockpile destruction program involves the creation of the Chemical 
Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) logo. In 1991,  FEMA and 
the Army approved an official logotype for use on all CSEPP printed 
materials. The logo was a triangle representing the three tiers of government 
involved with the CSDP: federal, state and local .  According to their 
newsletter CSEPP Update, the logo was created : 
To project a consis tent graphic image of our 
program . . .  Its graphic elements are designed to 
solidify and strengthen CSEPP identification in each 
community.  . .The Public Information and 
Education Standards recommended that the logo be 
used for CSEPP letterhead, CSEPP publications, 
briefings, transparencies and slides and CSEPP 
signage (CSEPP Update: September /October 1991 ,  p .  
2, 3). 
The CSEPP logo was in use until the summer of 1 992 when it was 
discontinued because of a special set of circumstances (see Chapter 6 for 
details ) .  In the following sections we will review the typical legitimations 
offered by the Army and examine some of the institutions and practices that 
support the legitimation function. 
5.3 Army Legitimations for the CSDP 
Since its inception, the Army has offered numerous j usti fications for 
the existence and the necessity for the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program 
(CSDP).  Some of the major legitimations proffered by the Army have already 
been mentioned in a previous chapter, e .g . ,  the Congressionally-mandated 
destruction deadline, the dangers of continued storage (i .e . ,  the deteriorating 
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s tockpile argument), the alleged "safety" of incineration, our international 
treaty agreements to eliminate chemica l /biological weapons ( i . e .  the 
Chemical Weapons Convention {CWCJ ), the potential economic benefits to 
the affected communities in terms of job creation, etc. All of these rationales 
have been debunked by factual demonstrations of their specious character. 
However, there is more to the process of legitimation than merely making 
pronouncements. In the next section, we will undertake an examination of 
some institutional arrangements that have evolved as a are part of this 
process .  
5.4 The ICCB and SARA Title III: Legitimating Practices and Institutions 
SARA Title III, otherwise known as Public Law 99-499, the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, also known as the Emergency 
Planning R ight-To-Know Act of 1 986, was created in response to the disaster 
in Bhopat India in which several hundred people were killed due to the 
release of toxic chemicals. Title III ' s  primary objective is to force states and 
communities to plan for these types of accidents. To accomplish its goals, 
Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) were established in 
communities .  These local committees were responsible for: " ( 1 )  gathering 
data on chemical facilities and disseminating that information to the public 
(" right-to-know"L and (2) incorporating public participation in chemical 
hazards planning" (Feldman 1991 ,  p. 134).  For a variety of reasons, not the 
least of which is the paucity of resources available to the LEPCs to carry out 
their mandate, Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) have fallen 
short of the mark set for them by the law. 
The Army, anxious to gain acceptance for its program of on-site 
incineration, and being fully cognizant of the added burdens placed upon 
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these local emergency planning committees, seized the day and superimposed 
another institutional structure, the Intergovernmental Consultation and 
Coordination B oards (ICCB s) on to the already-existing Local Emergency 
Planning Committee (LEPC) structure created under SARA .  Among other 
things, the ICCB added to the LEPC structure the fact of centralized control 
and coordination from the Pentagon. This statement taken from the minutes 
of the Kentucky ICCB meeting which was held in Lexington on October 6, 
1989, is indicative of the Army's thinking on the matter: 
f. There will be a Steering Committee meeting at 
the Pentagon in November. We need to be looking 
at such things as political and economic differences, 
etc . We need to develop a central theme that we 
can utilize in these programs (Min u te s  : LBAD 
ICCB Meeting, Lexington, KY., October 6, 1989, p. 2) .  
Title III requires that LEPCs be comprised of relevant state and local 
officials, police, fire, civil defense, public health, environmental a ffairs, 
transportation personnel, members of the mass media, and designated 
community groups (Feldman 1989, p .  16) .  While the Army is not legally 
obligated under SARA Title III as are private enterprises engaged in similar 
activities, the DOD agreed to voluntarily comply with certain aspects of the 
law, and employing an expansive interpretation of the Act, decided that the 
goals of the newly-created ICCB structure would best be served by including 
the following components: " (1 )  Army participation in local LEPCs; (2) Army 
selection of persons to serve on ICCBs; and (3) development of emergency 
notification and warning systems in cooperation with local communities" 
(Feldman 1989, p .  2) .  Through these channels, Army influence penetrates 
deep into the local social structure. 
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Concern about emergency response for the CSDP is a legitimate 
concern of the Army (nearly $8,000,000 has been allocated) ,  but so is 
community acceptance of incineration technology. We argue that the 
primary reason for the creation of this additional bureaucratic tier is to 
control the information flows into the community concerning the CSDP and 
to attempt to co-opt important members of state and local governments and 
other "diverse interests" into compliance with the Army's  Chemical 
Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP). 
There is little doubt about the Army's intentions to use the newly­
created ICCBs as a vehicle for gaining community acceptance for the Army's 
program. Feldman (1988) writes about "Maintaining Citizen Concurrence 
and Gaining public Support through Intergovernmental Consultation" 
(Feldman 1 988, p. 14 ) .  Later, he proposes that, " Intergovernmental 
Consultation and Coordination can reduce public opposition by providing 
institutional arrangements to mitigate socio-economic impacts arising from 
implementation of this program" (Feldman 1988, p. 14) .  He goes on to 
describe various methods by which the Army can induce communities to 
accept the CSEPP program by using either (a) tax-equivalent payments in lieu 
of revenue losses resulting from the necessity to upgrade emergency 
preparedness infrastructure; (2) anticipatory compensation payments prior to 
an action; or (3) incentive-building measures which might include providing 
technical assurances of quality control in program management, mitigating 
health and safety concerns, upgrad ing emergency response capabilities 
(Feldman 1988).  Indeed, the Army's decision to build Emergency Operation 
Centers in communities adjacent to each of the stockpile sites, represents such 
an effort. 
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Feldman (1 989) argues that because SARA Title III encourages the 
participation of "diverse interests" in emergency planning (e .g . ,  the mass 
media), the presence of these organizations on local ICCBs "may also produce 
a climate more conciliatory from that which prevailed during the public 
hearings I scoping meetings phase of the CSDP" (Feldman 1 989, p. 3). In 
defending the need for the creation of this additional bureaucratic structure to 
supplement the already-existing Local Emergency Planning Committees, 
Feldman (1989) argued that: 
While effectively facil ita ting installation-local  
community contact  and l ia ison for CSDP 
emergency planning, however, LEPCs c annot 
preform all intended aspects of ICCBs. Non­
emergency planning activities, such as public 
information and education, channeling public 
concerns to the Army, should be provided by ICCBs 
(Feldman 1989, p. 1 ) .  
Because these local committees are not autonomous from the 
structure, they are very dependent on on the Army's good will in order to 
obtain the needed goods and services necessary to cope with any untoward 
accident resulting from CSDP operations . This indebtedness helps to insure 
complian ce and allows the propaganda function to flourish without being 
obvious. Feldman's (1989) research into LEPC functioning at the various 
stockpile sites, indicated an almost universal lack of resources necessary to 
deal with the joint responsibilities imposed upon them by SARA and the 
CSDP. He reiterated this failing at a Hazardous Materials Management 
Conference in 199 1 ,  where he said: "Currently, the sole sources of fiscal 
support for LEPCs are state and local government revenues (often derived 
from a special chemical facilities' operator tax) (Feldman (April !  1991 ,  p. 135) .  
This is one of the reasons they are so vulnerable to Army influence.  He 
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found, for example, that in Alabama, "public information management, in 
general, is not up to expectation," and additionally, his report noted that, "the 
state lacks adequate resources for information management, data processing 
and clerical support" (Feldman 1989, p. 9) . In Arkansas, he found that no 
money had been appropriated for Title III implementation. With respect to 
Colorado, he wrote, "Title III has been funded by established emergency 
planning budgets of other agencies. Pueblo does levy a small fee on chemical 
facility operators" (Feldman 1989, p. 10) . In Indiana, he reported that there is 
no "Right-To-Know" law and noted that for 1987-88,  Ind iana had 
appropriated $65,000 for Title III implementation. This translates into one 
full and two part-time staffers and a small office. In Kentucky because of 
financial constraints, he reports, a "less than perfect effort" of Title III 
implementation exists. (There are other reasons that may explain Kentucky's  
"less than perfect effort" with respect to Title III implementation. It may also 
be due to the Army's lessened credibility and influence at that site and to the 
Army ' s  inabi l ity to co-opt important members of state and local  
governments) .  Feldman (1989) makes much of the organization and super­
enthusiasm of the LEPC in Fayette County, Kentucky as compared with that 
in Madison County, Kentucky. The fact of the matter is that Madison County 
(the site of the Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot) is more l ikely to be affected 
by an off-site release from LBAD, but it is also the site of the most vociferous 
and tenacious opposition movement. In an attempt to put a positive "spin" 
on events at LBAD, Feldman ( 1989) stresses the importance of "personal 
rapport" in the success of the ICCB program. He reports that in Madison 
County, for example, this rapport was developed over a period of eight 
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months in a series of one-on-one meetings "which were very constructive" 
(pp. 25-6) . 
In Maryland, he found that while unable to devote much money to 
l o cal emergency p lanning, Maryland had a head start on SARA 
implementation because i ts own hazardous materials p lan had been in 
operation since 1987. In Oregon, although no SARA Title III funding has 
been made available to Oregon, the state's RTK law has been funded 
sep arately for some time. Final ly,  in Utah, he reported that Ti tle III 
implementation funds had been made available by the legislature, but had 
not found their way to counties. Ho-wever, this is where the need for funding 
is felt (Feldman 1989). 
5 .4. 1 Mitigating Public Concern through 'Compensation' :  
The financial resources being thrown a t  these communities via ICCBs 
in an attempt to enhance their readiness to handle a chemical accident are 
substantial. In conjunction with discussions concerning the role of ICCBs in 
enhancing public acceptance of the Army's emergency p lan, compensation 
looms as one possible avenue of entry, as this statement demonstrates: 
A principal means of mitigating public concerns in 
perceived risk laden programs is compensating 
communities for their impacts (Carnes, et al., 1 983) . 
This can be a prime factor ha stening public 
acquiescence toward such programs. The Army, 
working in conjunction with FEMA, is committed 
to upgrading emergency response infrastructure at 
CSDP sites (U.  S .Army, 1 989a ) .  Initially, this 
upgrade process involved expendi tu res of 
$100,000/CSDP state, with several upgrade stages yet 
to be completed, as well as additiona l funds 
(Feldman ! May l 1991 ,  p .  1018) .  
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According to Feldman (1988) "Four different but complementary goals 
of ICCBs have been identified: ( 1 )  meet with requirements of federal laws; (2) 
maintain citizen concurrence with, or gain public support for a program; (3) 
maximize program effectiveness by minimizing delay and legitimizing 
decisions; and (4) promote democratic values shared by members of the 
public" (Feldman 1 988, p. 13 ) .  It is the second of these goals, that of 
main tain ing citizen concurrence, that concerns us here, for we are arguing, 
that legitimation of the on-site incineration decision through the co-optation 
of community social structures is the raison d 'etre for the Army's creation of 
the ICCBs. An Army Public Affairs Officer, gave the Army's version of why 
the ICCB was created, "To create a format to present a reasoned argument of 
what's going on" (4/ 28/92 Personal Communication to C .Griffith Davies) .  
Indeed, ICCB is  considered by some as "a potential form of alternative dispute 
resolution {or ADR} (Bear 1989) likely to increase the chances for constructive 
solutions to environmental conflicts by avoiding impasse" (Feldman {May} 
1991, p. 10 19) .  However, ICCB board participants at the Lexington Bluegrass 
Army Depot site in Kentucky, paint a rather different picture. According to 
Kentucky representatives, ICCB meetings are very top-down affairs with the 
Army setting agendas, showing viewgraphs, giving briefings, etc .  One 
informant remarked, " ICCB was originally sold to the communities as an 
information conduit  but it's been totally subverted into emergency response." 
A knowledgeable Kentucky state official commented, "I was concerned about 
spending so much time on emergency response. " The reference to 
"emergency response" refers specifically to CSEPP---the Chemical Stockpile 
Emergency Preparedness Program---the Army's  grand plan designed to 
protect citizens from a chemical accident resulting from CSDP operations . 
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The focus on emergency response IS very significant, for if one becomes 
enmeshed in the workings of the Army's Chemical Stockpile Emergency 
Preparedness Program (CSEPP), one buys into the idea of the inevitability of 
on-site incineration. Citizens who oppose the Army's plan in Kentucky 
realized this early on, as did the citizen activists in Maryland who, at one 
point, refused to accept money from the Army for emergency response. 
5.4.2 The ICCB and Control of Information: 
In conjunction with centralized control from the Pentagon, the Army 
imposes tight controls over the flow of information emanating from national 
ICCB meetings . While declaring that the process of information exchange 
through the consultation and coordination process is a vital component of 
the program, they tolerate only two types of information flow at the national 
level, i. e., from Army officials at the Pentagon to the local ICCB; from the 
local ICCB to the Pentagon. Information to the general public (and that 
includes citizens in the affected communities) is carefully controlled and 
monitored . An Army directive flatly states: 
All information provided by the Army to Local and 
Programmatic ICCBs which is in draft form and I or 
has not been cleared for public dissemination shall 
be treated as sensitive, confidential, and { is }  to be 
withheld from public disclosure until cleared by the 
Army for public release (U. S. Department of the 
A r m y ,  Procedures of the CSDP Programmatic and 
Loca l  In t e rgo vern  m e n  tal  Co n s u l ta t io n  a n d  
Coordination Boards, no date, p .  4 ) . 
While minutes are kept of the local ICCB meetings, none are kept of 
the national meetings, and all ICCB meetings are closed to the pub lic 
(although at times, visitors are permitted at local meetings) .  Feldman ( 1991 )  
writes that "The status of meeting closure, practiced by a l l  ICCBs, i s  a 
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contentious issue" (Feldman 1991, p .  1017) .  The Army's rationale for meeting 
closure can be seen in the following statement: "The prevailing view is that 
ICCBs are a "buffer" between the general public and the Army, offering the 
former the opportunity to channel their concerns to officials having access to 
the CSDP, while offering the latter a good communication forum for the 
candid airing of concerns" (Feldman 1991 ,  p. 1017) .  The Army feels that access 
should be controlled to "expedite frank discussion of concerns" (Feldman 
1 991,  p. 1 0 17) .  The real reason behind this need to control access to these 
meetings is that they want to prevent the general public from hearing 
discussions concerning such things, for example, as: (1) the re-entry problem 
which involves decisions as to when and under what circumstances persons 
may return to their dwellings after a chemical accident involving stockpile 
destruction activitities---a very sticky issue for the Army and a potentially hot 
potato for Army Public Affairs moguls; or (2) the problems with testing at the 
Johnston Island facility; or (3) discussions about b ids and the amount of 
contract awards etc. While the Intergovernmental Consultation and 
Coordination Board (ICCB) is not the main pillar in the Army's arsenal of 
institutions and practices designed to win public support for the incineration 
of chemical weapons, it is not insignificant. Although its influence is subtle, 
it represents yet another example of power processes at work, it creates 
another barrier to participation. An appreciation of its various workings and 
underpinnings can help to illuminate other parts of the puzzle. 
5.5 Ideology and Myth in the CSDP 
Closely associated with the concept of legitimation is that of ideology, 
which Berger and Luckmann (1967) describe as, "ideas serving as weapons for 
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social interest" (Berger & Luckmann 1 967, p .  6 ) .  According to their 
formulation, ideologies are the underlying assumptions (or presuppositions) 
embed ded in particular conventions and depend on the power relations 
which underlie these conventions. However, Clelland notes that '"ideology' 
is more often viewed as explicit  rationalized doctrine" (Personal 
Communication, March 1995). Ideologies are means of legitimizing existing 
social relations and differences of power simply through the recurrence of 
ordinary, familiar ways of relating which take these relations and power 
differences for granted (Berger & Luckmann 1970) .  What are the underlying 
assumptions or presupposition that underscore Army rhetoric vis-a-vis the 
Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program? In this section we will explore some 
of the more obvious ideologies and the myths that support them. 
5 .5 .1 Ideologies and the CSDP 
One of the most frequently employed ideologies to emerge in the early 
days of the CSDP was what we refer to as the ideology of harmony. The idea 
that "we're all in this together." The idea that we share a common goal (i .e . ,  
that of getting rid of chemical weapons) and a common purpose. Marx gave 
the fullest expression to this notion when he wrote: "The ideas of the ruling 
class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i .e . ,  the class which is the ruling 
material force of society, is at the same time its ruling in tellectual  force" (The 
German Ideology, pp. 64-66) .  He further argued that each ruling class 
conceives its ideas to have the status of immutable, inevitable laws . "For each 
new class which puts itself in the place of one ruling before it," he wrote: 
is compelled, merely in order to carry through its 
aims, to represent i ts interest as the common 
interest of all the members of society, that 1s, 
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expressed in ideal form: it has to give its ideas the 
form of universality, and represent them as the 
only rational, universally valid ones (Marx & 
Engles,The German Ideology (1845-6 ) ( 1970) p .  65) .  
We see the echoes of  this sentiment expressed in the Army's defense of  
the programmatic decision as  doing, "What's best for the country." Marx 
further argued that during normal periods, ( i .e . ,  not during periods of 
upheaval or revolution),  the maj ority of the subordinate class in most 
societies hold the belief that the society is working for their interests---or, at 
least, that it is the best possible society at the present time (Sherman and 
Wood 1989) .  Finally, mention should be made of Gramsci 's  notion of 
"cultural hegemony" since "harmony" is an idea generally accepted by both 
superordinates and subordinates thus making it difficult to combat. 
5.5.2 Eliade and the Function of Myth 
The function of myth according to Eliade (1958) is to provide a model, 
an exemplar, an archetype. "The main function of myth," he writes, "is to 
determine the exemplar models of all ritual , and of all significant human 
acts" (Eliade 1958, p.  410). Unfortunately, the original term 'my thos ' came to 
denote "what cannot really exist" and in usage came to mean "falsehood" or 
" il llusion."  However, Eliade (1958) argues that this is not how we should 
understand "myth ."  He directs us to look upon myth rather as the ancients 
looked upon them, as "exemplars" and models or patterns of behavior. 
According to Eliade, "Myth is an extremely complex cultural reality, which 
can be approached and interpreted from various complementary viewpoints" 
(Eliade 1963, p. 5) .  Myth taught man the primordial stories that gave him his 
existential identity, and for contemporary Americans, the myth of democracy 
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(i .  e . ,  the belief that the U .  S. i s  a democracy m the classic sense) holds 
preeminent place among all our cultural myths. 
5.5.3 The Myth of Democracy 
In the beginning (1984) the Army relied heavily on calls for patriotism 
to secure the cooperation of communities. In attempting to convince them 
that the weapons were everyone's problem and their rapid destruction was in 
everyone's best interests, they made it seem as if it were their patriotic duty to 
cooperate with the Army's incineration decision. 
The Army's rhetoric of "we're all in this together" did not hold sway 
very long in Kentucky. Therefore, Army replaced patriotism argument and 
began relying on what we call the myth of democracy. Belief in the ideal of a 
Jeffersonian Democracy (i. e . ,  'government of the people, by the people, and 
for the people ' )  runs very deep in Richmond, KY. Belief in democracy as a 
cherished value is to be  found among all  the persons interviewed in 
conjunction with this program--- Army personnel as well as citizen activists 
of varying political persuasions. For example, in describing the early days of 
organizing Concerned Citizens of Madison County in Richmond, KY. ,  one 
informant said the Army held many meetings with local citizens in the early 
days (circa 1984). As this Concerned citizen recounted: "Before the meeting, 
you can't imagine the turn out. It was swelling . What every person had 
done was before your eyes. Democracy and we the people were about to 
speak." When asked to speculate on the probable outcome of the c itizen 
protest at LBAD, that person replied, "I feel that they will gradually phase out 
this site because of the number ---we have less (i .e . ,  LBAD has only 1 .6% of 
the stockpile)--- and this is a democracy." Another example comes from the 
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account of an activist who was present at the hearing in which testimony was 
given before the House Armed Services Committee . Speaking about the 
Army, the informant said: 
They were damn mad . They were summoned by 
the duly-elected representatives of the people. We 
had our day. [Associa te] and I were treated fairly. 
That night, we passed the Jefferson Memorial. It 's 
true. We the people have the right to redress our 
grievances. That made me feel great. If you have a 
plausible concern, then you make yourself heard . 
These eloquent expressions embody our most fundamental political 
beliefs; yet they symbolize what we perceive to be true, rather than what is 
actual ly true. Following Eliade's ( 1958) formulation of myth as a pattern or 
archetypal model, the ideal of democracy, i. e . ,  'government of the people, by 
the people and for the people' is the quintessentially American myth. It is the 
model by which we judge other governments and our own conceptions of 
right and wrong behavior stem from our belief in this model . However, the 
myth can be employed by powerful interests to control the behavior of 
citizens. It can be used to thwart any attempts at rebellion. By evoking this 
myth, as the Army has done on numerous occasions at scoping meetings, in 
the press, in face-to-face encounters with opponents of the program. The 
ideals of democracy which revolve heavily around citizen participation in 
and control of government, can be effectively used to dissipate dissent. Let us 
make note here of the dialectic of "cultural hegemony."  The ideology of 
democracy does encourage dissent and does force the Army into an incredibly 
convoluted decision process. That is, this aspect of cultural hegemony is quite 
expensive for superordinates. 
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On numerous occasions, the Army has cautioned citizens to be patient 
and to have respect for "the process." "Having respect for the process" is 
equated with democracy. Here, instead of being the actual practice of  
democracy with all the potential chaos of a genuine "give and take" situation, 
we have the Army making a fetish out of the process and equating that with 
democracy. For example, citizens of Madison County (Kentucky) were told at 
a public hearing on the Draft Programmatic EIS which took place in 1986 that: 
This is not your only opportunity to be heard; there 
are ways to be heard, by written submission, by 
paying attention to the process that the law requires 
us to follow here, in particular, taking note that a 
final statement of  evidence, record, material ,  
comments, positions and the like has not been 
prepared and will not be prepared until we have 
had all of that material to consider (Transcript :  
CSDP Public Hearing, 28  August 1986 p. 8 ) .  
The effect of employing predominant myths in the service of  vested 
interests is one way of entrenching their power. It allows opponents of the 
stockpile destruction program to perceive the present problem as just a blip in 
an otherwise equitable system of checks and balances; it serves to secure the 
status quo because it forces people to be self-policing. It is inimical to any type 
of direct action as it makes this approach seem almost "unAmerican . "  
"Working through the system," to borrow a phrase from the sixties, becomes 
an exercise in futility as the system works to absorb controversy in an endless 
round of bureaucratic procedures and regulations. The entire opposition 
movement is encapsulated and opposition is not so much crushed, as it is 
kept in its proper place---"channeled" into a cul de sac as it were. 
Even among citizen activists, there are those who are unaware that 
they are being manipulated . Of course, this is clearly an example of the third 
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dimension of power, i. e . ,  where people have internalized the controls even 
when it is not in their interest to do so. In such cases, people see what they 
want to see. They see groups of citizens proudly standing up for their beliefs 
against what they believe is a bad decision, what we have come to expect as 
the essence of democracy. They see the government making some 
concessions---again, democracy in action. What many fail to see, is that their 
range of choices is so constra ined as to preclude any rea l  practice in 
democracy. This was Marcuse's (1968) point exactly when he wrote, "The 
range of choice open to the individual is not the decisive factor in 
determining the degree of human freedom, but what can be chosen and what 
is chosen by the individual" (Marcuse, 1968, p. 7) . This dichotomy between 
appearance and reality is reminiscent of Machiavelli who argued that it is 
important for rulers (or those who wish to maintain power) to at least create 
the appearance that the old forms have not changed . 
Related to the myth that America is a democracy is the idea that the 
Army is subservient to Congress --- that Congress is the representative of the 
people against the encroachment of the military establishment, and 
furthermore, that Congress exercises real authority over the military. Even 
members of Common Ground /KEF (Citizen group from Berea, Kentucky) 
who generally hold a more skeptical view of the system, regard Congress as 
receptive to citizens' concerns. One activist expressed great faith in Congress 
and said that at one point the focus of their activity shifted away from the 
Army to Congress because they were able to obtain more information from 
Congress and because "Congress controls the purse strings."  
In theory, Congress does control. However, in  practice, i t  rarely works 
out that way. Save for annual decisions about appropriations, there is little 
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oversight according to knowledgeable sources. As a member of Congressman 
Hopkins' (U. S. House of Representatives) staff pointed out. In theory, he 
said, it  is Congress that provides oversight and legislative {control )  . .  But he 
was careful to point out that: 
In real ity,  { there are )  varying degrees of  
interest/oversight. What is  involved is  legislative 
control of activities of a department of three 
million people (the DOD) and three services, plus 
all sorts of committees . Clearly, when you see the 
scope of the Department of Defense (DOD), you can 
see why { i t  is dif icult to scrutin ize the workings of 
the Army too closely ) . 
Additionally, another factor has entered the picture of the modern state 
which clouds the issue even further---that of the ascendence in the power of 
lobbyists, which the framers of our constitution could not even have 
imagined . Comments from concerned citizens who had gone to Washington 
to observe the Congressional deliberations concerning the Chemical Stockpile 
Disposal Program when it was in its infancy, recall seeing "the suits" (as they 
put it) in the gallery quietly observing the proceedings. They were sure these 
were lobbyists for the incinerator industry . Nevertheless, efforts to track 
down specific lobbying activities for the CSDP have proven fruitless, largely 
because reporting procedures are inimical to tracking down who gave what  
to  whom . .  (Although w e  understand that this is changing) . 
Nevertheless, as a general rule, the citizens who organized to oppose 
the Army's plan, believe fiercely in the ability of the system to change in 
respond to their pressure. Therefore, there is no need for the state to bring 
out its repressive forces, for as Parsons (1966) pointed out, "A power system in 
which the only negative sanction is the threat of force is a very primitive one 
which cannot function to mediate a complex system of organizational 
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coordination---it is far too b lunt an instrument" (Parsons, 1966, p .  260) .  Thus, 
perpetuating certain ideologies and playing upon myths is more effective in 
maintaining power processes. In this case, the myth that America is a 
democra cy along the Jeffersonian model is very useful to the Army, for it 
engenders the notion of 'playing by the rules' and fosters cooperation with 
the complex NEPA procedures and regulations which the Army uses to its 
advantage. As they are fond of reminding the citizens who oppose the plan, 
"We will comply with the law." Our analysis is in harmony with Althusser's 
( 1971) statist conception of power, where power is located in the state (as 
opposed to the people) and its various components, from the Armed Forces 
and the pol ice to the schools and churches---called by Althusser, the 
' repressive state apparatus' and the 'ideological state apparatus' respectively 
(Bocock 1986) . If we are to know the limits to the power of the state we must 
understand the premises from which it derives its power. In the case under 
consideration, the Army's ability to call upon the enduring cultural myths is 
of vital importance in the maintenance of its power. 
5.5.4 Hierophanies and Kratophanies 
"To the place of the skull we have come." These were the openmg 
lines from the script of a peace vigil (i .e . ,  demonstration) which was held in 
Kentucky at the site of the Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot on April 17, 1 992. 
A small group of activists and sympathizers from the community stood 
around in the light rain outside the gate to the depot to give witness to their 
opposition to the proposed nerve-gas facility. Participants in the peace vigil 
placed paper cranes on the fence at the conclusion of the vigil as a symbol of 
hope and empowerment. 
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There are about 70,000 M55 "explosively configured" rockets stored at 
the Lexington-Blluegrass Army Depot (LBAD) (See Appendix E). The rockets 
contain the nerve agents GB and VX. The igloos (earth-bermed bunkers) are 
90 feet long, 25 feet wide and 15 feet high. A local newspaper reported that 
"there are approximately 2,500 rockets stored in each igloo which is designed 
to be thinner on top so that if the rockets inside explode, the force of the blast 
will go upward, then fall back down into the igloo. The igloos are also placed 
far enough apart so that a blast in one will not detonate the rockets m 
another" (Lexington-Herald Leader, Tuesday, November 27, 1 984, p .  1 ) . 
One could see no evidence of the huge military presence that 
afternoon . The igloos are not visible from the depot gate. They are stored in 
the central portion of the depot and are not visible from the depot fence. 
However, it was pointed out quite eloquently by one of the speakers that these 
igloos represent the Army's version of "sacred ground" as they are heavily 
guarded and hidden from view (to frighten off potential terrorists, we are 
told) . They are modern-day h ierophan ies , i .e . ,  manifestations of the sacred . 
In this case they would also be categorized as kra t o ph a n i e s --- i .  e . ,  
manifestations of power which are therefore feared or  venerated (Eliade 
1 958) . Kratophanies are simply another modality of the sacred ---one that 
inspires fear. 
The phenomenon of h i e r op h a n ies  and kra to p h a n i e s  has been 
discussed quite eloquently by Mircea Eliade (1958) in his now-classic work 
Pat terns in Comparative Religion.  Hierophanies appear in many forms, he 
writes, "Everything unusual, unique, new, perfect or monstrous at once 
becomes imbued with magico-religious powers and an object of veneration or 
fear according to circumstances (for the sacred usually produces this double 
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reaction)" (Eliade 1958, p .  13) .  Anything---any object or person---may become 
a hierophany, he explains and we can find examples of such things even 
among modern-day civilization. "We must get used to the idea of  
recognizing hierophanies absolutely everywhere," he writes, "in every area 
of psychological, economic, spiritual and social life" (Eliade 1958, p. 1 1 ) .  A 
hierophany implies a more or less clear choice, a singling out. "A thing 
becomes sacred in so far as it embodies (that is reveals) something other than 
itself" (Eliade 1958, p. 13) .  Durkheim (1915) too has described the quality of 
the sacred as "things set apart," "things forbidden." (We are reminded that 
the word taboo, a Polynesian word also means "sacred" or "sacre"'  in Latin.) 
The igloos that house the "explosively configured" lethal unitary 
chemical weapons at the Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot certainly fit 
Eliade's description of kratophanies perfectly. These latter-day hierophanies 
inspire dread and fear because they contain some of the most lethal weapons 
of mass destruction ever created by man. (Recall that a drop of VX can kill a 
man in minutes) .  
The conceptualization of  the Army's nerve gas igloos as h ieroplz an ies 
1s directly related to the Third Dimension of Power. The presence of such 
phenomena contribute greatly---enhance enormously---the perception of 
power (and legitimacy) of the military, after all, the military are the possessor 
and the guardians of these weapons. They are the "experts" in knowing how 
to handle them, store them, deploy them. 
5.6 Gramsci's Concept of "Ideological Hegemony" 
Without entering into an extended debate regarding the issue of 
whether or not there is a r u l in g  or d o m i n an t ' c lass '  in contemporary 
2 6 2  
American society, it is useful to look at Gramsci 's  concept of h ege m o n y .  
which has relevance to our discussion. For Gramsci, hegemonic leadership 
involves developing intellectual, moral and philosophical consen t  from all 
major groups in a nation (Bocock 1986) .  Bocock (1986) points out that "it is the 
sheer taken-for-grantedness of hegemony that yields its full effects - - - the 
'naturalness' of a way of thinking about social, economic, and political issues" 
(Bocock 1 986, p. 6) . Forgacs ( 1988) comments that in Gramsci 's prison 
notebooks the meaning of hegemony is qualitatively modified:  "hegemony 
comes to mean 'cultural, moral and ideological' leadership over allied and 
subordinate groups .  . .Hegemony in this sense is identified with the 
formation of a new ideological ' terrain' ,  with political, cultural and moral 
leadership and with consent" (Forgacs 1988, p. 423). Gramsci also insists that 
hegemony is dynamic {dialectic} i .e . ,  " is characterized by the combination of 
force and consent variously balancing one another" (VII .2 .  in Forgacs 1988, p .  
423) .  The fact that hegemony i s  dynamic implies that i t  must take into 
account the interests and tendencies of subordinate groups. " In other words," 
Forgacs (1988) argues, "It presupposes an active and practical involvement of 
the hegemonized groups, quite unlike the static, totalizing and passive 
subordination implied by the dominant ideology concept" (Forgacs 1988, p .  
424) . (Recall that maintaining citizens '  co n s e n t  is also a key component of 
Machiavelli 's model . )  
We will elaborate further on  Gramsci's ideas regarding the dynamics of 
engineering citizens' consent in the next chapter which deals with Army 
propaganda.  At this point the reader will excuse a minor digression while we 
pick up one thread of Gramsci's argument concerning the force I consent 
dichotomy. For this can be seen clearly in the Army's attempt to convince the 
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citizens that the elaborate concrete fortresses built to protect igloos which 
house these weapons of mass destruction and the concomitant security 
measures which have grown up around them, are for their protection--­
against "terrorists ."  As Sherman and Wood (1989) remind us, ideologies 
make use of social myths and one of the primary myths operative in this 
controversy is the belief that the elaborate security systems at the Depots are 
necessary "for protection against terrorists ." Do these measures really make 
us more s a fe, or do they serve as legitimations for the Army's secrecy 
surrounding the production, use and stockpiling of weapons of mass 
destruction? And, what effect, if  any, do these measures have on the 
willingness of opponents to attempt any form of direct action or civil 
disobedience? To answer these questions we must turn once again to the 
empirical data. 
Speaking to an assembly of invited guests which included members of 
Concerned Citizens of Madison County (Kentucky), General Hidalgo made 
the following remarks at the Overview and Discussion Workshop held at the 
Tooele Army Depot (TEAD). Colonel Hidalgo opened his remarks by stating 
that "Special security measures preclude access to the grounds" (Hidalgo, 
Transcript TEAD CAMDS Overview and Discussion Workshop 1984, p. 122) . 
This bare statement is a master stroke of understatement. During the course 
of that session, in an effort to reassure citizens about the safety of the 
stockpile, the General gave these graphic descriptions of the state'6 attempt to 
secure the stockpile from untoward intrusion by "outsiders": 
6 We are us ing the word s t a te here in  the Gramscian sense .  The s tate cons is ts  
of  the  means  of v i o l e nce ( the  pol i c e  and the  armed forc e s ) in  a g i v e n  
te rri tory , together  w i t h  t h e  s tate-funded b u reau c rac i e s ,  e . g . ,  t h e  s e v e ral  
n a t i onal  l a b o ra tori e s .  
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There is a 5,000 to 5,500 pound block of cement on 
steel spikes sitting in front of each door to an igloo 
(Gen.  Hid algo 1 984, CAMDS Overview and 
Discusion Workshop,p . 123); 
Later he described the proposed destruction facilities in terms of their 
structural integrity and their security against untoward intrusion: 
The building would be a three-level rigid frame 
steel building, which would contain steel reinforced 
concrete explosive containment areas within 
(Portion of transcript of proceedings of the Tooele 
Army Depot CAMDS Overview and Discussion 
Workshop, August 15, 1984, p .  87); 
The plant site would be approximately 1 1  acres in 
size. It would be surrounded by security sensors . 
Personnel would enter the site from this 
position,through a guardhouse which is called an 
entry control facility (Portion of transcript of 
proceedings of the Tooele Army Depot CAMDS 
Overview and Discussion Workshop, August 1 5, 
1984, p .  87). 
The reality of the inaccessibility to the stockpile sites is driven home 
quite clearly to anyone who has visited any of the Army Depots where the 
unitary weapons are stored and seen the signs posted on the Depot fence 
which warn: "USE OF MAXIMUM FORCE AUTHORIZED." One citizen 
present on that tour described her feelings as she toured the Tooele Army 
Depot's chemical destruction facility complex: 
Many hours on a bus, and miles and miles of 
driving . When I saw the guards with guns and 
wire, it all became real to me. 
Is it any wonder that citizens are wary of attempting any kind of civil 
disobedience or direct action? With regard to this last point, early on in the 
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interview process (1991),  leaders of citizen groups who oppose the Army's on­
site incineration plan, voiced the opinion that some form of direct action or 
civil disobedience would not be ruled out somewhere down the line. There 
was talk of chaining themselves to the Depot fence. Presumably, they 
regarded this as a last resort if all else failed . One cannot escape the obvious 
conclusion that the Army has, through the use of carefully-controlled 
avenues for public participation, together with the implied threat of force 
(Gramsci 's force/consent dichotomy), been able to forestall just this type of 
escalation . The Army continuously assured the citizens during this same 
meeting in 1984 that "the community and the state officials and the Army are 
partners in this decision. And indeed, we will be partners {emphasis added ) 
in whatever decision is made" (Gen. Bobby Robinson 1984, Transcript, TEAD, 
CAMDS Overview and Discussion Workshop, Salt Lake City, Utah, p . 1 17) .  
The repressive forces in place at the Depots where the weapons are 
stored are a type of "insurance" for the Army, against terrorists---possibly, but, 
surely, these repressive forces can be turned against opponents of on-site 
incineration as General Hidalgo's remarks about the security in place at LBAD 
make quite clear: "In answer to your question directly," he said: "Yes, I 
believe that at Anniston and at Lexington . .  .I have personal knowledge that  
those forces are drilled, trained in every aspect and equipped to cope with a 
wide range of terrorists or dissident activities" (General Hidalgo 1984, p. 123) .  
5 .7 The Myth of Emergency Preparedness 
In their e fforts to gain community acceptance for the on-site 
incineration program, the Army has created a myth---The Myth of Emergency 
Preparedness. The Army argues it is prepared to handle the eventuality of an 
2 6 6  
accidental release of toxic nerve or mustard gas involving civilian population 
centers . (Here we are using the term "myth" in line with the common 
parlance---to refer to "illusion" or as we noted earlier "what cannot really 
exist" ) .  The author having spent several years at a national laboratory 
working closely with various aspects of the Army's "grand emergency plan," 
i .  e ., CSEPP (Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program), has seen 
firsthand how tenuous is the Army's claim that it can protect civilians in the 
case of an accident involving the release of nerve gas into a populated area . 
Up until the last half of this century, "Civil Defense" usually meant 
protection against ordinary bombs (Keyes 1982). With the advent of nuclear 
missiles, an entirely new adjustment had to be made. During the fifties, 
school children were trained in drills to "duck and cover" under their desks 
as if this would afford any protection against the firestorm of a nuclear 
explosion which Larson and Michells-Cyrus (1992) humorously describe as 
"No worse than if a 500,000 ton baseball, hit on a line drive, were to strike 
your home."  The creation of the nerve agents ( i .e . ,  nerve gas) pose even 
greater challenges in terms of adequate warning and protection against harm. 
Not only because they are among the most toxic substances known to man, 
but because they are colorless, odorless, and their presence---even in 
microgram amounts---can be deadly. Additional problems with protection 
against these agents involve the various routes to exposure. For not only can 
these gases be inhaled, they can also be absorbed through the skin; therefore, 
just donning a face mask is not enough protection. Additionally, unless the 
facemasks fits properly and are ready at hand, they are of no use at all . 
Protection against the various agents that make up the unitary 
stockpile of chemical weapons is complicated by the fact that research in this 
2 6 7  
area is in its infancy. In 1989, the first systematic investigation of the effects of 
in-place sheltering as protection against chemical agent infiltration was 
undertaken at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, in Oak Ridge, Tennessee 
(see Rogers et al 1990). The bulk of research that has been done by the Army 
regarding the human health effects of nerve and I or vesicant agents has been 
restricted to effects on young, healthy, males, under battlefield conditions . 
Complicating this already dim picture is the fact that the only known 
antidotes possess toxic properties of their own. Atropine, for one, is a 
hallucinogen, and its use is recommended only when agent exposure is 
relatively certain and then should be administered only by trained personnel 
(Rogers 1990) . In a brilliant understatement, Stringer (1 986) observes that "the 
measures employed to defend against chemical agents have unfortunately 
not achieved the quantum leap in effectiveness seen in the agents 
themselves" (Stringer 1986, p .  1 1 ) .  Additionally, the Army has not solved the 
reentry problem, and research in this area is fairly recent (Watson and Munro 
1990; Munro et al 1990; Munro et al 1991; Watson 1992, 1992, 1992; Argonne 
National Laboratory 1991; Daugherty, M. et al 1990; Halbrook, R. S .  et al 1992; 
U.  S. Department (HHS) 55 Federal Register 28940) .  
However, one of most troubling aspects m the entire oeuvre of 
designing protective actions for chemical agent accidents involves the short 
time available to warn the public. Data indicate that decision making among 
community officials would take 15 to 20 minuntes under ideal  conditions 
(Rogers 1990). Rogers and Sorensen (1988) found that "even assuming better 
than ideal decion-making times of about 1 0  minutes in fast moving events, 
many people would be exposed before being warned" (Rogers 1990, p .39) .  
While the t ime of arrival of a toxic plume will  vary depending on 
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meteorological conditions, the reader should be aware that, under certain 
conditions, it is possible for a toxic plume to arrive 3 km downwind in 8 
minutes. Now, admittedly, this would not present the same need for rapid 
emergency response if it occurred on Johnston Island (JACADS) (the Army's 
only full-scale test facility) as it would be if it occurred in Berea or Richmond, 
Kentucky or in the Edgewood Area of Aberdeen Proving Ground (MD), 
nevertheless, it presents one of the most difficult problems in terms of 
protecting civilian populations from exposure to toxic gases. 
5.8 The Creation of CSEPP: The Chemical Stockpile Emergency 
Preparedness Program 
Public safety was uppermost m the minds of Congress when they 
funded the creation of CSEPP. As Public Law 99-145 stipulates, the destruction 
of the unitary stockpile of chemical weapons is to be carried out in accordance 
with "maximum protection for the environment, the general public, and the 
personnel who are involved in the destruction of the lethal chemical agents 
and munitions referred to in subsection (a)" (PL 99-145, The Departmen t  of 
Defense A uthoriza tion Act of 1 986, November 8, 1985, Section 1412, p .  99 
STAT. 747) . The Army's emergency preparedness plan for the Chemical 
Stockpile Distruction Program, known as "CSEPP" (Chemical S to c kp i le 
Emergency Preparedness Program), grew out of this mandate. 
In 1988, the Army asked the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) to cooperate in the design, development and implementation of 
CSEPP (Carnes, Garcovich and Shriver 1 99 1 ) .  A memoramdum of  
understanding (MOU) was drawn up between FEMA and the DA 
(Department of  the Army) in which FEMA assumed responsibility for off-post 
emergency planning activities . Subsequently, a Joint Steering Committee was 
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instituted to serve as a focal point and provide oversight for CSEPP. Six 
subcommittees function to support the emergency planning effort, they 
include: Planning Standards and Criteria, Reentry /Restoration, Training 
Exercises, Public Affairs, and Automated Emergency Management and 
Simulation Modeling. 
Funding for CSEPP began in Fiscal Year 1 989 with the Department of 
the Army originally committing $100,000 for each of the eight sites with 
chemical storage installations . As it became apparent that local communities 
were not prepared for the new responsibilities imposed upon them by the 
impending on-site incineration program, FEMA requested the Army to 
release an additional $820,000 during Fiscal Year 1 989 to begin initial 
upgrades. Eventually, the CSEPP budget blossomed out to $27 million for 
Operations and Maintenance (O&M) and $5.5 million for procurement. 
(CSEPP Update: September /October 1991, p .  1-2) . 
According to the Army, CSEPP includes, " ten states, thirty-two 
counties, and at least five Federal agencies" (CSEPP Update 1991,  p. 1 1 )  
including, but not limited to: the newly-created U .  S .  Army Chemical 
Material Destruction Agency; DOD (Dep artment of  Defense);  EPA 
(Environmental Protection Agency); FEMA (Federal Emergency Management 
Agency);  the DHHS (Department of Health and Human Services) and 
numerous other state and local civil  defense agencies as well as several 
National Laboratories (e. g., Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Argonne 
National Laboratory, etc. ), as well as their subcontractors . 
CSEPP is by far the largest legitimation for the Disposal Program. After 
CSEPP's funding began in 1 989, the Army immediately contracted with 
various national laboratories (specifically the Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
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in Oak Ridge, Tennessee) to begin conducting research into various ways of 
protecting the public from an accident involving the release of chemical 
(nerve or mustard gas) agents resulting from disposal operations . CSEPP's 
very existence and its extensiveness are designed to support the belief that it is 
possible to adequately respond to a catastrophic accident involving the release 
of nerve /mustard gas involving a civilian population. CSEPP is like a giant 
octopus with tentacles penetrating deep into the local social structure of the 
communities adjacent to the stockpiled weapons. Its influence is both subtle 
and profound, and, as we shall see, is not limited solely to emergency 
response. It is the main propagandizing vehicle and the purveyor of the 
greatest myths, i .e . ,  ( 1 )  that the process can be controlled; and (2) that the 
communities, with help from the Army, are prepared (or can be prepared in 
time) to cope with a major release of toxic nerve or mustard gas which crosses 
the Army installation boundary. Michael Reich (1991 )  discussed the dangers 
inherent in putting blind faith in new technologies which make the Army's 
reassurances appear unrealistic at best. He wrote: 
Often, society reexamines the application of new 
technology only after it is too late, after the device is 
thoroughly integrated into social institutions, after 
the device has produced a series of undesirable 
second or third-order consequences, or worse, after 
the device has caused a disaster and a body count. 
The Army's emergency plan revolves around three princ ipal  
protective actions: ( 1 )  in-place sheltering; (2 )  evacuation; and (3 )  respiratory 
protection. Of the three, evacuation seems to be the one most experts feel 
offers the most promise of saving the most lives in the "unlikely" event of a 
chemical  acc ident relating to the operations of the d isposal program; 
however, there are serious problems with relying solely on evacuation as the 
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method of escape. Depending on the wind speed, direction of the plume and 
atmospheric stability, it may be necessary for a great number of people to seek 
shelter in place . All methods for protecting the public depend on obtaining 
quick, reliable, information on exactly what has been released, which 
direction the plume is likely to travel and what quantity of agent has been 
released .  In order to do this, sophisticated computer-generated atmospheric 
dispersion models have been developed. 
5.8.1 Plume Dispersion Models : "The Uncertain ty Principle : "  
I n  terms o f  hazard prediction, researchers working o n  atmospheric­
dispersion models (computer programs which predict how far a toxic plume 
will travel given certain parameters, e .  g., meteorology, topography, etc . )  for 
the Army have evolved some fairly sophisticated models . Research in this 
area has been going on at least since 1986 (Whitacre 1986) when the first of 
these models (D2PC) was developed by Army researchers at the Chemical 
Research and Development Center of Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. The 
work has continued since then, first at Los Alamos National Laboratory 
(Yamada et al 1989) and at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Oak Ridge, 
Tennessee) where the current models were perfected and tested.  However, 
even the experts who are involved in developing these models are guarded 
in their estimation of their effectiveness.  One researcher whose work is 
highly respected in the field, speaking about P A E C E , (Protective Action 
Evaluator for Chemical Emergencies) ,  which is actually a collection of 
FORTRAN programs designed to help the user in analyzing protective action 
scenarios, wrote: 
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Uncertainty permeates the PAECE at  every 
juncture: the dispersion model at best predicts the 
expected exposure within + 50%; the decision-to­
warn assumptions are based on limited cases; the 
receipt of warning is based on extrapolations and 
interpolations of limited data; public response is 
estimated based on a limited number of previous 
accidents; implementation of in-place shelter 
techniques is based on a limited number of trials . 
Although any one of these uncertainties may be 
es t imated ,  the combined effect of these 
uncertainties cannot be estimated (Rogers et  al 1990, 
p.91) .  
Even as late as the summer of 1 992 when the author was engaged m 
writing a user manual to be used in conjunction with the latest version of 
these air-dispersion models, (PADRE) Protective A ction D ose Reduct ion 
Estimator, there was still a great deal of  tentativeness associated with their use 
(PADRE User Manual, June 29, 1992. Unpublished Draft) .  Traffic models 
(computer-generated models of traffic flow and patterns) developed in 
conjunction with evacuation scenarios, have also achieved a great deal of 
sophistication, taking into account time-of-day, one-way streets, population 
density, special events, meteorology, topography, etc. These models are used 
in conjunction with air-dispersion models and are designed to assist decision­
makers in deciding upon possible evacuation routes. They employ a zone­
b ased emergency planning concept, a well-known method for developing 
emergency plans (Carnes et al 1989). Basicqlly, potentially-affected areas are 
divided into three zones: the IRZ (immediate response zone; the PAZ or 
protective action zone (an intermediate zone); and the PZ or precautionary 
zone. The IRZ is the zone in closest proximity to the threat, for example, it 
might be area within 3-10 km of a stockpile site (the actual distances may vary 
substantially, based upon the circumstances). The capability to implement the 
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most appropriate protective action(s) very quickly is critical within the IRZ, 
hence, w arning times are critical .  The PAZ defines an area where the 
available emergency response times and the hazard distances associated with 
them are sufficiently large to allow most people to respond effectively 
through evacuation; the PZ is far enough away from the hazard to allow 
sufficient time to both plan either evacuation or in-place sheltering. 
5 .8 .2 "In Harms Way": Communities at Risk 
The Army's probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) for the stockpile disposal 
program (GA Technologies 1987a, b, c, and MITRE 1987) identifies a whole 
range of possible accidents with potential "off-site" consequences related to 
disposal operations. Among those cited are storage accidents, transportation 
accidents, handling accidents, and plant operations accidents. Included in this 
risk analysis are catastrophic accidents caused by plane crashes into an igloo or 
an earthquake. The Army's risk analysis does not identify accidents with 
extremely low probabilities (less than 1Q-8), or accidents resulting from acts of 
sabotage or terrorism (Carnes et al 1989) . The focus is on catastrophic external 
events (earthquake,s plane crashes, etc . ) .  However, the FPEIS ( 1988) does list 
some smaller accident scenarios involving possible everyday occurrences 
such as forklift accidents or accidents involving the transportation of 
munitons from storage to the destruction facility. 
Although Army documents flatly state the the possibility for accidents 
resulting from disposal operations is extremely small and point to the low 
probability of catastrophic accidents, it should be kept in mind that even 
minor accidents of lesser magnitude could easily overwhelm local emergency 
responders. While the Army argues that the likelihood of an accident 
involving nerve or mustard gas is extremely small, one researcher involved 
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in studying protective actions wrote, "The universe of potential  accidents 
relevant to the storage and disposal of the unitary chemical stockpile is very 
large" (Rogers 1 990, p. 67). Army people are firmly convinced that an accident 
is unlikely, and pooh pooh any attempt to alter the impression that the 
CSEPP can handle the problem of protecting the public. However, given the 
complexity of the process and the high toxicity of the substances involved, 
this is a calculated risk at best. The question remains, what is an acceptable 
level of risk and to whom is it acceptable? 
Although it certainly is possible to exercise some control over what 
happens in the event of a chemical accident, nevertheless, it is very hard to 
predict (and thus to prepare for) the combined effect of several things going 
wrong at once. Perrow's concept of system accidents is particularly germane 
to the Army's chosen disposal technology and to the emergency plan now in 
place to protect the public. Perrow (1984) argues that most high-risk systems 
(such as the Army's reverse assembly thermal destruction system for the 
CSDP) have special characteristics beyond their toxic or explosive attributes 
that make accidents in them i n ev i t ab le ,  even "normal ."  He ca lls these 
qualities: i n terac t ive complexity and t igh t coupling. When he speaks of 
interactive complexity, he is referring to the possibility of simultaneous 
multiple failures . He argues that we can prepare for and predict any one of 
these failures, however, we are not prepared for the simultaneous failures 
that are bound to occur. "This interacting tendency is a characteristic of a 
system," he states, "not of a part or an operator; we call it the ' interactive 
complexity' of the system" (Perrow 1 984, p. 4). Add to this mix the idea of 
tight coupling, i .e . ,  the system works very fast and cannot easily be turned off, 
"the failed parts cannot be isolated from other parts, or there is no other way 
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to keep the production from going safely" (Perrow 1984, p .  4) .  He argues that 
interactive complexity and tight coupling will inevitably produce an accident, 
thus, he feels justified in referring to them as normal accidents . He concludes 
with the statement that although system accidents are uncommon, even rare; 
this is not at all reassuring if they can produce catastrophes (Perrow 1984). He 
gives Three Mile Island and the grounding of the Exxon Valdes as examples 
of normal acciden t.s and argues persuasively that these were not  caused by 
human failure as some have charged . 
Looking at stockpile disposal from the standpoint of the destruction 
technology alone, a very frightening picture emerges . However, if one pulls 
b ack and takes a more global look, which takes into account all the variab les 
relevant to emergency management ( i .e . ,  warning times, how swiftly a 
decision-to-warn is reached and communicated to the public, how quickly 
people respond to warnings, evacuation scenarios, meteorological conditions, 
population density, etc . ) ,  one can begin to question the Army's insouciance 
regarding the possibility of an accident as well as the capacity of communities 
to handle an accident. Where does that leave us? Despite the Army 
engineers' assurances about redundancies (back up systems) built into the 
technology, Perrow's ( 1984) work does give us cause to ponder, to question 
and, ultimately, to hold the Army and the various contractors accountable.? 
7 For an i nteresting discussion of l iabil ity with respect to the CS DP, read, "The 
Issue of Tort Liability and the Acquisition of Emergency Equipment:  Impacts 
on State and Local Governments . ' '  p .  1 9  in Feldman, 1 990, Implications of SARA 
Title III fo r Commun ity-Based Emergency Planning in the U. S. A rmy Chemical 
Stockpile D isposal Program: The A cqu isition of Equ ipment. ORNL/TM- 1 1 3 8 8 .  
Available from the National Technical Information Service,  U .  S .  Department 
of Commerce, 5 285 Port Royal Road, Springfield,  Virgnia 22 1 6 1 . 
2 7 6  
5.9 Summary and Conclusion: 
We have surely not said all that could be said regarding the issue of 
how language and its use supports certain power relationships, nor have we 
fully explored a l l  the multiple interconnecti ons between myths,  
legitimations, and ideologies. Our goal was more modest: (1 )  To show the 
numerous efforts, both institutional and linguistic that infuse the Army's 
CSDP with its peculiar flavor and help to determine the course of its 
acceptance by those who oppose or support its aim; (2) To demonstrate how 
the modern 'state' approaches the problem of legitimizing its prerogatives to 
its citizens; and (3) To illustrate the efficacy of the controls available to the 
state. 
We began this chapter speaking about the third dimension of power 
which involves investigating the various means  through which power 
"influences, shapes or determines conceptions of the necessities, possibilities 
and strategies of challenge" (Gaventa 1 980, p. 15) .  We have examined the 
various myths which help perpetuate the status quo decision of the Army. It 
should be noted that these various mechanisms (myths, legitimations, 
eupemisms of  power) help shape beliefs about the " inevitabililtly" of 
incineration as the only "possible" choice and about the sacredness of " the 
process" as the only proper venue for asking questions. Thus keeping the 
level of dissent well within the bounds acceptable to the Army by portraying 
the issue of the destruction of the weapons as a purely technical problem, 
rather than as an exercise in power. In the next chapter we will take up the 
issue of propaganda and we will further develop some of the ideas touched 
upon in this chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
Propaganda and the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program 
(CSEPP) 
'We cannot assume today that men must in the last resort be governed by their 
own consent. Among the means of power that now prevail is the power to 
manage and manipulate the consent of men. That we do not know the limits of 
such power---and that we hope it does have limits---does not remove the fact 
that much power today is successfully employed without the sanction of reason 
or the conscience of the obedient.' 
C. W. Mills, The Sociological Imagination (pp 40-41). 
6.1  The Third Face of Power--- Propaganda and CSEPP: 
In the previous chapter we presented several examples of what Lukes 
( 1 974) describes as the third dimension of power in the form of myths, 
ideologies and legitimations employed by the Army in defense of its program 
of on-site incineration. Analyses of power often assume that  the absence of 
grievances is evidence of concensus. However, the third dimension of power 
forces us to consider the fact that a concensus can be manipulated . Lukes 
(197 4) asks, 
Is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of 
power to prevent people from having grievances by 
shaping their perceptions,  cognit ions and 
preferences in such a way that they accept their role 
in the existing order of things, either because they 
can see or imagine no other alternative to it, or 
because they see it as natural and unchanageable 
(Lukes 1974, p. 24)?  
In this chapter we will examine exactly how the state attempts to shape 
the perceptions of citizens to suit its own purposes. The Army's attempts to 
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influence how citizens defined the situation did not begin in any formal way 
that one could identify as 'propagandizing' until the c itizen protest 
movement which started in Kentucky began to show appreciable gains at 
other, formerly quiescent sites. Then and only then, did we see the systematic 
development of propaganda on a national scale. It developed in concert with 
the Army's emergency plan known as the Chemical Stockpile Emergency 
Preparedness Program (CSEPP) . 
As the Army's major propagandizing device, CSEPP serves a dual  
purpose: (1 )  complying with the Congressional mandate to carry out the goals 
of the destruction program in keeping with the 'maximum protection of the 
public' (its manifes t  function); and (2) functioning as the major propaganda 
vehicle for the entire destruction program (its latent function --- in the sense 
of a "hidden agenda") .  
We argue that in pursuing its aim to site eight nerve-gas incinerators 
in the continental U. S., the Army has constructed an elaborate propaganda 
campaign. The campaign has several goals: (1)  to enlist the cooperation of 
state and local civil defense personnel and to utilize the infrastructure of 
emergency response as a vehicle for "selling" the states on the program; (2) to 
prop up the Army's prestige and thus its credibility; (3) to make the idea of 
destroying the stockpile by incineration seem inev i tab le ,  i .  e . ,  the only 
sensible thing to do; (4) to create an aura of certainty surrounding "safety ."  
That is, to  establish the idea that the Army, in  cooperation with state and local 
governments, is prepared to handle any catastrophic accident related to the 
destruction of the stockpile. Before returning to the empirical data, we will  
spend some time discussing some of the theoretical  perspectives that have 
examined the phenomena of propaganda in the modern state. 
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6.2 The Nature of Propaganda 
According to Lasswell ( 1950) propaganda consists mainly of political 
symbols manipulated for the control of public opinion . The definition 
requires that symbols be manipulated, that is, specifically introduced for their 
effect on public opinion. As Goebbels said, "We do not talk to say something, 
but to obtain a certain effect" (Goebbels 1935) . As far as definitions are 
concerned, there seems to have been an evolution in the United States . 
From 1920 to 1933 the main emphasis was on the psychological: Propaganda 
consisted of the manipulation of psychological symbols having goals of which 
the lis tener is not conscious . While definitions of propaganda multiplied, 
American authors eventually accepted the definition given by the Institute 
for Propaganda Analysis and inspired by Lasswell: "Propaganda is the 
expression of opinions or actions carried out deliberately by individuals or 
groups with a view to influencing the opinions or actions of other 
individuals or groups for predetermined ends and through psychological 
manipulation" (Ellul 1965, p. xii) .  Lasswell (1950) added that propaganda 
relates only to controversial matters, not to those on which disagreement is 
excluded by the group. He notes that nothing is implied in the definition 
about the properties of the symbols themselves, but only about their function .  
"The symbols may be (and, of course, frequently are) sentimentalized, 
fallacious, irrational and so on" (Lasswell 1950, p .  14) . Finally, Ellul ( 1965) 
agrees with Lasswell 's definition of the goal of propaganda which he says is 
"to maximize the power at home by subordinating groups and individuals, 
while reducing the material cost of power" (Ellul 1965, p. x, footnote) .  
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6 .3 Military Use of Propaganda 
According to Chomsky ( 1991 ) ,  the first  modern government 
propaganda operation began under Woodrow Wilson's administration (1916) 
around the time of the first World War .  The W ilson administration was 
committed to war and had to do something to rouse the generally pacifistic 
citizenry; so it established The Creel Commission---a government propaganda 
commission. Within six months, the Commission succeeded " in turning a 
pacifistic population into a hysterical, war-mongering population which 
wanted to destroy everything German, tear the Germans limb from limb, and 
go to war and save the world" (Chomsky 1991, p.9) . There had already been a 
p ublic relations industry in the United States where such things were 
p ioneered .  "This effort  taught the lesson that state propaganda, when 
supported by the educated classes, and when no deviation is permitted from 
it, can have a b ig effect" (Chomsky 1991, p .  9) .  
The use of public relations men and propaganda techniques on a huge 
scale dates from WWII (Cook 1962).  At that time, the Air Force (then, the Air  
Corps) led the way. The Air Corps, ��thirsted for equal status with the Army 
and Navy; i t  loaded its ranks with publicity men and pulled out all the stops 
in a propaganda campaign to glorify i tself, its generals, its heroes, i ts 
potentialities---bombing alone could bring Germany to her knees" (Cook 1962, 
p. 91 ) .  The pattern set by the Air Corps soon became the pattern for all the 
services. Every service began swelling its ranks with publicity staff devoted to 
the task of seeing that the American public got the correct perspective. "The 
growth of the publicity services as a result was spectacular" (Cook 1962, p. 95) .  
This grandiose propaganda machine perfected by the military, was 
exercised on a grand scale for the first time in the postwar battle over 
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universal military training. Cook (1962) observes, "Its effects were insidious 
and far-reaching and helped to determine to a great degree the pattern of the 
world in which we have lived ever since" (Cook 1 962, p .  97) .  He concludes 
his analysis with this tr�nchant observation: 
In the rabbit warren of the Pentagon, publicity 
branches and bureaus spread in octopus fashion. 
Each was designed to pluck a special nerve 
controlling a segment of public reaction. No media 
that was influential in creating and channeling 
public was overlooked (Cook 1962, p. 94) . 
In more recent times and in conjunction with the Chemical Stockpile 
Destruction Program, the Public Affairs Subcommittee ---part of CSEPP--­
(CSEPP), has taken over this role .  Cook ( 1962) argues that the American 
people have failed to recognize the full impact of the burgeoning propaganda 
mill perpetuated by the military. He avers that it portends nothing less than a 
radical shift in the basis of power in the United States. "The voting booth 
would be retained," he writes, "so would the democratic trappings of our 
society; but, increasingly, all the vital decisions would be influenced and 
predetermined by the uniform---by men whose professional judgment it 
would be positively unpatriotic to question" (Cook 1 962, p. 9 1 ) .  
6.4 Characteristics of Modern Propaganda 
According to Michael Parenti, "The first premise of propaganda in the 
United States is that it doesn't exist, that there is no propaganda from the 
established media and the government and that we have only ' information"' 
(Barsamian Interviews 1 991 ) .  However, Ellul (1965) cautions that we must 
pay close attention to the relationship between ' information' and propaganda 
because propaganda's content increasingly resembles information. Ellul 
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( 1965) argues that " a  surfeit of data, far from permitting people to make 
judgments and form opinions, prevents them from doing so and actually 
paralyzes them . . .  Thus the mechanisms of modern information induce a 
sort of hypnosis in the individual, who cannot get out of the field that has 
been laid for him" (Ellul 1965, p .  87). Furthermore, propaganda operates all 
the time, and its major dedication is to avoid  any kind of confrontation 
regarding class struggle in the United States. Peterson ( 1992) observes that, 
"One of the goals of ruling class propaganda is to deny that  i t's class 
controlled" (p. 82) . As Marx and Engles pointed out, they (the power holders) 
take their class interest and always try to represent it as the general interest. 
In the milieu of the technological society, Ellul (1973) argues that propaganda 
is simply the means used to prevent the State's prerogatives from being felt as 
too oppressive and to make people consent willingly with its world view. 
6 .5 Ellul's Propaganda Model: The State's Necessity 
Jacques Ellul (1965) has fashioned a view of propaganda and a method 
of analysis that goes far beyond the conventional understandings on the 
subject. It is to Ellul's model that we now turn. He states that, "Propaganda is 
c al led upon to solve problems created by technology, to play on 
maladjustment's, and to integrate the individual into a technological world" 
(Ellul 1965, p. xvii ) .  He maintains that propaganda is the Siamese twin of 
technological society. In his opinion, propaganda is needed for the exercise of 
power simply because the masses have come to participate in political affairs. 
"In order for propaganda to be so far-ranging," he writes," it must correspond 
to a nee d .  The state has that need" (Ellul 1965, p. 121 ) .  Unlike other writers 
on the subject, he prefers not to give a definition. "I consider it more useful," 
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he says, "to proceed with the analysis of the characteristics of propaganda as 
an existing sociological phenomenon" (Ellul 1965, p .. xii ) .  He flatly rejects as 
unrealistic all laboratory experiments that have been conducted with small 
groups to gauge the effectiveness of propaganda,  noting that propaganda is a 
unique phenomenon that results, " from the totality of forces pressing in 
upon an individual in his society, and therefore cannot be duplicated in a test 
tube" (Ellul 1965, p .  vii), or as Henri Poincare once said, "It is the scale that 
makes the phenomena . ' '  
Ellul ( 1965) argues that even Democratic regimes are driven into using 
propaganda because of the external challenges they face. In fact, he observes 
that the democratic State, precisely because it believes in the expression of 
public opinion and does not gag it ,  must channel and shape it. Furthermore, 
in a democracy, citizens must be tied to the decisions of the government. 
"This is the great role propaganda must perform," he writes. " It must give 
the people the feeling---which they crave and which satisfies them---to have 
wanted what the government is doing, to be responsible for its actions, to be 
involved in defending them and making them succeed, to be 'with it'" (Ellul 
1965, p 126) . In the case of the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program, the U. S. 
Army is subject to external pressures from Congress, U. S. international treaty 
obligations, industry lobbyists, numerous government regulatory agencies, 
and residents of the communities in question. 
Ellul (1965) observes that, "Propaganda must be seen as situated at the 
center of the growing powers of the State and governmental administrative 
techniques" (p. xvii) .  Many people erroneously believe that it is the kind of 
state that makes the effects of propaganda harmful. To this assumption, he 
counters that this inherently pernicious process has the same effects when 
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practiced by a totalitarian regime or an allegedly democratic one. He argues 
that propaganda renders the exercise of true democracy nearly impossible. 
Propaganda as a phenomenon is essentially the same, he writes, whether 
practiced in China or the former Soviet Union or the United States or, for 
that matter, Algeria.  He includes the newly-formed Public and Human 
Relations domain among the four areas that broadly cover the concept of 
propaganda. Others areas include purely psychological action, re-education 
and brainwashing, and psychological warfare. Although "disinformation" 
has also been mentioned as a component of propaganda, this is misleading in 
that, strictly-speaking, Ellul 's model eschews the view that propaganda is 
concerned with disseminating lies or deliberate falsehoods .  Rather, 
propaganda is concerned with truth, albeit a very circumscribed truth---half­
truth, truth out of context. He notes that propagandists agree that lies must 
not be told excep t those that are completely unverifiable. For example, 
Goebbel's could lie about the successes achieved by German U-boats because 
only the captain of the U-boat knew if he had sunk a ship or not. (Ellul 1965, 
p .  55 footnote) .  Similarly, the Army cou ld lie about the exact size of the 
unitary weapons ' stockpile because this information is class ified . Thus he 
writes, "Falsehood bearing on fact is neither entirely useless nor to be strictly 
avoided . Nevertheless, bear in mind that it is increasingly rare" (Ellul 1965, p .  
55). 
El lul  points out that social sc ience has greatly enhanced the 
effectiveness and scope of propaganda. In fact, he argues that propaganda in 
the modern world would not be possible without it. "Without the scientific 
research of modern psychology and sociology," he writes, "there would be no 
propaganda, or rather we would still be in the primitive stages of propaganda 
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that existed in the time of Pericles or Augustus" (Ellul 1965, p .  4) . In fact he 
argues that Propagandists will inevitably have a better idea of how to utilize 
the fruits of these sciences than many practitioners. The Propagandist must 
first of all know the terrain on which he is operating. He must be able to 
gauge the current trends in public opinion, and he must tailor the message to 
the type of audience to be reached . To this end, survey research, demography 
and even the skills of qualitative field research can serve the Propgandist. 
We wish to clarify at the outset our use of the term "Propagandist." In 
using this term, we do not wish to convey the idea that propaganda is the 
work of one individual. Rather, we are referring primarily to organizations 
that make propaganda ---not to individuals. A man standing on a street 
corner passing out leaflets containing his own opinion about a subject is n o t  
disributing propaganda. Organization is the sine qua non of Propaganda in 
Ellul 's model, and the Army's vast bureaucratic network financed by the 
Pentagon has the necessary infrastructure to sustain such an enterprise. 
Because the Army's Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program 
(CSEPP) involves three tiers of government (federal, state and local), it is 
perfectly poised to orchestrate an effective propaganda campaign on behalf of 
the CSDP that is capable of reaching a very wide and diverse group of 
potentially-affected parties and also quite capable of sustaining itself over 
time. 
Ellul (1965) argues that propaganda has the following characteristics: (1)  
Propaganda is sociological as opposed to merely psychological in character; (2) 
Propaganda deals with simplification and repetition; (3) Propaganda is 
d ialectical in nature and it must change according to circumstances; (4) 
Propaganda must be total. It must use every means available. (i .e., it is not 
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limited to the media as is the general conception); (5) Propaganda does not 
tolerate discussion. With respect to the latter, Ellul ( 1965) has argued that 
propaganda ceases when real dialogue begins. The following section presents 
a brief discursus on Ellul's  characterization of modern forms of propaganda.  
(1 )  Propaganda is sociological : 
It  is with respect to Ellul 's  ( 1965) insistence that propaganda is 
sociological in nature that, in our opinion, d istinguishes Ellul's model from 
others. Rather than look at the discrete actions of either the propagandist or 
the propagandee (who is assumed to be a pass ive receptor) Ellul directs our 
attention to the interactive nature of the process and views it more as 
dialectic rather than as a one-way, top-down imposition of information . As 
Ellul (1965) describes it, the situation is actually the reverse of what we have 
come to believe. "There is not just a wicked propagandist at work," he writes, 
"who sets up means to ensnare the innocent citizen. Rather, there is a citizen 
who craves propaganda from the bottom of his being and the propagandist 
who responds  to this craving" (Ellul 1 965, p. 1 2 1 ) .  This perspective 
underscores his position regarding the sociological character of modern 
propaganda. For the individual, confronted with a dilemma throws himself 
in the direction of a propaganda that justifies him and thus eliminates one of 
the sources of his anxiety. 
(2) Propaganda involves s implifica t ion  and repet i tion : :  
Ellul states, "Propaganda dissolves contradictions and restores to man a 
unitary world in which the demands are in accord with the facts" (Ellul 1965, 
p. 159) . This effect is achieved through the twin processes of s impl ifica t ion ,  
and repetition---two of  the characteristic processes o f  propaganda.  These are 
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particularly salient concepts when analyzing the stockpile disposal program, 
which presents the penultimate politico / technological conundrum . Ellul 
( 1965) writes: 
Without simplification, no public opinion can exist 
anyway; the more complex problems, judgments, 
and criteria are, the more diffuse opinion will be.  
Nuances and gradations prevent public opinion 
from forming; the more complicated it is, the 
longer it takes to assume solid shape. But in the 
case of such diffusion, propaganda intervenes with 
a force of simplification (Ellul 1965, p. 205) .  
Answers to problems become clear-cut, black and white (i .e . ,  the Army 
says, "The stockpile is deteriorating and needs to be destroyed; "incineration is 
a safe proven technology," etc . ) .  Thus, citizens facing the information 
overload presented by the complexities of the Chemical Stockpile Disposal 
Program are already predisposed to search for a ready anchor, and that anchor 
the Army is only too happy to supply in the form of its emergency 
preparedness program, i .  e., CSEPP. Repetition figures prominently in this 
process as an aid to solidify positions after they have been articulated . 
Because propaganda is a slow, continuous process, not a "quick fix," repetition 
becomes an important element in keeping the "correct" line in full view. 
(3) Propaganda is d ialectical in nature: 
The dialectical nature of propaganda also assumes that it must remain 
flexible and demonstrate an ability to change. Two examples drawn from the 
empirical data will serve to illustrate this point. First, we can see a marked 
contrast in the content of the Army's propaganda of the fifties and that of the 
eighties and nineties with regard to protection of the public from toxic 
chemicals. Early efforts were directed at showing off the various protective 
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apparatus designed to protect civilians from chemical warfare attack.  For 
example, the U. S. Army Chemical Corps and the Office of Civil Defense 
Mobilization developed a gas mask constructed to resemble Mickey Mouse for 
children, which was displayed at the Andrews Air Force Base 1959 Armed 
Forces Day celebration (See Appendix E). More recently, Army propaganda 
excludes any mention of protective gear, e.g., you will not see the baby bubble 
for infants (see Fig. C3, p .  C-14 in Rogers 1990), or the protective j acket and 
hood for child ren (see Fig. C2, p .  C-12, in Rogers 1990) .  Current Army 
propaganda dwells almost exclusively on the safety of the process, the 
unlikeliness of an accident and the excellence of their emergency 
management plan, while all the time they may be glossing over a potentially 
even greater danger. 
Additionally, Army rhetoric changed over the years in response to 
public opposition. At the early public meetings ( 1984) held to discuss the 
program, there was a great deal of talk about the "technical" aspects of the 
incineration process in the belief that "a little knowledge is a dangerous 
thing." The Army sponsored tours to their prototype facility in which they 
flooded participants with information regarding the technical aspects of the 
incineration process. However, realizing that this was not succeeding in 
quieting the opposition (in some ways it fed the fires of their skepticism),  they 
changed the focus of their discourse away from the technical aspects per se to 
the emergency preparedness program itself as t he  "fail-safe" back up 
mechanism. 
However, the dialectical nature of propaganda can be seen most clearly 
in the Army's response to the citizens in Maryland when in April of 1992, the 
Kent County Board of Commissioners published an anti-incineration 
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statement and divorced themselves and the county from CSEPP. They 
refused to accept federal (FEMA) money for enhanced emergency 
management related to the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness 
Program (CSEPP) .  A statement given to the Army from the Kent County 
group read: "We cannot, in good conscience and practice, continue to accept 
grant funds for a planning program that we believe is indirectly tied to, and 
coincides with, the Federal government 's plan to construct a chemical 
weapons incinerator at APG" (CSEPP Upda te: May /June 1 992, p .  4) . The 
Army countered by saying that, "Maryland CSEPP is needed because of the 
threat that exists due to the presence of an aging chemical agent stockpile at 
APG. The means by which the stockpile is ultimately destroyed does not 
guide the Maryland CSEPP and it never will" (CSEPP Update, May /June 1992, 
p. 4). Citizens dispute the fact that CSEPP is not directly tied to incineration. 
Members of the Kent County group argue that the Army did nothing to 
mitigate the risk posed to the community by the presence of the chemical 
weapons prior to the disposal program. They like to point out that the cost of 
mitigating the risk of continued storage of the weapons would be far, far less 
than building a half a billion dollar incinerator facility. 
A footnote to this episode has to do with the context for the opposition 
in Kent County, Md . Kent County has a population of about 1 7,000. There 
are 8,000 registered voters . In April 1992, 7000 persons from Kent County, 
Maryland signed a petition against the Army's on-site incineration plan for 
that site (APG) citing concerns such as the potential long-term health effects 
and the continued use of the incinerator. 
The Army concluded from this experience that they had learned a 
" lesson" and that lesson resulted in their changing their approach. 
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"Maryland learned a difficult lesson," an Army directive lamented, "If we are 
to take a proactive emergency management message to the citizens, it must be 
generic emergency management and in no way linked to destruction of 
chemical weapons" (CSEPP Update: May /June 1992, p .  4 ) .  The dilemma over 
Kent County's recalcitrance caused the Army to do some soul-searching. 
Quickly on the heels of this experience, the Army Public Affairs Office at the 
Pentagon instituted sweeping changes in the way the Army presented 
emergency management materials (and thus the entire stockpile destruction 
program) to state and local emergency responders . Some of the changes the 
Army recommended include the following: 
All reference to CSEPP logo will be deleted from all 
public information documents . They 've been 
selling people on the idea that CSEPP was just part 
of your regular, normal emergency preparedness 
program; the logo draws attention to the fact that 
CSEPP is separate and related specifically to the 
nerve-gas issue which the Army wishes to 
downplay for obvious reasons. (Field Notes: ORNL, 
July 13, 1992) .  
By July of 1992, however, Kent County was back in the program. What 
caused this radical about-face in the space of only two months? According to 
two informants, it was money --- lots of money. The money offered to the 
community jumped from $50,00 to $450,000. "It was hard for them to hold 
out," one informant said. The Army said something like, "We'll buy buses, 
radios, etc ." For a poor rural community, this kind of money was difficult to 
turn down. Because the Army's emergency plan for Aberdeen Proving 
Ground centered largely on evacuation, Kent County, would need buses with 
which to evacuate its citizenry. However, there were conditions placed upon 
the Army when Kent County finally capitulated.  They insisted that the 
2 9 1 
Army's on-site emergency management staff person desist from engaging in 
any public relations activities concerning the proposed incinerator. 
4) Propaganda is total: 
Although scholars such as Gitlin (1980) and Chomsky (1988; 1991 )  have 
contributed greatly to our understanding of modern propaganda techniques 
by analyzing how the mass media is used as a propaganda vehicle, mass 
media are only one part of propaganda.  Ellul (1965) argues that propaganda 
must be total, in the sense that every means available must be used. Ellul 
(1965) writes that "the Propagandist must utilize all of the technical means at 
his disposal---the press, radio, TV, movies, posters, meetings, door-to-door 
canvasing" (Ellul 1965, p. 9). Because, he agues, there is no propaganda as 
long as one makes use of, in sporadic and random fashion, a newspaper 
article here, a poster or a radio program there . . .  Each usable medium has its 
own particular way of penetration" (Ellul 1965, p.  10) .  He contends that, "the 
very fact that the effectiveness of each medium is limited to one particular 
area clearly shows the necessity of complimenting it with other media" (Ellul 
1965, p. 10). 
The aim of the propagandist is to get as much saturation as possible to 
several discrete audiences; therefore, a mix of methods, strategies and 
techniques must be available. These may include movies, T .  V., radio 
programs, interviews, appearances on talk shows, posters, flyers, news 
briefings, conferences, scoping meetings, door-to-door canvassing, feature 
articles in newspapers, Letters to the Editor, etc. Ellul ( 1965) writes that, 
"propaganda tries to surround man by all possible routes" (p . 1 1 ) .  The Army 
has utilized all the above-mentioned methods---and then some--- in getting 
its message across. 
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To begin with, the Army's CSEPP Update (the newsletter sponsored by 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and distributed widely 
to interested parties) contains a wealth of information on the Army's vast 
p ropaganda machine related to the Chemical Stockpile Emergency 
Preparedness Program (CSEPP) .  There is a regularly featured Public Affairs 
segment called, SUBCOMMITTEE HIGHLIGHTS, which reports on the latest 
media event or project related to Public "Education ."  For example, the 
May /June 1 992 issue talks about a Communications Workshop that was part 
of a national conference. Numerous other public relations efforts are also 
mentioned. The editor reports that, "Expected to be competed by press time is 
the emergency management calendar materials for local reproduction; The 
Public Officials briefing materials have been sent into the field; Several States 
have requested assistance in public affairs plan development; Work is 
continuing on a national video and citizens ' brochure" (CSEPP Update, 
May /June 1992, p 4). Another issue of CSEPP Update reports that "Successful 
Media Interviews" a primer on media relations for non-public affa irs 
professionals, was distributed at both the National Conference (June 1 -4, 1992, 
Huntsville, AL) and the Public Affairs Conference . "Other products in the 
pipeline," the editor boasts, "include the CSEPP Orientation brochure for the 
general public and press kits. In addition, the 'PIO Handbook,' a manual for 
public affairs professionals involved in CSEPP was distributed in September" 
(CSEPP Update, p. 1 1 ) .  
Evidence of  an intensive campaign, which coincides with E llul's ( 1965) 
conception of propaganda as "total," is buried in one of the government 
planning documents prepared by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in 
support of the Army's plan to install alert and notification systems (i. e . ,  
2 9 3  
warning sirens, etc . )  at the various stockpile sites . The document entitled, 
"Guidelines for Conducting Public Affairs Activities in Support of Alert and 
Notification System Development, Installation and Operation" (FEMA, Final 
Interim Guidance, September 7, 1991 ) .  The document represents a massive 
public education effort to prepare people for the inev itabi li ty of on-site 
incineration and falls squarely into the category of the third dimension of 
power. 
The Introduction to this report begins: "An aggressive public education 
campaign is an essential ingredient of the CSEPP alert and Notification 
system if the public is to understand and accept it" (p. 2) . Ellul (1965) discusses 
the importance of public education as a form of 'pre-propaganda . '  "The 
conditioning of minds with vast amounts of information already dispensed 
for ulterior purposes and posing as "facts" and as "education" (Ellul 1965, p .  
vi) . In  line with Ellul's (1965) contention regarding the role of  "education" in 
the preparing the way for propaganda, the Army report states that, "Pre­
emergency public education must complement and support other elements of 
the community's emergency preparedness program" (FEMA, Final Interim 
Report, September 7, 1991 ,  p. 3) .  
Given Ellul's (1965) assertions that propaganda must be to tal, the report 
is m a sense a b lueprint for the Army's propaganda campaign for the 
Chemical Stockpile Disposal  Program. The report identifies various segments 
(i .e. ,  target populations) and outlines very specific methods and strategies for 
reaching these audiences. The report is broken down into several parts each 
dealing with a specific topic area, e .  g . ,  Goals, Assumptions, Basic Vs .  
Enhanced Public Affairs Activities, Operational Concepts, Identification of 
Information to be Presented,  Identification of Media, and then of course, 
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Standards . Finally, and in concert with Ellul 's  ( 1965) formulation that 
propaganda seeks to tailor its message to discrete audiences, we read :  "The 
public education materials (brochures, television and radio spots, newspaper 
ads, public presentations, etc . )  must be designed and disseminated to target 
audiences" (FEMA, Final Interim Guidance,1991,  p. 4). 
Under the BASIC Public Affairs Activities, the following topic areas are 
listed: Army briefings; prepared news releases; attendance at media editorial 
board meetings; establishing a dedicated telephone line to receive public 
inquiries; establishing, maintaining and using mailing lists of persons with 
expressed interest in CSEPP; establishing information depositories for Alert & 
Notification /CSEPP program materials; drafting and issuing radio / TV public 
service announcements; preparing and distributing information for special 
needs populations; developing and using RTQ (Response-To-Query), 1 .e . ,  
questions and answers regarding Alert & Notification issues. 
Enhanced Public Affairs Activities include: developing materials to be 
included in local school curriculum; establishing and operating speakers 
bureaus; conducting community involvement activities (e. g., calendar art 
competition, mall demonstrations, county fair exhib its) ;  developing 
promotional items for dis tribution at community fairs, malls, meetings; 
conducting specialized briefings for targeted opinion leader groups (e .g . ,  
medical, legal, political, educational, religious, agricultural, etc . )  (FEMA: Final 
Interim Guidance: 1991,  p .13) .  The Army will argue that this massive Public 
Education plan is necessary and that it has nothing to do with incineration; 
however, adding the tag, "in support of Alert and Notification" in no way 
changes the hidden agenda for this program, which we argue is purely Public 
Relations designed to serve as a propaganda launching pad for the Army's 
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on-site incineration decision. As has been stated elsewhere, the Army's claim 
about the fragility of the stockpile has been greatly exaggerated. We know, for 
example, that at least at the Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot (LBAD) the 
stockpile has been certified stable for at least 25 years. The claim that this 
mammoth public education effort is simply to secure Alert and Notification 
systems is spurious. 
6.6 Army Propaganda Pieces 
While the above-mentioned documents outline only a plan, the 
following sections will describe actually existing materials that are part and 
parcel of the Army's Public Affairs "project . "  In keeping with Ellul' s ( 1965) 
dictum that propaganda must "surround man by every possible means," the 
following information is a chilling reminder of the vast resources available to 
the military to influence the public (FEMA: 1989-1992, A Proposal) .  
6 .6 .1  CSEPP Calendar 
Of all the glossy four-color process "info" p1eces the Army has 
developed for general consumption regarding the stockpile disposal program, 
none produced quite the stir among opponents of the CSDP as the 1992-1993 
Mad ison County Emergency Preparedness Calendar .  The calend ar ,  
d istributed to  citizens of  the Berea /Richmond area at  the site of the 
Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot, caused quite a stir. The calendar itself is a 
visual delight, drawing cleverly on Berea 's rich cultural traditions with 
gorgeous photographs of bucolic countryside, historic buildings, and lush 
flora . The inside cover contains maps and evacuation information and 
explains the various protective action zones, which are part of the grand 
2 9 6  
emergency preparedness plan. It also contains a glossary of terms, a drawing 
depicting the location of the new Emergency Operations Center (the "E-0-C") 
and a space on the inside cover to write in your own personal evacuation 
plan. The evacuation plan itself has been the center of intense debate among 
citizen opponents and seeing this piece cleverly d istributed to area residents 
rankled even the most tacit observers of the program. Again, there is no way 
to evaluate the impression this calendar made in establishing the legitimacy 
of the CSDP. But recalling Ellul's (1965) dictum that propaganda must be total 
and must use every means available, the calendar is but one small example of 
the resources available to influence the population. Because the Lexington 
Bluegrass Army Depot was the site of the most intense opposition, a CSEPP 
calendar could be viewed as an easy way to soft-peddle the on-site 
incineration program to the unwary citizens of Madison County; but the 
calendar itself, does not constitute Propaganda; it is only a small piece of the 
p1e. 
6.6.2 "SRFX-91"- The Video 
"SRFX-91 "refers to the Army's training exercise, which was held in 
Tooele, Utah during the week of June 10-14, 1991 at the Tooele Army Depot. 
The exercise was designed to train the emergency managers and technical 
teams that would respond to an accident involving military chemical agents . 
This exercise was the seventh in a series of annual exercises held at Army 
depots across the country. SRFX-91 ,  which stands for "Service Force Response 
Exercise," served as a pilot exercise for CSEPP, the Army's grandiose 
emergency preparedness plan. According to an issue of CSEPP Update, "The 
exercise included play by the State of Utah and Tooele County, Utah County, 
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and Salt Lake City, including the activation of their respective emergency 
operations centers . Exercise activity also took place at local care centers, 
medical facilities, and traffic control points to evaluate protective actions 
taken in communities near the depot" (CSEPP Update: September / October 
1991, p .  10) .  
In March of 1992, the Army released a video documentary on the 
exercise entitled, "SRFX-91 :  The Community Response." The video which 
la sts about 30 minutes, opens with a panoramic view of the areas 
surrounding the Tooele Army Depot (Tooele, Utah) and features the sounds 
of birds chirping prominently in the background . An Army's newsletter in 
describing the video boasts: "The finished product employs animated maps 
and other special effects as well as music and sound effects created 
electronically in the editing room" (CSEPP Update: February /March 1 992, p. 
1 ) .  
The exercise was designed to test the meta l o f  emergency responders in 
the area . However, the staged accident involved only mustard agent (Bear in 
mind that 42% of the stockpile is stored at Tooele, most of it is nerve gas) .  
From what we could see, there was only one fatality. There was hardly 
enough drama to merit the hyperbole regarding the success of the exercise 
which emenated from the Pentagon. Additionally, there was no clock in the 
picture so one really doesn't get any information about elapsed time into the 
incident, which would be very useful information. But the most disturbing 
thing about the video, from the position of those who oppose the incinerator 
complex, is the portrayal of protesters outside the depot fence. Opponents 
were presented as "hippies" clad in bell-bottom blue jeans and carrying signs 
(Certainly not the profile of citizens who comprise the opposition 
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movement.)  And, of course, these were OUTSIDE the depot fence. There 
isn't even a hint of the massive military presence that is waiting in reserve, 
aside from warning signs on depot fences that advertise "Use of Maximum 
Force Allowed-Keep Out." And, of course, there was the typical interview of 
the "innocent by-stander" who says that he/she believes the weapons must be 
destroyed and that incineration is the way to go. Copies of this video were 
d istributed to FEMA regions and CSEPP states. Copies were also made 
available to local governments. 
6.6.3 Videos for the General Public 
While the training video described above deals with a fairly specific, 
delimited area of the Army's overall emergency preparedness program, i .  e. ,  
that of training experts to deal with a potential crisis, Army Public Affairs 
persons have been busy devising other types of videos intended for viewing 
by the general public. For example, CSEPP staff in Harford County, Maryland 
planned to introduce a video entitled, "Partners in Preparedness" to all high 
schools, middle schools, and 4th and 5th elementary school grades, as well as 
private and parochial schools (CSEPP Update: October/November 1993, p. 1 ) .  
In  addition, the Army plans to  use the video in presentations to  clubs and 
associations, for example, Lions C lubs, Kiwanis Clubs, and the Harford 
County chapter of the Association of Retired Persons. Harford County also 
plans to provide a copy of the video to cable television stations as well as the 
1 1  branches of the public l ibrary. CSEPP Update reports that copies of the 
video were shipped to each CSEPP state (CSEPP Update: October /November 
1993). 
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6.7 The Mass Media 
Despite the media blitz that surrounded the issue of chemical weapons 
during The Gulf War, and considering its international ramifications, the 
destruction of the U. S. stockpile of unitary chemical weapons has received 
surprisingly little attention from the press. Except for a few notable 
exceptions, the national media (especially print media) has virtually ignored 
the topic of the nerve-gas controversy---the entire chemical weapons disposal 
program has fallen into a black hole of sorts. When the national print media 
has dealt with the subject, it has framed the subject as a NIMBY ("Not-In-My­
backyard"--- a strictly local phenomenon); they tend to parrot the Army's 
imperatives about the necessity for destroying the stockpile. Whether this is 
by accident or design, the fact remains that the CSDP controvery has been 
largely ignored by the mainstream press (and, we might add, the alternative 
press as well) .  The Army has shied away from employing the media as its 
principal public education vehicle, although as noted previously, the Army 
Public Affairs Office at the Pentagon has prepared a handbook for use by 
Army professionals on how to deal with the media. The Army's posture vis­
a-vis the press with regards to the CSDP appears to be one of maintaining a 
low profile . Opponents of the Army's plan lament this lack of attention 
arguing that reporters are ignoring what could be a Pulitzer Prize-winning 
story. As the co-founder of Concerned Citizens of Mad ison County 
commented, "This is the greatest David and Goliath story ever! "  Some of the 
notable exceptions include stories in The Washington Post and The New 
York Times (e. g., The Washington Pos t, May 8,  1 986. "Maryland Officials 
Prob ing  Aberdeen Che m i c a l  Disposa l ;  " The  New York Times 
INTERNATIONAL, Tuesday, October 31 ,  1989 "An Oratory Fades, Obstacles to 
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Chemical Arms Pact Multiply.") Articles have also appeared in The Chicago 
Tribune, USA Today, Tlze LA Times and the Savannah Tribune  according to 
citizen activists . 
However, the local papers at the Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot site 
(Kentucky) have been fairly good about keeping the issue before the public 
and representing the community's views fairly, with the possible exception of 
the Lexington-Herald Leader , which, according to activists, has been guilty of 
such things as under-reporting the number of people attending scoping 
meetings, not returning telephone calls, etc . The four local newspapers in 
the Berea / Richmond area include:  The Berea Ci t izen ,  The R ichmond  
R egis ter ,  The Lexington Herald Leader and The Courier Joumal .  Between 
them they published no less than sixty-four articles in 1 984 alone on the 
nerve gas issue--- more than one per week. By 1986, when a Congressional 
Hearing took place in Richmond, that number jumped to 220! Coverage has 
since tapered off considerably. However, there are still items in the paper at 
least bimonthly. (A sampling of headlines from the year 1 984 appears in 
Appendix G-2). 
Asked about their opinion of the media, citizens at LBAD believe that 
the media has helped. One activist commented, "They {i .e . ,  the local press ) 
have tried very hard to maintain objectivity. They always present the Army's 
point of view later---an editorial debate of sorts. In their reporting, they try to 
give both sides." According to this informant, "National news tends to be 
more objective---non-interested parties. They are not so educated on the 
issues as the local press. They don't have the breadth." However, all in all, 
activists feel the media has been a boon to the opposition. Another activist 
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from LBAD commented, "The media has been all important. . . What 
brought every single political person was the media (i .e . ,  the local papers) ." 
Opponents of the Army's plan at other sites, however, paint a different 
picture of the role of the local media. Although we only have detailed 
information about the role of the media at LBAD, anecdotal information 
points to the fact that Kentucky's local press differs markedly from the local 
press coverage at other sites, which have more in common with the press 
coverage at Aberdeen Proving Ground (Maryland) ,  where the local press 
seems to favor the Army. Activists at APG report that the local media was, 
"very cool, very conservative, very much in favor of the Army. Sometimes 
they try to be objective, but it always seems slanted towards the Army ." The 
founder of Concerned Citizens for Maryland 's Environment observed that, 
" reporters usual ly accept the Army' s  definition of the situ at ion 
unquestionably when they say that continued storage is more dangerous than 
incineration ."  Nevertheless, there was once a good piece in the Bal t imore 
S u n  , and apparently the Evansville, Indiana newspaper did a scathing piece 
on emergency response in 1993 (CWWG Newsletter, March 3, 1993) . Beca use 
these three sites : Kentucky, Maryland and Indiana have the most well­
organized and vocal opposition movement, there is obviously some 
connection between level of mobilization and the media, at least at the local 
level. The exact nature of the dynamic is not well understood,  but it may 
have something to do with social network ties ( i .e . ,  reporters ties to the 
community) or with the proa ctive attempt by activists to educate the media 
about the issues . 
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6.7.1 Broadcast Media 
Although largely marginalized by the mainstream press, the nerve gas 
issue has been picked up by the broadcast media. Several major networks 
have picked up the story during the ten years that the controversy has 
ensued. The most famous of these, of course, is the segment done by CBS's 
"60 Minu tes" news program which aired on January 5, 1992. The segment 
was called, "Time Bombs," and disappointingly, but not surprisingly, the 
segment regurgitated the Army's line about the d angers posed by the 
deteriorating weapons (hence the name Time Bombs)---specifical ly referring 
to the M55 rockets which are stored at LBAD. Although the television crew 
impressed activists at LBAD with their thoroughness, the program does leave 
one with the impression of the urgency attached to the demilitarization of the 
weapon. Again, this emphasis supports the Army's point of view. 
In the early days of the controversy (November 29, 1984), CBS filmed a 
panel discussion featuring depot representatives (i .  e . ,  Army experts) and 
members of the Madison County Concerned Citizens group. Activists were 
interviewed by a "CBS Good Morning" crew including reporter Robert 
Pierpoint. On November 21 ,  of that same year, the nerve gas issue was 
discussed on "ABC /TV Good Morning America." In 1991 ,  Sebia Hawkins of 
G reenpeace Pacific C ampaign appeared on a PBS television show c alled, 
"America 's Defense Monitor," which originates in Washington, D.  C .  on 
station WHMM (Channel 32). In addition, Greenpeace has produced its own 
video on the chemical weapons controversy called, "Scrapping Chemical  
Weapons . "  
Overall, the media has not played a dramatic role in the Army's 
propaganda effort for the disposal program. Instead, they have placed heavy 
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emphasis on the Public Affairs function of CSEPP and, as we have stated 
elsewhere, CSEPP is perfectly poised to carry out this leading role. 
6.8. The Committee for National Security (CNS) 
In 1992, eight years after this controversy first began, a new entity 
entered the fray in the form of "The Committee for National Security," also 
known as CNS. CNS was created in 1981 as a direct reaction to the election of 
Ronald Reagan. It was started by Paul Warnke, an Arms Control negotiator 
in the Carter Cabinet. (Paul Warnke was head of the American delegation to 
S.A.L.T. when Carter was President. )  CNS is staffed by retired military and 
government officials interested in Arms Control issues. It is based m 
Washington, D .  C . ,  and was started with foundation money . A 
knowledgeable source said, "They got together a few hundred thousand 
dollars { they were all well-connected} .  Founders are all members of ' the 
power elite ." '  A CNS Newsletter boasts: "CNS is made up of over one 
hundred men and women who are experts in various aspects of arms control 
and other national security issues" (CNS Newsletter, no date, p. 4) .  
6 .8 .1 Horizontal Propaganda 
CNS represents a new form of propaganda, which Ellul ( 1965) describes 
as horizon tal propaganda because it is made inside the group (not from the 
top) .  It involves using knowledge of group dynamics and human relations to 
overcome opposition and build consensus; its locus is the small group setting. 
It is a form of in tegration (as opposed to agitation ) propaganda.  Ellul (1965) 
argues that horizontal propaganda is very hard to make particularly because it 
requires so many instructors---but it is exceptionally efficient. "It is peculiarly 
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a system that seems to coincide perfectly with egalitarian societies claiming to 
be based on the will of the people and calling themselves democratic: each 
group is composed of persons who are alike, and one actually can formulate 
the will of such a group" (Ellul 1965, p .  84) .  "Progress is slow," Ellul ( 1965) 
writes, " there must be many meetings, each recalling the events of the 
preceding one, so that a common experience can be shared" (p. 81 ) .  According 
to Ellul ( 1965) each individual helps to form the opinion of the group, but the 
group helps each individual to discover the correct line. "For miraculously, 
it is always the correct line, the anticipated solution, the 'proper' convictions 
which are eventually discovered" (Ellul 1965, p. 81 ) .  All the participants are 
placed on an equal footing, meetings are intimate, discussion is informal, and 
no leader presides. (In Project Victory's mediated dialogues, leaders are 
replaced by facilitators .  ) Now let us return to the empirical data and analyze 
how this form of propaganda fits into the Chemical Stockpile Disposal 
Program. 
6.8.2 Project Victory 
Project  Victory is but one undertaking of the Committee for National 
Security (CNS). It is a California-based "educational" organization that offers 
workshops on conflict resolution and conducts dialogues on controversial 
public issues. The Executive Director says he was approached by the Director 
of the Committee for National Security (CNS) John Parachini, who had 
obtained a $10,000 Ford Foundation Grant to conduct research concerning the 
stockpile destruction controversy. CNS turned to Project Victory because of 
its interest in conflict resolution techniques . The Executive Director agreed to 
become involved in the chemical disposal controversy, and his first 
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assignment was to conduct a survey of the communities adjacent to the 
stockpile sites . 
On the subject of the chemical weapons controversy, one informant 
said, "We take no position. We're not pushing incineration. We just want to 
help people work together more effectively." They reiterated their neutrality 
at the first meeting, at which time the Executive Director stressed that he was 
not working for the government, that he was independent from the 
government, and that they existed solely to conduct meetings in 
communities with knowledgeable people from both sides.  They were 
neutral .  "As far as we could tell," commented one participant, "they were."  
However, we find CNS's claim to neutrality suspect. As Schattschneider 
( 1975) points out, "It must be assumed that every change in the number of 
particip ants is abou t something; that newcomers have symp a thies or 
antipathies that make it possible to involve them. "By definition, t h e  
in terven ing bystanders are not neutral" (Schattschneider 1975, p .  4) .  
Project Victory's executive director has the squirrelly enthusiasm of a 
salesman who can't stop talking about his product because he truly believes 
in it; however, what he and his organization are really selling is sham 
democracy couched in the rhetoric of inclus iveness and c i tizen 
empowerment. Project Victory 's rhetoric is flamboyantly "democratic" but 
driven by narrow speical interests. It is part of the new style of democracy 
which emanates from "K" street in Washington---the seat of public relations 
firms and "spin doctors" who utilize artfully constructed "opinion polls" and 
can corral experts at a moment's notice to support any particular position. 
The latest trend to emerge from this milieux are groups devoted to correct 
situations where citizens put up roadblocks to what they consider to be 
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undesirable governmental or corporate projects. "Mediation" techniques are 
fast becoming the new religion. 
Ellul (1965) argues that the aim of modern propaganda is not to change 
ideas but to provoke action---to obtain an or thopraxy .  The action that 
propaganda seeks is not individual but collective. One must be mobilized 
within the context of one's peers. The goal of collective action is the reason 
why Ellul ( 1965) sees organiza tion as fundamental to propaganda, precisely 
because "without organization, psychological excitement leads to excess and 
deviation of action in the very course of its development" (Ellul 1 965, p .29) . 
Thus action must be integrated within the confines of a group. According to 
Ellul (1965) propaganda is not basically interested in determining the truth or 
falsity of dogmas, " it seeks instead, to unite within itself as many individuals 
as possible, to mobilize them, and to transform them into active militants in 
the service of an orthopraxy" (Ellul 1965, p .  97). 
The idea of praxis (action) is central to Ellul 's  model, and indeed, 
Project Victory stresses the importance of participation. In their letter to 
"community leaders" they write: "I hope you will plan on being an active 
participant" (Letter to a Community Leader, Harford County, MD. June 1 ,  
1992). Additionally, they encourage these "community leaders" to  educate 
their friends and colleagues about the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program. 
This is the orthopraxy that the Committee for National Security (and, of 
course, the Army) seeks and the reason the Army has allowed this group to 
go into the communities and tamper with the discourse surrounding this 
program.  
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Project Victory's raison de etre seems to be the alleviation of what they 
term, "the politics of gridlock," a catch-all phrase applying to recent grassroots 
opposition movements that have had a moderate amount of success at 
blocking the siting of hazardous waste incinerators nationwide. As their 
newsletter explains: 
As you know, we believe that to overcome the 
politics of gridlock, reflected in our current national 
and global crises, requires a fundamental shift in 
values and consciousness. All of our programs are 
directed toward helping to create this shift in the 
way we live our lives towards respect for self, 
others, community and E arth. (Project Victory 
Fund-raising letter, July 1 ,  1992). 
While conflict resolution may indeed be their short-term goal for the 
Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program, CNS and Project Victory have more 
grandiose long-range goals, which call for fundamental change in the social 
structure. What this change portends is anyone's guess, but it has something 
to do with the way our democracy functions. To eliminate what they term 
" the politics of gridlock" caused by our "national crises " may in fact mean 
eliminating the messy aspects of a functioning democracy whereby citizens 
can become obstreperous with respect to certain governmental programs. 
In calling for a "fundamental shift" in the social structure, one 
wonders what they have in mind to replace democracy? We aver that it is 
the politics of engineering consent that is real business of both CNS and 
Project Victory. The following few examples illustrate the type of work for 
which Project Victory is known: they conducted dialogues between 
environmental and corporate leaders in Silicon Valley on how to reduce toxic 
waste; they facilitated a one-day training in conflict management and effective 
communication for the University Lutheran Church in Palo Alto, California 
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in December 1991;  in March 1992, the President of Project Victory, facilitated a 
one-day training session entitled, "Turning Conflicts into Mutual Gain." 
Finally, in 1992, they began work on a proposal to conduct a series of 
interracial Dialogues designed to reduce violence and racism. 
Project Victory developed a technique known as "mediated dialogues" 
which it utilizes in an attempt to bring contentious issues to resolution by 
bringing together opposing parties, not in an open debate, but rather in a 
particular structured situation. Hence the term media ted dialogues, rather 
than simply dialogues . Their newsletter says: 
Project Victory 's  innovative 1 0-step model of 
M e d i a t e d  Dia logue h a s  been n a t i o n a l l y  
acknowled ged as a pioneering effort at  true 
communication and creative problem-solving 
among people of divergent views. We use this 
model to address particular conflicts or issues in 
order to build consensus and generate win /win 
strategies (Project Victory Newsletter: July 23, 1992, 
p. 4) . 
The newsletter explains that the 1 0-step approach IS intended for 
structured meetings while the more informal four-step approach (STOP, 
LOOK, LISTEN, DISCOVER) is used in less formal settings. The choice of the 
word "discover" is very interesting. For Ellul ( 1965) insists that in settings 
such as these, individuals are led to "discover" the correc t l ine. In this case, 
that would be that incineration is the only real alternative for the disposal of 
these weapons . Project Victory's  newsletter describes the program it 
conducted in Harford County, Maryland : 
Theo Brown used Project  Victory ' s  1 0-step 
mediated dialogue process to facilitate a dialogue 
between two experts---one representing the Army's 
position that incineration is a safe technology, and 
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one speaking for environmental groups who 
believe that a better method of disposal can be 
found.  (Project Victory Newsletter, 1992, p .  3) .  
The writer pointed out that the dialogue identified areas of agreement 
and disagreement, "so that future discussion of this vital question can focus 
on the real areas of dispute" (Project Victory Newsletter, 1992, p. 3). Here is 
another curious statement. If the question of the safety of incineration is not 
the real issue, then what is the real issue? What are the real issues? 
Finally, Project Victory's newsletter bears a logo which is strangely 
suggestive of a Christian cross, which may or may not be an attempt to play 
upon one of the dominant ideologies---the cross being suggestive of victory 
over death. The resemblance is probably not accidental. However, it is not 
clear what the " Vic tory " in Project  Vic tory stands for, unless it refers to 
victory over the politics of gridlock. This less than subtle attempt to insinuate 
religious symbolism into a clearly secular endeavor leaves one with the 
uneasy feeling that there is more going on here than meets the eye. At any 
rate, it adds a curious flavor to their otherwise ordinary document. 
6.8.3 Project Victory and "The Harford County Community Leader Dialogue 
Forum on Chemical Demilitarization" (Maryland) 
An informant for Project Victory says he spoke with activists at  six of 
the stockpile sites but had no success gaining entrance to the community 
around the Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot in Kentucky. CNS and Project 
Victory spokesmen were summarily dismissed by the Citizen Groups around 
LBAD and the newly-formed Kent County, MD. citizens group did the same. 
However, they were able to gain a foothold in Harford County, Maryland---at 
the Aberdeen Proving Ground site. An activist at the Edgewood Area of 
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Aberdeen Proving Ground recalls her first encounter with representatives 
from CNS with dismay. Two members of this group came to her house 
saying that they wanted to act as liaison between the grassroots activists and 
the Army. She distrusted them. She commented, "If I receive any threats, 
I'm out of here ."  At first, she rejected the idea, but was pressured into 
participating by a local government official , who insisted that if she didn't 
attend, the citizen opposition group would appear to be a "fringe" group and 
would be discredited. She reluctantly agreed . She said the meeting was "by 
invitation only" and that about 30 or 40 people attended . They included local 
elected officials ,  a Chamber of Commerce representative, numerous 
educators, environmentalists and other civic leaders. "The primary goal of 
the evening," according to Project Victory's spokesman, "was to identify 
various aspects of chemical demilitarization of most concern to area 
residents. " One participant (a high school science teacher) recalled that, 
"Ambassador Flowers (retired Arms Control negotiator) began the program 
by giving background information on the Arms Control treaties that have 
made chemical demilitarization necessary." This informant also recalled that 
Ambassador Flowers, although strictly speaking, not part of the debate, talked 
freely with participants during breaks about how safely the Army could 
destroy the weapons. Now recall that CNS insists on its neutrality in this 
debate; nevertheless, they have permitted this type of behavior contrived for 
its effect on the conscience of the participants. One participant described the 
meeting as follows: " {Public Relations Officer for the Army} was permitted to 
speak as well as several other 'Army experts . '  The audience was invited to 
ask questions."  The citizen activist herself was not permitted to speak nor to 
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rebut any of the Army's information. "I was only allowed to ask questions," 
she said. 
A second community dialogue forum took place on June 16, 1992. The 
question discussed was: "Does the proposed on-site incineration of the 
mustard gas at Aberdeen Proving Ground pose a significant health risk?" 
Again, the same participants heard presentations, this time on the potential 
health effects of the proposed mustard-gas facility at APG . In a letter to a 
participant, CNS stated that the purpose of the second forum was to "clarify 
the confusion many feel when assessing the ac tua l  threat that chemical 
demilitarization plans pose to Harford County residents ." Again, as if there 
were no real threat, but only a perceived threat. A third forum examined the 
issue of alternative technologies to destroy chemical weapons other than 
incineration. This meeting took place on August 3, 1992.  It  involved a 
presentation by two persons on opposite sites of the issue: Mr. Charles 
Baronian, Deputy Program Manager and Technical Director for the CSDP and 
Ms. Sebia Hawkins, Coordinator of Greenpeace's Pacific Campaign. The 
meeting consisted of presentations by each person and a question and answer 
session later in the program. The facilitator again acted as moderator. 
Lest anyone have doubts about the efficacy of this type of program for 
shaping opinion, the following two statements were given by one of the 
participants we interviewed: ( 1 )  "We have agreed to eliminate our chemical 
stockpile with other European countries---that is the reason we had to get rid 
of the unitary stockpile;" (2) "It needs to be incinerated because this material 
has been there for 50 years. The chances are greater than transporting and 
incinerating it ." Each statement contains a half truth. As Ellul (1965) points 
out, propaganda deals not with deliberate falsehoods, but with truth---half-
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truth, and truth out of context. In this respect, we can examine these two 
statements in an effort to glean just how cleverly this process works. The first 
statement, made by a person who has a great deal of credibility in the Arms 
Control area, is true---but only half true. Yes, the United States does have 
international treaty obligations to destroy existing stockpiles of chemical 
weapons; however, timetables can be changed and have been altered in the 
past. The real reason for the destruction of the stockpile originally had to do 
with the Army wanting to get funding to build binary weapons, and in order 
to obtain this funding, Congress mandated the destruction of the unitary 
stockpile as a condition. This information was not conveyed to participants. 
What is particularly salient here is that this same informant observed that 
most participants in these workshops, although educated individuals, were 
not very well informed when they came in about the chemical stockpile 
destruction program, and therefore, were susceptible to suggestion. The 
material was presented to them in a very digestible form . The second 
statement is purely and simply the Army's prime legitimation for moving 
ahead with incineration. The idea is to portray alternatives to incineration as 
taking ten years before they could be perfected and at the same time, create a 
concern about the stability of the stockpile. Ellul (1965) has cleverly analyzed 
this technique and states that, "A large dose of fear precipitates immediate 
action; a reasonably small dose produces lasting support. The listener 's 
critical powers decrease if the propaganda message is more rational and less 
violent" (Ellul 1965, p. 86) . 
Many of the citizens who were asked to participate in "Project 
Victory 's" mediated dialogues were no doubt flattered to be asked, since 
ordinary Americans are seldom invited to participate in a personal way in the 
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larger debates, even by national civic organizations that presumably represent 
them. In a twisted sense, Project Victory's leader does what political parties 
used to do for citizens---he educates, he agitates and he mobilizes. The Army 
has nothing to loose by permitting CNS to meddle with the CSDP because 
they disclaim having anything to do with the mediated dialogues or CNS. 
However, Project Victory did obtain permission from the Army to conduct 
these dialogues in the stockpile site communities even though the Army did 
not actually pay for them. The nature of the dialogues as described in in 
interviews with participants, leaves the question of CNS's neutrality on the 
incineration issue open to question 
It is difficult to assess the long-term impact of projects like "Project 
Victory . "  However, programs such as these are part of a national trend 
toward trying to find ways to build consensus through conflict remediation 
techniques in communities across the country where hazardous technologies 
are being questioned. 
6.9 The Role of National Laboratories and the Control of Information 
Lukes ( 1974) suggests that power holders need not resort to extreme 
measures to achieve thought control which is a third dimensional power 
relationship . He argues that, "One does not have to go to the lengths of 
talking about Brave New World, or the world of B .  F .  Skinner to see this: 
thought control takes many less total and more mundane forms, through 
control of information, through the mass media, and through the process of 
socialization" (Lukes 1974, p .  23) . 
Habermas (1976) supports this position. He argues that in the context 
of the Western democracies, social control of opposition is achieved, not by 
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outright repression, but by control of information (Habermas 1976) .  Chomsky 
( 1991 )  has also spoken on the subject of information control and its 
implications. He says: "An alternative conception of democracy has been the 
belief that the public must be barred from management of its own affairs, and 
the means of information must be kept narrowly and rigidly controlled" (p . 
8). 
Control of Information figures predominantly in the exercise of power 
m the modern state. However, it takes many subtle forms . Information 
control is one way power holders attempt to shape the way a situation is 
perceived,  and its use in the Stockpile Disposal Program is one which has 
received scant attention. However, it is  easy to see why this aspect of power 
may have been overlooked . It is primarily because one of the features of the 
modern state and the hallmark of the Army's Stockpile Disposal Program is 
the production of vo luminous  amounts of information . This "information 
overload" is aided by NEPA regulations and compounded by the extensive 
d a ta -gathering capab il ities of  the nat ional laboratories and their 
subcontractors . Opponents of the Army's on-site incineration decision often 
complain about being overwhelmed by too much information ,  too many 
documents, yet another study, etc . So, how is it that we can suggest that 
control of information is not only employed, but effectively employed in the 
service of keeping only certain kinds of information circulating to the 
"official publics." As we shall see, despite the appearance of openness, the 
Army exercises tight control over what information "gets out" and the shape 
it takes when it does. The national laboratories p lay a significant role in this 
regard, but the Army always has the last word . 
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There is a curious paradox with respect to "information" and the 
public 's right to know in a democracy. On the one hand, citizens demand 
being kept informed, and the government is supposed to be accountable to 
the people. Indeed, there are laws which explicitly mandate public disclosure 
of information (e .  g . ,  SARA Title III Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act of 1986, also known as the EMERGENCY PLANNING 
RIGHT-TO-KNOW Act of 1986) . On the other hand, government has a stake 
in pursuing certain prerogatives . Ellul (1965) offers some insight into the 
rationale behind the State's desire to control information: 
Propaganda can never reveal its true projects and 
plans or divulge government secrets. That would 
be to submit the projects to public discussion, to the 
scrutiny of public opinion, and thus prevent their 
success (Ellul 1965, p. 59) .  
First, although few (if any) documents relating to the Chemical 
Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP) or the Chemical Stockpile Emergency 
Preparedness Program (CSEPP) are classified, documents produced by the 
national laboratories for the Army are subject to a fairly rigorous and tightly­
controlled distribution protocol. All documents go through various stages in 
the course of their development from conception to their final end-point 
distribution. They usually begin as DRAFT documents and / or "Preliminary 
Assessments," and as such as not intended for release or publication. Later, 
they may appear in FINAL DRAFT form, then move on to FINAL REPORT 
status---again, these remain strictly internal documents . At other times, 
documents receive tentative approval for distribution to officers in 
cooperating agencies for their review and comments . A later stage might 
involve distribution to certain " interested "  parties and finally some 
documents are released as Technical Memorandums (TM) and are available 
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to the general public from the National Technical Information Service (U.  S .  
Department o f  Commerce/ 5285 Port Roya l, Springfield, Virginia) .  Many 
documents relating to the Chemical  Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP) are 
available through this service for a fee. For example, the Army did release a 
series of "Concept Plans" (one for each of the eight sites)� which described 
how the destruction program would affect each site/ during the preliminary 
phases of the stockpile destruction program. However/ these were very 
general in nature and not particularly useful as instruments of persuasion, 
although they did serve a purpose as legitimation devices for the Army. This 
is why we believe they were made available for public release. For purposes 
of information control/ many documents deemed by the Army to be 
potentially sensitive, are kept in the DRAFT form for years---some as long as  
five years. Occasionally/ we have seen documents stamped "Sanitized for 
Public Distribution ."  However, this is not the norm. Not all documents 
make it as far as public distribution/ however/ some do. 
As stated earlier/ the Army maintains tight control o\·er the work 
produced by its contractors at the various national laboratories. With respect 
to the Army's stockpile destruction program/ the Public Affairs Subcommittee 
(headquartered at the Pentagon), one of six subcommittees organized by the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as part of the Chemical 
Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP), is  the bottom line about 
information is released and to whom.  For example, research staff at the 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory have been developing a training course for 
Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) and Paramedics which will contain 
job aids, video presentations, and computer-based modules. The Army 
routinely reviews all documents prepared by the staff of the national 
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laboratories prior to release. Research staff at the Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory (ORNL) were dismayed to discovered on one occasion that the 
Army had deleted entire sections of a document and replaced them with the 
words "To be developed" ---or required drastic revisions. This practice became 
Stand ard Operating Procedure (SOP) and continued throughout the 
development of the Training materials. Sections that were deleted included: 
emergency medical services, reentry, etc. This practice continued to be an area 
of great concern to research staff who took their charge to develop plans to 
protect the public quite seriously. Someone speculated, "They may be worried 
that these sections will cause anxiety about the program and therefore, felt it 
was easier to leave it out. "  (Field Notes: ORNL, Staff Meeting, Hazard 
Management Group 7 / 13/92).  This foot dragging is typical of the way power 
holders deal with sensitive information which could be potentially damaging 
to their case or could raise pesky questions about the real agenda.  On another 
occasion, contractors working on Environmental Impact Analyses for the one 
of the sites in the destruction program were told that they could not 
communicate directly to state level emergency managers, but instead had to 
submit their questions in written form to the Army's Public Affairs officer for 
approval. 
6.10 Summary and Conclusion 
As C. W. Mills (1959) observed, we don't know the limits of the State's 
ability to control the thoughts of its citizens; however, Ellul 's ( 1965) model of 
propaganda provides some insight into how the modern state goes about the 
task of engineering the consent of citizens. The fact that propaganda 
s u rrounds us, as Ellul (1965) points out, makes it very difficult to analyze it, 
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for we are confronted with a phenomenon and a force that is relatively new 
(at least in its present form) and ubiquitous. We have argued in this chapter, 
that the Army's emergency preparedness program (CSEPP) is a propaganda 
apparatus and have presented evidence of a vast, heavily-financed Public 
Relations ("public eduction") campaign directed from the Pentagon. 
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Chapter 7 
Discussion and Conclusion 
'The denizen of the technological state of the future will have everything his heart ever 
desired, except of course, his freedom.' 
Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society. p .  xvii 
7.1 An Attempt at Synthesis 
In this chapter we will attempt to draw together the various elements 
of this research which have hitherto been treated somewhat individually. To 
do this, we will try to answer the following questions: ( 1 )  What are the 
conceptual components of the work and how are they related; (2) How do 
they integrate into a conceptual system; (3) How does the work contribute to 
theory; (4) What are the limitations of the study; (5) What are the possibilities 
for future research in this area; (6) "What's To Be Done? !"  
7.2 Conceptual Components and their Relationship 
This research purports to call  in to question the validity of the 
pluralists assumptions about political power in contemporary America where 
participation is assumed to occur within decision-making arenas, which are 
in turn assumed to be open to virtually any organized group. What is at stake 
is the whole question of power and how the State uses it to maintain its 
prerogatives. 
We have employed the framework developed by Lukes ( 1974), who 
argues for a view of power that looks beyond the overt, obvious exercise of 
power proffered by the pluralists . His three dimensional view of power 
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stresses mechanisms and strategies of control that remam hidden unless 
brought to light in an analysis that takes into account what goes on behind 
the interstices of power --- precisely a Machiavellian concept. 
In the case under consideration, the first dimension of power can be 
seen in the Army's decision over the choice of technology, which it 
announced in 1 984. Following a pluralist methodology, we can only judge 
who is powerful by observing the "observable," i .e . ,  by observing a ctua l  
decisions in  ac tua l  situations of  overt conflict. In  the absence of conflict, 
according to pluralist thinking, there would not be an exercise of power. 
Since pluralists characterize the situation as open and available to all, the 
absence of challenge is merely an indication of consensus . The major 
decision affecting this program was the Army's unilateral decision to destroy 
the stockpile through thermal destruction, i. e., incineration. However, since 
that decision was made in secret somewhere in the halls of the Pentagon, 
there was no "observable" conflict over that decision simply because people 
didn't know about it when it was being made. Are we to assume then, that 
no one objected? Judging from the public outcry after the decision was 
announced, we know the answer is that many objected . Needless to say, there 
is no observable conflict when decisions are made outside the bounds where 
people cannot do anything about it, so our analysis of power does not stop 
here. 
The pluralists model takes no account of the fact that power may be, 
and often is, exercised by confining the scope of decision-making to relatively 
safe issues . The second dimensional view of power involves the erection of 
barriers to participation and control over issues through tactics such as agenda 
setting, "decisionless decisions," and recourse to existing biases of the system 
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or failing these, the creation of new barriers . The NEPA process, as we have 
demonstrated, creates formidable barriers for citizens who oppose 
government projects, despite the fact that it also provides entry points for 
opponents (citizen participation is a mandatory part of the law).  
First, as we have argued, the entity who proposes the action is 
empowered to prepare the necessary impact statements. This alone precludes 
ordinary ci tizens from the process because tremendous resources are 
necessary to adequately prepare an EIS. The Army also engaged in a good deal 
of what theorists refer to as 'non-decision making' in the creation of the 
extra-legal NEPA steps described as the Site Specific Environmental Impact 
Statement (SSEIS) and associated the PHASE I and PHASE II processes . 
The SSEIS debacle is only one instance of several where the Army used 
non-decision making to lull opponents of the plan into believing that 
someday, they would do what the citizens asked i.e., come down and conduct 
individual site specific studies and then re-evaluate the on-site incineration 
decision ---on a site-by-site basis . By adding these additional ("extra-legal") 
steps to the already-cumbersome NEPA review process, they created yet 
another formidable barrier to citizen participation, while at the same time 
appearing to comply with citizens expressed wishes. Time and again, the 
Army sought to short-circuit attempts to widen the scope of the conflict by 
delaying tactics, as was the case with the promises for site-specific studies and 
by "defining out" certain issues they did not wish discussed openly by publics, 
e .g . ,  the dioxin issue, the continued use of the incinerators beyond the 
destruction of the stockpile, the long-term health effects of incineration, the 
decontamination issue, and, of course, the issue of w h e t h e r  to use 
incineration at all or some other alternative. Recall the FPEIS which defined 
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the three alternatives which the Army considered before making its on-site 
incineration decision: ( 1 )  national site; (2) regional site; or (3) on-site) . In each 
case, the decision was about where to conduct the incineration, not whether 
to do it. 
Finally, we come to what Gaventa ( 1980) describes as ' the least 
understood ' mechanisms of power --- those of the third dimension. The 
Third Dimension has to do with how an entity (in this case, the Army) 
influences and shapes citizens' consciousness about the destruction program. 
It has to do with explaining how dominant groups create the impression that 
the status-quo is the only plausible reality and consequently attempts to 
reformulate the situation along lines more in line with subordinates wishes 
are not only undesirable, but also lacking in legitimacy. 
With respect to the CSDP, we hear expressions of powerlessness 
coming from some unsuspecting sources e .g ., not only do citizens feel 
intimidated and frustrated by the NEPA review process, but there is evidence 
that many state and local emergency managers are also exasperated in their 
attempts to deal with the new responsibilities being thrust upon them in 
conjunction with the CSDP. As one state emergency manager who had grown 
weary of trying to live up to Army expectations with respect to the CSDP said, 
"They are asking us to do things we cannot do" (Field Notes: November 1 1 ,  
1991) .  
The Third Dimension of Power also relates to how the Army goes 
about creating the impression that incineration is the inevitable and only 
rea s o n a b l e  alternative . For this we turned to Ellul ' s  ( 1965) theory of 
propaganda and we argued, that, quite clearly, the Army's emergency 
preparedness program is the vehicle for a massive propaganda campaign 
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designed to make the populace comfortable with the inevitability of 
incineration through complicity with the CSEPP program. In essence, the 
Army has exercised control over issues, manipulated the NEPA process, set 
agendas, controlled information, co-opted state and local leaders, used 
"selective incentives" to co-opt community leaders, and instituted a massive 
propaganda campaign in pursuit of its goal of siting eight nerve gas 
incinerators in the continental United States. 
Finally, it should be noted that the success of the opposition 
movement in Kentucky, Maryland and Indiana is due, n o t  to their 
participation in "the process," as laid out for them by the Army, but to their 
taking advantage of the one Achilles heel --- that of state control of air 
pollution control permits. The citizens, having exhausted all the avenues 
available to them via "the process " ( i . e . ,  NEP A scoping meetings, 
independent community review studies, site-specific reports, Congressional 
hearings, etc . ) ,  went directly to the state legislators in their efforts to forestall 
the construction of incinerators in their respective communities . Only then, 
did they achieve the necessary leverage to block the Army's inexorable march 
towards incineration. Although there are no state laws, strictly speaking, that 
forbid the construction of nerve-gas incinerators, the laws passed in these 
three states make it nearly impossible for the Army to obtain state permits for 
operating incinerators (Ember 1989, p. 20). 
7.3 Limitations of the Study 
As a research paradigm, case studies present certain limitations, not the 
least of which is their lack of representativeness. However, because of its 
scope, involving as it does three tiers of government as well as industrial 
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elites and at least half a dozen federal agencies, (including the military 
bureaucracy), we argue that this study has the potential to illuminate certain 
regularities and patterns of the social structure. Thus, despite the limitations 
of this study, its value lies in the ability to reveal previously hidden processes 
of power that are an integral part of the social structure of twentieth century 
technological society, particularly in the United States. 
However, there are some obvious limitations which we will try to 
present in a brief synopsis. Admittedly, the present study cannot speak about 
the very important issue of why it took so long for sites other than the 
Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot (LBAD) to mobilize. Unfortunately, 
although there is anecdotal evidence that the Army's reputation for power 
was responsible for the relative quiescence at many of the stockpile sites, we 
did not conduct a systematic investigation of this phenomenon. 
We believe the relative quiescence at other sites (e .g . ,  ANAD, PBA, 
TEAD, UMDA, PUDA) is related to the perception that the Army is "going to 
do what it is going to do," and to the hegemony enjoyed by the Army at those 
sites vis-a-vis the adjoining communities, many of these towns being very 
much under the spell of the Army because of the depot's prominence in the 
community as an important source of revenue and jobs. This is not true of 
the Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot site however . The depot there no 
longer holds the importance for the community that it once did. 
We lack any basis for comparing the sites with one another with regard 
to either the mobilization of protest or the role of the media in sustaining 
quiescence, nor can we evaluate the relative success or failure of the Army's 
propagand a campaign. Admittedly, there is  ample room left for future 
researchers interested in grassroots mobilization surrounding hazardous 
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waste incineration and the variables involved in either quiescence or rapid 
mobilization. It will also be up to future researchers to determine if  the 
patterns of power, which we have identified, are typical of the ones that 
prevail in society with regard to other conflicts of similar scope. 
7.4 Reprise: General Theoretical Import 
We have argued that the Army has been able to put up formidable 
barriers to participation, despite citizens efforts to widen the scope of issues to 
be considered . In order to level the playing field (if this is even possible), one 
of the problems facing us is the vast scope of power exerted by industry on the 
government ( i .e . ,  Congress and certain federal agencies) .  For example, 
Freudenburg (1984) writes that, "Industry's success in forcing the EPA to see 
itself as a 'neutral' judge of the various positions, rather than as an advocate 
for the people --- its legal mandate --- is one measure of its immense power" 
(Freudenburg 1984, p. 64) . Coupled with the co-optation of the EPA (i .e. ,  the 
Environmental Protection Agency) we have the problem of the corruption of 
NEP A (The National Environ men tal Policy Act of 1969), particular! y, the 
scoping process which has been turned into a tool of the powerful, where, 
although the "letter" of the law is fulfilled, its spirit is egregiously violated, to 
make matters worse, we have the added feature of a powerful entrenched 
bureaucracy spewing out propaganda directed at creating a climate more 
conciliatory to dominant interests ---the engineering of consent- --- on an 
unprecedented scale which goes largely unrecognized as such, but hides 
under the guise of public "education" and which denies its true class-based 
nature. 
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Finally, we come face to face with the limitations of science as a tool for 
solving environmental health problems. Freudenburg ( 1984) cautions that 
the relationship between science and politics is important and he reminds us 
that during the Love Canal debates, "Every scientific finding became the 
subject of controversy . . .  scientists who studied health problems near the 
dump site disagree profound ly on the ill effects of that exposure" 
(Freudenburg 1984, p .  58) . Similarly, in the case of the Chemical Stockpile 
Disposal Program (CSDP) experts appeared on both sides of the controversy . 
On the one hand, we have Army experts testifying to the alleged "safety" of 
the incineration process, and on the other hand we have credib le 
scientist / scholars testifying to the unremitting dangers associated with 
incineration --- both short term and long term. 
There are p arallels here too with Parenti 's  ( 1970) Analysis of the 
Newark Community Union Project (NCUP) rent strike and traffic-light 
issues . The rationalizations used to defend the government 's  actions with 
respect to the traffic-light issue, are very similar to those employed by the 
Army in conjunction with the stockpile disposal program: (1 )  the insistence 
that the problem needed elaborate investigation; (2) the claim that the issue 
was not within a given authority 's jurisdiction, or that this was not the 
correct time or place to raise certain issues; (3) the posing of rigorous and 
time-consuming legalistic procedures; (4) the ritualistic appearance of a public 
official to investigate the question followed by disingenuous promises that a 
solution was at hand; (e.g., the National Academy of Sciences numerous 
"independent" studies of the problem); (5) and the constant admonition that 
the protesters should exercise restraint and patience (Parenti 1 970) .  For 
example, the Deputy Program Manager and Technical Director once called for 
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"common sense" to prevail at Aberdeen IAPGl (Harford County Sun,  Sunday, 
August 1 1 ,  1991, p. 7) . 
The situation facing us is described succinctly by William Greider (1992) 
in his book, Who Will Tell the People . ,  Greider ( 1992) argues that American 
democracy is in much deeper trouble than most people wish to acknowledge.  
If communities now feel distant from Washington, i t ' s  because they are, he 
writes . He argues that we are experiencing a new kind of democracy --- "the 
new politics," he calls it. We are seeing what he describes as: 
the expensive politics of facts and information. Only 
those who have accumulated lots of money (typically 
major corporations) are free to play in this version of 
democracy. Only those with a strong, immediate 
financial stake in the political outcomes can afford to 
invest this kind of  money in manipulat ing 
governing decisions (Greider 1992, p.  35). 
Greider doesn' t  offer any real solution to these dilemmas other than to state 
that people must come together and fight to retain power. However, 
indications are that even this kin d of "coming together" or ci tizen 
empowerment is going to come upon some formidable obstacles under the 
present system. As Parenti ( 1980) points out: "Far from the fluid interplay 
envisioned by the pluralists, the political efficacy of groups and individuals is 
largely determined by the resources of power available to them, of which 
wealth is the most crucial. . .  those who control the wealth of society enjoy a 
persistent and pervasive political advantage" (Parenti 1980, p .  304) .  Needless 
to say, the military has great wealth as do the major corporations that have 
now turned from making bombs to the business of building incinerators to 
destroy existing munitions. 
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Parenti ( 1980) argues that some of our liberal elites believe our 
problems can be solved within the present system, simply by changing our 
"warped priorities ." He argues that, "the political system will belong to the 
people only when the resources of power belong to them, enabling them to 
effect their democratic will at all levels of private and public institutional life" 
(Parenti 1980, p .  319) .  Given this caveat, Parenti doesn't hold out much hope 
for structural change within the present system. He concludes that people 
will not discard the present system no matter how it oppresses them until 
they can conceive of an alternative that would be better. "It is not that they 
don't want things to change, but they don't believe things can change --- or 
they fear that whatever changes might occur would more likely be for the 
worse," he writes (Parenti 1980, p. 322). 
If we have learned anything from this research it would be that our 
taken for granted assumptions about the nature of our democracy must be re­
examined in light of the evidence that we are in the midst of a shift in the 
b alance of power away from traditional views of what a democracy is .  
Whether a constitutional amendment for the environment, as some have 
suggested (Caldwell 1989), would effect any significant change in the trend 
away from citizen control of the government, is a moot point. It doesn 't 
appear such an amendment is in the offing. The recent successes of grass­
roots environmental groups in preventing the siting of hazardous waste 
incinerators could be construed as a ray of hope or a window of opportunity 
toward greater citizen empowerment. If this study can shed some light on the 
political climate within which the citizens of the twenty-first century must 
labor, perhaps we have made a contribution. 
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7.5 Stockpile Activities Update: (May 1995). 
The Army is steadfastly sticking to its guns with respect to incineration. 
As recently as August 1994, the Executive Program Manager for Chemical 
Demilitarization wrote that, "Both the Army and the NRC agree that no 
alternative technology is currently available to replace the liquid agent 
inc inerator" (Letter: Walter L. Busbee, Brigadier General, U.  S .  Army, 
Commander / Director to Mr. John E. Nunn, III,  Co-Chair Governor 's  
Commitee on Alternative Technologies, August 1 9, 1 994, p .  3 ) .  Since tha t 
time, General Busbee has been reassigned and a number of key players in the 
drama have retired . 
Activists report that gigantic strides are being made at the Army 
research laboratory at Aberdeen Proving Ground,  MD. involving the 
d evelopment of alternative technologies---p articularly neutralization 
involving the most lethal of the nerve agents VX and the vesicant mustard. 
Additionally, activists report that on a recent visit with individual  
Congressmen (March 27, 1 995) attitudes had shifted somewhat and many 
seem to be asking opponents of the plan for a "road map" a way out of the 
CSDP conundrum. (Personal Communication: Executive Director KEF, Inc . 
5 /  4 /95) . (The CSDP has been subject to huge cost overruns and is now not 
very popular with the conservative Congress) . 
With regard to the current status of the citizen opposition movement, 
it breaks down by site in the following manner: 
Cluster I: 
TEAD 
Cluster II: 
(Tooele, Utah) 
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Facility built and undergoing 
testing. Appeal of permit 
pending. 
APG (Aberdeen, Maryland) Nothing built yet; opposition strong 
LBAD (Richmond, Kentucky) Nothing built yet; opposition strong 
NAAP (Newport, Indiana) Nothing built yet; opposition strong 
PUDA (Pueblo, Colorado) Nothing built yet; opposition strong 
UMDA (Umatilla, Oregon) Nothing built yet; permitting process 
underway; opposition strong 
Cluster III: 
ANAD (Anniston, Alabama) Nothing built yet; permitting process 
underway; opposition movement 
gaining momentum. 
PB A (Pine Bluff, Arkansas) Nothing built yet; opposition 
movement still weak 
The sites in the southern states are, not surprisingly, were the last to 
organize and are receiving assistance in this regard by individuals from the 
more vocal sites. Much of the delay is likely the result of a combination of 
factors: (a) the Army's reputation for power in the communities adjacent to 
these sites; and (b) their rural character . At Alabama, organizers of the 
opposition are considering law suits charging environmental racism. 
Residents of Pine Bluff are predominantly black and activists charge that this 
population has been largely ignored by the formal NEP A procedures. 
7.6 "What Is To Be Done?" 
In a recently released report prepared by the Battelle Corporation (1994), 
Bradbury et al analyzed community viewpoints of the Chemical Stockpile 
Disposal Program and came to the following conclusions: They argued that 
"it is increasingly evident that public protest over "risk" technologies is not 
only about technology, it is also, and perhaps mostly, about people and 
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human relationships" (Bradbury et al, 1994, p .  1 .5 ) .  This agrees with our own 
premise as stated in the Introduction, that the controversy surrounding the 
destruction of chemical weapons is not primarily a technical controversy, but 
is essentially a political problem ---i.e., it is concerned with power. 
One solution regarding 'what 's to be done' is proposed by Michael 
Reich (1991 ) in Toxic Politics . He writes that one alternative to government 
regulation of industry is to depend on industry's self-regulation (Reich 1991 ,  
p .  278) .  He  dismisses this proposal almost a s  quickly as  he suggests it, and 
concludes that "such proposals, however, are not likely to be well received in 
corporate circles" (Reich 1991 ,  p .  278) .  He then suggests that various policies 
could be adopted to insure that companies pay the cost of redress. Again, not 
a proposal l ikely to succeed . Reich (1991) points out that increased regulation, 
of itself, will not accomplish the goal of alleviating the present crisis .  He 
notes that "conceivably, all the companies in our cases could have been in 
compliance with TSCA and RCRA (Reich 1991 ,  p .  278); new regulations 
without enforcement will accomplish little. 
Feldman (1991), one of the most articulate writers on public policy, has 
described his suggestions for reformulating public policy in his book, Wa ter 
Resources Management: In Search of an Environmen tal  Ethic .  He writes: 
An optimal public policy would maximize the range 
of alternatives under consideration and provide 
lucid, scrutable information about all alternatives. It  
would hold policy makers accountable for the 
consequences of their decisions and would assure 
adequate time and methods for deliberation about all 
relevant social goals (Feldman 1991 ,  p.  15) .  
If we were to follow his advice, we might be paving the way toward 
developing an environmental ethic that would help avoid the pitfalls created 
by the present u n-regula tory climate. Dr.  Feldman ( 199 1 )  suggests that 
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ecofeminism might provide a useful paradigm for the development of such 
an ethic. Ecofeminists place heavy reliance upon: ( 1 )  examining the long­
term consequences of environmental impacts; (2) self-management and direct 
democracy; (3) open decision-making, with full and free discussion of all 
available alternatives, stemming from the conviction that the dynamic 
processes of change and growth necessitate the free flow of information 
(Merchant 1981 ) .  
Feldman (1991 )  calls for a reemphasis on "process," but it is  precisely 
this emphasis on "process" as opposed to "substance" that has allowed the 
abuses of power such as we have described, to creep in. Under the present 
system, the Army has made a fetish of "process ."  Broadening public 
participation in the political process, in and of itself, is not the answer either. 
The Army was quick to point out that the citizens were e m p owered  to 
participate in the process .  
As we mentioned earlier, Lynton Caldwell 's  ( 1 989) answer is a 
constitutional amendment for the environment. Perhaps this is the answer, 
but we have doubts about the possibility of such a proposal altering the status 
quo. The answer, if there is one, lies somewhere in the realm of generating 
alternatives to the present politico I economic arrangement. Alternatives that 
combine the high idealism of the ecofeminist perspective with ones that 
embody real choice and veto power by publics, and real consequences for 
would-be polluters. 
However, most promising of all is a concept that has already been tried 
in Denmark. In answer to the question, "Can everyday fo lks p lay a 
constructive role in complex decisions involving science and technology?" 
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The Danish model seems to answer a resounding YES! The model, described 
by Sclove (1994) is referred to as the "Consensus model ." As he describes it: 
In 1992 a panel of ordinary Danish citizens attended 
two background briefings and then spent several days 
hearing diverse expert presentations on genetic 
manipulation in animal breeding. After cross­
examining the experts and deliberating among 
themselves, the lay panel reported to a national press 
conference their judgment that it would be "entirely 
unacceptable" to genetically engineer new pets but 
ethical to use such methods to develop a treatment 
for cancer. Their conclusions influenced subsequent 
Parliamentary legislation. 
In order to institute such a program, the Danish government's Board 
of Technology (an institution roughly akin to the U. S.  Office of Technology 
Assessment) begins by selecting a salient topic and then advertises in the 
newspapers for volunteers. These volunteers are asked to send in a one-page 
resume detailing their background and explaining why they are interested in 
a particular topic .  About 15 lay persons are chosen to serve on panels. 
According to Sclove (1994), "These are genuine lay groups ranging, say, from 
college-educated professionals (but excluding professionals in the topic under 
consideration) to housewives, office and factory workers, or garb age 
collectors" (Sclove 1994, Memo, p .  1 ) .  Next a separate panel is assembled 
consisting of people with varying levels of expertise with the particular 
technology. A final step is bringing these two panels together in what is 
termed a "Consensus Conference," ---a three-day event bringing the lay and 
expert panels together in a forum open to the media and the public at large. 
Sclove ( 1994) reports that Danish businesses, once skeptical have openly 
embraced the idea of a "Consensus conference," as being useful in forestalling 
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the more common types of gridlock encountered when communities resist 
projects involving hazardous technologies. 
However, adopting this model to the United States will not prove easy. 
Even though the panels' decisions have often been adopted by the Danish 
Parliament, this doesn't guarantee the concept would have the same impact 
here. In the first place, the decision of the "Consensus Conference" is not 
binding. The panels are only advisory. We have already witnessed what can 
happen when the conclusions drawn by citizen advisory panels (for example, 
the Army-funded Community Study Groups for the CSDP) go against vested 
interests. They are summarily ignored.  The Danish model does show 
promise, however. It suggests a structure within which citizens can perform 
the duties incumbent upon citizens who live in a democracy. It is perhaps a 
beacon for the future. 
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Site locaton 
Appendix B 
Table 1 
Percent Distribution of Unitary Weapons Stored in the 
Continental United States 
Percetage of total 
Tooele Army Depot, UT 42.3 
Pine Bluff Arsenal, AR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.0 
Umatilla Depot, OR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 .6 
Pueblo, CO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 .9 
Anniston Army Depot, AL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 .1 
Johnston Island, South Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 .6 
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. . . . . . . . . . . . 5.0 
Newport Army Amunition Plant, IN. . . . . . . . 3 .9 
Lexington-Blue Grass Army Depot, KY. . . . . . . 1 .6 
(Source: U.S. Department of the Army, "Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program Final 
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement," Vols. 1,2,3, Office of the Program Manager 
for Chemical Demilitarization, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, 1988). 
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S u p e r fund S i t e s  
Hazardous Waste Sites 
. Hazardous Wasle Siles on the National Priority Lisl, by Slate: 1991 
(lnch.JOes both PfD� ana ftnaJ sttcs. ���led on t h e  Na1 1ona1 Pnv,a!les lnsr  for the Supeffvnd program a s  aulhonzed oy the 
ComP't:hcnsr�t�e En'fflonmenlal Response Comoensahona. ana l1abd1ty Acl of 1 980 and !he Svoetlund Amendments and 
Reauthonzatton Act of 1 986) 
Per- J Non-
STATE Tolal Rank cent I Fed- FeO· sttcs d1Slt•· eral 110¥'\ "''' 
Total lXI 1 19 1 ,091 
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1 
0 8 1 3 7 Arkansas 32 0 8  1 0  
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Through the Past . . .  
ln prrparing for a chnnial attack on thr United Stairs, lhr U.S. Anny Chrmic:al Corps and the Officr of Civil Ddrnse 
Mobi.liution developed and drsigned civilian protection gear against chemical, biological and radiological warfare. 
Thesr and other "space-age drvelopments" werr displayed at Andrews Air Force Base during thr 1959 Armed Forces 
Day Celebration. 
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I .  The Research Paradigm 
Appendix G 
Methodology 
Essentially the research presented here is based on a case study of the 
U. S. Army's programme to destroy the U .  S. stockpile of chemical weapons 
{known as the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP) }  and o f  the 
citizens' movement that emerged to oppose the Army's on-site incineration 
plan. The research is based on field work took place between April 1 99 1  and 
June 1992 in the towns of Berea and Richmond, Kentucky, the site of the 
Lexington Bluegrass Army Depot known as "LBAD" in Army documents and 
to the residents as "the depot." 
This is also a work of ethnography as I have sought to capture the 
distinctive interpretations of reality that were made by members of the groups 
I studied---both the Army's perspective and that of the citizen activists. Since 
the first task of field work is to assemble "richly textured and accurate 
descriptions of events and activities in the l ives of those studied" (Emerson 
1983, p. 20), I found myself faced with a dilemma of sorts. The stockpile sites 
are located around the country at eight different locations throughout the 
continental United States as well as on a remote island in the South Pacific. 
Lacking a grant with which to travel to many of the more remote 
places, my choice of fieldwork setting was dictated by mere convenience. As it 
happened, the choice of the LBAD site proved propitious for a number of  
reasons. It was here that the earliest opposition movement emerged ---we 
might say it "exploded" on the scene a fter one seemingly innocuous 
precipitating event (from the perspective of the Army) .  This being the case, I 
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was able to track the growth of the movement first-hand and to gauge the 
various responses this provoked in the Army. 
My fieldwork was not limited only to this site, however. I was able 
through the many contacts I made in Berea and Richmond, KY to gain 
entrance to another field setting at the Aberdeen Proving Ground site in the 
Edgewood Area of Maryland .  During the course of the field work, I made 
several trips to Aberdeen to talk with activists and to speak with Army 
personnel at the Proving Ground . Additionally, I was able to spend a good 
deal of time in Washington, D.C. interviewing military and civilian elites at 
the Pentagon. I also had the opportunity to visit with staffers from 
Greenpeace whose headquarters is also in Washington. Finally, because I was 
simultaneously involved in working at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in 
Oak Ridge, Tennessee, I had the unique opportunity to see first-hand many of 
the Army documents relating to the Stockpile Disposal Program. In fact, I was 
actively involved in preparing many of the site studies undertaken in 
conjunction with the various protective action/ evacuation scenarios. As one 
would expect, this dual role presented certain constraints upon my research, 
not the least of which was the fact that I had to curb my tendency to want to 
side with the activists and to "do good." Additionally, I had the problem of 
convincing citizens that I was not working for the Army. However, the other 
side of this dubious position was that it allowed me access to documents that 
would otherwise have completely escaped my purview and it gave me some 
credibility with the higher strata of decision-makers in the military, whose 
cooperation might not have been so easy to secure. But, of course, this is 
sheer conjecture. 
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II .  Participant Observation 
My first contact in the field was made through the intercession of a 
member of Greenpeace who provided me with a list of activists working at 
the LBAD site. I made my first contacts by telephone. I explained my interest 
in studying the problem of chemical weapons destruction and asked if a 
meeting could be set up . A cook-out was arranged and I was invited to meet 
all the members of the group (Common Ground) at one time. From there, I 
set up individual interviews and later I contacted the key players from the 
Richmond group and began a similar dialogue. 
During the fourteen or so months of field work, I made as many trips 
as I could manage to the Berea/Richmond, Kentucky area. In the beginning, 
this was almost weekly. I usually stayed the whole week-end as I was 
working part-time in Oak Ridge, Tennessee and couldn't remain in the field 
on a full-time basis ---although I would have liked to. I usually stayed with 
activists or at the Boone Tavern Hotel. Often, my husband would accompany 
me on these trips and he proved to be a valuable co-researcher. Having him 
along a lso seemed to help me secure the trust of the activists. Lengthy 
interviews were conducted ---both formal and informal .  Some lasted for 
hours and well into the night.  Often these took p lace at Papa Uno 's  
Restaurant --- a local restaurant in Berea and a favorite haunt of students and 
residents of the small college town. Interviews were not tape recorded. I took 
detailed notes and transcribed them immediately upon returning to my 
room. I also kept a log in which I made notes about the field setting. 
While in the field, I took part in planning meetings (occasionally) ,  
attended a peace vigil held at the depot, met regularly with activists, attended 
numerous pot-luck suppers sponsored by the Berea Interfaith Task Force for 
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Peace, met with members of the press, attended a gala rock concert ( fund 
raiser) and was invited to attend the press conference sponsored by the 
C hemical  Weapons Working Group {CWWG)  (Richmond,  KYL the 
international coalition of activists from U. S.  sites as well as from Hawaii and 
the former U.  S .  S .  R. I never had the opportunity to attended any of the 
scoping meetings held at the sites . That phase of the project had been over by 
the time I entered the field . However, I availed myself of the opportunity to 
read over thousands of pages of transcripts of scoping meetings produced by 
the Army from meetings held around the country. 
III. Primary Sources-The Interview Data: 
Interviews were conducted with pertinent persons involved with the 
CSDP both in the field, in Maryland, at the Pentagon and at the Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee. A total of forty-five persons were 
interviewed during the course of the study (July 1991 through September 
1994), although 95% of the interviews took place between 1991 and 1992. 
A snowball sampling technique was utilized to obtain the names of 
l ikely interview cand idates. Semi-structured interview sched ules were 
develped in conjunction with each separate target group, i .e . ,  activists, 
military elites, local political elites, members of the press, etc. During the 
course of the field work, multiple interviews were conducted with members 
of Common Ground /Kentucky Environmental Foundation, Inc., Concerned 
C itizens of Madison County (Kentucky) ,  and C oncerned C itizens for 
Maryland's Environment (at the Aberdeen Proving Ground site, Maryland) . 
Additionally, I interviewed a number of political and military elites at  the 
local, state and federal level. 
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For example, in addition to citizens involved in protesting the CSDP, I 
interviewed : mi litary officers and civilian government officials at the 
Pentagon (including Federal Emergency Management Agency {FEMA) staff) , 
professional staff members in the House of Representatives, local and state 
political elites (e.g., the local mayor, state regulators, etc . ) ,  research staff at the 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory and Army Public Affairs Officers . Further 
interviews were conducted with legal counsel for the citizens opposition 
movement, newspaper reporters, and Greenpeace activists in Washington D. 
c. 
Interviews lasted an average of three hours, although many lasted five 
or six hours. Interviews were not tape recorded, although detailed notes were 
kept of all interviews and an informal interview schedule was drawn up 
although not always adhered to. Interviewees often offered interesting 
insights that might have been missed had a format more s tructured 
interview been forced upon them. Additiona lly, because of my c lose 
interaction with the activists over an extended period of time, I had ample 
opportunity to develop new insights as events progressed, thus enabling me 
to further refine the theoretical framework. (A list of those interviewed 
appears at the end of this section. Only job titles are given due to the privacy 
regulations governing human research subjects as required by the University 
of Tennessee's Human Subjects as required by the University of Tennessee's 
Human Subjects Committee. Other primary sources include my personal 
correspondence with activists, field notes, log book, minutes of ORNL staff 
meetings, etc. 
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I V .  Secondary Data Analysis 
The documents used for secondary data analysis include materials 
drawn from the following sources: ( 1 )  Oak Ridge Nation al Laboratory 
published technical reports (TMs); (2) archival  data from the Berea College 
Library, Southern Appalachian Collection which included : newspaper clip 
files from the years 1980 through 1992 pertinent to the CSDP as well as 
memorandums, personal letters, transcripts of public meetings, committee 
reports, minutes of ICCB meetings, etc.; (3) thousands of pages of transcripts 
from public scoping meetings; (4) the p rivate records and personal 
correspondence of citizens with Army elites; (5) pertinent documents relating 
to the early history and activities of Common Ground and Concerned 
Citizens {a t  least three boxes of documents};  (5) news i tems and reports 
obtained from the Defense Technical Information Center (OTIC) ,  Defense 
Logistics Agency, Alexandria, Virginia, an electronic database whose access is 
restricted to the military and their contractors; ( 6) transcripts of public 
meetings held at the ANAD (Alabama) site gathered by researchers at Auburn 
University; (7) hundreds of assorted Army documents relating to the CSDP 
and to CSEPP, the most noteworthy of which are, of course, Volumes 1, 2, and 
3 of the Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (FPEIS), final 
reports of al l  the Army-funded study groups, the MITRE report on continued 
use, etc . ;  (9 )  numerous government documents such as those produced by 
FEMA, the U .  S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Office of 
Technology Assessment, the Federal Register, the National Academy of 
Sciences, the National Research Council, The Congressional Record, etc.; ( 1 0) 
media such as videotapes of scoping meetings, documentaries prepared by 
Greenp eace, and the videotape of CBS's 60 M i n u tes segment on the 
< 
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destruction of chemical weapons. Finally, the Army's two newsletters: CSEPP 
Update  and Chem ica l Demil i ta riza t ion UPDA , and the opposition 's  
newsletter, Common Sense: A Newsletter of Common Ground ( funded by 
the Kentucky Environmental Foundation),  were all very helpful m 
providing details and updated information about emerging events . 
V .  Triangulation. Throughout the course of the research, every effort was 
made to gather data from many sources and to check facts revealed in 
interviews with authoritative documentation. At times, this meant tthecking 
and rechecking certain factual information. Additionally, considerable effort 
was made to interpret the interview data in a fashion consistent with the 
differing world views presented by informants. 
V I .  Qualitative Data Analysis 
The analysis of the interview data was done with the aid of a computer 
software package known as "HyperQual2" For Qualitative Analysis and 
Theory Development. HyperQual enhanced greatly my ability to manage the 
interview data. Nevertheless, while programs such as these surely are time 
savers, it is still up to the researcher to do the conceptual work. The program 
doesn't do your "thinking" for you. But I was glad to have had the 
opportunity to utilize this state-of-the-art technology in the analysis of the 
date. Of course, in the case of interview data in which tape recorders are 
used, programs such as HyperQual or Ethnograph are invaluable because 
taped interviews produce anywhere from thirty to forty pages of text . 
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11 /24 
11 /22 
11 /22 
11 /21 
11 /20 
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1 1 / 17 
1 1 / 17 
1 1 / 17 
1 1 / 17 
1 1 / 14 
10/25 
9/6 
8/29 
8/29 
8/23 
Appendix G-1 
Newspaper Clip Files 1984 
List of Headlines 
CBS films debate over nerve agent incinerator. (RR) 
Nerve Gas Disposal refined at Utah site/ Army tests Nerve-Gas 
incinerator at Utah 
Army's Plan to burn nerve gas has met skepticism in Madison 
Plan to incinerate nerve gas has met doubts in Madison (LHL) 
Nerve Gas was once burned in open pits, sunk in ocean. (LHL) 
Nerve-gas disposal refined at Utah site. (LHL) 
Richmond lives anxiously with nerve-gas dilemma. (LHL) 
Utah governor says nerve gas should be destroyed on site. (RR) 
Kentuckyans arrive in Utah for tour of nerve-gas incinerator 
( RR) 
Final word still out on nerve gas issue. (BC) 
Officials reveal emergency evacuation plan. (RR) 
Never Gas issue is discussed on ABC-TV 
Disposing of nerve gas: incinerator seems safest. (LHL) 
Report urges burning gas in Madison (LHL) 
Evacuation plan for citizens revealed by disaster officials. (RR) 
On-site nerve gas disposal recommended.(RR) 
Nerve gas report suggests disposal at storage sites. (RR) 
Report Recommends disposal of nerve gas at current storage 
sites.(CJ) 
Officials Reveal emergency evacuation plan. (RR) 
Doctor explains physical effects of nerve gas. (RR) 
Riding it Out on the Horns of a Dilemma. (BC) 
Citizens respond to task force report. (RR) 
Hauling missiles to Utah would entail risks, too (LH) 
Army strikes out on tour of Utah facility (BC) 
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8/27 77-percent of locals opposed to Army's nerve gas 
incinerator . (RR) 
8/23 Burning of one pound of nerve gas produces 1 .59 lbs. residue. 
(RR) 
8/23 Task Force Receives Briefing (photo in article) . Owen Grise. (RR) 
8/22 At Tooele Depot : Scrap furnace used to burn nerve gas. (RR) 
8/20 Unconvinced. (RR) 
8/ 19 Some options to nerve-gas incinerator would spread danger(CJ) 
8 / 19 *Visitors find depot welcome in Utah (LHL) 
8/19 Task force returns from Tooele depot. (RR) 
8/17 Tour doesn't change minds of task force. (RR) 
8/ 16 Task force receives 4-hour briefing in Utah. (RR) 
8/14 Nerve gas task force leaves for Utah Wednesday. (RR) 
8/11  Army to abide by state EPA regulations .(RR) 
8/10 Nerve Gas inspection permitted. (LHL) 
8/9 State says Army must obey waste law (LHL) 
8/9 Army plans meeting on rocket transport(BC) 
8/9 Army finally on right track on nerve gas issue (BC) 
8/7 New option is offered to dispose of nerve gas (CJ) 
8/3 Army delays hearing on shipping nerve gas rockets to 
Utah(LHL) 
8/2 Funds denied for nerve gas disposal at depot (BC) 
8/4 Army talks on moving nerve gas set for '85 (LH) 
8/1 EVACUATION for gas accident is  discussed . (RR) 
9/13 Army may fly gas out of Madison County (BC} 
7/26 Nerve gas debate highlights U.S. polity (BC) 
7/26 Congress cuts nerve gas funds . (RR) 
7/19 Hopkins says Army Depot is getting new commander.(RR) 
7/19 Ford questions the safety of rockets at Army depot.(RR) 
7/12 Army invites task force to visit incinerator in Utah(BC) 
7/11  Army tries to calm fears about disposal of  old nerve gas(CJ) 
5/28 Army may import nerve gas to plant, EPA a lleges. (RR) 
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6/21 General says depot won't get more nerve gas(LHL) 
6/21 Depot won't get more nerve gas, Army says: Citizens' panel 
voices concerns on incinerator. (  CJ) 
6/19 Huddleston says Congressional inquiry possible on nerve 
gas . (RR) 
6/15 ARMY depot to hold open house (RR) 
6/ 15 Nerve gas group sets objectives (LHL) 
6/7 Depot workers are also concerned about safety(LHL) 
5/31 County seeks Congressional investigation.(RR) 
5/28 Army may import nerve gas to plant, EPA alleges. (RR) 
5/1 1  Madison requests nerve gas probe. (LHL) 
4/19 Other options still open for nerve gas facility 
4/ 19 Army wants to improve its image.(RR) 
3/6 Court opposes destruction of nerve gas here (RR) 
3/1 Ordinance to double number of employees(BC) 
2/23 Additional 2,000 jobs coming to Army depot at A v. (RR) 
2/23 Residents against plan to dispose of nerve agent( BC) 
2/19 No easy answer to gas disposal (LHL) 
2/18 Nerve gas disposal draws heavy opposition: Residents distrust 
weapons disposal plan.(RR) 
2/17 Madison area residents denounce Army plan to incinerate nerve 
gas. (LHL) 
2/9 Public hearing set on disposal of gas. (BC) 
Legend: 
BC 
LHL= 
RR = 
CJ = 
Berea Citizen 
Lexington-Herald Leader 
Richmond Register 
Courier Journal 
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Nerve Gas Chronology 
A brief history of events pertaming to the chemiCal weapons stoc.kpde at the Lexington-Bluegrass 
Army Depot at Richmond, Kentucky. All events have been verified a.ncl documentea. 
Early 1 940's: Lexington Bluegrass Army Depot (LBAO) activity begun. 
Early to Mid 1 960's: M55 rockets containing nerve agent transported by rail into LBAO. 
Early 1 970's : 
August 1 979: 
February 1 984: 
, Spring .. 1 984: 
June 1 984 : 
April 1 9 8 6 : 
June 1 986:  
J uly 1 9 86:  
August 1 986: 
J anuary 1 987: 
November 1 9 87: 
January 1 98 8 :  
January 29,  1 988: 
February 1 98 9 :  
November 1 989: 
May 1 990: 
J uly 1 990: 
Some nerve agent moved out by rail under strict secrecy. 
Improper burning of smoke pots causes a toxic cloud. resultin� in 45 local citizens 
hospitalized. The Army denies responsibility until independer.t �bservers identify LBAD as 
the source. 
Army announces h earing to explain plans for nerve gas in-:.:inerator. Over 300 citizens 
attend, overtlowing the base cafeteria and expressing overwhelming rejection ot the plan. 
•concerned Citizens of Madison County• is organized in response to the Army briefing. 
LBAO Security Guard kidnaps two co-workers. Incident ends ir. shoot-out with Richmond 
City Police. · 
LBAD Employee barricades himself in his Richmond apanmem: shots tired at police. 
General munitions storage igloo at LBAD explodes do.& t!i ir·�rr.:ct storage prvcedures. 
Army issues Draft Programmatic Environmsmal I mpact Statement. 
Public hearing on the Draft Programmatic Environm ental Impact Statement. Army agrees 
to fund local study group. 
Community Review Support Contract signed to fund study team headed by Dr. Oris 
Blackwell. 
Community Review group issues report recommending air transport of the Richmond 
stockpile to Tooele, Utah. 
Army releases Final Programmatic EIS recommending on-site incineration. 
Over 2000 citizens pack the gymnasium at Madison Central High School lor meeting with 
Army Representatives. State and local officials join citizens in rejection ol the plan to 
build an incinerator in Madison County. "'-'\'"' ,. ....,c., p-'t "'l ''f'\ ') '.c... ... 1: -:. 1 ' lol. \J.. . .......,. 
.:...>- :....; , ·' � ':'fU--'- ,...,h ... .. .X )'--� '--) 1� ' "'- "-
Army announces Programmatic Record ot becision to build incinerators at all eight sites. 
including Richmond, and that the Sile Specific EJS will not re-evaluate the options for each 
site: it will only be used to decide where on the depot to build the incinerator. 
Congress approves funding tor a study of possible on-going use of the incinerators after the 
nerve agent is burned. 
Army training exercise uses scenario of local protesters in conjunction with terrorist 
activity. Scenario includes protest at front gate, gunfire. guards wounded, terrorist 
sniper "disposed of." 
Chemical stOCkpile moved from Germany. 
Compiled by Common Ground, 620 Blue Ucl<. Ad., Berea. KY 4040:' 
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1 990 AND1 980 US CENSUS DATA 
Unltrd States Maryland Baltimore County llarrord County Kent County 
1990 1980 19110 1980 1990 1980 1990 1980 1990 1980 
Urban and Rural Rfsldenc:e 
Total Population 248,709,873 226,545,805 4,78 1 ,468 4,21 6,975 692,1 34 655.61 5  1 82.132 145,930 11,842 1 6695 
Urban Population 187,05 1,543 1 67,054,638 3,887,981 3.386,693 631,280 604,132 1 26,975 91 , 190 4 ,005 3,300 
Pr:n:ml 75.2191. 73.74'1o 8 1 .3091. 80.31 "  91.20'1o 92.15'1!. 69.70" 62.4991. 22.4091. 19.1791. 
Rural Population 6 1,658,330 59,491 ,167 893,487 830,281 60,854 5 1 .483 55,151 55,1 36 1 3,837 1 3 ,395 
Percent 24.7991. 16.2691. 1 8.76'11. 19.69" 8.80% 1.85% 30.30" 37.7891. 77.60% 80.23" 
Farm Population 3,87 1 ,583 5,61 7,903 32,596 44,934 1 ,734 • 1 , 102 • 1 .207 • 
Pl:rc:enl (of total population) 1 ..56" 2.4891. 0.68'Ao 1.07" 0.25 ... • 0.61" • 0.00% • 
Eduatlonal Allalnmfnt 
Persons 25 Yean and over 1 58,868,436 1 32.835,687 3,122,665 1 ,952.261 413,574 4 1 1 .225 1 15,199 62,565 1 1 ,822 10.260 
Percent hith school graduate of higher 75.20% 66.50% 78.40% 69 90" 18.40% 68.3091. 8 1.60" 64.10% 71 .40% 53 90% 
Percent Bachdor's decree or higher 20.30% 16.20% 26..50" 22.10% 25.00% 1 8.80% 2 1 .50% 1 7 . 1 0% 1 6.9091. 1 2.60% 
Employmtnt 
Persons 1 6  years and over 191 ,829,27 1 1 7 1,214,258 3,736,830 3,214.983 556,056 520,5 1 5  1 38,391 106.697 14,467 1 3.271 
Pm:ons in labor force 125,1 82,378 106.084,668 2,639,896 2,108.754 381 ,531 345,31 8  102,019 12,031 9,197 7,691 
Percent 65.26% 61 .96% 70.6 65.5"' 68.60'1. 66.30% 13.70 67.51'1. 6J.6 57.96'1. 
*'"" Civilian labor force 1 23,413,450 104,449.81 7  2,592,878 2,06.5.5 1 1  380,440 344672 96,76.5 66,613  9,128 7,664 Cl 
N Emplll)'ed 1 1.5.68 1 .201 97,639,35.5 2,481 .342 1,946.6 1 2  366.276 327.459 93..500 62,129 8,822 7,084 
Unemployed 7,792.248 6,810,462 l l l ,S36 1 18,900 14,164 1 7.21 3  3,265 3,884 306 580 
Pr:n:cnt Unemployed 6.31 %  6.5291. 4.3091. 5.7691. 3.70" 5.26" 3.40" 6.19'1. 3.47% 7 . .57'Ao 
Anned Fortea 1 ,708,928 1 ,634,851 47,018 43,242 1 ,091 646 5,254 5,4 1 8  69 18 
Pe:rc:ent 1 .3791. 1..54'- 1 .26'Ao 2.0591. 0.20'- 0.1"' 3.80% 7.5291. 0.48% 0.36'A't 
Jncomf (In dollars) ln 1989 In 1979 ln 1989 In 1979 ln 1989 In 1979 In 1989 In 1979 In 1989 In 1979 
Median household income $30,056 $16,841 $39,386 $20,28 1 $38,837 2 1 640 $41 .680 $27,612 $30.104 $13,979 
Median family income $35,225 $19,911 $45,034 $23, 1 1 2  $44.S02 $24,4 13  $4.5,923 $30,328 $15.231 $ 1 6,347 
Median non-family Income $17.240 $6,695 $24,482 $8,398 S24,Sll $ 1 0.163 $23,356 $1 3,004 $14.2 1 2  $4,306 
Per-capita inC:ome $ 14 ,420 $7,298 $17,130 $8,293 $ 18,658 $9,044 $ 1 6,612 $ 10,065 $15,488 $6,502 
Povfrty Sl•tus (1989) In 1989 In 1979 In 1989 In 1979 In 1989 In 1979 In 1989 In 1979 In 1989 In 1979 
All persons for whom poverty sllbll is delamined 241 ,917.859 220,845,766 4,660,.591 4,1 18.381 617,7 14 642595 178.074 1 4 1 ,910 1 6.928 1 6,085 
Pl:nmu below the poverty level 31,742,864 27,392,.580 385,296 404,560 37,154 33.1161 9,122 10,638 1 ,943 2,129 
Pl:rccnl below the �ert,t: level 1 3. 12'1. 1 2.40% 8.27'1. • 9.82.,. 5.48% 5.27'- 5.12" 7.5091. 1 1 .48% 1 3.24'-
• Dal• 1101 provided 
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Demographic Data for 
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Urban and Rural Residence 
Tow Population 
Urban Population 
Percent 
Rural Population 
Percent 
Farm Population 
Percent (of total popula&.lon) 
Educational Attainment 
""" Penoos 25 Years and over 0 Percent high school graduate or hi& her """ Percent Bachelor's degree or bl&her 
EmplopDent 
Persons 16 years and over 
Persons in labor force 
Percent 
Civilian labor force 
Employed 
Unemployed 
Percent Unemployed 
Armed Forces 
Percent 
lacome (In dollars) 
Median household income 
Median family income 
Median non-(amily income 
Per�ita income 
Poverty Status 
All penons for whom poverty status is 
determined 
Penoos below abc poverty level 
Percent below the 1!2vcnz lcvel 
• O.U• po'ri.W 
1990 AND1980 US CENSUS DATA 
United States Alabama Calhoun County Talladega County Cleburne County 
1990 1980 1990 1980 1990 1980 1990 
248,709,873 226;545.805 4,040,587 3,893,888 1 16,034 1 19,761 74,107 
187,051 ,543 167,054.638 1,437,7 15  1,337,033 82,726 90.459 39,081 
75.21 %  73.74% 6().30% «1.0291, 7 1.30% 75.53% 52.70% 
61 ,658,330 59,491,167 1,602,872 1,556,855 33,308 29,302 35,026 
24.79% 26.26t. 39.70 .. 39.98% 28.70% 14.47% 47.30% 
3,871,583 5,617.903 59,349. 87,757 768 • 674 
1 .56% 2.48 .. 1 .47 .. 2.25% 0.66 .. • 0.91 %  
1 58,868.436 1 32,835,687 2,545,969 2,217,3 1 5  72,445 65,34 1 46,091 
75.20% 66.50% 66.90% 56.50% 67.40% 57.60% «1.70% 
20.30 .. 16.20t. 1 5.704JL 12.20% 1 4.204JL 1 Ul04JL 10.204JL 
191 ,829,27 1 171,214,258 3,103,529 2,881 ,348 90,240 90,228 56.181 
125,182,378 106,084,668 1 ,895,361 166,352 5!1,865 54,762 32,687 
65.26% 61 .96% 61.10'11 51.80% 61.90'11 «1.704JL 58.20% 
123.473.450 104,449,817 1 ,870.381 1,634,743 5 1,249 46.833 32.S46 
1 15,681 ,202 97,639,355 1 ,74 1,794 1,51 1 ,928 46,899 42,549 30.069 
7,792,248 6,810,462 128,587 112.8 1 5  4,350 4,284 2,471 
6.3 1 %  6.52% 6.90'11 7.5 1 %  8.50% 9. 1 54JL 7.«1 .. 
1 ,708,928 1 ,634,851  24,980 30.609 4,616 7,929 1 4 1  
1.37t. 1.544JL 0.80t. 18.404JL 5.124JL 14.48t. 0.2.54JL 
In 1989 In 1979 In 1989 In 1979 In 1989 In 1979 In 1989 
$30.056 $ 16,841 $23,597 . $13,669 $23,802 $13,665 $21.378 
$35,225 $19,917 $28,688 $ 16,347 $28,340 $16.13 t $25,225 
$11,240 $6,695 $10,894 $4,589 $10,765 $4,327 $8.540 
$14,420 $7,298 $ 1 1 .486 $5,894 $10,704 $5,576 $9,700 
In 1989 In 1979 In 1989 In 1979 In 1989 In 1979 In 1989 
24 1 ,971,859 220,845,766 3,945,798 3,813,014 1 10,981 1 J 1 ,618  71 ,619 
31 ,742,864 27,392,580 723,614 719,905 1 7,385 18,231 14,435 
1 3.12 .. 1 2.40% 1 8.34'11 1 8.904JL 1 S.664JL 16.33% 20.16% 
1980 1!190 1980 
73,826 12,730 12.595 
37,396 �.908 3 .014 
50.65% 12.80% 23.93% 
36,430 9,822 9581 
49.35% 71.20% 76.07% 
• «<I • 
• 4.72 .. • 
40,547 8,101 7,425 
49.10% 49.80% 38.30% 
7.80% 6.SO% 5.80% 
52,448 9,816 9,327 
29,656 6,104 5.587 
56.50% 62.20% 59.90% 
29,414 6,074 .5,572 
26.755 5,74 1 5,232 
2,659 333 340 
9.0491, 5.50% 6.10'11 
242 30 1 5  
0.82% 0.31 4JL  0.27% 
In 1979 In 1 989 In 1979 
$12.62!1 $21 .158 $1 2.782 
$14,806 $25,900 $14,642 
$3,826 $6.633 $3,637 
$4,981 $9,876 $5,0 1 3  
I n  1979 In 1 989 In 1979 
7 1 .992 12,653 1 2.550 
14,973 1 ,936 2,093 
20.80% 15.30% 16.70% 
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Urban and Rural Resldeac:e 
T otll Population 
Urban Population 
Pat:cnt 
Rurll Populadoll 
Percatl 
Farm Population 
Pm:cnt (of total populallon) 
ldueallonal Allalnmrnt 
Pa- 25 Ycan iUid -
Pm:mt hl1h adloo1 1radua1e ar hl1hcr 
Pm::all Dadu:lor'a depa� ar hi&hcr 
>+:>- Emplo,meal 0 0\ Ptnom 16 yean lnCI ova: 
Ptnom 1n Iabar ron:e 
Percent 
CivUi1111 Iabar force 
Employed 
Unemployed 
Pat:cnt Uac:mploytd 
Armed farees 
Pm:cnt 
Jaeame (198t0 la dolan) 
Median housdlo1d lncarne 
Median family Income 
Median non·famlly Income 
Pcr-apita lncome 
I"PtrtJ SIIIIDI (1919) 
All � far whom pcwctty ltatwl b dctamlnal 
Ptnom below the poverty JeyeJ 
Pm::all below the povaty leYel 
1990 US CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING SUMMARY 
Uahed States KeahK'kf 
2�11.709.173 3.685.296 
1 81,051,543 1 ,910,1)21 
75.21 5 1 .1 
61,651330 1 ,7l5,268 
24.19 41.2 
3,81 1,513 114,204 
1..56'1. 4.73'1. 
1 58,168,436 2,333,133 
15.20 64.6 
10.30 1 3.6 
191.129.211 2,131,709 
1 25,112.371 1,711,145 
- 65.26 60.5 
113.413,450 I,611JI4 
1 15,681 .202 1 ,563.960 
1,792.241 124J54 
6.31 7.4 
1 ,708.921 29,831 
1 .37'1. l .OS'Io 
$30,056 $22,534 
$35,225 $27,021 
Sl1.240 $ 1 1 ,471 
$ 14,420 $1 1,153 
241.977.859 3,512.459 
31 ,7�2.164 681 ,827 
13.12'1. 19.03'1. 
SUmmary Tape File 3A 
Clark 
Coualf Wlaebater 
29,496 15,799 
15,799 1 5,799 
53.6 100 
1 3,697 0 
46.4 0 
1 ,608 0 
5.45'1. O.OO'Io 
19,112 10,165 
65.1 62.4 
13  1 1.4 
22,612 12.066 
14,115 7,354 
62.5 60.9 
14,150 7,344 
1 3,222 6.190 
928 454 
6.6 6.2 
25 10 
O. l l'lo O.OI'Io 
$25,323 $21.543 
$19,089 $21.50 
$1 2,663 $ 1 1 ,581 
$1 1 ,655 $10,132 
29.1 19 15,623 
5,142 3,113 
11.66'1. 21.65'1. 
• 
Madlsoa 
Coualf Rlebmoad 
57.501 2 1 .155 
30,28 1 21,155 
52.7 100 
27,227 0 
47.3 0 
2,666 0 
4.� .. O.OO'Io 
32,274 10,054 
. 64.1 65.4 
19. 1 19.6 
46,210 1 8, 132 
29,576 10,7 1 6  
64 59.1 
29.444 10.�6 
27,242 9,474 
2.202 1,172 
7.5 l l 
131 70 
0.29'1. 0.39'1. 
$21,311 S I S.SBI 
$27,052 $21.441 
SIO, I l l  S9.4'!0 
$10,029 $8,11 1 
5 1 ,109 1 6, 151  
10,1159 5,1 12 
21.21  'lo 3 1.65'1. 
Estill 
lena Coualf 
9,1 26 14.614 
9,126 2,116 
100 19.3 
0 1 1 ,798 
0 80.7 
0 807 
O.OO'Io 5..52'1. 
5,141 9,170 
66.5 46.5 
26.1 5.4 
7J60 1 1 , 1 34  
4,171 5,640 
66.2 50.7 
4,154 5,637 
4,565 4,866 
219 171 
6 1 3.7 
11 3 
0.23'1. 0.03'1. 
$11 ,622 $ 16,056 
$26.391 $19.223 
Sl2,288 $6.681 
$9,102 $7,474 
7.165 14.�65 
l ,l65 4,199 
11.36'1. 29.0l'lo 
I nine 
2,8 1 6  
2 ,8 1 6  
100 
0 
0 
0 
O.OO'Io 
1 ,145 
46.7 
7.4 
2,117 
955 
43.7 
955 
857 
98 
10.3 
0 
O.OO'Io 
$ 1 5.)66 
S22.14l 
$8,403 
$7,972 
2.705 
101 
29.61 '1.  
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1 990 AND1980 US CENSUS DATA 
United States lndiau Vermillion County 
1998 1988 1998 1988 1990 1980 
Urban and Rural Residence 
Total Population 248,709,871 226,545,80.5 .5,544,1.59 .5,490,224 1 6.773 18,229 
Urban Population l87,0.S I,S43 1 67,054,638 3,596,017  3,S2S.298 5,040 5,267 
Percent 75.21 1JJ 73.74" 64.86 .. 64.2 1 "  30.0.5" 28.89'!1, 
Ruml Population 6 1 ,6.58,.330 .59,491 ,167 1,948,142 1 ,964,926 1 1 ,733 12,962 
Percent 24.79" 26.26" 3.5.141JJ 35.79" 69.95" 71 . 1 1 '!1,  
Fn Population 3,871 ,583 5,6 17,903 . 188,133 • 748 • 
Percent (of total populatloo) 1 ..56" 2.48" 3.39" • 4.46" • 
Educational A ttalnmenl 
Persons 2.S Years and over 1.58,868,436 132,835,687 3,489,470 3,135,772 1 1 ,1 63 1 1 ,268 
Percent high school graduate of higher 7.5.20% 66.50% 7.5.60" 66.40" 72. 10% 60.50'!1, 
� Percent Bachelor's degree or big her 20.30" 16.20" 0 I.S.601JJ 1 2.50CJ. 7.801JJ 7.80" 00 
Employment 
Persons 16 years and over 191,829.27 1 17 1 ,214,2.58 4 ,248.923 4,080.934 13.082 13,749 
Persons In labor forte 12S,I 82,.J78 106,084 ,668 2,798,.370 2,.57.5,284 7,538 7,609 
Percent 65.26CJ. 6 1.96CJ. 65.86" 63. 1 1 "  57.62" 5.5.34'!1, 
Civilian labor force 123,473,4.50 104,449,8 17  2.788,838 2,.566,7.55 7,507 7.590 
Employed 1 1.5,68 1.202 97,639,.3.5.5 2,628,69.5 2,366.263 6,9.52 6,944 
Unemployed 7,792.248 6,810,462 160,143 200,492 555 646 
Percent Unemployed 6.3 1 '!1,  6.52CJ. .5.74" 7.81'l! 7.39'!1, 8 . .S I 'lrr 
Armed Forces 1 ,708,928 1 ,634,85 1 9,532 8,529 3 1  1 9  
Percent 1 .371JJ l..54'll 0.341JJ 0.331JJ 0.4 1 "  0.2SIJJ 
Income (In dollars) In 1989 In 1979 In 1989 In 1979 In 1989 In 1 979 
Median household Income $30,056 $16,84 1 $28.797 $1 7,582 $22,339 $14,1 1 9  
Median ramlly Income $35,22.5 $ 19.9 17  $34.082 $20,535 $29,100 $ 17,1 4 1  
Median non-family Income $17,240 $6,69.5 $ 1.5,379 $6,389 $ 10,177 $6,556 
Per-capila income $ 14,420 $7,298 $ 1 3,149 $7,142 $ 1 1 ,2 17  $6,1 51  
Ponrly Status (1989) In 1 989 In 1 979 In 1989 In 1979 In 1989 In 1979 
All persons fot' whom poverty ltalus Is determined 24 1 ,977,859 220,845,766 .5,372,388 .5,34 1 ,438 16,494 1 8,0 1 6  
Persons below lhe poverty level 31,742,864 27,392,580 .573,632 .516,190 1 ,925 1 ,925 
Percent below the 22vert! level 13. 12'l! 12.40CJ. 10.681JJ 9.66 .. 1 1.67'l! 10.68" 
• Diu IIIOC poYideol 
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1 990  US CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING SUMMARY 
Summary Tape File 3A 
JeiTtrson Saline 
United Stain Arkaaut Conoly l'tae BluiT Wbltt Hall Altheimer Wabbast'b Rtdneld County 
Urban and Rural Rflidtlle« 
T oul Population 2411,709,87) 2,350.715 115,487 57,140 ),849 988 3711 1 ,082 64 . 1 8 3  
Urban Populadon 1 87,05 1 ,54) 1 ,2511,1911 62,004 57,140 3,1149 0 0 0 3 1 , 1 7 8  
Percent 75.21  53.5 72.5 100 100 0 0 0 48.6 
Rur ll Popul won 6 1,651.330 1 ,092,.527 2),48) 0 0 9811 )78 1 .082 33,00.5 
Percent 24.79 . 46.5 27.5 0 0 1 00  1 00  1 00  5 1 .4 
Farm Populallon 3.117 1 ,.583 6)j89 6 1 5  0 0 24 I I  0 475 
..,.. Pa-tmt (o( IOL&I population) 1 .56" 2.7 1 �  0.72'7. 0.� O.OM. 2.43� 2.9 1 "  O.OM. 0.14% ..... 
0 
Educational Altalamtlll 
Penons 25 Y em and over 1 5 8,868,436 1 .496.1 50 .5 1 ,74 1 34,116 2,)79 557 225 651 4 1 ,012 
Percml high school sraduace or higher 7520 66.3 659 6.5.5 17.4 49.7 40.9 75 11 12 9 
Pm:mt Bachelor's degru 01' higher 20.30 IJ.J 14.6 1 6.6 1 2.6  5.9 8.4 1 1 .9 1 1 .9 
Employmtal 
Pc:nonJ 1 6  yean and over 1 9 1 ,829.271 1 .800.0Hi 64.239 42,433 2 ,810 688 261 785 4 !1 ,6!1 1 
Pt:noru in I abo! f orcc l lS,I81,378 1 ,077 . 1 .5 1  37,1 60 24,.50] 1 .899 ] 5 1  1 27 533 J I J M  
Pm:all 65.26 .59.1 S7.8 57.7 67.1  I 48.5 67.9 64.8 
Ci viii 1111 labof force 1 23,41),4.50 1 .066.361 36,899 24,)90 1 ,887 ]51 127 5211 3 1 .496 
Employed I 1 5 ,68 1 ,201 �.289 33,236 21 .68) 1 ,720 295 101 5 1 0  29.887 
Unemployed 7,792.241 72,079 3,66) 2,707 1 67 56 lS t 8  1 ,609 
Percmt Unemployed 6.31 6.11 9.9 1 1 . 1  8.9 6 19.7 3.4 5 I 
Armed Fon:eJ 1 ,708,928 1 0.783 261  I I ) 1 2  0 0 5 70 
Pm:cnt 1 .37� 0.� 0.41'11. 0.27" o.u" 0.� O.OM. 0.64" 0.14� 
loromt (1989, 1a dollan) 
Medilfl hOW<:hold income SJ0.056 S 2 1 . 1 47 S 1 1 .J21 S l9 , 1 4 3  $211,768 S l i .4 1 Z 5 1 4 ,688 SJ0,76 1 S28 .161 
Medilfl ltmily incume $35.223 523,395 $26.360 524,442 5 ) 1 .419 S l 6.1 1 1  $ 1 7.500 S 3 5 ,719 5 3 1 .8 � 5  
M�dian noo·f amily income s 1 7 ,240 510,195 59.5 5 8  $9,.548 5 1 6,07 1 $-4,999 5 1 1 .230 59,700 5 1 1 .95 1 
�<.apita inc:ornc $ 1 4 ,420 5 1 0.320 S9,11S2 S9,.5)0 5 1 1 ,428 $5,989 S6,9S8 S l l  .333 $ 1 1 ,671 
Poftrty Stallll ( 1 989) 
All pcnons r.,.. whom pov1:11y IUIWI b determined 24 1 ,977 .8S9 2.292.031 8 1 ,244 55,162 3,840 996 37!1 1 ,082 62 ,912 
�SON b<: low the pov1:11y level ) 1 ,742,864 437,089 1 9,4 1 0  1 5 ,28 3 329 188 1 88 1 02 H·IS 
Pcn:alt below lbe poverty level 1 3. 1 2" 1 9.07� 23.8� 27.7 1 "  8.57" 39.).5" 49.74� 9.431. 9.2� 
I-6 
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1990 US CENSUS OF POPUlATION AND HOUSING SUMMARY Summary Tape File 3A 
Pueblo AY011dale Crowley Crowley Ordway El PlUG 
Ualttd Slates Co Iondo CoUII'J hthlo CllJ Booat Dhlsloa Co••tr T-• T-• Couatr 
Urhaa and Rural ResldtDct 
Toul l'opulation 241,709,11) 3.294.394 123,051 98,640 331 �0 3.946 20 1.016 397,014 
Urban Popdalbl l17.0SUU 2.7U,749 l1D.652 91,640 0 0 0 0 0 374,089 
l'l:rc:a!t 15.21 12.4 19.9 100 0 0 0 0 0 94.1 
Runll'opuladola 61,6511.330 .571,645 12,399 0 331 2,3.50 3,946 143 l ,Oi6 22.925 
hRall 14.79 11.6 10.1 0 100 too 100 100 100 5.11 
f�m� l'opullllon 3,171,5113 45,111 911 0 0 272 394 l9 0 161 
l'l:rc:a!l (of tol&l population) l.S6'1o 1.37'1. 0.75'1. O.OO'Io O.OO'Io 1 1..57'1. 9.98'1. 1 1.93'1. 0.00'1. 0.22 ... 
Ed•c:allolla1 Alttlameal 
l'monJ 25 Y un and over 151,161,436 2,101,o72 79,524 6].625 210 1 ,4, 2,UI 137 704 240,H l 
,j::.. l'l:rc:a!l hlp IChool araduale or hlper 75.20 14.4 73.9 73.1 51.6 6.5 70.3 .5U 61.4 IIJ.l ,_. Fm:ad Bld!dlll'a depce or hlsher 20.30 21 1 4  13.1 1 12.6 I 1.3 1 1 .2 25.1 N 
!mploJIIIIDl 
l'monJ 16 yean and over 191.119.211 1,511,411 94,MI 75,610 227 1,104 3,199 166 190 1911,563 
Pmonll ln labor rorco 125,112.311 1,171,101 .52,310 41.211 1 00  1 ,002 1 ,143 5I 365 215,0.50 
l'm:all 6.5.26 70.3 ,,6 54.6 44.1 .5.5.5 3.5.7 34.9 46.2 12 
Civilllll ldlor bee 123,473,450 1.732.719 51.107 41,146 100 1,002 1.141 .51 363 1 16.047 
Empl�JYed 115,611.201 1.633.211 41.431 37.313 90 944 1,067 49 336 112,530 
Unempl�JYed 7,792.241 99,01 4,676 3,133 10 .51 14 9 27 13,511 
Pl:rc:a!t UnempiO)'ed 6.31 !U 9 9.3 10 u 6..5 15..5 7.4 7.3 
Anned forca 1.7011,921 31,381 203 141 0 0 2 0 2 29,003 
l'l:rc:a!l 1.37'1. 1..52'1. O.ll'lo O.IK 0.00'1. O.OO'Io 0.06'1. 0.00'1. 0.25'1. 9.71'1. 
llleomt (19t9, la doQan) 
Median hoosehold lncDme S30,M6 30,140 21 .553 20,501 14,167 20.526 16.011 1 1 ,175 14.500 29,604 
Median f1111Uy Income $35.225 35,930 25,714 24.997 16.563 22,303 11,345 13,000 18.1« 33,932 
Median llllll·famlly IDcome $17,240 11.941 1 1 ,701 11 ,417 6,761 15.395 9,455 6.667 1.956 19.164 
Pt:r-cepita lnc:ome $14.420 14,121 10,347 10,161 6,315 10,101 6,971 4.«1 1.533 tl,664 
Pomtr Slatu (IH9) 
All pcnoos for 1rhom povaty IIJ.llll It ddamlned 241 ,977,.,9 3.212,550 120,239 95.914 331 2,350 2,908 243 963 380,785 
l'monJ below the poverty level 31,742,164 375.214 24,318 20,178 145 502 693 1 1 2  2J.t 39.519 
Pat:ad below the povaty level U.t2'1o 1 1 .61'1. 20.ll'lo 21.65'1. 42.90'1o 21 .36'1. 23.13'1. 46.0K 24.JO'Io 10.38'1. 
Appendix I-7 
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1990 US CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING SUMMARY Summary Tape File 3A 
l!aillllllal Blll:d11: Iaus 
llmaiDia t.fort'OW 
UaWIIAitl ana- CMatJ H_..._ IWIJitW CMatJ ._.._ lnta• ....., lt•MWidl ..... 
Ur\aa aad lttbl luWeaa 
Tlllall"opu!IIDI 241.l09.1U U41Jll 59J49 10.040 I.KJ 1,125 IAU 8'.1 4,191 41,1" 20.331 
Urt..tP� lll.IISIJU 2.002.999 33,510 10,040 0 0 0 0 4,t9l 42,1" . lt.IIU 
Paeml 75.21 10.f su 100 0 0 0 0 100 100 91 
.... � 11-"1310 ll9.l12 �,119 0 '"" 7.525 1,431 m 0 0 402 
l'aCCIIl 24.79 l!U 43.3 0 100 100 100 100 0 0 2 
Fum l\lpll•lbt un.m ll,nt 2,1U6 0 3J 629 0 0 0 0 21 
l'mml (oftaeal�) 1.56'1 1.42'1 4.41'1 0.00'1 1.11'1 1.25'1 0.00'1 0.00'1 0.00'1 0.00'1 0.11'1 
!Aitatlollal AIIAlameal 
Pmcnt 2S Yeen anclcmor 151.161,436 1,155,169 31,]11 I,OU ... 4,7)) 769 4.44 3,1146 14,919 10,181 
l'aCCIIl blah IC:hool ...... - • bl&ht 7UO IU 7U 71 .9 60.4 7U 61.4 61.9 1U IU 51.7 
l'lr:n:all l.tdar'l 4cp� ...... 20.30 20.1 IU 11.7 u 11.1 IU u 4.2 1!1.1 1.1 
� 
lapto.r-ol 
1-' l'mol'll l6rurullllcmor 191.129Jll 2.191.1� 44JJI 1J20 I.OSJ 5J44 910 500 U11 30,196 14.010 
� l'mol'll lnlalatGRI 125,112,311 1,410,119S 21,011 4,611 706 :s.m 722 HI U61 20,116 un 
l'accnl 65.U 64.4 51.9 64.1 61 64.4 U7 su 6U 61.9 6U 
C.W�n t.r.. ran. IU.4l:t,4SO 1 .407,143 27.914 4,661 104 3JU 7 1 4  H6 2.361 20.155 1.734 
EmpiOJcd 11UIIl02 1,319.960 25,611 4,19J "' JJll 641 236 1.211 l9.39:t 1.116 
Ut�emploJcd 1,19U4l IUU 1,.311 411 69 310 n 20 140 1,461 1 .001 
Paeml UMmplafool 6.ll u u IQ.I 9.1 9 102 u u l 1 1 .5 
Anacd FORCI 1,701,911 uu 32 I) 1 u • 1 0 31 2l 
Pacal Ul'l 0.16'1 om" D.ll .. D.IK 1.23 .. 0.12 .. 0.40'11o 1.110'1 1.111'1. 0.16'1 
bee•• (lm, la doDenJ 
Medlla houehal4 .._ SlO.OU Sll.UO $22,791 S20.U4 SUJ� $11,969 S1l.ll6 s20.m SlO,IU S21J6t SIU91 
J.tc:dlq fllllDy llx>ooM mm $)1.336 S11.4S9 SH�OI $24,449 Sl6,12S 111.461 $11,116 131.419 11,,024 Sll,4lJ 
Mc:dl• --ramJtr ._. SI7J10 $16.009 Sll�OO SIUU Sl2.1l31 $1],094 114.196 $9,449 $10.19) 117.609 $9.904 
Pw-o,lla baM $14,420 SlMU Sll,l71 $9.719 ll.il5 $10,412 $1.142 11.632 $11,165 $12,167 SI,D16 
,....,11J Sbllll (1919) 
II lkJcnnlncd 241.917.1'9 1.175.901 51.046 9.911 1.m lJ:J9 l,4 1J 690 4,IU 41.150 19.904 
�'!non� bdcnr dll ponny lcM.I Jl,lU,JM 344,161 9,419 1,962 290 t,m ]IJ 1 14 10] 5,8 1 4  6�10 
l'aCCIIl bdcnr the pwa'IJ te-.d 1].12'1 12.41'1 16.51'1 19.16'1 11.10'1 IUl'l 22.12'1 IUl'l 14.40'1. I :Ul� ]].01'1 
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1990 US CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING SUMMARY 
Summary Tape File 3A 
T-It T-It Rush St1nsbury 
Ualted Sllttt Ullll County CIIJ Staclton V•ller Ve1110a Plrl COP Ophir 
Urb•a 1ad Runl Raldeaar 
Tout Populalian 141,709,873 I,722,8SO 26,6l)J 13,887 -408 375 114 1 ,014 IS 
Urb111 Population 187,051,.543 1,499.375 18,174 1 3,887 0 0 0 0 0 
Pa-calt 75.21 87.00 68.30 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Runt Populadan 61,658,330 123,475 8,411 0 408 375 174 1 ,014 1 5  
Pa-calt 24.79 13.00 3 1.70 0.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
fum Population 3,111.583 1 1 ,685 254 0 0 26 50 0 0 
Pcrcalt (of toll) population) 1.56'1. 0.68'1. 0.95'1. 0.00'1. 0.00'1. 6.93'1. 21.74'1. 0.00'1. 0.00'1. 
Eduartlota•l Alllblment 
,.!;:.. Pmonl lS  Y em llld over 1 58,868,436 897,321 1-4.511 1,021 220 235 96 621 1 4  ,...., 
0', Paa:nt hl&h schooi iJ'Idu.&llll a' hl&ba- 75.20 15.1 17.3 17.3 73.1 8 1 .3 19.6 93.6 85.7 
Pcrcalt B lldldor'a depa a- hl&hct 20.30 22.3 1 1.3 11 .2 1.8 3.1 8.3 26.8 7.1 
EmpiOJitltDI 
PmonJ 16 yem llld ovct 191,129.271 1,15-4,039 1 1,988 9,685 254 274 125 739 14 
PmonJ in labor force 125,182.311 184,501 12.345 6,238 113 188 97 546 10 
Pen:c:nt 65.26 61 68.6 64.4 68.1 68.6 77.6 1).9 7 1 .4 
Civilian Itt- roo:o 123,473,450 m.441 1 1,968 6.162 113 188 91 538 1 0  
Employed 1 1S,681.202 736,059 1 1 ,037 5.533 153 111 95 505 10 
UMmp1oyed 7,792.248 41.389 931 629 20 11 2 33 0 
Pau.nt Unemployed 6.31 5.3 7.1 10.1 1 1 .6 9 1.1 6.1 0 
Annc.d Fon:ca 1,708.921 7,053 . 377 76 0 0 0 I 0 
Paa:nt 1.31'1. 0.61'1. 1.10'1. 0.71'1. 0.00'1. 0.00'1. O.OM. 1.08'1. 0.00'1. 
IIICOIIIt (l91f, la doDan) 
Median household inc:omo $30.056 $29,470 $30,171 $29,714 $28.214 $36,389 $33,125 $45,000 $26,875 � 
Mcdi111 famDy Income $35,225 $33.246 $33,507 $33,389 $32.500 $37.222 $35,750 $50,914 $26,115 1 
Mcdi111 non-family Income $17.240 $1 5,969 Sl4,160 $14,211 $12.500 $21 ,1..50 $26,815 S25.l1S $22.500 s 
Pa-capill lncome $14.420 $11,029 $10.561 $11 .090 $9,038 Sl·t.013 $10,685 $14,385 $21.523 
Pll'ftl'tJ StilUS (191f) 
All pc:nons for whom pova1J lt&IUJ II dc:lennlned 241,917,859 1 ,694.357 26.273 13,746 401 375 114 1 ,014 I S  
Penon� below the povUI)' level 31,742,864 192.415 3,012 1,641 42 I 3 6 0 
Pa-calt below the pmtUI)' level 13.12� 11 .36'1. 1 1.46� 1 1 .94� 10.32� 0.27� 1.72� 0.56� 0.� 
Appendix J 
Sample Interview Schedules 
CSDP Study 
4 1 7  
APPEND IX  
Interview Guidelines for Grassroots Activists 
1 .  H i story o f  the group. When i t  w as f ormed, w hy, and how; soc 1 a l  
character J s t i cs of :  a )  membershi p  b )  steering comm i ttee; members h i P  
number, number o f  act i ve members; organ i z a t i on a l  f orce , l ega l status;  
re l at 1 onsh 1 p  w i th other oppos i t i on groups; re l a t i onsh i P  w i th the l oc a l ,  stare  
and nat i ona l  governments.  re l at i onshi p w l t h  the  med i a; I deo l ogy; resource 
base ,  etc. 
Sam p l e  quest i on: " P l ease descri be the ear ly  beg inn i ngs o f  your group." 
_____ (name o f  s i te ). 
2. What h i stori c a l l y  has been the re l at i onsh i p  between the Army and 
the community? 
3 What do you see as the major 1 ssue? 
4 What are the goa I s  of the movement, both short term and l ong term ? 
(For th i s  spec i f i c group a t  th i s  spec i f i c  s i te . )  
5. How do you fee l about the Army's c la i m  that d e l ays in 
i m p l emen t i ng the program are a bad thmg? 
6. How is your group struct ured? 
7.  How are dec i s i ons m ade w i th regard to tac t i cs/strateg i es? 
8 How of t en and m what manner do you communicate  w l th other 
groups in the coa l i t ion? 
9. Some peop l e  be l i eve that Greenpeace Is beh i nd the m ob i l i z a t 1 on 
o f  c i t i zens in opp os i ng the i n c i nerat i on o f  chem i c a l  w eapons. What 
r o l e  ( 1 f  any ) has Greenpeace p l ayed i n  mob l l l z l ng peop l e  to 
oppose the Army's p l an ?  
1 0. What s trategies have been used thus far to oppose the CSDP? 
1 1 . About what percentage o f  c i t i z ens i n  th i s  com m un i ty support your 
e f f orts t o  oppose the Army' s p l an? (Just a "guesst i ma te'' ) 
1 2. Do you act ive ly  recr u i t  new members? 
1 3 . How has the Army responded thus rar to the oppos i t i on ?  
1 4. Do you th i nk the NEPA process,  spec i f ic a l ly,  the scop ing meet ings 
w ere usefu l  forums for a i r i ng your v iews? Why/ Why not? 
1 5 . What, I n  your op i m on ,  has been the i mpact o f  c i t i z e n  oppos i t i on on the 
Army' s  p l an? 
1 6. Descri be what happened a t  the l ast scop ing  m e e t i ng you a ttended? 
(G ive date and t i m e )  
i 7 .  Wha t  do you d o  < a s  a group ) when y o u  need goods, serv i ces, e.g. , 
l ega l  adv i ce,  postage, p r i n t i ng, etc. ? 
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Jnfonnal [nterview Schedule 
Militarv/Government Elites .I 
Research Project 
ChcmicJI Stockpi le Disposal Program 
1 .  In 1 990, Laura Hayes Holgate did a master's thesis entitled, "The Politics IJf 
Chemical Weapons Production," in whkh she argued that there has be:l!n "J 
high degree of publ ic scrutiny of the CSDP." DO YOU AGREE? 
2. Thus far, what has been the Army's position on the public opposition to 
incmeration? 
3. Statement: A reporter for the N ew York Times said, "In Utah and Alabama, 
citizens say they are satisfied with how the Army conducted itself and have 
rc-spnncted V'.rith overwhelming sttpport. How do you acL·ount for the 
different responses at the different sites? 
4. Hayes Holgate and others have argued that the stipulation for public 
participation in the reg1.1latory process (specifically the N EPA process) 
opens the door to de lays and complications in the implementation oi 
the CSDP. What is your feeling about this issue? 
5. There is mention in the literature of the potential for a Presidential 
wa1ver to remove military activities from the burden of complying 
with environmental regulations. Is there such a waiver and what is 
the possibility it would be used? 
6. STATEMENT: 1l1e CSDP is a huge program, technologically ve1y 
sophis ticated, complex, difficult to evaluate and fraught with 
ambiguities. The CSDP proposes to destroy the U.S. arsenal of 27,000 
metric tons of toxic lethal nerve and mustard agent in incinerators 
constructed specifically for that purpose. This program has never been 
done before on the proposed scale. Naturally, the program has 
produced fears on the part of the citizens who live near the proposed 
destn1ction sites. 
419 
How doc.."i the 1\.rmy evaluate the publics' fears? Are some reality 
based while others are not? Which ones, in your opinion, are 
legilirnalc concem'i? PJcasccommcnt. 
7 Some of the publics' fears surround the issue of the continued '.lSC nt 
the incinerators. It is my understanding tha t Public Law 99-145 
authonzl!d thE; di�manthng of the mcmerators once the weapons 
·mumtions were destroyed. 
JJoes the Anny have .. ny pbms for tdtlizatton of thQ inCinerators 
beyond the destruction of the weapons? 
8 Who (or what agency) is responsible for handling public relations \'>1th 
respect to the Chemlcal 5!ockpllc Disposal Program? 
9. I know there are plJns tG present a wmkshop for emergency managers 
throughout the n<.ltion t h1s fall. Are there any plans of a siml!Jr mturc 
to educate the publ!c wtt h the incineration process? If so, whi1t are tbev; 
how and when will ihe:v be implemented? 
1 0. MEDIA Jn your opmion, has the media been a help or a hindrance t�1 
the CSDI'� Discuss Can you giVe examples? 
·nunk you so much for your kmdness and pallence in answcnng my 
questions. Arc there other people in the Anny with  whom f could spc.1k m 
conJunct10n WJth this research pm;ecU 
Would you be willing to giVe me a letter of intmduc..iion or mJy I :;ay I've 
spoken With you7 
NAMES: 
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3. 
4 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
Interview Schedule 
MEDIA 
How and when did you first become acguainted with the nerve gas 
cont roversy at LBAD'? 
Have you covered si milar stories before? 
How is th1s controversy different ti·om or similar to others you have 
written <:�bout? 
Can you tell me a little about the lustotv of the relattons between the 
community and the depot? 
You":e covered the story for many years, what do you sec as the major 
issue j s'? 
Was the nelVe gas incinerator issue selected for you or did you chGDse it 
yourself? 
What is the editorial position oi the Richmond .Register with respect l o  lhb 
issue7 
Did you cover the scoping meeting at the Oarke- Moore Middle School l,1.:;l 
Apnl? 
What wr1s your impression of the proceedings? 
9. vVho / whr.lt are your main sources of infom1ation regarding the 01cm1cai 
Stockpile Disposal rrogram? 
10. Do you have a regular contact person in the Atmy? 
1 1 .  With the citizens opposing the plan? 
1 2. Does the Army fumtsh you With press releases about new 
developments? 
1 3. Have you ever visited the depot ?  
Under what drcumstances did you visit7 Did you have a guided tour 
Conference? 
1 4. Did you Witness the cxcrdse invoMng their mock terrotist att�ck? 
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1 5. You've vvritten about a number ot the maJor controversies involved in 
this issue , e.g., the SSEIS 1ssue, the "continued use " issue? 
How has lhe Am1y rc::,pundcd to the citizen opposition? 
1 6. Hc:we you had ;:"tl1)' constraints placed on your wnl ing aboul th1s issuet 
1 7. Have you met any of the activists who oppose the indnerator7 
Pleasedescribe: 
1 8. How would you characterize the two �·roups? 
1 9. How do you think the whole thing is shaping up7 
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Date : 
______ 
_ 
Q l :  Many people who have written about the CSDP comment on the 
difficulties faced by the Army in carrying out its Congres sional 
mandate to destroy the weapons and at the same time, do i t  in 
a manner consistent with the stipulation that thi s  be 
accomplished with maximum protection of the public in mind. 
How h a ve you tried to d ea l  with this q u es t i o n  g ive n  the  
fact t hat many people are  wary of the  choice of i ncineration 
as the method of choice? 
Q2 : Thus far, what has been the Army 's  position on t h e  
p u bl ic  opposi tion t o  t h e  incineration p roposa l ?  
STATEMENT: A reporter for the New York times said,  " I n  Utah and 
A l abama,  c i ti ze n s  say they are sati sfied with h o w  the Army 
conducted itself and have responded with overwhelming support. 
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Q3: How d o  
d i ffe r e n t  
you account 
s i t e s ?  
for the d i fferent  responses  at  the  
- - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - � - - - - -
Q4 : and oth e rs have Holgate 
for p u b lic 
argued that the s t i p u lation 
i n  part i c i p ation 
p rocess( i .e.,  specifi c a lly t h e  
i m p l e mentation of t h e  CSDP 
fee l i n g  o n  t h i s  i s s u e ?  
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t h e  regulat ory 
NEPA p rocess)  
p rogram. Wha t i s  your 
QS : The re is  m e ntion in the l i terature of the  potential  for 
a Pres i d ential  w a i v e r  to remov·e m i l i tary a c t i v i t i e s  
from t h e  b u rde n of com plying w i t h  environ m ental  
regu lations. Is th ere such a waiver? If so, d o  you 
think such a thing wil l  be  used? 
STATEMENT: The CSDP is a huge program, techn ologically very 
sophi sticated, complex, an d fraught with ambiguitie s .  The program 
has produced numerous fears on the part of the public .  
QS : How does the Army eval uate the public 's  fears?  Are 
some reality-based whi le  oth ers are not? What is 
your assessment of the p u blic  's  perception of the 
t h r e a t ?  
STATEMENT: Some of the publics' fears surround the issue of the 
conti n ued use of the incinerators . It is my understanding that 
Public Law 99- 1 45 au thorized the dismantl i n g  of the inci nerators 
once the weapon s/munitions were destroyed.  
Q 6 :  Does the Army have  any plans for u t i l ization of the 
i n c i n e rators beyond the  d estruction of the weapons?  
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Q7:  Who ( or what agency) i s  responsible  for han d l ing  
p u b l ic relations with  respect  to t h e  C hemical  S tock p i l e  
D i s p os al  Pro g ra m ?  
QS : I know there are p lans t o  present a workshop for 
em ergency managers throughout the  nation this  fa l l .  
Are  their any s imilar plans under way for p u b l i c  
e d uca tion that  c o i n c i d e  w i t h  the  i m p l e m en ta t i o n  phase  
of the C SDP? 
Me d i a  
Q9 What is your impression o f  how t h e  m e d ia has  han d led 
information regarding th e C SDP? 
F A V O R A B LE/UNFA V O R A B L E ?  
---------
------------------------------
------------�-----
426 
Questi onnaire # 5 
Date : Code: 
Questionn aire for Me mbers of 
Kentucky Community Review Team 
1 .  How and when did you become a member of Concerned 
C itizen s ?  
2 .  I n  your opinion, what are the m a j o r is sues  from the standpoint  
of Concerned Citi zens? 
3 .  How did the Richmond Study group come about? 
4 .  Can you describe your role i n  that study group? 
5 .  How was the group struc tured and what did you all  d o ?  
6.  Did the Army cooperate with your efforts ? 
7 .  In your artic le ,  you said ,"  The A rmy s taff u n d o u b t e d l y  
s o u g h t  t o  v i e w  t h e  team a s  a m eans o f  mit igating 
public  concerns while  recogn izi ng that t h e  t e a m ' s  
existence c o u l d  n o t  b e  al lowe d t o  become a n  w h a t  
y o u  m eant b y  t h i s .  (p . 295 ).  
8 .  What d id the study group conc lude/ what were its 
re commendations to the Army? 
9 .  \Vhat did the Army d o  with the report? 
1 0. If you had it to do over again, would you d o  anything 
differe ntly with respect to the study team process?  
1 1 .  Did working a s  a member of the research team alter your 
perceptions of the situation or cause you to rethi nk your 
opposit ion to incinerati on? 
1 2 . In your article you argued that a key fac tor was the team's 
early decision to foc us  on participation i n  the proc ess (p.295 ) .  
Would you c o m m e n t  on this  stat e m e n t ?  
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1 3 .  You implied that scoping meetings were not effective  
mechanisms for "mitigating publ ic  concerns , "  and that  study 
teams offered more opportunity for real exchange of v iews .  
Do you see  publicl ly-fu n d e d  study teams as the w a v e  
of the future in  terms of improving the N E P A  proc e s s ?  
1 4 . What percentage of the community would you guess are 
opposed to the incineration of the weapons on-site at LBAD? 
1 6 Has EKU taken any position on the issue? 
.MEDIA: 
1 7 In  _your opinion, how has the media  reported th is  issue? 
1 8 .  Has the media been a help or a hindrance to the opposition 
groups at LBAD? 
B IOGRAPHICAL DATA 
1 9 .  Have you been active i n  other kinds of protes t  groups? 
2 0 .  What percentage of your time d o  you devote to movement 
ac t i v i t i e s ?  
2 1 . With whom do you most often interact about this i ssue? 
2 2 .  A re other members of your family involved with Concerned 
Citizens ?  
2 3 How h ave you managed to balance the roles of ac tivist/ 
scholar/ fami ly person?  
2 4 .  How long have you lived i n  this community? 
2 5 .  Do other family members live in  this community? 
2 6 .  Do you own or rent  your home? 
2 7 .  Ed ucat ion:  Some HS (Circle One) 
H. S. Grad 
Some college 
College grad/ trade school 
428 
Grad u ate or Profess ional 
2 8 .  Has thi s  experience radical i zed ;you i n  other areas of your 
l i fe ? 
2 9 .  Could you su ggest anyone else with whom I could talk about  
this  i s sue? Other members of study group? 
COMMENrS: 
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